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Abstract 
Heidegger is commonly assumed to have been at first uninterested in science, and then 
later on positively hostile towards it. This thesis sets out to re-evaluate Heidegger's 
attitude towards science in general by carefully reconstructing an account of natural 
science that lies, I claim, at the heart of his major and early work, Being and Time. The 
existential conception of science articulated in this account revolves around three main 
issues: 1. ) The genesis of science from everyday pre-theoretical behaviour; 2. ) The 
structural necessity of crisis to the 'progress' of the sciences; 3. ) The transformation of 
the concept of scientific foundation in the light of the permanent necessity of scientific 
revolution. In the course of the reconstruction it becomes apparent that certain basic 
concepts of the existential analytic are in urgent need of reinterpretation. In particular, 
the concepts of objectivity and presence-at-hand need to be disentangled. Once 
separated, it becomes clear that Heidegger's work is not a critique of the notion of 
objectivity, but rather an attempt to salvage it from the wreckage of epistemology. 
Equally, the charge first levelled by Karl Löwith and then repeated by Paul Ricoeur that 
Heidegger `forgets nature' proves premature. This rereading of fundamental ontology 
suggests, in addition, that Heidegger opens up a path largely not taken by 20th century 
philosophy of science. Heidegger's interpretation of relativity theory, taking its cue from 
Weyl's attempt to extend Einstein's thinking to electromagnetism, differs fundamentally 
from the response of figures such as Cassirer, Reichenbach, Carnap and Schlick. It 
offers a perspective on questions about the status of scientific theory outside of the usual 
three-cornered debate between empiricism, realism and constructivism. Finally, the 
recovery of a specifically Heideggerian conception of science, allows us to understand 
and evaluate Heidegger's claim that philosophy is the science of Being. 
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Introduction 
I he physicist and Nobel laureate. Steven Weinberg. hay drawn attention to a 'pu, /Aing 
phenomenon. ' which he dubs. the unreasonable ineffectiveness of philosophy when it 
comes to science. an ineffectiveness that contrasts sharply with what a `generation earlier 
Eugene Wigner had called the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics. "' Philosophy, 
Weinberg says, provides no help to the sciences whatsoever. Metaphysics tells science 
nothing about its content, epistemology nothing about its validity, methodology nothing 
about its procedures. Anything that philosophers have ever declared to he necessarily 
true or necessarily scientific. has always turned out to be false or irrelevant. The onlv 
benefit a philosophical doctrine may provide the sciences is the ambiguous one of 
protecting them, temporarily at least, from other philosopical doctrines. 2 This is the role 
positivism played at the beginning of the 20`x' century, helping to rid science of the 
illusions of neo-Kantianism. But positivism itself has been responsible for at least as 
many illusions about what science can and cannot say or do, and ended up being just as 
much a hindrance to scientific progress as the doctrines it had so vigorously criticised as 
anti-scientific. This does not mean, however, that Weinberg embraces a kind of 
Feyerabendian epistemological anarchism. On the contrary, he takes Feyerabend to be 
representative of a peculiarly philosophical response to the uselessness of philosophy. 
l znored by science, philosophy in a fit of pique calls into question scicncc's ohlcctivit\. 
Relativism is philosophy of science's final, embittered form; the grotesque and sunken 
1 Steven Weinberg, Dreams of a Final Theory - The Search For The Fundamerntal_I. awws Of 'nature, 
(London. Vintage. 1Q93), p. 134. The chapter in which Weinberg presents his the' on the useiesmne. s 
of philosophy is entitled 'Against Philosophy. ' pp. 132-151. Wigner coins his phrase in: F. P. Wigner. 
`The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics. ' Communications in Pure and Applied Mathematics, 
13 (1960), pp. 1-14. 
-- 
shadow of its once imperious self:, a Miss Haversham, at once ludicrous and alarming. 
scheming malevolently at her wedding table vengeance upon the one who deserted her. 
but finally only consuming herself in her own hatred. 
Of course, Weinberg's disdain for philosophy is likely to be met with an equal and 
opposite disdain, his remarks dismissed as the all too predictable prejudices of a scientist 
incapable of recognising his own metaphysical commitments. But Weinherg's remarks 
should be taken less po-facedly and more seriously than that. They do not set out as 
philosophical position. however nave, they simply report a state of affairs. `I know of no 
one who has participated actively in the advance of physics in the post-war period ww hose 
research has been significantly helped by the work of philosophers. '3 This situation is 
interesting because the scientists clearly have the expectation that philosophy should be 
of some help. Weinberg himself stresses that it has been in the past. Moreover the 
philosophy that proves to be of no help is not primarily the continental philosophy 
lampooned by Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont in Intellectual Impostures, but the very 
philosophy of science that prided itself on its allegiance to science and which was 
supposed to clear away the metaphysical rubbish impeding its progress. The peculiar 
fact, which Weinberg's brief history of the relations between philosophy and science in 
the 20`h century draws our attention to, is that modern philosophy of science and the 
modern science which ignores it are both products of a period of particularly intense 
interaction between philosophy and science in the 1920s. 4 
2 'The value today of philosophy to physics seems to me to be something like the value of early nation- 
states to their peoples. It is only a small exaggeration to say that, until the introduction of the post office. 
the chief service of nation-states was to protect their peoples from other nation-states. ' Weinberg, p. 132. 
3 Weinberg. p. 134. 
' l'he fundamental role relati\ ity theor\ played in the logical-positi\ ist break with neo-Kantianism is b" 
no\\ well-documented. See, for example. Michael Friedman, 'Philosophy and the Exact Sciences - 
Logical Positivism as a Case Study'. Inference. f \planation, and Other Frustrations -Essays in the 
Philosophy of Science, ed. by John Earman, (Berkeley, Los Angeles, Oxford. Universit, of California 
Press, 1992), pp. 84-98. Current debates in philosophy of science, in particular the three-cornered match 
between empiricism, realism and construct iý ism. can be plausibly read as simply the legacy of the 
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Martin Heidegger is not perhaps the obvious candidate to re-establish contact between 
philosophy and the sciences. His antipathy to science, summed up in his dictum that 
`science itself does not and cannot think, ' is well-known. 5 It' science has no need of 
philosophy, that is simply a consequence of the fact that science in its modern guise has 
subordinated itself whole-heartedly and completely to the furious and devastating \vill to 
exploit and dominate, which Heidegger identifies as the essence of technology. 'Modem 
science and the total state, as necessary consequences of the essence of technology, are 
also its attendants. '6 The self-certainty of the scientist and the objectivity of his 
knowledge are simply the most extreme examples of the necessary linkage between 
subject and object in the last phase of Western metaphysics. `Even this, that man 
becomes the subject and the world the object, is a consequence of the essence of 
technology establishing itself, and not the other way around. " The objectification of the 
world is simply the first step in the reduction of everything there is to raw material that is 
to be utilised for nothing else than the ceaseless expansion of the means to reduce 
everything to raw material. 'Man becomes that being upon which all that is, is grounded 
as regards the manner of its Being and its truth. Man becomes the relational centre of 
that which is as such. '8 But man's mastery over everything that is, is in fact an 
enslavement to the will to dominate, which regulates and determines all his thoughts and 
actions, leaving no room for anything questionable, threatening a collapse into mere 
thoughtlessness. `What has long since been threatening man with death, and indeed N. ti ith 
equivocal and still unresolved nature of this break. That the founding fathers of modem physics. 
Flinstein. Bohr, Heisenberg. Weyl. and man-, others, were in no doubt as to the importance of 
philosophical reflection to the formation of scientific theory 
is also equally well attested and 
acknowledged, if somewhat uneasily, by their successors who scorn philosophy. 
5 Martin Ileidegger, What Is Called Thinking?, trans. by J. Glenn Gray (Nev York, Harper and RoNk. 
1972), p. 8. 
b Martin Heidegger, `What are Poets For? ', Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. by Albert Hofstadter. 
(New York, Harper and Row, 1971, pbk 1975), p. 1 12 - translation slightly altered. 
7 Ibid. 
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the death of his own essence, is the unconditional character of mere willing in the sense 
of purposeful self-assertion in everything. '' But if modern science is the herald and the 
vanguard of the essence of technology, one might think that the central role it plays in 
the culmination of Western metaphysics, would be grounds for subjecting it to intense 
philosophical scrutiny. But this proves not to be the case. Science serves technolo`g% 
precisely by obscuring its essence and the origin of that essence. But above all. 
technology itself prevents any experience of its essence. For while it is developing its 
own self to the full, it develops in the sciences a kind of knowing that is debarred from 
ever entering into the realm of the essential nature of technology, let alone retracing in 
thought that essences original(' To think that the essence of technology could be 
thought through and thought back to its origin by analysing modern science would be to 
risk falling back into metaphysical thinking, which assumes that modern technology is the 
product of modern science and not the other wav around. On the contrary, the only 
chance of thinking the essence of technology, which cunningly cloaks itself in modern 
science, is by meditating on the profound words of certain German poets who have 
managed to punch a few holes in the enveloping darkness so as to look beyond it, and by 
attempting to retrieve the equally profound words of certain ancient Greek thinkers. Aho 
stood in the dawn before the Platonic betrayal. Thereby is authorised the almost 
complete lack of any Heideggerian interpretation of the phenomenon of modern science 
even though it is one of the hallmarks of the modernity which Heidegger supposedl, so 
vehemently rejects. As Theodore Kisiel has said at the beginning of an article on the 
8 Martin Heidegger, 'The Age of the World Picture', The Question Concerning Technoloeý and Other 
f : ssav s, trans. by William Lovitt (New York. Harper and Roy.. 1977), p. 12S. 
' What are Poets For? ', p. 110. 
10 lbid, p. 1 17. 
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subject, 'Heidegger and science? To some, the combination undoubtedly still sounds 
strange and unlikely, let alone fruitful and worthy of extended consideration. '" 
Heidegger and Weinberg, it would seem, are the perfect personifications of the two sides 
in what has come to be known as the science wars, equally incapable of comprehending 
the other, equally contemptuous of the other's incomprehension: Weinberg, for 
Heidegger, the epitome of unthinking technological man; Heidegger, for Weinberg. the 
father figure for all the irrationalist nonsense threatening the sciences. It is a little strange 
then to find Heidegger himself diagnosing this mutual incomprehension as the real threat 
posed to the sciences: 
Between them the hyper-sophistication of philosophy and the intransigence of 
science create the hopeless situation in which both parties obstinately persist in 
talking past one another and foster the spurious freedom in which each 
eventually leaves the other to its own devices. [... ] Such a state of affairs is 
symptomatic of contemporary science and represents its innermost danger. ' 2 
This thesis attempts to take Heidegger's diagnosis seriously, and in doing so takes a first 
small step in dispelling that familiar image of Heidegger, which Alain Badiou has 
succinctly and caustically, summarised under the rubric `Heidegger viewed as 
commonplace. ''' It does so, however, not by tackling the question of technology and 
modem science's subordination to it head on, but by returning to Being and Time. This 
is not simply because the task of confronting the later Heidegger is too daunting, though 
anybody who has attempted to read the Beiträge unsustained by blind faith will have 
Theodore Kisiel, 'Heidegger and the New Images of Science', Research in Phenomenology 7, ed. by 
John Sallis, (New Jersey, Humanities Press, 1977), p. 162. 
12 Martin Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics - World, Finitude, Solitude, trans. by 
William McNeill and Nicholas Walker, (Bloomington and Indiana, Indiana University Press, 1995), p. 
190 - hereafter referred to as 
FCM. This is the text of the lecture course Heidegger gave at Freiburg in 
the winter of 1929/30, first published in German as volume 
29/30 of the Gesamtausgabe, Die 
Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik. Welt - Endlichkeit - Einsamkeit, ed. by Friedrich-Wilhelm von 
Herrmann, (Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio Klostermann, 1983,1992) - hereafter referred to as G29/30. 
Alain Badiou, Manifesto for Philosophy, trans. by Norman Madarasz (Albany. NY, State University of 
New York Press, 1999), chapter 4, pp. 47-52. The chapter starts, `What does the "current" Heidegger 
say, the one who organises opinion. ' 
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despaired at the magnitude of the task. Rather. the step back to Bein,, and Time is 
motivated by the conviction that the later Heidegger's thinking can never begin to be 
understood except as a prolonged and agonised reflection upon the meaning and 
implications of that work. Thus in 1947, Heidegger writes, `The thinking that hazards a 
few steps in Being and Time has even today not advanced beyond that publication. '" 
Indeed the commonplace view of Heidegger has arisen precisely because as I leidegger 
himself notes, `It is everywhere supposed that the attempt in Being and Time ended in a 
blind alley. "5 It is commonly supposed that Being and Time falls prey to the very 
metaphysical thinking the later Heidegger warned against. The existential analytic, 
because it takes circumspective concern with the ready-to-hand as primordial, remains 
entrapped, one commentator tells us, `within the technological spirit. ' 16 Michael 
Zimmerman in his book Heidegger's Confrontation with Modernitv staking out the claim 
that Heidegger is to be read as a reactionary modernist, agrees: Being and Time 
`constitutes one of the final stages in the history of productionist metaphysics. '" As such 
it is to be dismissed as a 'paradoxical and ultimately unsuccessful attempt' -a youthful 
stab in the dark before the light dawned, and Heidegger `discovered he could not 
reconcile a quest for a priori structures of human existence and a historicist conception 
of human existence. "8 It is therefore assumed that after Being and Time Heidegger was 
forced to start afresh. 
With the `turn. " the exaggerated claims for the scientific character of 
philosophy give way to the judgement that the book Bi was an aberrant wav 
from the one topic of philosophy and thought. And , vhcn Heidegger first 
Martin h eideýgýger. 'Letter on Humanism. ' trans. by t=rank A. Capuzzi and J. Glenn (gray, lia`ir 
Writings, ed. by C)a\ id Farrell Krell, (London, Routledge. 1977, rev. ed. 1993), p. 246. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ureww Leder, 'Modes of Totaliration: Heidegger on Modern I echnolog\ and Science', Philosophy 
Today, Vol. XXIX (Fall 1985). p. 255. 
Michael F. Zimmerman, Heider s Confrontation with Modernity - Technology, Potitic: s, Art, 
(Bloomington and Indianapolis, Indiana University Press. 1990), p. 149. 
18 Zimmerman, p. 147, p. 166. 
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realizes that BT was a failed project, he then re-turns to earlier insights left 
unpursued in order to begin again. This re-turn is the real meaning of his se11= 
professed and much discussed "turn. " 19 
But. as this quote implicitly suggests, the connection between Being and Time and the 
later Heidegger can never be established unless the place of science in the earlier thinking 
is first disinterred. reconstructed and interpreted. Only when we are in possession of a 
specifically Heideggerean concept of scientificity, shall we be able to assess whether 
Being and Time should be dismissed simply because of its exaggerated claims to 
scientificity, or whether on the contrary the commonplace view of Heidegger should be 
dismissed for its failure to read Being and Time as anything but a failure. This thesis, 
therefore, focuses upon the period of composition of Being and Time and the period 
immediately afterwards when Heidegger struggled to develop its thinking still further. 
that is to say, roughly from 1924 to 1930. This period. of course, coincides with the 
period we have already identified as being one of intense interaction between philosophy 
and science. the period in which both modem physics and modern philosophy of science 
were born. As we shall see, Heidegger like the nascent logical-positivists displayed a 
sustained and deep interest in the revolution occurring in the sciences during this period. 
For Heidegger, however, it was the crisis itself, and not the theory that resulted, which 
was of primary interest. The crisis in the sciences illuminated the conditions of possibility 
of science, and it was the possibility of science in which he was interested. An existential 
analytic that did not include an analysis of the conditions that made science possible 
would not be capable of encompassing the question of Being. Heidegger alludes to this 
condition for the existential analytic, when in the Kant book he writes. 'Mathematical 
19 Theodore Kisiel, The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time, (Berkle\. Uni\crsity cif California 
Press. 1993, pbk 1995), p. 458. 
natural science gives an indication of this fundamental conditional connection betu een 
ontic experience and ontological knowledge. '2' 
The title of this thesis. `Heidegger and Science. ' is meant. then. to suggest a reciprocal 
movement of elucidation: Heidegger casting light on science, science casting light on 
Heidegger. But what kind of science? Science in general, or as the subtitle 'Nature. 
Objectivity- and the Present-at-hand' hints. just natural science? It is customary at this 
point to point out that the German word Wissenschaft does not correspond precisely 
with the English word `science. ' Whereas `science' in English tends to mean primarily 
the natural sciences, and its use is only extended somewhat reluctantly to include those 
social and human sciences that have adopted the quantitative or experimental procedures 
of natural science such as economics or experimental psychology. Wissenschaft is used in 
German quite naturally to denote practically all the academic disciplines from physics to 
philology and history. even theology. This difference of extension is supposed to 
generate confusion between the English and German speaking worlds. With Heidegger. 
however, it is something of a boon because the difference mirrors a characteristic feature 
of Heidegger's approach to science. When Heidegger says `Wissenschaft' he means 
Wissenschaft, but he is usually thinking of science. Unlike Dilthey. say, Heidegger is not 
interested in providing the historical or human sciences with a transcendental foundation 
similar to that supposedly already provided for the natural sciences by Kant. Instead he 
wants to reopen the question of science in general by returning to the natural sciences 
and analysing what it is precisely that they turn out to be. 
Michael Friedman in his book. :1 Parting of the Ways, has documented and clearly 
analysed how the philosophy of the early logical-empiricists. in particular Carnap. and the 
early philosophy of Heidegger were both formed through a process of engagement v ith 
20 Martin Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, trans. b\ Richard I alt_ (R1 o minion and 
-1II - 
and criticism of the work of Ernst Cassirer., ' Friedman is concerned to show that the 
divide between continental and analytic philosophy originates in the different . w, ays in 
which Heidegger and the logical positivists, both it should be said using Husserl for this 
purpose, broke with neo-Kantianism. But Friedman assumes that the difference between 
the continental and analytic traditions is in large part determined by which bits of neo- 
Kantianism they chose to break with and thus indirectly preserve. Heidegger reads, 
admires and criticises The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms. Part Two: Mvihical Thought 
and the course is set. Carnap and Reichenbach read, assimilate, attempt to extend and 
eventually reject Substance and Function, and their course is also set. But we have 
already seen that there was also another parting of the ways, not a parting within 
philosophy, but a parting between philosophy and science. In this thesis I want to suggest 
that paradoxically it is the way that Heidegger took, the path apparently away from 
science, that offers the best chance of philosophy talking to science again and not just 
talking about it to itself. 
-0- 
Karl Jaspers in an unpublished note commented on the experience of listening to 
Heidegger: `Among contemporaries the most exciting thinker. masterful, compelling, 
mysterious - but then leaving you empty-handed. '" This is just a negative way of 
expressing what Heidegger himself always insisted was the basic trait of phenomenology. 
`lt is of the essence of phenomenological investigations that they cannot be revic\. ý ed 
Indianapolis, Indiana Universit Press, 1990, revised 1997). p. 7. 
1' Michael Friedman, A Parting of the liars - Carnap, Cassrrcr, and Heidegger, (Chicago and I. a 'alle, 
Open Court Publishing Company, 2000). Hans Reichenbach, another prominent logical-empiricist 
charts his own gradual break with Cassirer in Modern Philosophy of Science - elected l: ssa,, s. trans. 
and ed. by Maria Reichenbach, (Westport, Connecticut, Greenwood Press. 1981). 
22 Quoted in Rüdiger Safranski, Martin Heidegger - Between Good and Lvil, trans. by Ewald Oscr, 
(Cambridge MA, London, Harvard University Press. 1998). p. 100. 
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summarily but must in each case be rehearsed and repeated anew. ' 23 The investigation 
must be repeated because it leaves you empty-handed. There are no results that can be 
taken away and stored up for another day. The truth uncovered in the investigation is the 
very process of the investigation. This is no doubt what the later Heidegger also meant 
when he celebrated the `uselessness' of philosophy as its highest virtue. If the last five 
years have taught me anything it is the real meaning of these words. Again and again I 
have found myself returning to the same passages in Being and Time, the passages on the 
worldhood of the world and the nature of the understanding, and come away empty- 
handed, though nonetheless certain that something has happened. This experience 
suggests that the structure of the thesis is not, cannot be the structure that I intended. I 
conceived and dreamt of a work in which each chapter built upon the last, somewhat in 
the nature of a deductive proof, until in the end we had a clear structural understanding 
of scientific activity, even if that structure were meant to be dizzingly self-embedded and 
self-transforming. But each chapter has proved to be inconclusive, what insight there has 
been, difficult to carry over to the next, which suggests perhaps that each chapter should 
be read as an individual foray, a separate cut across the field. But that would still be to 
fail to grasp the meaning of repetition. I prefer to think that each chapter, if not built 
upon the last, is at least informed by it. How past experience informs the present, how 
something that happens lasts beyond its happening. is of course the question. 
'' Martin Heidegger, History of the Concept of Time - Prolegomena, trans. by Theodore Kisiel. 
(Bloomington and Indianapolis, Indiana University Press, 1985. pbk 1Q92). p. 26 - hereafter referred to 
as HC"I'. This is the text of the lecture course Heidegger gave at Marburg in the summer of 192 S. first 
published in German as volume 20 of the Gc'samtausgab&', Prolýgomena zur Geschichte des /citbecriffs. 
cd. by Petra Jaeger. (Frankfurt am Main. Vittorio Klostermann. 1979) - hereafter referred to as 620. 
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Chapter One 
The Place of Science in Being and Time 
On the face of it Being and Time doesn't have much to say about science. In a book that 
is nearly 500 pages long, Heidegger discusses the topic, explicitly at least, only twice: in 
paragraph 3 of the introduction and subparagraph 69b of division 2, which taken 
together amount to only some 11 pages, or round about 2% of the total text. In other 
words, questions about science appear to have virtually no place in Being and Time. 
Evidently, it is a subject that remains strictly peripheral to Heidegger's main concerns, 
and in which he displays no great interest. Little wonder, then, that William Richardson 
back in 1968 should assert as a matter of self-evidence that `Heidegger could never be 
called a philosopher of science. " Despite a brief flurry of interest in the 70's around the 
idea that Heideggerian concepts such as world and projection might prove a useful 
background for an understanding of post-positivist philosophies of science such as 
Kuhn's or Polanyi's, this has been pretty much the consensus ever since. 2 Indeed, to my 
knowledge, only one commentator has had the gall to protest the exact opposite. 
Hans Seigfried in a paper published ten years after Richardson's does not merely claim 
that Heidegger might have had something interesting to say about the sciences along or 
'William J. Richardson, 'Heidegger's Critique of Science, ' New Scholasticism, 42(1968), p. 511. 
2 See, for example, Theodore Kisiel, `Heidegger and the New Images of Science', Research in 
Phenomenology 7, ed. by John Sallis, (New Jersey, Humanities Press, 1977), pp. 162-181. Also by 
Theodore Kisiel, `The Rationality of Scientific Discovery', Rationali Today/Rationalite Aujourdui, ed. 
by Theodore F. Geraets, Collection Philosophica (Ottawa, University of Ottawa Press, 1979) pp. 401-41 1, 
and `Scientific Discovery: Logical, Psychological or Hermeneutical? ', Explorations in Phenomenology: 
Papers of the Society for Phenomenological and Existential Philosophy, ed. by David Can and Edward S. 
Casey, (The Hague, Martinus Nijtoff, 1973) pp. 263-284. Joseph Rouse, `Kuhn, Heidegger and Scientific 
Realism', Man and World 14, (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1981), pp. 269-290. And a little later John D. 
Caputo, 'Heidegger's Philosophy of Science: The Two Essences of Science', Rationality, Relativism and 
the Human Sciences, ed. by J Margolis, M Krausz and R. M. Burian (Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1986) pp. 43-60. All of these papers agree that though some of Heidegger's comments are 
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by the way, but that `Being and Time has to be read as a treatise in the philosophy of 
science. '3 This unlikely thesis is based entirely upon paragraph 3 of the introduction in 
which Heidegger seeks to assert the ontological priority of the question of Being. But, 
according to Seigfried, this paragraph is of the highest strategic importance to the 
treatise as whole. It answers the question why the question of Being, which as 
Heidegger famously states in the very first line of Being and Time has today been 
forgotten, ' should be revived at all. 4 As Heidegger himself says, `One may, however, 
ask what purpose this question is supposed to serve. '5 Without an answer to the question 
of what drives Heidegger to re-open the question of Being, we are left essentially in the 
dark about what Being and Time is really trying to accomplish. But this question, 
according to Seigfried, has itself been forgotten. Such is the fascination exerted by the 
question of Being, upon Heideggerians at least, that its primacy is simply taken for 
granted. To outsiders, all the chatter about Being is in danger of appearing purely 
cultish; in Heidegger's own words `a mere matter of soaring speculation about the most 
general of generalities, ' which only serves to obscure what makes this question `of all 
questions, both the most basic and the most concrete. '6 Yet Heidegger himself does 
provide an answer to the question of the necessity, the urgency, and the purpose of re- 
opening the question of Being; an answer that, in Seigfried's words, `is so clear and 
explicit that it is simply amazing that it has been so consistently overlooked. '7 At the 
end of paragraph 3 Heidegger says: 
suggestive in the light of later developments in philosophy of science, Heidegger is still in no way to be 
read as primarily a philosopher of science. 
Hans Seigfried, 'Heidegger's Longest Day: Being and Time and the Sciences, ' Philosophy Today, 22 
(Winter 1978), p. 319. 
° Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. (Oxford, Basil 
Blackwell, 1962, reprinted 1967), p. 21. First published in German as Sein und Zeit, (Tübingen, Max 
Niemeyer Verlag, 1927,17`h ed. 1993) - hereafter referred to as SZ. 
5 Being and Time, p. 29. 
6 Being- and Time, p. 29. 
Seigfried, p. 320. 
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The question of Being aims therefore at ascertaining the a priori conditions not 
only for the possibility of the sciences which examine entities as entities of 
such and such a type, and, in so doing, already operate with an understanding of 
Being, but also for the possibilities of those ontologies themselves which are 
prior to the ontical sciences and which provide their foundations. 8 
This settles it as far as Seigfried is concerned, and one can see why. The passage appears 
to be unequivocal. Being and Time is quite simply `a treatise in the foundations of 
science (Grundlegung der Wissenschaften, BT 10), the proper domain of the philosophy 
of science. '9 The sciences require foundation because they do not start from scratch. 
Rather, the entities which the sciences investigate, to begin with at least, are already 
available and to some extent known to us prior to any scientific inquiry. We, or at least 
our ancestors, observed the stars, tilled the ground, reared the sheep, endured the winter, 
and feared the dark long before there was any science. Confusion as to what should be 
reared as opposed to tilled, or what should be patiently waited for as opposed to 
diligently sought after, did not reign. When a science first gets started, it chooses a 
certain range of phenomena, a definite set of those entities already familiar to us, as its 
subject matter. But this choice is never purely arbitrary. The subject matter is always 
contained within a domain that has already been demarcated in pre-scientific experience. 
Any science relies, to start with at least, upon these pre-scientific demarcations for 
assurance of the potential unity of its subject matter. Moreover, in exploring its subject 
matter, a science adopts as its initial guide those basic concepts about the entities in 
question that are already at least implicit in our pre-scientific experience and activities. 
It is notable, for example, that the concepts that are used even today to demarcate the 
field of biology, and to identify the various avenues open to it for research - namely, 
8 Being and Time. p. 31. 
9 Seigfried, p. 320. Seigfried's page reference - BT 10 - is. in actual fact, to Sein und Zeit. This serves to 
obscure the fact that his translation of Grundlegung differs 
from that of Macquarrie and Robinson. Their 
translation of the relevant sentence runs, 'Laying the foundations for the sciences in this way [Solche 
Grundlegung der Wissenschaften] is different in principle from the kind of "logic" which limps along 
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self-movement, responsiveness, growth, reproduction, and energy-release - would all, 
bar perhaps the last, be perfectly familiar to any subsistence farmer or hunter gatherer. 10 
But these concepts and demarcations are lifted straight from the rough and ready world 
of everyday existence. There is no telling whether they might not be hopelessly naive or 
utterly confused, simply not up to the job of providing conceptually transparent 
knowledge of the way things are; and conceptually transparent knowledge, Seigfried 
takes it, is what science is all about. That the pre-scientific concepts and demarcations 
which science is forced to rely upon are not in fact up to the job is demonstrated by the 
fact that the sciences are from time to time compelled to go back and revise the basic 
concepts with which they started. These periods of crisis testify to the fact that the 
sciences are not merely extensions of pre-scientific ways of thinking but have their own 
autonomous ideals, and therefore stand in need of some other grounding. But 
fundamental revisions to a science's basic concepts, though testimony to science's 
desire for objective truth, have no more inherent legitimacy than the concepts which 
they replace. Executed on the hoof, as it were, simply in order to get the whole 
enterprise back on track again, they may be nothing more than make-shifts. If the 
sciences did indeed get off on the wrong foot because of their reliance upon a 
conceptually unarticulated and possibly incoherent understanding of the fields under 
investigation, then who is to say whether the various breaks with their past have brought 
them any closer to the reality that they claim to articulate, or on the contrary have simply 
been the ramifications of that faulty start? The nightmare, to which mathematics first 
awoke in the second half of the I9`h century with the realisation that its understanding of 
the continuum produced paradox in the calculus, is that the entire theoretical edifice 
after, investigating the status of some science as it chances to find it, in order to discover its "method". ' 
(Being and Time, p. 30. ) The translation of Grundlegung will turn out to be of some importance. 
10 See, for example, the introductory section 'What is Life? ' in M. B. V. Roberts, Biology -A Functional 
Approach, (London. Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd., 1971), pp. 2-3. 
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may be unsound, the most prized and sophisticated conceptual apparatus nothing more 
than a grotesque assemblage of bodged repairs to a bodged job. The whole programme 
might crash at any minute, and no ad hoc alteration will get around the problem because 
the problem is precisely the proliferation of get-arounds. In Being and Time Heidegger 
reports that this pervasive sense of crisis, this urgent sense of a need for `new 
foundations, ' now grips all the sciences. 1 The reason why the question of Being needs 
to be reopened is the contemporary crisis in science. Only when the sciences have 
worked themselves to a point where the instability of their foundations can no longer be 
ignored; only then, when the relationship between the sciences and their subject matter 
`begins to totter, ' does the question of Being get reawoken. '` The question of Being sets 
us the task of ascertaining the meaning of Being as such. The discipline that pursues this 
task, which Heidegger calls fundamental ontology, provides the necessary conceptual 
clarification for a series of further ontological investigations, which seek to ascertain the 
ontological constitution of the various different kinds of entities that are already 
available to us in pre-scientific experience. These regional ontologies will provide the 
positive sciences - what Heidegger calls the ontical sciences, the sciences that deal with 
specific kinds of beings - with the basic conceptual clarification they have hitherto been 
lacking. By ascertaining what it means to be a particular kind of being, a regional 
ontology will demonstrate concretely and prior to all theoretical speculation the kind of 
conceptual determinations and methodological procedures appropriate to that particular 
realm of beings. Regional ontologies provide the individual sciences with the categorial 
structure, if you like, of their particular domain. 
13 
11 Being and Time, pp. 29-30. 
12 Being and Time, p. 29. 
13 Thus Heidegger quite deliberately cites Kant as an example when discussing the regional ontological 
foundations of the individual sciences: `Similarly the positive outcome of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason 
lies in what it has contributed to the working out of what belongs to any Nature whatsoever, not in a 
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At the end of his paper Seigf ied expresses the modest hope that now the real purpose of 
the question of Being has been pointed out, Being and Time will at long last be 
recognised as the contribution to philosophy of science that it really is. It will thereby be 
saved from becoming an impressive but increasingly irrelevant historical monument, 
and be brought back into the mainstream of contemporary philosophical discussion. But 
recognition did not follow. The clear and explicit statement of Heidegger's intent went 
on being as consistently overlooked as it had always been, despite the fact that it had 
now been clearly pointed out. It rather begins to look as if the failure to recognise Being 
and Time as a treatise in the philosophy of science is due not so much to an oversight as 
to a blind refusal to even countenance the possibility; and the reasons for this prejudice 
are not hard to find. In the very next paragraph, immediately after detailing the 
ontological priority of the question of Being, Heidegger turns his attention to what he 
terms its ontical priority. This turn proves decisive, since it detemiines the whole 
subsequent trajectory of Being and Time. 
In paragraph 4, Heidegger attempts to demonstrate that if we are to pursue the question 
of Being then we must examine the Being of the entity which we ourselves are. What 
distinguishes this entity from all others is that its own Being is an issue for it. That we 
are, that we may at any moment no longer be, these are clearly issues for us. Moreover, 
what we are is not fixed before it becomes an issue for us; rather we become what we 
are in the course of an existence in which what we are, what we shall become, and what 
we have been, are all issues for us, even if they are issues which we may ignore or put 
off to another day. Consequently, Heidegger tells us, `we have chosen to designate this 
entity as "Dasein", a term which is purely an expression of its Being. ' 
14 The term 
`theory' of knowledge. His transcendental logic is an a priori logic for the subject-matter of that area of 
Being called "Nature". ' (Being and Time, p. 31. ) 
"Being and Time, p. 33. 
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`Dasein' highlights the fact that what is ontically distinctive about us is that we are 
ontological. It is part and parcel of what we are that we have some kind of 
understanding of what it is to be, and not just what we are, but also what we are not, and 
that means in turn not just what we have turned out not to be, but also what, in being 
what we are, we have come up against that is not us. Thus some kind of understanding 
of Being as such belongs to the Being of Dasein. And this means, so Heidegger thinks, 
that the entities which we ourselves are have a special priority when it comes to the 
question of Being. The question of Being is to be pursued by examining what it means 
`to understand Being. ' Precisely because an understanding of Being is integral to the 
Being of Dasein, that Being is quite unlike the Being of entities for which Being is not 
an issue. Heidegger reserves the term `existence' for this kind of Being alone. Only 
Dasein, strictly speaking, exists. Other entities certainly are, but, though Heidegger 
seems to be happy at this stage to borrow from the tradition and think of the ontological 
constitution of these entities as categorial, the manner in which they are has yet to be 
determined. 15 By contrast the structures belonging to the Being of Dasein are termed 
existential. `Therefore fundamental ontology, from which alone all other ontologies can 
take their rise, must be sought in the existential analytic of Dasein. ' 16 
Seigfried is, of course, aware of all this, but insists that nothing in paragraph 4 indicates 
a diversion from the aim laid out in paragraph 3. Consequently, `the existential analytic 
of Dasein is nothing but a means to that end. ' 17 Seigfried reads paragraphs 3 and 4 as 
dealing in turn with the questions of what fundamental ontology is supposed to do, and 
then how it is supposed to go about it. But paragraph 4 is not, after all, entitled `The 
IS `Because Dasein's characters of Being are defined in terms of existential it v. we cal them "exlstentialu, ". 
These are to be sharply distinguished from what we call "categories" - characteri: tics of Bein, for entities 
whose character is not that of Dasein. ' (Being and Time, p. 70. ) 
" Being anti lime, p. 3-4. 
17 Seigfiied, p. 127. 
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priority of Dasein for the Question of Being, ' though that on the face of it is what the 
paragraph sets out to demonstrate. Instead, the section is entitled `The Ontical Priority of 
the Question of Being, ' clearly echoing the title of paragraph 3. The phrase, it is true, is 
potentially ambiguous. It could at a pinch be interpreted as referring to what, within the 
ontical realm, has priority for the question of Being, but the echo of the title for 
paragraph 3 suggests that it is meant to refer to a priority that the question of Being 
itself has, a priority alongside and perhaps equal in status to its ontological priority. This 
priority is ontical in so far as it concerns an entity, i. e. Dasein itself. The ontical priority 
of the question of Being would then refer to a priority that the question had for Dasein in 
its actual existence as that entity which it is, over and above any purely theoretical 
interest in determining the ontological constitution of entities that are the object of 
scientific investigation. These two interpretations of the title cannot, of course, be 
disentangled. The whole point is that Dasein has priority for the question of Being, as 
the entity to be interrogated about its Being, precisely because the question of Being has 
priority for Dasein. To exist doesn't simply mean to be what one is, nor even to 
understand what one is; rather it means to put to the test what one takes oneself to be by 
existing as that possibility. A stone does not exist in this technical sense because what it 
is, is not an issue for it. It simply is what it is. It does not enter into the question of what 
it is. By contrast, Dasein pursues its own existence. `The question of existence never 
gets straightened out except through existing itself. ' 
18 The kinds of understanding 
involved in pursuing one's own existence, Heidegger calls existentiell in contrast to 
existential. The existentiell/existential distinction is akin to the ontical/ontological 
distinction between beings and Being in general. The existential refers to the ontological 
constitution of Dasein as such, whereas the existentiell refers to whatever is ontically 
18 Being and Time, p. 33 
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distinctive in each case about the entities that are Dasein. But precisely because Dasein 
is ontico-ontological, what is ontically distinctive in each case about Dasein is the stance 
that Dasein in its existence takes towards that existence. That somebody is happy or 
unhappy is an ontical characteristic of a specific entity, but one is happy or unhappy not 
as a stone is heavy or light. One is only ever happy or not happy about something that 
matters to one in the context of one's own singular and idiosyncratic existence. The 
release of Nelson Mandela or the relegation of QPR to the second division can only 
bring joy or despair to those whose lives turn upon such things. As Heidegger says, 
Dasein has in each case its Being to be, and the way that it `copes' existentielly with this 
`burden' is what ontically differentiates it. The fact that Dasein is in this sense ontico- 
ontological, is what makes ontological inquiry possible. If it were not for the fact that 
Dasein's Being is an issue for it, there could be no existential analytic, because there 
would be no access to the Being of Dasein. But this condition of possibility is 
simultaneously a guarantee of complication -a complication of two levels that one 
might have hoped could be kept separate. The name for this complication is facticity. 
And it is the reason why the existential analytic must always be interpretative, that is to 
say, hermeneutical. 
The relationship here between hermeneutics and facticity is not a relationship 
between the grasping of an object and the object grasped, in relation to which 
the former would simply have to measure itself. Rather, interpreting is itself a 
possible and distinctive how of the character of being of facticity. Interpreting 
is a [way o fl being which belongs to the being of factical life itself. If one were 
to describe facticity - improperly - as the "object" of hermeneutics (as plants 
are described as the "object" of botany), then one would find this 
(hermeneutics) in its own object itself (as if analogously plants, what and how 
they are, came along with botany and from it). 
19 
19 Martin Heidegger, Ontology - The Hermeneutics of Factici , trans. 
by John van Buren, (Bloomington 
and Indianapolis, Indiana University Press, 1999), p. 
12. This is the translation of the Freiburg lecture 
course given in the summer semester of 
1923, originally published in German as part of the 
Gesamtausgabe, Band 63: Ontologie (Hermeneutik der Faktizität), ed. by Käte Bröcker-Oltmanns, 
(Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio Klostermann, 1988). 
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But the point is not purely methodological. If it were, then the distinction between ends 
and means that Seigfried relies upon, would indeed be preserved. However the factical 
embeddedness of hermeneutical inquiry within the very thing that it inquires into, i. e. 
factical existence, has implications not only for the way in which such inquiry should be 
carried out, but also for the nature of any possible result. If ontological inquiry is 
necessarily an existentiell affair, it must have an existentiell result. 
But the roots of the existential analytic, on its part, are ultimately existentiell, 
that is, ontical. Only if the inquiry of philosophical research is itself seized 
upon in an existentiell manner as a possibility of the Being of each existing 
Dasein, does it become at all possible to disclose the existentiality of existence 
and to undertake an adequately founded ontological problematic. But with this, 
the ontical priority of the question of Being has also become plain.? " 
Because the existential analytic cannot simply be pursued as though it were the analysis 
of an object independent of the analyst, it must be seized as an existentiell possibility of 
the analyst herself But that means that the analysis will be in some way transformative 
for the analyst in her factical existence. In pursuing the existential analysis of the Being 
of Dasein, fundamental ontology will necessarily alter our conception of what it is to be 
ourselves. But self and self-conception cannot be disentangled. Since Being is an issue 
for Dasein, since part of what it is to be Dasein is in each case to understand what it is 
to be Dasein in some way or other, Dasein is co-determined as what it is, i. e. determined 
existentielly, by what it takes itself to be. But it works the other way round as well. The 
existential analytic doesn't just produce an existentiell transformation in the Dasein 
engaged in such a pursuit, the pursuit cannot even be undertaken except on the 
basis of 
an existentiell transformation of Dasein. The factical existence of the 
inquirer must turn 
upon the question of Being, not just because that 
is the task that the inquirer happens to 
be engaged in, but also because the existentiality of 
Dasein cannot even show up unless 
Dasein is so existentielly transformed. This is the ontical priority of the question of 
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Being. The transformation occurs not simply in the light of a theoretical result obtained 
through ontological inquiry, rather the transformation is itself the result sought for in 
inquiry as the necessary condition for inquiry. `But in that case the question of Being is 
nothing other than the radicalisation of an essential tendency-of-Being which belongs to 
Dasein itself - the pre-ontological understanding of Being. '21 The ontical priority of the 
question of Being consists therefore in the way that it promises an existentiell 
transformation of Dasein that not merely makes ontological inquiry possible, but that 
brings Dasein back in its very existence to what at root it is most capable of being. 
Once again, as with Greek philosophy, it is a question not so much of knowledge as of 
flourishing. 
It seems, then, that the question of Being has two priorities, two goals -a traditionally 
metaphysical goal of determining what kinds of things there are, and an existential, or 
more precisely, existentiell goal of awakening Dasein to the possibility of its own 
authenticity. The connection between these two goals, the structure of dependence or 
interdependence, promises to be difficult to work out. Not least because Heidegger 
seems to hint that the ontological priority depends upon the ontical priority: `whenever 
an ontology takes for its theme entities whose character of Being is other than that of 
Dasein, it has its own foundation and motivation in Dasein's own ontical structure. '22 
And this in turn suggests that the relation between the positive sciences and the regional 
ontologies that serve as their foundation is not going to be quite as simple as Seigfried 
perhaps hopes. Science, as Heidegger notes at the very beginning of paragraph 4, cannot 
simply be taken as a theoretical edifice, an interrelated totality of true propositions about 
some domain of entities. It is also an activity, one of the many ways in which human 
20 Being and Time, p. 34. 
`'' Being and Time, p. 35. 
22 Being and Time, p. 33 [my emphasis]. 
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beings pursue their existence. As such it belongs to the ontical structure of Dasein, that 
is to say, science represents an existentiell possibility of Dasein, one of the possible 
ways in which it may choose to exist. If science belongs to the ontical structure of 
Dasein, and if any ontology of beings other than Dasein has its foundation in that ontical 
structure, then science taken as an activity begins to look as if it might be foundational 
for those regional ontologies that are foundational for the sciences taken as theoretical 
edifices of true propositions. The relation is beginning to look almost circular. And 
since fundamental ontology pursued through and as existential analytic is existentielly 
transformative of Dasein's ontical structure, it begins to look as if perhaps the way in 
which fundamental ontology underwrites the possibility of regional ontology, is 
precisely by transforming our existentiell understanding of the positive sciences as 
activities that we ourselves pursue. All of which, in sum, suggests that Seigfried may be 
a bit premature in dismissing what he calls the `existential interpretation' of Being and 
Time. It seems pretty clear that the `existential interpretation' doesn't so much miss the 
point that the existential analytic is merely a means to an end, as grasp the point that the 
ontical priority of the question of Being muddies the waters about means and ends; a 
point that Seigfried himself appears to be blind to. At the very least, it appears 
incumbent upon Seigfried, if he is to substantiate his claim that Being and Time really is 
an exercise in philosophy of science, to demonstrate how the existential analytic is 
meant to help in laying the foundations for the sciences. But this is precisely what he 
chooses not to do.. -' 
23 Seigfried does discuss the way in which the existential analysis of understanding, world, knowing, and 
the `ontological genesis of the theoretical attitude, ' may help in a philosophical assessment of the `new' 
philosophies of science emerging in the work of Polanyi, 
Kuhn and Feyerabend, but nowhere does he 
discuss how this existential analysis of scientific activity is supposed to help in providing 
phenomenological clarification of the Being of the beings that those sciences 
investigate. Indeed, in a 
footnote he suggests that any further elaboration of the way 
in which the existential analytic deals with 
science is irrelevant to his claim. `In order to bring out and 
demonstrate the bearing Being and Time has 
on the discussion of the problems raised by the new philosophy of science, these points 
have to be 
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The problem facing Seigfried is that Heidegger never gets as far as establishing the 
connection between fundamental ontology pursued via the existential analytic and those 
regional ontologies which are supposed to lay the foundations for the individual 
sciences. In fact, he doesn't even get around to a complete analysis of science thought of 
as an activity, that is to say, as an existentiell possibility of Dasein's existence. If we 
turn to the only other place in Being and Time where science is explicitly discussed, we 
discover that it is mentioned only so that a proper discussion may be postponed. In 
paragraph 69b, Heidegger warns: 
Yet a fully adequate existential Interpretation of science cannot be carried out 
until the meaning of Being and the "connection " between Being and truth have 
been clarified in terms of the temporality of existence. The following 
deliberations are preparatory to the understanding of this central problematic. 2' 
In other words, even at this stage - and it is a pretty late stage in the overall exposition of 
Being and Time - Heidegger is still not able to specify the existential conditions of 
possibility for scientific acti`-ity. 25 The chances, then, of providing the sciences with 
their foundations, whatever that might turn out to mean, appear even more remote. 
However, Seigfried can no doubt take some comfort in the fact that the existential 
analysis of science is not postponed arbitrarily, or because the question has proved in the 
course of the existential analytic to be after all incidental to its goals. On the contrary, 
the analysis is postponed precisely because it is so closely tied to the central problematic 
of fundamental ontology, that is to say to the question of Being as such. If the question 
of science gets touched upon only incidentally in the course of Being and Time as it 
stands, this is because the time for it was not yet ripe. The right time for the question of 
science would have been division 3 of Being and Time, `Time and Being, ' which was to 
elaborated. However, to further elaborate them in this paper would distract from the main point I am 
trying to make. ' (Seigfried, fn 12, p. 331. ) 
2' Being and Time, p. 408. 
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have provided `the explication of time as the transcendental horizon for the question of 
Being. '26 But division 3 was, as we know, withheld from publication in 1927, because, 
as Heidegger tells it, he felt after long conversations with Karl Jaspers that its exposition 
had proved unintelligible. 27 The problem proved to be more than one of exposition, 
however, and in 1953 with the appearance of the 7`h edition any hope that the remaining 
parts of Being and Time might eventually appear was finally abandoned. 28 Indeed 
already at the very end of division 2, Heidegger alludes to the problem of the connection 
between Being and truth, which he has already told us has to be clarified before there 
can be any adequate existential interpretation of science, as a limit to his investigations. 
`Any investigation which goes further in the direction of questions such as these, will 
come up against the same "boundary" which has already set itself up to our provisional 
discussion of the connection between truth and Being. '29 This `boundary' is first 
encountered at the end of division 1, but one can assume that it was precisely the failure 
to push beyond this limit in any intelligible manner at the end of division 2 as well, that 
led Heidegger to abandon the publication of division 3. Even if we assume that 
Heidegger had intended the ultimate object of his phenomenology to be the clarification 
of the conceptual foundations of the positive sciences, it begins to look very much as if 
he was forced to abandon this ambition. The task of laying the foundations of the 
sciences was permanently deferred because it lay on the other side of a limit which 
Heidegger found he could never get beyond -a limit which seemed to impose itself at 
the very moment he tried to move from the analytic of existence to the question of Being 
in general; a move he was able only ever to couch in the form of a question, but never 
25 `we are asking which of those conditions implied in Dasein's state of Being are existentially necessary 
for the possibility of Dasein's existing in the way of scientific research. ' (Being and Time, p. 408. ) 
26 Being and Time, p. 63. 
27 Heidegger gives this version of events in the 1941 lecture course on Schelling. Quoted in William D. 
Blattner, Heidegger's Temporal Idealism, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 261. 
28 See the preface to the 7`h edition, Being and Time, p. 17. 
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enact: `Is there a way which leads from primordial time to the meaning of Being? Does 
time itself manifest itself as the horizon of Being? ' 30 
In short, there appear to be strong reasons for rejecting Seigfried's claim that Being and 
Time can only be properly read as a contribution to philosophy of science. In the first 
place, the emphasis placed upon the ontical priority of the question of Being suggests 
that the task Heidegger sets himself in Being and Time is not as clear cut as Seigfried 
makes out. In the second place, even if Seigfried were right, and the whole of Being and 
Time as it stands, including division 2, were just a means to an end, the fact would still 
remain that that end is never even touched upon let alone achieved, and that, therefore, 
whatever remains of value in Being and Time, it certainly isn't what it contributes to the 
philosophy of science. The best that can be said for Seigfried's claim is that there are 
some indications in the first few pages of the book that Heidegger may have originally 
thought that Being and Time would make a contribution to philosophy of science, but 
that that is not how it turned out. 
There is, of course, another reason why we might want to remain suspicious of 
Seigfried's claim. It is the rather disconcerting way in which he can tell us without 
batting an eyelid that philosophy of science proper consists in laying the foundations 
[Grundlegung] of the sciences. But isn't that precisely what philosophers of science 
have come to realise over the last hundred years is not the proper task of philosophy of 
science? And yet curiously, Seigfried is anxious to ally Heidegger's conception of 
science with the views of those post-positivists, such as Thomas Kuhn, Paul 
Feyerabend, and Michael Polanyi, who have done more than most to discredit the idea 
that the basic concepts of science are subject to independent philosophical validation. 
Indeed, Seigfried wishes to use Being and Time to provide post-positivism with a proper 
29 Being and Time, p. 472. 
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philosophical backing. Part of the problem, in his opinion, with these so-called new 
philosophies of science is that the arguments advanced in support of them are by and 
large not really philosophical at all, but instead merely historical or psychological. `In 
this situation, Being and Time could prove to be helpful, since it not only anticipated 
many of the so-called new views, but it dealt with them in a thoroughly systematic 
fashion and provided philosophical arguments and ample phenomenological evidence 
which would allow us to settle this philosophical controversy one way or another. '31 But 
the controversy is in large part a controversy over the proper task still facing philosophy 
of science, once any hope of laying the conceptual foundations of the sciences has been 
abandoned. The post-positivist break with traditional Anglo-Saxon philosophy of 
science was a break with the positivist concentration upon the justification of 
methodology. But it did not thereby represent a return to the justification of theoretical 
content, rather it represented a break with justification altogether. Indeed, a figure suck 
as Feyerabend must surely be seen as continuing the revolution initiated by logical- 
positivism. Logical-empiricism, as it was then called, arose in Germany and Austria 
during the 1920s out of and in reaction to neo-Kantianism, when a generation of 
students brought up in that tradition recognised the futility of attempting to provide 
transcendental deductions of the a priori truths underpinning the sciences, not least 
because the scientists were dispensing with those truths as fast the philosophers could 
prove them a priori. The concentration upon methodology, the question of verification, 
the logic of induction, the theory-independent description of observation, were all the 
result of a self-imposed ban on the justification of theoretical concepts. Philosophy was, 
if you like, to concern itself only with the justification of the procedures of justification 
employed by the sciences themselves. A work such as Feyerabend's Against Method 
30 Beingrand Time, p. 488. 
31 Seigfried, p. 321. 
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simply extends the prohibition to even this limited regulatory role. Science is what 
science does, and any attempt to restrict its freedom of action risks stifling its capacity 
for innovation. Of course, this instantly raises the question of what role, if any, there still 
is for a philosophy of science. Perhaps one of the reasons why the arguments raised in 
favour of the new descriptions of scientific activity were to Seigfried's taste not properly 
philosophical at all, was precisely because the argument was not between two 
competing philosophies of science, but rather was an argument about what kind of 
`meta-discipline' there could properly be about science at all. In this light, the historical 
researches of Thomas Kuhn are not meant to hint inadequately at a potential, new 
philosophy of science, still sadly lacking proper philosophical elaboration or validation, 
but rather are meant to demonstrate concretely that the only fruitful kind of talk about 
science is historical. Philosophy of science is to he replaced variously by history of 
science, sociology of science, and, at its most anaemic, science studies. The only task 
left to philosophy itself is to reconcile itself to the fact that the sciences have at last 
broken free from its apron strings. 
In other words, if Being and Time really is a treatise in the philosophy of science, then it 
is a treatise in the wrong kind of philosophy of science, the kind of philosophy of 
science that really does still believe it can run ahead of the sciences and prescribe for 
them the true nature of their subject matter, a kind of philosophy of science that nobody, 
whether positivist or post-positivist, whether empiricist, realist, or constructivist, has 
any interest in anymore: not so much a philosophy of science as a full-blown 
metaphysical subordination of science to philosophy. Worse still, Being and Time would 
then be a treatise in the wrong kind of philosophy of science that chooses precisely the 
wrong method to set about its task. If the existential analytic really 
does throw up 
philosophical arguments that support the kinds of 
description of scientific research 
provided by Kuhn or Feyerabend, then one 
is at a loss to know how it is supposed to lay 
.ý- 
the foundations for the sciences, since there are on the basis of its own arguments no 
foundations to the sciences, or at least no foundations that can be philosophically 
secured. All the more reason then, surely, to read Being and Time, whatever Heidegger's 
original, real or ultimate intention might have been, as the existentialist tract it is 
conventionally taken to be, and forget all about the introductory talk of a priori 
conditions, regional ontologies, and laying the foundations of the sciences, especially 
since thankfully none of these promissory notes are ever honoured. One senses that to 
read Being and Time as a treatise in the philosophy of science on the basis of a few 
scattered remarks that may be nothing more than the residues of Heidegger's own neo- 
Kantian and Husserlian training, would be to condemn it to real historical irrelevance, 
and strip it of everything that in actual fact did prove significant and revolutionary about 
it. Perhaps this is even Seigfried's secret intention: to recast Heidegger as the devoted 
disciple of Husserl that he turned out not to be, patiently dedicating himself to the 
painstaking task, which Husserl himself thought might last generations, of 
phenomenologically securing the foundations of Western science. 
But before dismissing Seigfried completely, we should perhaps examine a text that was 
not available when he wrote his paper. Published in 1979 as volume, 20 of the 
Gesamtausgabe, the lecture course that Heidegger gave at Marburg in the summer 
semester of 1925, bears a particularly close relation to Being and Time. We find not only 
that large portions of the course have been carried over into the text of Being and Time 
virtually unchanged, but that the entire structure of division 1 and the first two chapters 
of division 2 have already been fully worked out and executed. It seems reasonable to 
assume, therefore, that the 1925 lecture course represents what its translator, Theodore 
Kisiel, has called the penultimate draft of Being and Time. What is interesting for us, 




investigation to the possibility of philosophy of science even more explicitly than he 
does in Being and Time. 
The theme of the lecture course is to be understood, Heidegger tells us in its opening,, 
sentence, by way of its subtitle, not its title. The course is entitled `History of the 
Concept of Time, ' but it is subtitled `Prolegomena to the Phenomenology of History and 
Nature. '32 The subtitle tells us what a history of the concept of time is for. It is meant to 
provide us with whatever is necessary from the very beginning, if we are to be able to do 
phenomenology of history and nature. `This means, ' Heidegger tells us a little later. 
`that we wish to arrive at a horizon from which history and nature can be originally 
contrasted. This horizon must itself be afield of constituents against which history and 
nature stand out in relief. Laying out this field is the task of the "prolegomena to a 
phenomenology of history and nature. "' 33 But we can only learn what the prolegomena 
actually consist of, if we know `what a phenomenology of history and nature is 
supposed to be. '34 The distinction between history and nature is most readily apparent in 
the sciences which investigate these two separate domains. But that does not mean that 
the basis for this distinction is to be found within the sciences. On the contrary, the 
sciences already operate within this distinction, and take their bearings from it. `But the 
phenomenology of history and nature promises to disclose reality precisely as it shows 
itself before scientific inquiry, as the reality that is already given to it. [... ] In this way, 
the basis for a philosophy of these sciences is first created. '35 
32 HCT, p. 1. Though the lecture course was announced under the title 'History of the Concept of Time' 
and bore the subtitle 'Prolegomena to the Phenomenology of History and Nature, ' the German editor tells 
us that it seemed appropriate to change the title of the published work to Prolegomena zur Geschichte des 
Zeitbegriffs, and lose all reference to a phenomenology of history and nature, 'since Heidegger did not 
complete the presentation of the central thematic' (HCT. p. 32 1). In other words, rather than a history of 
the concept of time as the prolegomena to the phenomenology of history and nature. all Heidegger 
managed to present in the course of his lectures was a prolegomenon to the prolegomena. 
33 HCT, p. 5. 
34 HCT, p. 1. 
35 HCT, p. 2. 
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It might seem that these introductory remarks to the 1925 lecture course really add 
nothing new to what we have already gleaned from Being and Time. Indeed, to the 
extent that they emphasise how closely the ambition of establishing the possibility of a 
genuinely perspicuous philosophy of science is tied to the traditional neo-Kantian 
problematic of grounding the difference between the historical and the natural sciences, 
it could be argued that they simply confirm the suspicion that the references to science 
in paragraph 3 of Being and Time are nothing more than the remnants of a philosophical 
orientation that had to be discarded in the very process of working out the prolegomena 
to a phenomenology of Being. This is certainly how Theodore Kisiel interprets it.; `' 
However Heidegger immediately goes on to outline how the basis for a philosophy of 
science is to be established, thus making it clear what he considers a philosophy of 
science should be trying to do, and what therefore it should look like. This clarification 
will prove to be crucial in deciding the question of whethei or not science really does 
have a place in the overall scheme of Being and Time. The phenomenology of history 
and nature will create the basis for a philosophy of the sciences, Heidegger tells us, 
`serving 1. ) to provide the foundation for their genesis from pretheoretical experience, 
36 Kisiel has this to say about the 1925 lecture course: `this a course of misnomers, false starts, and false 
promises, beginning with the irrelevance of its announced title and followed by an inertially faulty 
introduction. [... T]he initial motivation, [... ] spelled out in the opening lecture, would still reflect the 
Diltheyan inspiration of the systematic essay, in its concern for founding the division of the field of the 
sciences into the natural and the historical (human, cultural) sciences (Dilthey's forte), as well as the 
mathematical and metaphysical sciences. [... ] Heidegger in fact makes clear only in the fourth week ('stay 
28,1925) what "the real theme of the course" (124/91) actually is, as he burrows ever more deeply into an 
excessively detailed Preliminary Part on the history and nature of phenomenology. a Part that one could 
almost overleap to get to the point of the course. ' Theodore Kisiel, The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and 
Time, (Berkley LA, London; University of California Press; 1993. pbk 1995), pp. 363-64. 
But what those who would like to consign the talk of laying the foundations of the sciences to a 
faulty start 
that might just as well be skipped. have to explain is why this talk 
is not confined to Heidegger's 
preparatory work before Being and Time, but in fact recurs 
insistently after its publication. For example, 
in late 1927we find Heidegger still declaring grandly. 'Laying the foundations of a science means 
founding and developing the ontology which underlies the science. 
In turn, these ontologies are grounded 
in fundamental ontology, which constitutes the centre of philosophy. 
' Martin Heidegger, 
Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, trans. by Parvis Emad and Kenneth 
Maly, (Bloomington and Indianapolis, Indiana University Press, 1997), p. 
27 - hereafter referred to as 
PIK. This is the text of the lecture course given at Marburg in the winter of 
192728, first published in 
German as volume 25 of the Gesamtausgabe, Phänomenologische 
Interpretation von Kants Kritik der 
- 
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2. ) to exhibit the kind of access they have to the pregiven reality, and 3. ) to specify the 
kind of concept formation which accrues to such research. '37 
This makes it clear that the clarification of the conceptual foundations of the sciences is 
to proceed by way of an analysis of science not just as one activity among others, but as 
an activity that arises out of prescientific activity. The way in which science arises out 
of prescientific activity promises to cast light upon the kind of access that science has to 
its subject matter, because that subject matter is pregiven in prescientific experience. 
Science detaches itself from prescientific activity precisely so as to be able to make the 
reality already implicit in prescientific activity accessible to it. Access to the given is a 
question of forging a certain distance from it. In turn, the question of the basic concepts 
underlying a science's theoretical articulation of a particular domain is to be sorted out 
by examining the ways in which those concepts are formed in the very process of 
opening up access to the domain. In other words, Heidegger's suggestion is that 
concepts do not just appear out of the blue, and then subsequently have to be married up 
against the domain they are supposed to help conceptualise. Nor are they simply 
borrowed from prescientific experience. Rather concepts are forged in the very process 
of gaining access to a domain. They are themselves the results of an activity. An 
understanding of how a science gains access to its domain, will determine what kind of 
concepts are appropriate or relevant to that particular science. 
This in turn begins to explain the special emphasis that Heidegger places upon scientific 
crisis. `Our path to the fields of subject matter is therefore not by way of the theory of 
the factually available sciences. This is shown by the sense of the present crisis of the 
reinen vernute, ed. by Ingtraud Gärland, (Frankfurt am 
Main, Vittorio Klostermann. 1977,3rd ed. 1995) 
- hereafter referred to as 
G25. 
37 HCT, p. 2. 
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sciences, if we truly understand what this means. '38 But scientific crisis, if truly 
understood, does not offer an excuse for ignoring the sciences. Rather a true 
understanding of scientific crisis is a necessary step on the path to laying the foundations 
of the sciences. In scientific crisis scientific activity concerns itself with basic concepts. 
[T]he real crisis in the sciences is internal to the sciences themselves, wherein 
their basic relationship to the subject matter which each of them investigates 
has become questionable [ ... 
] which activates the tendency to carry out a 
propaedeutic reflection on their basic structure. Such a reflection seeks to 
dispel the insecurity over the fundamental concepts of the science in question 
or to secure those concepts in a more original understanding of its subject 
matter. Genuine progress in the sciences occurs only in this field of reflection. 39 
And this is a necessary feature of science, if Heidegger's conception of the way in which 
philosophy of science is to proceed, is to have any chance of success. It is precisely 
because basic concepts are forged in scientific activity that an examination of scientific 
activity can. have any hope of clarifying those basic concepts. If scientific activity merely 
proceeded on the basis of a conceptual framework that came from who knows where, 
then scientific activity would be a secondary phenomenon not worthy of philosophical 
attention. Everything a science did would be determined by the conceptual framework 
that would have to be established in some other and as yet unexplained manner. If, on 
the other hand, sciences are responsible for their own conceptual frameworks, then 
scientific crisis is the middle term that negotiates the passage between science thought 
of as an activity susceptible to existential analysis and the conception of science as a 
systematically articulated body of true propositions requiring grounding of its 
fundamental concepts. Laying the foundations for a science does not therefore mean 
providing that science with an already fully worked out conceptual framework within 
which to pursue its research. Rather, it means establishing the grounding link between 




the structure of the subject matter as it already presents itself in prescientific experience 
and the kind of concept formation exemplified by scientific activity in periods of crisis. 
The laws of progress by which a scientific revolution occurs differ in the 
individual sciences because the mode of being of the experience and what is 
experienced is different, because the states of affairs stand in definite 
fundamental relationships to man himself, and because sciences themselves are 
nothing but concrete possibilities of human Dasein speaking out about the 
world in which it exists and about itself. 4° 
If, as Heidegger asserts, the sciences in crisis assume a philosophical cast, and `thus say 
that they are in need of an original interpretation which they themselves are incapable of 
carrying out, 41 this is not because they are incapable of radically revising their basic 
concepts. Indeed, such capability is the hallmark of their maturity. ` Rather, what the 
sciences prove themselves incapable of in crisis, is an interpretation of that capability in 
terms of the very field that they seek to investigate and their peculiar relation to it. What 
always gets obscured by a scientific revolution is not so much the origin of the nc 
conceptual delimitation within the field itself - that, after all, tends to be taken for 
granted - as the origin of the possibility of transformation within the field itself. A 
sociology of theory formation is not a rival to scientific realism, rather it is the necessary 
supplement to a realism about theories. The more original interpretation that Heidegger 
seeks, is thus neither a sociology of knowledge nor a metaphysical realism, but an 
interpretation of scientific activity and the fields which such activity investigates as they 
are bound together within human existence as a whole. 
Here it becomes apparent why Seigfried's claim was destined to be ignored, even 
though he appears to have cottoned on to something important. The thesis that Being 
and Time is to be read as a contribution to philosophy of science, 
is presented with the 
"' HCT, p. 4. 
41 HCT. p. 3. 
-- 
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clear aim of explaining what Being and Time is really all about. But this assumes that 
philosophy of science is already well-defined, and that Being and Time gains definition 
by being identified with it. We see now that for Heidegger, on the contrary, it is the idea 
of philosophy of science that first needs to be worked out, and that Being and Time is 
intended, amongst other things perhaps, to provide the prolegomena for such a 
definition. In other words, the primary task is not to supply a philosophy of science, but 
rather to rethink the relation between philosophy and science altogether. This is why, no 
doubt, in the 1925 lecture course Heidegger goes on, immediately after outlining the full 
plan for the prolegomena to a phenomenology of history and nature, to give a brief 
historical overview of the situation facing philosophy under the title `Philosoph- and the 
sciences. ' The situation is one in which philosophy defines itself as scientific in a 
twofold sense - scientific in that having relinquished to the sciences its traditional 
subject matter it takes the sciences themselves as its own proper domain - philosophy 
conceives of itself as a theory or logic of the sciences - and scientific also because 
insofar as it now takes for itself one specific domain amongst all the others, it conceives 
of itself as one specialised science amongst all the others, and borrows from the already 
constituted sciences the criteria for its own scientificity. 
The point, however, is not that this self-conception of philosophy should be denounced 
as incorrect. It is, after all, the situation that philosophy finds itself in. Rather the 
question is: how is this situation to be addressed? If we think that laying the foundations 
of the sciences means providing them with a body of results, handing them the a priori 
categorial structure of their various domains on a plate, then science is strictly speaking 
outside the scope of fundamental ontology, ignored in favour of the reality that presents 
42 'The level which a science has reached is determined by how far it is capable of a crisis in its basic 
concepts. ' Being and Time, p. 29. 'Such crises do not take place 
in the histonological sciences only 




itself prior to scientific investigation. Science is to be thought of as merely the passive 
recipient of the results. But this way of understanding what is meant by laying the 
foundations of the sciences, just as much as any squeamishness at the thought of such 
philosophical hubris, is a symptom of the very way in which philosophy defines itself in 
relation to the sciences. If, on the other hand, we now remember that the existential 
analytic cannot be pursued except on the basis and with the aim of an existentiell 
transformation, we can ask what is that is supposed to be existentielly transformed? 
Precisely the situation of the questioning itself. But how is it to be transformed? By 
reading Being and Time and engaging with it in reading it. Being and Time is addressed 
to science. The active reading of Being and Time is meant to produce a transformation 
in the existence of the sciences themselves, such that the `foundations' of scientific 
research, the necessary existential preconditions for such research, have been made 
ready in that very existence. The question of the centrality of science in Being and Time 
is not to be answered by measuring the extent to which it is the subject of sustained 
thematic analysis, but rather by considering to what extent it is both the background 
against which fundamental ontology defines itself, and the audience to which it 
addresses itself. The place of science in Being and Time is behind it and in front of it. 
All of this is made spectacularly explicit in the address Heidegger gave to the 
academics, that is to say, researchers, assembled before him in his inaugural lecture 
upon assuming the chair of philosophy at Freiburg university: 
We are questioning, here and now, for ourselves. Our existence - in the 
community of researchers, teachers, and students - is determined by science. 
What is happening to us, essentially, in the grounds of our existence, when 
science has become our passion . 
43 Martin Heidegger, 'What is Metaphysics? ' trans. by David Farrell 
Krell, Pathmarks, ed. by William 
McNeill, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 1998), p. 82 
[also Basic Writings, ed. by David 
Farrell Krell, (London, Routledge, 1977,1993). p. 94). This rhetorical 
'we, ' this call from within the 
community of researchers for that community to take up 
the task of transforming itself, is maintained 
throughout the 1930s, most notably perhaps in the 
infamous Rectoral Address of 1933. see `The Self- 
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The timing of this address is also significant. It occurs after Being and Time, at the 
beginning of that period dating roughly from 1928 to 1931 that is commonly supposed 
to mark the beginning of the turn in Heidegger's thinking. That is to say. the explicit 
emphasis upon the situation in which questioning about Being finds itself, occurs 
precisely at the time Heidegger is attempting to push the thinking of Being and Time on 
towards the question of Being in general. It is here that we should expect science to 
become an explicit theme of existential analysis, if, as Heidegger asserts in Being and 
Time, that analysis cannot be undertaken until the question of the relation between 
Being and truth has been clarified. And that is precisely what we do find. The very first 
lecture course that Heidegger gave upon returning to Freiburg in 1928 is almost entirely 
devoted to determining the `essence of science. ' But at the beginning of this lecture 
course Heidegger inserts a word of warning about how such a reflection upon the 
essence of science should not be taken. 
Only one thing still remains to be said, before we finish speaking about the 
crisis [in the sciences]: It would be blind enthusiasm, if you were now for 
example suddenly to begin explaining in the seminar exercises of your 
speciality that the sciences stand authentically in crisis, and tried to reform your 
science with the help of a Heideggerian terminology. 44 
Assertion of the German University, and The Rectorate 1933/34: Facts and Thoughts', trans. by Karsten 
Harries, The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 38 (March 1985), pp. 467-502. But it is also exemplified 
practically as late as 1936 by the seminar group Heidegger organised with the members of the faculty of 
the natural sciences, the notes to which have been published under the title 'The Threat to Science, ' see 
'Die Bedrohung der Wissenschaft', Zur philosophische Aktualität Heideggers - Band 1: Philosophie und 
Politik, ed. by Dietrich Pappenfuss and Otto Pöggler, (Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio Klostermann, 1991), 
pp. 5-27. It recurs even in the 1950s at the very moment Heidegger supposedly denounces science: 
'Science does not think. This is a shocking statement. [... ) Hence we, those of us who come from the 
sciences, must endure what is shocking and strange about thinking - assuming we are ready to learn 
thinking. ' What is Called Thinking?, trans. by J. Glenn Gray. (New York, Harper and Row, 1972), p. 8. 
What is shocking and strange about thinking only endures in being endured by those who come from the 
sciences. Those who would take comfort in Heidegger's rejection of science are surely as incapable of 
experiencing what is shocking and strange about thinking as those who endeavour to set up a 'comfortable 
commerce between thinking and the sciences. ' Ibid. 
44 'Nur das eine mag noch gesagt sein, bevor wir aufhören. über die 
Krisis zu sprechen: Es wäre blinder 
Eifer, wenn Sie nun zum Beispiel in Seminarübungen Ihres Faches plötzlich anfingen zu erzählen, daß die 
Wissenschaften eigentlich in einer Krisis ständen, und wenn Sie versuchten, Ihre Wissenschaft mit Hilfe 
einer Heideggerischen Terminologie zu reformieren. ' 
Martin Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, Band 27: 
Einleitung in die Philosophie, ed. by Otto-Saame and Ina Saame-Speidel, (Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio 
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Being and Time is bracketed by appeals to science. On the one side the project of 
fundamental ontology is introduced in 1925 in the light of a phenomenologv of history 
and nature which will make a philosophy of science possible for the first time. On the 
other side, the effort to push beyond Being and Time and rethink the turn from the 
question of the Being of Dasein to the question of Being in general is couched in terms 
of a reflection upon what is going on in the depths of the existence of we who have 
allowed science to become our passion. Simultaneous with this rhetorical appeal, there 
appears to be a sustained effort to provide an existential interpretation of science. The 
"proof' of science's centrality to the aims of fundamental ontology lies, therefore, in the 
failure ever to accomplish its analysis in terms of fundamental ontology. 
The examination of Heidegger's introductory remarks to the 1925 lecture course has not 
simply confirmed what we already found in Being in Time. It has clarified the kind of 
interest Heidegger has in science, and it has focused our attention on three aspects of the 
subject that appear to be crucial to Heidegger's conception of the way in which a 
philosophy of science should proceed. These three topics are: 
1. ) Science's genesis from pretheoretical experience. 
2. ) The crisis in the sciences. 
3. ) Laying the foundations for the sciences. 
These three topics provide the guiding thread for the exegesis of Heidegger's existential 
conception of science. In the next chapter, I examine Heidegger's analysis of everyday 
existence, out of which scientific activity arises in the first place. Then in chapter three, 
a general account of the genesis of science is derived on the basis of Heidegger's 
examination of a paradigm case, modem mathematical physics. In chapter four, I 
Klostermann, 1996), p. 39 - hereafter referred to as G27. This is the text of the lecture course given at 
Freiburg in the winter of 1928/29. All translations from this work are my own. 
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attempt to reconstruct a Heideggerian interpretation of scientific crisis in the context 
both of the contemporary rhetoric of cultural crisis and contemporary interpretations of 
relativity theory. Chapter five then deals with what Heidegger means bý, 'laving the 
foundations of the sciences. ' Finally, in chapter six. we return to the question of the 
relation between philosophy and science in the light of the interpretation of science that 
has been achieved. Here it will be possible for the first time to gain some understanding 
of the place science has in Heidegger's thinking, and the way that the interpretation of 
science reflects back upon the conception of philosophy itself. 
-4? - 
Chapter Two 
The Everyday Origins of Science 
That science arises out of some kind of pre-scientific experience or activity is clearly 
true, but does it mean anything? One might hold, for instance, that though the sciences 
as a matter of ineluctable fact are indeed conducted by ordinary human beings who had 
ordinary human lives before they ever became scientists and no doubt continue to lead 
ordinary human lives outside the lab, this has got nothing to do with the sciences 
themselves. The scientist is supposed to leave his life at the door. Maybe lie doesn't 
always manage it - perhaps he allows his inalienable sense of superiority to women to 
cloud his judgement for a generation or two, it happens - but a science is scientific 
precisely to the extent that it has procedures for eliminating the prejudices it inherits 
from its workforce. Science becomes science only as it cleanses itself of the pre- 
scientific. The fact, then, that it arises out of the pre-scientific can tell us nothing about 
science itself - it is an empty given. Science has to arise out of something, but precisely 
because science is rationally autonomous, it doesn't matter what. This view of science is 
surprisingly widespread, and certainly not just confined to logical empiricism or 
Popperian rationalism. The Bachelardian concept of an epistemological break, for 
example, is just as much a quarantine device as the obsessively reiterated distinction 
between the context of discovery and the context of justification. Both philosophical 
notions serve to underwrite the rational autonomy, of the sciences. Even a constructivist 
such as Thomas Kuhn can be seen as maintaining the autonomy -ii not strictly 
speaking, rational autonomy - of the sciences. Science is distinguiThed from non- 
scientific activity precisely by the adoption of a paradigm. This adoption of a single 
agreed procedural and theoretical framework imposes order upon a discipline and allows 
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steady progress to be made. Within a science everybody agrees most of the time upon 
what is and what is not important; outside of science nobody ever does. Even when a 
paradigm breaks down in periods of scientific crisis, what is distinctive about research 
communities is the rapidity with which they agree upon a new paradigm. This 
communal consensus, rather than any traditional notion of objectivity, is the crucial 
difference from pre-scientific speculation, which Kuhn identifies as the essential trait of 
mature sciences. ' And it should not be thought that the paradigms, which provide the 
scientists with the rules and standards for their research, might carry over from pre- 
scientific experience some content that would make a pre-scientific metaphysics 
determinative of science and its results. It is not just that paradigms are arbitrary, it is 
even more that they are scientific. A paradigm is a solution to a problem that is taken as 
exemplary. A paradigm is not, at least in Kuhn's more radical formulations, simply a 
conceptual framework. It is rather an already existing body of procedures, some 
theoretical, some practical, which although perhaps very limited in scope are, because of 
their perceived success, taken to be the right way forward. A paradigm serves as a 
template for further investigations, and in so serving gets extended and elaborated, 
perhaps changing beyond all recognition. But what it is important to realise is that this 
use, extension and elaboration of paradigms is a practise peculiar to science itself, and 
that paradigms only exist in the context of their use. Paradigms are not the products of a 
1 See Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, (Chicago, The University of Chicago 
Press, 1962,2"'. ed. enlarged 1970), pp. 10-22; in particular the following passages: 'Acquisition of a 
paradigm and of the more esoteric type of research it permits is a sign of maturity in the development of 
any scientific field. ' (p. 11); `No wonder, then, that in the early stages of the development of any science 
different men confronting the same range of phenomena, but not usually all the same particular 
phenomena, describe and interpret them in different ways. What is surprising, and perhaps also unique in 
its degree to the fields we call science, is that such initial divergences should ever largely disappear. ' (p. 
17); `Ever since prehistoric antiquity one field of study after another has crossed the divide between what 
the historian might call its prehistory as a science and its history proper. ' (p. 21) Collectively, these 
passages confirm that though in its early days a science may be characterised 
by a clash of schools who 
agree on nothing, or a Baconian accumulation of random and unconnected facts, a science is only really a 
science to the extent that it is capable of crossing the divide that marks mature science off 
from all other 
fields: adoption of a single paradigm. 
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prescientific metaphysics, they are its replacement. The single-minded pursuit of 
paradigm elaboration cuts science off from the everyday life surrounding it just as surely 
as any strictures on normativity or the imposition of a neutral observation language. This 
is indicated by the fact that Kuhn's historical investigations always yield internal 
histories of science. Adoption of a paradigm, because it is both arbitrary and scientific, 
effectively seals the development of the science off from any outside cultural or social 
influence. Adoption of the paradigm is the initiation rite which any aspiring research 
student must pass through to enter the hermetic order, guaranteeing its purity. 
On the other hand, one might hold that the fact that the sciences arise out of pre- 
scientific experience is of no great philosophical significance because there is no 
essential difference between scientific and pre-scientific experience. The real 
philosophical problem - the problem of knowledge, how it is possible and what 
guarantees that it is not merely belief - is common to both. Perhaps, science is to be 
distinguished from the assertions of common-sense simply because it is more conscious 
of this problem, and submits more rigorously to the forms of adjudication devised in the 
course of epistemological research. In this regard, science is exemplary for common- 
sense, and is held up as a standard to which we should all aspire. Again, this view is 
common to some unlikely bedfellows. It underlies the programme of teleological 
criticism initiated by Rickert, in which Heidegger himself was schooled, just as much as 
Catnap's programme of logical reduction. That the various forms of empiricism 
obviously take this position shows that though it provides a contrary reason for not 
being fussed about the genesis of science from everyday experience to that provided by 
those who believe in the purity of the sciences, it does not contradict their position. If 
pre-scientific experience is itself theoretical, or science merely the accumulation and 
ordering of sense data already available to us, then either way the fact that science arises 
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out of our pre-scientific activities becomes neither very remarkable nor very 
informative. 
It is important to realise at the outset that Heidegger considers the fact that the sciences 
arise out of our pre-scientific existence to be philosophically significant because he 
disagrees with both positions outlined above. He does not mindlessly commit a fallacy, 
rather he explicitly disputes that there is a fallacy. The belief that the proper 
philosophical concern when it comes to science is the context of justification, and not 
the context of discovery rests in the end upon a distinction between the space of nature - 
that which scientific knowledge is to be about, and a space of reasons - that in which 
scientific knowledge as rational gets justified. This distinction itself is just a 
reformulation of the Cartesian distinction between the res extensa and the res cogitans. 
But this is to get things the wrong way round. The primary phenomenon that calls out 
for philosophical investigation, and is at the same time the basis for any such 
investigation, is that the beings that we are, Dasein, are primarily characterised as 
Being-in-the-world. "World" is to be understood, Heidegger says, `as that "wherein" a 
factical Dasein as such can be said to "live". '2 The insistence upon Being-in-the-world 
as a priori, is meant to suggest that what is fundamental to Dasein is the structured 
totality of ways of being in the world. World is that in which Dasein moves and dwells, 
it is the structured totality in which Dasein necessarily already finds itself prior to any 
inquiry into itself or anything else. 
It is absurd to wish to subject to a proof of existence that which founds in their 
very being all questioning of a world and all attempts to prove and demonstrate 
that the world exists. World in its most proper sense is just that which is 
already on hand for any questioning. 
3 
2 Being and Time, p. 93. 
3 HCT, p. 215. 
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But if, as we suggest, we thus find phenomenally that knowing is a kind of Being which belongs to Being-in-the-world, one might object that with such an Interpretation of knowing, the problem of knowledge is nullified; for what is 
left to be asked if one presupposes that knowing is already `alongside' its 
world, when it is not supposed to reach that world except in the transcending of 
the subject? In this question the constructive `standpoint', which has not been 
phenomenally demonstrated, again comes to the fore; but quite apart from this, 
what higher court is to decide whether and in what sense there is to be any 
problem of knowledge other than that of the phenomenon of knowing as such 
and the kind of Being that belongs to the knower? 4 
In other words, the problem of knowledge presupposes that we already know what 
knowledge is, and then asks how there can be knowledge of the external world. It asks 
an ontical question about knowledge, but then draws ontological conclusions from the 
answer. The problem of knowledge is ontico-ontologically confused. in that on the one 
hand it poses itself as a question about a particular sort of knowledge - knowwwled;, c of the 
external world as opposed, say, to knowledge of our own internal mental states - asking 
how knowledge, already determined as something or other, can as this something or 
other be knowledge of the external world; but at the same time it takes the answer, or 
rather the lack of an answer, to be ontologically- indicative, in that doubt as to the 
possibility of knowledge of the external world casts doubt upon the possibility of 
knowledge at all, since knowledge as such is taken to be knowledge of the external 
world or nothing at all. The sleight of hand should be instantly apparent. Knowledge of 
the external world is taken to be on the one hand analogous to knowledge of some 
particular thing or fact, say the number of the planets, and therefore to be something 
which we may or may not have, and on the other hand to be essentially characteristic of 
knowledge as such, thus suggesting that knowledge as such may be something which we 
either do or do not have. But the question is not whether we do or do not have 
knowledge as such, but rather what it is that knowledge proves to be, and in particular 
what `having' it might mean. The question is not do we 
have knolt-ledge, but rather in 
° Being, and Time, p. 88. 
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what way do we have knowledge - what does this having mean? And this question is 
clearly prior, in a purely analytic sense, to the question of what knowledge, if any. we 
can actually have, in this as yet unanalysed sense of `have. ' 
And because knowing is only one way in which human beings find themselves to be in a 
world, only one mode of Being-in-the-world, Heidegger also disputes the second reason 
for denying the philosophical importance of the genesis of science out of pre-scientific 
existence: the assumption that there is no essential difference between scientific and pre- 
scientific experience, that all experience is to a greater or lesser extent a form of 
knowing the world. Heidegger insists that on the contrary the reality which is already 
given prior to any scientific investigation, and out of which the sciences carve their 
various domains, is not known, and it is precisely this which allows it to be a priori. In 
the 1925 lecture course, for example, Heidegger says, `But the world into which concern 
has fallen at any given time is not thematically perceived, not thought, not known, and it 
is just this which grounds the possibility of an original reality. '5 Things are already 
present for us in so far as they concern us, or better yet, in so far as they are caught up in 
our concerns, without us having had to fix our attention explicitly upon them. Concern, 
not knowing, is the primary mode of Being-in-the-world. And this. realisation 
necessitates a fundamental reorientation of the way we go about 
inquiring into the 
possibility of any kind of knowledge, scientific included. 
If we do not explain our encounter of the world from our apprehension of 
it but 
instead understand the later as based on the former, then it becomes clear that 
it 
is the presence of what is of concern which first and 
foremost brings to light 
what we in the context of theoretical apprehension 
designate as the 
immediately given. The genuine immediate datum is thus once again not the 
perceived but what is present in concerned preoccupation. 
5 HCl', p. 193. 
6 HCT, pp. 194-95. 
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But this reorientation is not merely necessitated by the phenomenal facts, it promises to 
side-step, as it were, the pitfalls that bedevil the traditional approach to the problem of 
knowledge. In particular, the concept of `the thing in itself as that which remains 
stubbornly transcendent to all knowledge does not so much vanish, as find itself entirely 
demystified. Heidegger tells us that the `basic phenomenal trait' of that which is of 
concer, is: 
presence in the manner of inconspicuousness, its presence precisely on the 
basis of not yet being apprehended and nevertheless having [been] discovered 
primarily, permitting encounter. 
It is on this basis that we understand the sense of a favourite expression, that of 
the `in-itself' of the being of the world. It is customary to point out that the 
world is first there not on account of a subject, the world is rather `in itself. ' 
The frequent use of this expression `in-itself of course never tells us anything 
about its sense. ? 
And indeed in its customary usage the term has no positive sense. The phrase `in itself 
which is supposed to characterise what we mean by reality - how thirgs are in 
themselves and not how they may simply appear to us - is a purely negative marker, 
pointing to a transcendental X, which must be posited if appearances are indeed to be 
appearances of something, but about which nothing further can be said. It now however 
acquires a positive phenomenal interpretation. The `in itself no longer refers to a 
transcendental realm forever shut off from our perception, an absolute absence, but 
rather to the primary form of presence - the presence of what is of concern to us, but 
which we need not be directly cognisant of. How something is `in itself still refers, if 
you like, to how it is before it is perceived, but it is not so much a question of that which 
cannot be perceived, as rather a question of what it is that enables that which is present, 
nevertheless not to be perceived. The `in itself' s not hidden from us by something else, 
the veil of appearances, say; rather it is inconspicuous to us 
in its very proximity to us. 
After all, something inconspicuous is inconspicuous not 
because of anything else, but 
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precisely in itself, because it keeps itself to itself and does not draw attention to itself. 
This "holding itself in, " as Heidegger dubs it in Being and Time, `this is what we have 
our eye upon in the "Being-in-itself' of something. ' 
The presence of the specific world of concern means precisely non-ohjcetivity 
as something apprehended. For the time being, the following question will 
be 
left open: To what extent is there actually a world present in concern and why 
does reality mean non-objectivity9 
The true phenomenal sense of the `in-itself' is however fully visible in its 
structure only when we have clarified this very presence of what is of concern 
and understood it in its primacy. This will also show the extent to which non- 
objectivity is and can be constitutive of reality. The non-objectivity, of the 
immediately given world is not nothing; it is a positive phenomenal character 
belonging to the presencing of the environing world. 1° 
Heidegger is, therefore, attempting to clarify the phenomenon of knowledge by untying 
a series of knots of our own making. For Heidegger, the phrase `objective reality' is 
simply an oxymoron, and as such it blocks not just the possibility of any genuine 
understanding of what might be meant by reality, but equally any hope of getting a grip 
on what might constitute `objective knowledge. ' 
What comes before knowledge is what Heidegger has already designated as encounter. 
We are in the world and encounter the entities within it prior to amassing any 
knowledge about it or them. The encounter with entities is the phenomenon that must be 
interrogated, if the basis for our knowledge of things is to be uncovered. There is simply 
nowhere else to turn. 
The being of entities does not lie in the activity of encountering them, but the 
encounter of entities is the phenomenal basis, and the sole 
basis, upon which 
1HCT, p. 197. 
8 Being and Time, p. 106. 
9 HCT, p. 193. 
10 HCT, pp. 197-98. 
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the being of entities can be grasped. Only the interpretation of the encounter 
with such entities can secure the being of entities, if at all. 11 
`Encounter' translates the German verb begegnen, but it cannot capture the peculiarity 
of the German idiom. Used reflexively, the verb means `to meet' usually by chance, to 
run into, ' and has persons as its subject. When used to mean an encounter with a thing. 
however, it is the thing and not the person that is the subject. Das Ding ist nur bepcýgirer 
would normally be translated as `I encountered the thing, ' but literally, since begegnen 
derives from gegen ('against'), the phrase means something like `The thing has run up 
against me. ' Heidegger seizes upon the idiom because it emphasises that the notion of 
encountering is not merely an extension of the idea of experience, certainly not as 
understood in Kantian terms, but is in some sense its reversal. For Kant experience of an 
object is the product of the subject's activity, specifically the unification of a manifold 
under a concept. The object is constituted by this grasping of the manifold in its unity. 
Now, it would be perfectly possible to complain that Kant had far too restricted a notion 
of experience, and to argue that in fact all human activity, not merely the synthetic 
activity of the understanding, was constitutive of objectivity. Objects would then be 
constituted by the various human activities that grasped them. Heidegger's use of the 
word begegnen should alert us, however, from the very start to the fact that this is not, 
despite appearances, what he is going to argue. On the contrary, the encounter does not 
constitute an object, rather things are discovered in the encounter. 
Does this mean that encountering is as purely passive as 
Kantian intuition - that it is 
nothing more than a waiting for things to happen? 
Not at all. When an acorn falls from 
an oak tree upon the ground, the ground 
does not encounter the acorn. But if it should 
fall upon the head of someone walking underneath the tree, 
then that person does indeed 
encounter it. Wherein lies the difference? 
That the person is conscious of a light blow 
" HCT, p. 217. 
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upon the head, as presumably the ground is not? Yes and no, because consciousness of a 
light blow upon the head is indeed one way of encountering something, but 
consciousness by no means exhausts the various ways of encountering things. Heidegger 
would want to say that the person equally encounters the roots of the tree when she steps 
over them, whether she is conscious of stepping over them or not. Perhaps rubbing her 
head and looking ruefully up, she is now conscious only of the branches and the leaves 
against the sky, yet nonetheless she does not stumble but picks her way carefully 
between the tracery of roots only half submerged in the ground. Her encounter with the 
roots, then, occurs through avoiding them while walking, in other words, through a 
modification of her behaviour that takes them into account. Heidegger uses the German 
verb sich verhalten to designate this relation to things -a relation which manifests itself 
in the modification of one's own behaviour. Sich verhalten in ordinary usage means `to 
behave', `to act', while sich zu etwas verhalten means `to have an attitude towards 
something. ' The infinitival noun Verhalten means `behaviour or `conduct', while the 
noun Verhältnis, also derived from the verb, has as one of its meanings `relationship'. 
Thus the phrase sich zu etwas verhalten could also be construed as literally meaning `to 
relate oneself to something, ' and indeed this is how it does get translated at times by 
Macquarrie and Robinson. ' 2 The usual translation, standard to most translators, is 
however `comportment' for Verhalten and `to comport oneself (towards something)' for 
sich (zu etwas) verhalten. This is fine as long as one remembers that to comport oneself 
towards something does not necessarily mean to direct one's attention or even activities 
at it specifically. Rather it means that in one's behaviour there is already a relationship 
to things, whether or not that behaviour actually acts, so to speak, upon them. This is 
12 See Being and Time, fn. 1, p. 23, and fn. 1, p. 162. 
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why Heidegger can say, `to speak of intentional comportment is already a pleonasm. '' 3 
In other words, all human behaviour is intentional in Brentano's sense of the word. 
Intentionality no longer belongs simply to consciousness (of something). Indeed 
intentionality now gets defined in terms of comportment, so there can no longer be any 
confusion between it and the content of a mental act. `The expression "relation of 
perception" means, not a relation into which perception first enters as one of the relata 
and which falls to perception as in itself free of relation, but rather a relation which 
perceiving itself is as such. This relation, which we signify by intentionality, is the a 
priori comportmental character of what we call self-comporting. ' 14 Thus intentionality 
is the intrinsic character of behaviour that it is itself a relating to things, a relating 
however that is not necessarily directed at anything, but rather is a self-modification that 
takes things into account. This taking things into account, of course, still remains 
mysterious, and we are tempted to view it as some sort of tacit knowledge, based 
perhaps on implicit perception. Surely, in order to be able to step over the roots of a tree, 
I, or at least some part of me, must know where they are? And in order to know where 
they are, must I, or again at least some part of me, not at some point have perceived 
them? 
Laying this worry aside for a moment, we can see that the encounter with things is 
inextricably bound up with comportment towards things. There only ever is any 
encounter with things because we are self-comporting, and all comportment is self- 
modifying on the basis of the encounter with things. We can also see how 
encountering/comporting redescribes the passivity/activity of Kantian sensibility and 
13 Martin Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, trans. by Albert Hofstadter, (Bloomington 
and Indianapolis, Indiana University Press, 1982), p. 61 - hereafter referred to as BPP. This is the text of 
the lecture course Heidegger gave at Marburg in the summer of 1927, first published in German as volume 
24 of the Gesamtausgabe, Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie. ed. by Friedrich-Wilhelm von 
Herrmann, (Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio Klostermann, 1975) - hereafter referred to as G24. 
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understanding, so as to avoid the seemingly inevitable conclusion that the activity of the 
understanding must work upon the passively received content of sensibility so as to 
form it into objects of experience. In the Kantian schema, the conditions of possibility of 
experience, i. e. the categories, are themselves the necessary determinations of the 
objects of experience. Here it is the other way around. The condition of possibility of 
encountering a thing, i. e. behaviour, does not determine the thing encountered, rather the 
thing encountered determines the behaviour. Behaviour is the condition of possibility of 
encountering a thing because it opens up a `space' within which that encounter can take 
place, but that `space' is precisely the behaviour itself and the encounter is nothing other 
than the modification, that is to say the determination, of the `space' of behaviour. 
This leads us back to our initial worry. How does behaviour take the thing encountered 
into account? At first sight, Heidegger undoes all the work he has just done by 
answering very simply that it is understanding which allows comportment to take 
something into account and thus make the encounter with it possible. 
In all comportment toward beings - whether it is specifically cognitive, which 
is most frequently called theoretical, or whether it is practical-technical - an 
understanding of being is already involved. For a being can be encountered by 
us as a being only in the light of the understanding of being... 
... 
[Understanding] is as such the condition of possibility for all of the Dasein's 
particular possible manners of comportment. It is the condition of possibility 
for all kinds of comportment, not only practical but also cognitive. The 
explanatory and understanding sciences - if this classification is admitted as 
being at all legitimate - are possible only because the Dasein, as existent, is 
itself an intrinsically understanding entity. ' 15 
This reintroduction of understanding as the condition of possibility of comportment and 
encounter would seem to reinstate the traditional relation between cognition of a thing 
and action towards it, restoring the traditional primacy of epistemology. But Heidegger 
14 BPP, p. 61. The last sentence reads in German: `Diese Beziehung, die wir mit Intentionalität meinen, ist 
der apriorische Verhältnischarackter dessen, was wir mit Sichverhalten bezeichnen. ' G24, p. 85. 
's BPP, pp. 275-77. 
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is repeatedly insistent that, `With the term "understanding" [ Verstehen] we have in mind 
a fundamental existentiale, which is neither a definite species of cognition [Erkennen] 
distinguished, let us say, from explaining and conceiving, nor any cognition at all in the 
sense of grasping something thematically. ' 16 Or again: `And what is more, in the end 
understanding [ Verstehen] is not at all primarily a cognition [Erkennen] but - since 
existence is indeed more than mere cognition in the usual spectator sense of knowledge 
and such knowledge presupposes existence -a basic determination of existence itself. ' 17 
What then is understanding, if it cannot be understood in terms of conceptual 
knowledge, but rather is radically antecedent to such knowledge? In both Being and 
Time and Basic Problems of Phenomenology Heidegger appeals to the normal usage of 
the verb verstehen: 
When we are talking ontically we sometimes use the expression "understanding 
something" [ "etwas verstehen "] with the signification of "being able to 
manage something" [ "einer Sache vorstehen können "], "being a match for it" 
[ "ihr gewachsen sein "], "being competent to do something" [ "etwas 
können , ]. 18 
In German we say that someone can vorstehen something - literally, stand in 
front of or ahead of it, that is stand at its head, administer, manage, preside over 
it. This is equivalent to saying that he versteht sich darauf, understands in the 
sense of being skilled or expert at it [has the know-how of it]. The meaning of 
the term "understanding" [Verstehen] as defined above is intendedr to go back 
to this usage in ordinary language. ' 9 
Understanding, then, is something like `know-how. ' It is an ability - an ability to cope 
with something - not a representation of something. Nor need this 
know-how be 
dependent on such conceptual representations. To use an example of Wittgenstein's, one 
doesn't have to be able to draw a map of a town, to know one's way around it. 
20 The 
16 Being and Time, p. 385. 
" BPP, p. 276. 
18 Being and Time, p. 183. 
19 BPP, p. 276. 
20 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Zettel, trans. by G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1967), para. 
516. 
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point of this example is not just that one doesn't have to have a map in order to find 
one's way around, rather the fact that one may actually be unable to draw a map even 
though one can find one's way around points to the logical priority of being able to find 
one's way around. To anyone who argued that being able to find one's way around 
necessarily presupposes some kind of internal map, albeit not one that one necessarily 
was aware of, one would have to reply that this fundamentally misunderstands how real 
maps work. A real map presupposes that one already knows how to find one's way 
around, most obviously on the map itself, but also in the world at large. How else could 
the wanderings of one's finger upon the surface of the map be translated into one's 
wanderings upon the surface of the earth? An internal map if it really were to be the 
precondition for knowing one's way around would have to be something entirely 
different from an actual map, and so would probably be better called something else 
altogether. 
Understanding [Verstehen], then, as know-how, that is to say, the ability to cope with 
things, is inherent in all behaviour [Verhalten], and is a precondition for any encounter 
[Begegnen] with things that might arise out of such behaviour. Knowledge [Erkennen] 
comes after the encounter with things, and is dependent upon that encounter for that 
which it is knowledge of - what Heidegger calls the pregiven reality. 
Know-how cannot 
in its turn be dependent upon knowledge, not even implicit knowledge, because as we 
have seen the idea that know-how might simply be the application of 
knowledge 
surreptitiously invokes the idea of some further know-how, namely the ability to apply 
that knowledge. Does this mean, then, that know-how is something basic beyond wt 
hich 
we cannot go in our analysis? 
21 In which case, how do we know what know-how is? 
21 This would certainly seem to be Hubert Dreyfus's position, whose exposition 
of Heidegger's notion of 
understanding in terms of coping I have so 
far been following pretty closely. 'But on the other hand, 
originary transcendence (being-in-the-world, 
disclosure) is not something radically different from ontic 
transcending (transparent coping with specific things, 
discovering); rather, it is the same sort of coping 
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Shouldn't our suspicions be aroused by the fact that any determinacy which attaches to 
know-how seems to ride upon its characterisation as an ability to cope with something? 
Be that as it may, we can already see, broadly at least, how a Heideggerian account of 
science will proceed. It will consist of two steps. In the first place, there will be an 
analysis of encountering comportment. In the second place, there should be some 
account of how theoretical knowledge arises out of that encountering comportment. But 
since on the one hand understanding is the condition of possibility of comportment, 
while on the other hand cognition is characterised by Heidegger as a particular kind of 
comportment, which therefore will have its own particular kind of understanding, it is 
clear that understanding is the lynch-pin that both underpins and connects the two steps. 
The rest of this chapter, therefore, will consist of two sections: the first on how things 
are encountered in comportment; the second on the understanding which makes such 
comportment possible. This prepares the way for the next chapter, where the 
modification of the understanding inherent in the genesis of scientific behaviour is 
examined. 
Worldhood and the Being of the Ready-to-hand 
The starting point (Ansatz) of the investigation is Being-in-the-world (In-der-Welt-sehr). 
`In the interpretation of Dasein, this structure is something "a priori". '22 This means that 
Being-in-the-world is not arrived at at the end of the existential analytic as a result, 
something deduced and therefore proved to be fundamentally constitutive of Dasein. 
functioning as the holistic background for all purposive comportment... One needs to 
be finding one's 
way about in the world in order to use equipment, but finding one's way about 
is just more coping. Any 
specific activity of coping takes place on the background of more general coping. 
Being-in-the-world is, 
indeed, ontologically prior - in Heidegger's special sense, a priori - as 
the ontological condition of the 
possibility of specific activities, yet being-in-the-world 
is just more skilled activity. ' Hubert Dreyfus, 
Being in the World A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time. 
Division 1, (Cambridge, MA: 
London; The MIT Press; 1991,7t' printing 1997), p. 107. 
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But neither is it something posited as a first principle from which the various possible 
kinds of encounter with entities could be deduced, so that the validity of the whole 
investigation would stand or fall with the validity of its initial assumption. Rather it is 
something already there that must be `laid bare' as the investigation goes ahead, if the 
investigation is to go ahead at all. 23 Being-in-the-world is not an axiom, from which a 
model of human being is systematically constructed; it is not an alternative to the cogito, 
but rather the a priori condition of impossibility of all axiomatics. This is perhaps what 
Heidegger had in mind when in a footnote to Being and Time he said, `But to disclose 
the a priori is not to make an 'a-prioristic' construction. Edmund Husserl has not only 
enabled us to understand once more the meaning of any genuine philosophical 
empiricism; he has also given us the necessary tools. '24 
All comportment towards entities, therefore, takes place in the world, and it is 
Heidegger's contention that no encounter with entities could take place except in the 
context of a world. But what world is, that is to say its worldliness (Weltlichkeit), cannot 
be decided beforehand, but can only be determined precisely through an analysis of that 
encounter with entities which takes place in the world. This structure can be best 
delineated by investigating the world that is always closest to us, the world of everyday 
existence that can never be escaped from because it is in some sense the prerequisite for 
all other kinds of worldly living. This world Heidegger calls `the environment' 
(Umwelt), the world that is immediately around us. `We shall seek the woridhood of the 
22 Beingrand Time, p. 63. 
23 `Adhering to the procedure which wie have fixed upon for starting our investigation. wie must lay bare a 
fundamental structure in Dasein: Being-in-the-world. ' (Being and Time, p. 63. ) 'Unter 
Festhaltung des 
fixierten Ansatzes der Untersuchung ist am Dasein eine Fundamentalstruktur freizulegen: das In-der-Welt- 
sein. ' (SZ, p. 41. ) And again, at the beginning of chapter 2: 'But these 
determinations of the Being of 
Dasein must now be seen and understood a priori on the basis of the state of 
Being which we call "Being- 
in-the-world". The right initial approach consists in the interpretation of this constitutive state. 
' (Being 
and Time, p. 78, trans. slightly altered. ) `Diese Seinsbestimmungen 
des Daseins müssen nun aber a priori 
auf dem Grunde der Seinsverfassung gesehen und verstehen werden, 
die wir das In-der-Welt-sein nennen. 
Der rechte Ansatz der Analytik des Daseins besteht in 
der Auslegung dieser Verfassung. ' (SZ, p. 53. ) 
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environment (environmentality) by going through an ontological Interpretation of those 
entities within-the-environment which we encounter as closest to us. '25 We encounter 
entities within the environment in our everyday dealings (Umgang) with them. By 
investigating how these dealings take place, by looking at what this tells us about the 
entities thus encountered, we uncover the Being of these beings, and at the same time 
the worldhood of the world in which they are encountered. 
In our everyday dealings with the world we encounter things precisely because they are 
materially implicated in those dealings. We come across something because it is 
somehow bound up with what we are doing. The door-handle is that with which we 
open the door in order to go outside. We encounter the door handle not just when we 
look at it, but also, when we open the door with it. In fact, xve only really encounter it as 
a door handle when we open the door with it. Just looking at it, we could not tell if it 
were a door handle, unless we already knew that we could open the door with it. In other 
words, a purely visual encounter with it as a door handle, is dependent upon at least the 
possibility of encountering it by actually using it as a door handle. Use, however, does 
not exhaust the ways in which something can be caught up in our affairs. We may 
encounter something precisely because it gets in the way of what we'rc doing. Or 
something may actually be essential to what we're doing, without us really using it - 
unless we want to push the word way beyond its normal usage. Do I use the floor when I 
stand upon it? Nor do things which do get used in what we're doing, get used in exactly 
the same kind of way. Something may be used as raw material in the production of 
something else, or as a tool that works upon that raw material. Or something may be 
used not in the production of anything at all, but in order to accomplish some task. 
But 
though this is true both of a book and a bus, clearly they are not used in the exactly same 
24 Being and Time, fn 10, p. 490. 
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way either. This is why Heidegger shies away from saying that the kind of comportment 
towards things found in our everyday affairs is simply one of use. The word is both too 
prescriptive and too vague. 
Heidegger does however choose a particular word to denote the kind of things that we 
by and large encounter in our everyday concerns. This word is Zeug, which could be 
translated into English as `gear' or `equipment', or even 'stuff. Heidegger chooses it for 
its generality, but also because it is used widely in compounds that have very specific 
meanings, depending on the spheres of human activity in which they are used. Thus 
Heidegger cites Schreibzeug `writing things', Nähezeug `sewing kit', Werkzeug `tool'. 
Fahrzeug `vehicle', and Meßzeug `measuring instrument'. 26 In addition, one could 
mention Spielzeug `toy' and Flugzeug `aircraft'. Zeug, therefore, denotes the kind of 
things encountered in our everyday activities, while indicating that there is no 
overarching `use' to which these things are put. An instrument is not a special kind of 
tool, unless you empty `tool' of most of its usual meaning, and it would sound very odd 
indeed to describe a vehicle either as a tool or as an instrument, while it is not at all 
certain that a toy would even remain a toy if one actually used it for anything. 
What these things do have in common, however, is that they can never exist alone. 
`Taken strictly, there "is" no such thing as an equipment. '27 Any piece of equipment 
always comes as part of a kit. The door handle comes with the door. The door comes 
with the room. And this is not merely accidental. A piece of equipment is a piece of 
equipment precisely because it plays a part in a collection of equipment. This means 
that something that is encountered in the course of our affairs, is not just bound up with 
those affairs, but is already bound up with other things. Indeed, it 
is only bound up with 
25 Being and Time, p. 94. 
2e SZ, p. 68. 
2' Being and Time, p. 97. 
-60- 
our affairs, and therefore only encounterable, because it is bound up x ith things that 
drag it, as it were, into the circle of our concerns. 
Equipment - in accordance with its equipmentality - always is in terms of [ iu ] 
its belonging to other equipment: ink-stand, pen, ink, paper, blotting pad, table, 
lamp, furniture, windows, doors, room. These "Things" never show themselves 
proximally as they are for themselves, so as to add up to a sum of realia and fill 
up a room. What we encounter as closest to us (though not as something taken 
as a theme) is the room; and we encounter it not as something "between four 
walls" in a geometrical spatial sense, but as equipment for residing. Out of this 
the "arrangement" emerges, and it is in this that any "individual" item of 
equipment shows itself. Before it does so, a totality of equipment has already 
been discovered. 29 
This means that the piece of equipment does not merely have relations with other things, 
rather in some sense it is nothing other than those relations. This is why Heidegger uses 
the preposition aus ('out', `from'). The individual thing arises out of, comes from the 
equipmental whole - it is what it is only on the basis of its place 
in the system. But its 
place in the system is precisely to move us onto something else in the system. A piece of 
equipment is always there in order to do something else. Its constitutive relation to the 
other things is not merely static, but is precisely a passing on; its place to be taken 
in 
succession. The door knob is not what it is simply in terms of its relation to the 
door, 
rather the doorknob is for opening (or shutting) the door. But this 
functionality does not 
simply relate the doorknob to the door, rather what the 
doorknob is for bears itself a 
relation to what the door is for, i. e. leaving (or entering) the room. 
In fact, it allows it. 
What the doorknob is for, is, in the end, simply to give access to what the 
door is for. 
Heidegger uses the term Verweisung to describe this 
kind of relation inherent in the 
structure of the in-order-to. Verweisung means 
both `expulsion' and `referral', but 
`referral' in the specific sense in which a GP might refer you to a specialist. 
The door- 
knob's functionality does not simply refer to the functionality of the 
door, as one might 
refer in passing to the weather, rather 
it passes one over to it. The functionality of the 
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doorknob deports itself into the functionality of the door; and in fact this is the function 
of functionality in general. What the doorknob is, is its in-order-to. And yet what a 
doorknob is in-order-to, is precisely to let it go. 
The piece of equipment is not merely embedded in the system of equipment, it must 
actually withdraw (zurückziehen) in order to be effectively what it is, something that 
enables something else to be what it is. 29 But this is not a withdrawal from the limelight, 
as if each piece of equipment were allowed its brief moment of glory before handing 
over to the next piece. Rather the withdrawal is structural and inherent. By and large the 
things encountered in our everyday dealings are not focused upon at all, and do not 
come explicitly into view even when we are using them. Indeed, the less they come into 
view the better: `the less we just stare at the hammer-Thing, and the more we seize hold 
of it and use it, the more primordial does our relationship to it become, and the more 
unveiledly is it encountered as that which it is - as equipment. '"' This does not mean, 
however, that our attention is focused elsewhere; on the goal we are aiming at perhaps. 
the final product of our activities rather than the tools in use. Heidegger emphasises this 
in Basic Problems of Phenomenology: 
When I am completely engrossed in dealing with something and make use of 
some equipment in this activity, I am just not directed toward the equipment as 
such, say, toward the tool. And I am just as little directed toward the work 
itself. Instead, in my occupation I move in the functionality relations as such. In 
understanding them I dwell with the equipmental contexture that is handy. I 
stand neither with the one nor with the other but move in the in-order-to [ Um- 
zu]. It is for this reason that we have dealings [Umgang] with things - not 
merely a path of access [Zugang] towards something lying in front of us, but a 
dealing with things as they exhibit themselves as equipment in an equipmental 
contexture. 31 
28 Being and Time, pp. 97-98. 
29 Being and Time, p. 99. 
30 Being and Time, p. 98. 
31 BPP, p. 293, trans. slightly altered. 'Wenn 
ich ganz hingegeben mit etwas beschäftigt bin und dabei 
irgendein Zeug gebrauche, so bin ich gerade nicht auf 
das Zeug als solches gerichtet, etwa auf das 
Handwerkszeug. Ebensowenig bin ich auf das Werk selbst gerichtet, sondern 
in der Beschäftigung bewege 
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It is not even as if one were focused upon the functionality relations between things 
rather than the things themselves. Fully occupied by the task, one moves in the 
functionality relations that tie the various bits of equipment together, like a fish in water. 
The kind of awareness that accompanies this movement is precisely not a directedness. 
`The view in which the equipmental contexture stands at first, completely unobtrusive 
and unthought, is the view and sight of practical circumspection [Umsicht], of our 
practical everyday orientation. '32 But circumspection, Umsicht, does not mean simply to 
survey the scene, to look around; rather, circumspectively we find our way around. 
`When we enter here through the door, we do not apprehend the seats as such... 
Nevertheless, they are there in this peculiar way: we go by them circumspectively, avoid 
them circumspectively, stumble against them and the like. " To be circumspect means 
to act in accordance with the way things are, in line with how they are set up; to be 
prudent and not rock the boat. It is imprudent to rock the boat because of the likely 
consequences. Prudence is a proper sense of the order of things, the way one thing 
follows upon another. The uni in Umsicht is not so much the uni of the herum, the 
`round about' or the `hereabouts, ' rather it is the um of the Um-zu, the in-order-to. But 
this is, in fact, true of all the words that cluster around the um, not just the Umgang 
('dealings'), but the Umwelt ('environment') as well. And this means that what is round 
about, the meaning of um exemplified in such words as Umgebung and Umkreis 
('vicinity', `surroundings') as well as Umwelt, is only round about because it is involved 
in the complex web of in-order-tos. The immediate vicinity is not distinguished from the 
remote by distance, but by relevance. There only is something like an environment, a 
ich mich in den Bewandtnisbezügen als solchen. Im 
Verstehen derselben halte ich mich beim zuhandenen 
Zeugzusannmenhang auf. Ich stehe weder beim einen noch 
beim anderen, sondern ich bewege mich im 
Um-zu. Daher haben wir Umgang mit den Dingen, nicht einen 
bloßen Zugang auf etwas Vorliegendes, 
sondern einen Umgang mit den Dingen, sofern sie als 
Zeug in einem Zeugzusammenhang sich zeigen. ' 
G24, p. 416. 
32 BPP, p. 163. 
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neighbourhood of things, because the structure of the in-order-to knits them together - 
this is what their `closeness' consists of. Yet the notion of `around' does not simply get 
eliminated in what would be a pure reduction of a derivative, secondary and perhaps 
metaphorical meaning to the original and true one. This is because the Um--71i, the 'in- 
order-to' already contains a notion of circulation. The `in-order-to' gets, if you like, 
passed around within the equipmental whole, but never points outside of it. 'The work 
to be produced, as the "towards-which" of such things as the hammer, the plane, and the 
needle, likewise has the kind of Being that belongs to equipment. ... It lets us encounter 
already the "towards which" for which it is usable. '34 Circumspection, Umsicht, cannot 
be a gaze directed at, or an attention focused upon, the Um-zu, the `in-order-to', because 
the Um-zu is already dispersed throughout the equipmental whole. Just when you think 
you've got it pinned down it moves on to something else, or if you think you've got to 
the end of the chain you find yourself back at the beginning again, as in the song 
`There's a hole in my bucket'. 
Equipment, then, is only genuinely encountered in circumspective dealings (umsichtige 
Umgänge) with it - perhaps when it is employed for what it was meant for, when, for 
example, the hammer is picked up and used for hammering, but not just then. The table 
is literally umsichtig umgegangen i. e. `prudently gone around' every time one doesn't 
knock into it, whether or not one sits down at it, or puts anything on it, i. e. employs it as 
what it is meant for. The encounter is genuine because what is encountered is 
encountered as what it is. There is no room for scepticism or illusion in this encounter 
because the encountering and the encountered fit together like hand and glove, or more 
appropriately hand and handle. `The hammering does not simply have knowledge about 
(uni] the hammer's character as equipment, but it has appropriated this equipment in a 
33 BPP, p. 163. 
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way that could not possibly be more suitable. '35 In employing a piece of equipment, %e 
discover what it is. `The functionality that goes with chair, blackboard, window is 
exactly that which makes the thing what it is. '36 This functionality is brought to light 
precisely in employing the equipment. But this discovery, this bringing to light, is not 
the representation or even the reproduction of something already there in the equipment, 
rather employment of the equipment realises its functionality, makes it actual. 
Employment doesn't tell us about the functionality of the equipment; it demonstrates it. 
It acts it out, as it were. How what something is gets manifested is not a property of the 
thing itself, rather it is an ontological characteristic of the Being of the thing. That a 
piece of equipment has a specific manipulability [Handlichkeit] linked to its 
functionality is an ontical characteristic of it. But the fact that it is ontically 
characterised by manipulability at all is an ontological characteristic of equipment as 
such; i. e. of the Being of equipment. Equipment is the kind of thing that is made 
manifest as what it is by being taken up and put into employment. This requires both 
that it is in some very general sense of the word `manipulable' (handlich) and that it be 
`available' (verfügbar). Heidegger sums up this dual ontological requirement with the 
term Zuhandenheit. That something is zuhanden means simply that it is to hand. 
Macquarrie and Robinson translate it as `ready-to-hand' so as to indicate that equipment 
is not merely available, within reach as it were, but is ready for its specific use, shaped 
to it as it were. `Readiness-to-hand', Zuhandenheit, denotes, then, in the most general 
way possible, the kind of Being that belongs to equipment. 
So far I have been cheating slightly, by talking blithely of the `functionality' of 
equipment and its `involvement' in the `in-order-to'. These are the words chosen by the 
30 Being and Time, p. 99. 
3s Being and Time, p. 99. 
36 BPP, p. 164. 
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translators of Basic Problems of Phenomenology and Being and Time respectivel\- to 
render the German word Bewandtnis into English. But though `functionality' and 
`involvement' both get at what Heidegger is about, they are not what Bev undt, zis means. 
This is important because it is not Heideggers business to present us with a result; sav, 
that the Being of equipment is its functionality. Rather Heidegger does not want to 
presuppose the concept of functionality at all. This is because the concept of 
functionality is already bound up with a whole series of other concepts, `act', and 
`purpose', for instance, that threaten to prejudice the enquiry from the outset. It would 
be very easy to see Heidegger's entire project as consisting of a switch of emphasis from 
the subject as perceiver, to the subject as actor. Functionality, then, would be to the 
things which the acting subject picks up and uses, as the categoriai is to the objects of 
perception. In other words, to say that the ready-to-hand is its functionality, could be 
read as saying that what a piece of equipment is, is something imposed by the 
spontaneous action of a subject. Or perhaps better, to say that the ready-to-hand is its 
functionality is to beg the question, because any attempt to say what functionality is 
comes up against the task of saying what an action is. Instead Heidegger wants to work 
towards a phenomenological description of a structure which will turn out to give us 
something very like what we have always meant by `functionality. ' This working out 
however tells us what `functionality' is, and it tells us what it is by lighting upon an at 
first innocuous and highly idiomatic word, and unpacking what is implicit in the 
seemingly merely idiomatic usage. This technique does not rely upon an a priori and 
dogmatic assertion of the identity of reality and idiom, however. No doubt, there are 
many idioms which cast no light upon the truth. Rather, in unpacking the idiom we are 
meant to recognise that that is indeed the way it is. And this recognition can only come 
because we are already acquainted with the phenomenon being interpreted. 
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The ordinary usage of Bewandtnis is highly idiomatic and restricted to an impersonal 
phrase with a very specific syntax: `Damit hat es eine andere Bewandtnis' ('There's 
another reason for that. '); `Damit hat es seine eigene Bewandtnis' ('That's a long 
story. '); `Damit hat es folgende Bewandtnis: ' ('The facts of the matter are as 
follows: '). 37 Now both in Basic Problems of Phenomenology and in Being and Time 
Heidegger first introduces the word in precisely this familiar idiomatic construction. 
`Wahrnehmend bin ich auf das Fenster dort als dieses bestimmte Gebrauchsding 
gerichtet. Mit diesem Seienden, Vorhandenen im weitesten Sinne, hat es eine bestimmte 
Bewandtnis. ' Translating for the moment as colloquially as possible, and with no regard 
37 See Macquarrie and Robinson's footnote on the meaning of the word, where they admit, The terms 
"Bewenden" and "Bewandtnis" are among the most difficult for the translator. ' (Being and Time, p. 115, 
fn 2. ) This difficulty has become something of a cliche. Theodore Kisiel comments, for example, 'Having 
discussed this point at various international conferences, I have yet to find anyone who could admit to a 
"ready-to-hand" translation of Bewandtnis in his/her language. ' (The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and 
Time, p. 546, fn 10. ) The difficulty, however, does not justify abandoning translation altogether, and 
instead substituting a term of the translator's own choosing, supposed to indicate what he or she thinks 
Heidegger was actually getting at. That would be to admit to the essential unintelligibility of Heidegger s 
argument at this crucial point, his reasons for designating the Being of the ready-to-hand Bewandtnis. 
This is precisely the accusation made by Ernst Tugendhat in his Habilrationsschrift [Der Wahrheitsbegriff 
bei Husserl und Heidegger, (Berlin, Gruyter, 1967), pp. 289ff]. The only translator, that I am aware of, 
who has attempted to address the difficulty actually in his translating, and thus counter Tugendhat's 
accusation of unintelligibility, is Manuel Jimenez Redondo in his translation of Volume 27 of the 
Gesamtausgabe into Spanish. In an epilogue that was demanded by Heidegger's estate, Redondo 
demonstrates very clearly, I think, the necessity of a radical and rigorous translation of Bewandtnis: 'I 
refuse to translate by a single Spanish term a term which in German capriciously unites two distinct 
meanings that no Spanish term unites. [... ] the translation of Bewandtnis by a single term implies the 
acceptance of the risk that the argument of section 18 of Being and Time and also of essential fragments 
(or the essential fragments) of the first part of the present "Introduction to Philosophy" end up 
unintelligible. [... ] when Tugendhat says that this phrase is untranslatable into any other language, I 
understand that what he wants to say is that it would be pure chance if another language were to contain a 
term which corresponded with this German term in such a way that a phrase for phrase translation would 
be possible. [... ] Now then, my colleagues, in the afore-mentioned translations, use one single term or at 
most two when Heidegger says Bewandtnis. [... ] I, however, use a first meaning from a 
dictionary entry, a 
second meaning from the same dictionary entry and an articulation of these two meanings 
[ 
... 
]. That is to 
say, when H says Bewandtnis in the original, my translation of it comes to occupy 
in Spanish from 3 to S 
lines and at times even 6. And the objection is: this is not a translation; 
it is a gloss or a commentary: the 
translator is not properly resolving the problem of translation but running up against 
it, what happens is 
not translation but something more; you could say it is attributing to 
Heidegger what Heidegger says. My 
response is: what I try to do is to say in Spanish exactly what 
Heidegger says in German; [ ... 
J to 
transform what is in the first language into a second 
language in terms which end up in this second 
language as intelligible as what the author says in the 
first, and demonstrate the argument by which the 
author hits upon the concept which he seeks. ' 
[Introduccion a la filosfia trans. by Manuel Jimenez 
Redondo, (Madrid, Fronesis - Catedra Universitat 
de Valencia, 1999), pp. 445-46.1 Redondo's point, then, 
is that it is precisely the substitution of a single term that amounts 
to an implicit commentary on or 
interpretation of Heidegger's intentions, a gloss that only serves to obscure 
the function of the word 
Bewandtnis in Heidegger's argument. [My thanks to Antonio 
Castellote for drawing my attention to this 
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for what Heidegger is about to do with the phrase, in other words trying to maintain the 
flavour of the sentence as it would have been heard by an audience as yet unaware of 
what is going to happen: `In perceiving, I am directed toward the window there as this 
particular thing of use. This being, extant in the broadest sense, is there for a reason. '38 
At this stage, Bewandtnis, a little like Dasein, is a word that is completely familiar, but 
very hard to pin down. In fact, its meaning seems to be so vague that it is virtually 
redundant. In the following passage from Kant, the whole complicated idiomatic 
structure is translated by Norman Kemp Smith by the verb `to be'. `Was es fair eine 
Bewandtnis mit den Gegenständen an sich und abgesondert von aller dieser Rezeptivität 
unserer Sinnlichkeit haben möge, bleibt uns gänzlich unbekannt. ' `What objects may be 
in themselves, and apart from all this receptivity of our sensibility, remains completely 
unknown to us. '39 Perhaps Bewandtnis connotes nothing more specific than a state of 
affairs, `the facts of the matter', but with a suggestion that states of affairs are always 
tied up in, or in fact are in themselves always, some kind of narrative or history, `that's a 
long story', in which one thing leads to another, and so might be said to provide some 
kind of reason or explanation for any particular element in the state of the affairs, as 
long as one doesn't expect the explanation to be anything more than a narrative 
explanation. 
Only after having used it purely idiomatically does Heidegger then draw attention to the 
peculiarity of the construction and the etymology of the word. Bewandtnis derives from 
translation, and my especial thanks to Frances McLoughlin for translating Redondo's afterword 
into 
English for me. ] 
38 G24, pp. 95-96; BPP, p. 68, trans. altered. In Being and 
Time the word is first used colloquially and 
without emphasis in discussing the nature of signs: 'Signs always 
indicate primarily "wherein" one lives, 
where one's concern dwells, what sort of involvement there 
is with something. ' Being and Time, p. 111, 
'Die Zeichen zeigen primär immer das, "worin" man lebt, wobei 
das Besorgen sich aufhält, welche 
Bewandtnis es damit hat. ' SZ. p. 80. 
39 Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Werke, Band 11, ed. by Wilhelm 
Weischedel, (Darmstadt, 
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1983,1998), p. 87: Critique of Pure Reason, trans. 
by Norman 
Kemp Smith, (London. Macmillan, 1929,2`d impr. 1933, repr. 1993), p. 82 
(A42, B59). 
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the verb bewenden, past participle bewandt. It is the state achieved by the action of the 
verb. Unfortunately, the verb bewenden doesn't actually seem to denote any specific 
action. Again it is only ever used in highly idiomatic constructions such as `es bei etwas 
bewenden lassen', `to be content with something', `wir wollen es dabei bewenden 
lassen', `let's leave it at that', or as a noun, `dabei hat es sein Bewenden', `there the 
matter rests'. Heidegger again draws attention to this everyday meaning. `Ontically, 
"letting something be involved" signifies that within our factical concern we let 
something ready-to-hand be so-and-so as it is already and in order that it be such. '"' 
Bewenden lassen means both simply letting something be, and letting it become itself. 
One lets something be what it is only by letting it alone at the right moment, at the 
moment when matters rest, so that the thing can be left at that. 
Heidegger now amalgamates the idiomatic use of Bewandtnis and the idiomatic use of 
bewenden. `If something has an involvement, this implies letting it be involved in 
something [bewenden lassen mit etwas bei etwas]. The relationship of the "with... in... ' 
[»mit... bei 
... «] shall 
be indicated by the term "assignment" or "reference" 
[Verweisung]. '41 Note that the use of both mit and bei together is not idiomatic. Mit may 
replace bei in the idiomatic use of bewenden lassen, but it is never used alongside it. 
The mit in Heidegger's usage, therefore, seems to be imported from the idiomatic use of 
Bewandtnis. This amalgamation radically transforms bewenden lassen from a one place 
to a two place predicate. 42 Its meaning would seem to something like, `The facts of the 
matter regarding X rest at Y. ' Bewandtnis is not, therefore, the relation of reference 
40 Being and Time, p. 117; `Bewendenlassen bedeutet ontisch: 
innerhalb eines faktischen Besorgens ein 
Zuhandenes so und so sein lassen, wie es nunmehr ist und 
damit es so ist. ' SZ, p. 84. 
41 Being and Time, p. 115 
42 The fact that Heidegger is here amalgamating two idiomatic usages 
for his own idiosyncratic ends 
appears to have been passed over largely without comment 
in the Anglo-saxon literature. Ernst Tugendhat 
points it out in his Habilitationsschrift, 
but considers it to be evidence of the capriciousness of 
Heidegger's argument. Only Manuel Jimenez Redondo, as 
far as I am aware, has attempted to argue for its 
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between things, the involvement of one in the other, rather it is that involvement's 
possibility. It is the way such relations get forged. Playing on the derivation of bewenden 
from wenden, which means primarily `to turn', we can say that the ready-to-hand turns 
out to be what it is when it is turned to use. The prefix be- can either make an 
intransitive verb transitive or form a verb out of an adjective or noun that means 
providing something with that thing or quality. Bewenden, then, could mean transitively 
`to turn something' (derived from the intransitive `turn'), or alternatively it could mean 
`to give something the quality of a turning'; taken together `to turn something into a 
turning'. The ready-to-hand is turned to turning out something else and in this turning 
out turns out to be what it is. Bewandtnis is this `turnedness' - all these `turnednesses' 
turned upon each other, to the point at which we say `leave it at that. '43 
Bewandtnis is what makes the ready-to-hand what it is; it is, if you like, the `essence' of 
being ready-to-hand. As such, Heidegger says explicitly, it is the Being of the ready-to- 
hand. ' What is the relation, then, between Bewandtnis and readiness-to-hand 
(Zuhandenheit), which is the name Heidegger has already given to the Being of the 
ready-to-hand? Are they merely synonyms? The relation can be clarified by looking at 
the careful way in which Heidegger introduces the two terms: `Die Seinsart von Zeug, in 
der es sich von ihm selbst her offenbart, nennen wir die Zuhandenheit. '45 `Der 
Seinscharakter des Zuhandenen ist die Bewandtnis. '46 This is a specific example of what 
Heidegger calls the articulation of Being. Seinsart ('kind of Being') and Seinscharakter 
importance in understanding the structure of the Being of the ready-to-hand. 
[See references in footnote 
37. ] 
43 The provisonal character of the kind of "explanation" 
denoted by Bewandtnis should not be ignored; it 
too belongs to the Being of the ready-to-hand, which 
has the capacity always to be determined in some 
new and possibly unexpected way by 
following the chain of its involvements a little bit firther along. 
" 'Bewandtnis ist das Sein des innerweltlichen Seienden, ' 
SZ, p. 84; 'Bewandtnis selbst als das Sein des 
Zuhandenen... ' SZ, p. 85. 
45 SZ, p. 69. 
4b SZ, p. 84. 
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('character of Being') are respectively the `how' and the `what' something is. In Basic 
Problems of Phenomenology Heidegger examines the scholastic distinction between 
existentia and essentia, and concludes: `Formulated more generally, the thesis that 
essentia and existentia belong to each being merely points to the general problem of the 
articulation of each being into a being that it is and the how of its being. j... ] The 
articulation of being varies each time with the way of being a being. '' Equipment 
manifests itself by being ready-to-hand. This is how it is there. What gets manifested in 
its being ready-to-hand is determined as what it is through its involvement, its 
functionality, its Bewandtnis. 
The reference relations inherent in the involvement of the ready-to-hand ultimately point 
back to a `for-the-sake-of-which' which has itself no further involvement, that is to say, 
which does not have the kind of Being belonging to the ready-to-hand Rather the `for- 
the-sake-of-which' has the kind of Being that belongs to Dasein, and is furthermore an 
issue for it. `We have thus indicated the interconnection by which the structure of an 
involvement leads to Dasein's very being as the sole authentic "for-the-sake-of- 
which". '48 The `for-the-sake-of-which' towards which all the reference relations within 
the totality of involvements ultimately point, always pertains to Dasein; it is a potential 
way that Dasein could be, and not just in the sense that Dasein might be this or that, but 
rather as that which is precisely an issue for Dasein itself. But Heidegger now introduces 
a new term, significance, which refers to a set of new relations that seem to run the other 
way, emanating out from the "for-the-sake-of-which" and binding the involvements of 
the ready-to-hand both together and to it. `The understanding lets itself make 
assignments both in these relationships and of them. The relational character which 
these relationships of assigning possess, we take as one of signifying. In 
its familiarity 
47 BPP, p. 120. 
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with these relationships, Dasein `signifies' to itself. '49 Dasein could be said to inhabit 
these signifying relations, and indeed Heidegger goes on to tell us that it is they, that 
make up the worldhood of the world. `These relationships are bound up with one 
another as a primordial totality; they are what they are as this signifying in which Dasein 
gives itself beforehand its Being-in-the-world as something to be understood. The 
relational totality of this signifying we call "significance". This is what makes up the 
structure of the world - the structure of that wherein Dasein as such already is. 's0 But 
this makes it clear that significance and the way in which Dasein inhabits the wti orld lead 
us directly to the issue of understanding. Understanding could be said to be the act of 
being in the world. 
Understanding: Projection and Letting-be 
We have already seen that Heidegger is adamant that understanding should not be 
thought of as some special kind of cognition, rather understanding is the condition of 
possibility of any comportment towards entities whatsoever. But we have already 
worried that this idea of know-how may be self-defeating. As such it is to be thought of 
in terms not so much of knowing as of know-how. But we have already worried that this 
idea of know-how may be self-defeating. On the one hand, know-how is meant to be 
what underlies our activities. It is meant to express the fact that there is something 
which allows us to do the things that we can do. Know-how is supposed to be what 
makes us capable. But, on the other hand, in the absence of any concrete description of 
what know-how might actually consist of, the concept of know-how appears to 
he 
simply synonymous with the ability to do something. Does saying that one 
knows how 
d8 Being and Time, p. 117. 
49 Being and Time. p. 120. 
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to ride a bike really say anything more than that one is able to ride a bike? In which case, 
to say that one is able to pursue an activity because one has the know-how for it, says 
nothing more than that one is able to pursue an activity because one is able to pursue it. 
Hence the constant temptation to reinterpret know-how as some kind of internal and 
implicit knowledge about what goes to make up the activity; a knowledge which then 
gets applied when one engages in the activity. This at least appears to provide an 
explanation of how one can actually go about the activity. On the other hand, one could 
bite the bullet and accept that there was after all nothing underlying our activities. The 
buck stops there; no further interpretation is either possible or necessary. 
Now Heidegger appears to do neither of these two things. He does not fall back upon 
some internal representation of the activity, which the actor is supposed to mimic in 
carrying out the activity. But neither does he accept the behaviourist thesis that we are 
nothing more than what we do. This is because what we do is co-ordinated, and no mere 
enumeration of activities would ever be abie to capture this co-ordination. It is the wav 
that activities are fitted together that demonstrates understanding, not activity itself. Of 
course, any activity is always a co-ordination of a series of subsidiary activities, and that 
probably in itself casts doubt on the idea that there are anything like activities in 
themselves, which might provide the atomic facts for a behaviourist description of our 
understandings. " Instead of worrying about know-how, Heidegger sets his sights firmly 
50 Being and Time, p. 120. 
`' It is the atomistic presupposition, which appears inevitable in any expression of the 
behaviourist thesis, 
i. e. that there are indeed individual activities that could 
be picked out and enumerated once and for all, 
that is at fault. The criticism is similar to that which Kant 
discovered in his attempt to overcome Humean 
scepticism. The impossibility of knowing that the connection 
between events is causal only holds if there 
are atomic events, which then need somehow to 
be linked together. If on the other hand the very 
possibility of identifying an event is dependent upon causality. then 
the sceptical argument falls away. 
There are no singular events and so there 
is no call to link them together. If what is misidentified as a 
singular event is already a causal nexus, then there 
is no inherent reason why one shouldn't regard the 
connection between two `singular' events as 
just a larger event, in no way different from the 'singular' 
event and structured in just the same way 
by causality. This is the real insight behind Kant's dictum that 
the conditions of possibility of experience are also 
the conditions of possibility of the objects of 
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on the concept of ability, that ability to do something which seems to be at the heart of 
the possible redundancy of the concept of know-how. Heidegger claims that the ability 
to do something could never be explained in terms of know-how, unless Dasein were 
already itself its own ability to be. `The kind of Being which Dasein has, as Being-able- 
to-be, lies existentially in understanding. Dasein is not something present-at-hand which 
possesses its ability for something by way of an extra; rather it is primarily Being- 
possible. '52 But what does this mean? We understand what something is, because we 
understand how it fits or does not fit into what we are doing, and we understand how it 
fits or does not fit because we understand what we are doing. But, in turn, we 
understand what we are doing because we understand what wt e are about. This `what we 
are about' translates as well as anything the idiomatic force of the German expression 
`es geht uns um... ': the phrase that Macquame and Robinson translate as -... is an issue 
for us. ' We are what we are about, and what we are about is what is at issue for us. We 
understand ourselves insofar as we go about being what we are. To understand oneself 
here means, to subordinate oneself to, to co-ordinate oneself in one's comportments 
around, a possible way of being oneself, it means, to go about existing for the sake of 
that possibility. And this in turn means: to be able to be that possibility which one is, is 
the way in which Dasein is. Understanding is Dasein's being able to be, its competence 
for itself. 
When we are talking ontically we sometimes use the expression `understanding 
something' with the signification of `being able to manage something', being a 
match for it', `being competent to do something'. In understanding, as an 
experience. The unity which the understanding imposes upon the objects of experience 
doesn't come after 
the event. 
52 Being and Time, p. 183 [trans. altered. ] `Im Verstehen liegt existenzial 
die Seinsart des Daseins als 
Sein-können. Dasein ist nicht ein Vorhandenes, das als Zugabe noch besitzt. etwas zu können, sondern es 
ist primär Möglichsein. ' SZ, p. 143. Macquairie and 
Robinson translate Sein-können as 'potentiality-for- 
Being, ' but this obscures the clear relation between our own Sein-können and our ability to 
do something 
['etwas zu können'], which they translate in the next sentence as 
'competence for something. ' 
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existentiale, that which we have such competence over is not a "what", but Being as existing. 53 
The kind of possibility that Heidegger is talking about here is not logical possibility. If it 
were then the ability to be its possibility would not be ontologically distinctive for 
Dasein. In so far as any entity actually is, it is clearly, in some very loose sense. `able to 
be' its logical possibility. But we balk at saying this. A stone is not able to be a stone 
just because it actually is a stone; rather it is a stone whether it likes it or not. Nor is the 
kind of possibility that Heidegger is talking about, the possibility of becoming 
something which the entity happens not yet to be. Dasein does not pick some possibility 
of being Dasein which it has happened to find lying around so as to actualise it, or so as 
to set about the task of becoming it once and for all. Rather Dasein exists as and in that 
possibility here and now. Its possibility always remain an issue for it. But it is only 
because it is a possibility that it can be an issue at all. There would be no issue about it 
nothing one could do about it, if it were something actualised. And this is, very 
succinctly, why Dasein never becomes its possibility, but rather can only ever become 
what is most impossible, most unlike the possible, that actuality called death in which 
Dasein quite simply and quite suddenly ceases to exist, ceases to be possible, ceases to 
be a possibility. This means that for Dasein's Being to be an issue for it that Being must 
be and must remain as possibility, a Being-possible. But this means in turn that Dasein 
is not first something which then adopts a possibility as a goal perhaps, rather Dasein is 
only insofar as it seizes upon that possibility for the sake of which it exists as 
Possibility. Dasein is able to be possibility as such, and understanding is the way in 
which Dasein is able to be its possibility as possibility. `Understanding 
is the Being of 
such being-able-to-be. ''4 Understanding is an existential structure of 
Dasein - it is one of 
53 Being and Time, p. 183. 
54 Beingrand Time, p. 183. [Again I have translated Sein-koJnnt'n 
by 'being-able-to-be'. ] 
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the ways that it is in the world; it is a structure of that Being-in which is constitutive of 
Being-in-the-world. This structure has the character of projection [Enttii'urj]. But 
projection does not mean here that Dasein has concocted some plan which it attempts to 
carry out, or that it has projected some self-image which it then feels beholden to live up 
to. No doubt, we do on occasion make plans or attempt to keep up appearances, but 
these are existentiell affairs. There would be no carrying out, no living up to, if Dasein 
were not existentially projection; if it did not exist by projecting. Dasein projects itself, 
throws itself out onto its possibilities, and in so throwing itself, it allows them to be. 
These possibilities would have no existence except in being so projected. `As 
projecting, understanding is the kind of Being of Dasein in which it is its possibilities as 
possibilities. '55 In The Basic Problems of Phenomenology Heidegger provides the 
following illuminating gloss upon this gnomic statement: `To understand means, more 
precisely, to project oneself upon a possibility, in this projection to keep oneself at all 
times in a possibility. A can-be, a possibility as possibility, is there only in projection, in 
projecting oneself upon that can-be. '56 
Dasein understands what it is about in terns of a possibility for the sake of which it 
pursues its existence. Projection is the existential condition that there could be anything 
like a for-the-sake-of-which existentielly characterising Dasein in the first place. It is 
how Dasein - as the bundle of `activities' that we are unfolds as the 
`story' that we also 
are - takes place. `Understanding as the 
Dasein's self-projection is the Dasein's 
fundamental mode of happening. '57 Dasein projects itself through its existence, 
constantly throws itself, in the course of its existence, forward 
into possibilities of 
existence; which is why it is appropriate and so familiar to say that one pursues one's 
ss Being and Time, p. 185. 
56 Being and Time, p. 277. 
57 BPP, p. 277. 
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existence. `We also call it existentiell understanding because in it existence, as the 
Dasein's happening in its history, temporalizes itself. The Dasein becomes what it is in 
and through this understanding. '58 
But why does projection still get characterised as understanding? Doesn't the 
redescription of understanding in terms of projection, the way in which Dasein `moves' 
through its existence, strip the word of everything we familiarly understand by it. and 
reduce it to a mere process? Which would be why Heidegger is forced to go on 
describing projection as understanding, precisely so as to hold onto that which has not 
been accounted for in the redescription of understanding as projection. Surely Heidegger 
implicitly confesses to this impasse when he says, `this understanding, this becoming 
manifest of the self, is not a self-contemplation in the sense that the ego would become 
the object of some cognition or other; rather the projection is the way in which I am the 
possibility; it is the way in which I exist freely. '59 Clearly, a great deal rides on the little 
word, "freely, " appended to the end of this sentence; but that would seem to beg the 
question that has not been answered. How are we supposed to have the freedom to 
decide our own existence unless we in some sense know what possibilities are offered 
by that existence? It is not at all clear why Dasein's possibilities should become 
manifest to Dasein simply because it projects itself into those possibilities so as to be 
them. However, Heidegger himself sets a great deal of store by another little word used 
in the passage, the word "am" - hence, no doubt, its emphasis in the text. The `I am' is, 
in Heidegger's mind at least, linked intimately to the possibility of understanding. 
It is not cogito stem which formulates a primary finding but rather sum cogito. 
And this sum is not to be taken in the ontological indifference in which 
Descartes and his successors took it, as the extantness of a thinking being. Sum 
58 BPP, p. 278. 
59 BPP, p. 277. 
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here is the assertion of the basic constitution of my being: I-am-in-a-world and 
therefore I am capable of thinking it. 60 
The connection between being a possibility and manifesting that possibility resides in 
the `I am'; and it resides in the `I am' because the `I am' already says `I am in the 
world, ' `I reside in it, I 'I inhabit it. ' In Being and Time Heidegger seeks to establish the 
connection between `am' and `in' etymologically. "'In" is derived from "finnan" - "to 
reside", "to dwell" [... ] The expression "bin" is connected with "hei", and so "ich bin" 
["I am"] means in its turn "I reside" or "dwell alongside" the world. '" Regardless of 
whether this etymology is correct or not, the inference is clear: The projection of Dasein 
into its possibilities can only be understood as simultaneously manifesting those 
possibilities, that is to say, understood as understanding, because Dasein is Being-in-the- 
world. The possibilities which Dasein projects itself upon are not the various possible 
states of an ego-thing; they are, rather, possible ways of being in the world. Does this 
then mean that they manifest themselves in the world? It all, depends of course, on what 
we mean by `in. ' If Dasein's possibilities manifested themselves in the world like actors 
upon a stage, then that would simply beg the question of the manifestation of the world 
within which these possibilities were supposed to appear; a question which the recourse 
to Dasein's projection upon its own possibilities was meant to resolve, not rely upon. In 
Being and Time we come across a passage that on the face of it is very similar to the 
passage I've just quoted from The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, in which 
Heidegger insists that in understanding Dasein manifests itself, while equally 
vehemently denying that this self-manifestation is to be taken as in any way cognitive. 
Dasein is such that in every case it has understood (or alternatively, not 
understood) that it is to be thus or thus. As such understanding 
it `knows' 
where it is with itself - that is to say, with 
its being-able-to-be. This `knowing' 
b0 HCT, p. 216. 
61 Being and Time, p. 80. 
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does not first arise from an immanent self-perception, but belongs to the Being 
of the "there", which is essentially understanding. 6, 
Though this looks suspiciously as if it is simply going round in circles, the reference to 
the "there" is illuminating. Dasein `knows' where it is; and the "there" where it is. is not 
some location in which Dasein just happens to be placed quite independent of what it is, 
rather it is already out there. `The entity which is essentially constituted by Being-in-the- 
world is itself in every case its "there". '63 But if Dasein is its `there, ' i. e., is not just 
there where it happens to find itself, but is only in so far as it is that `there", that 
situation in which it finds itself, then Dasein is not some self-contained entity but is 
instead open to the world, an opening in the world. `This entity carries in its ownmost 
Being the character of not being closed off. In the expression "there" we have in view 
this essential disclosedness. '6" Dasein discloses itself, and this is the way in which 
Dasein manifests itself to itself in understanding. Heidegger explicitiv distinguishes this 
`self manifestation' from the way in which entities are `discovered' in our CtiCounI 1 
with them . 
65 Dasein does not appear to itself, nor is it discovered in some kind of self- 
encounter. There is no process of self-discovery. Rather Dasein `uncloses' itself, opens 
itself out, unfolds itself, in projecting itself upon its possibilities. Hence Heidegger 
02 Being, and Time, p. 184 [trans. altered]. The sentence which I have altered runs in German, 'Als solches 
Verstehen »weiß« es, ii'oran es mit ihm selbst, das heißt seinem Seinkönnen ist. ' (SZ, p. 144. ) Nlacquarrie 
and Robinson's translation obscures the fact that Heidegger is using a very particular idiom. To say in 
German, `man weiß bei ihm nie, woran man ist, ' is equivalent both in syntax and meaning to saying in 
English, `you never know where you are with him. ' The kind of knowing involved here is clearly not 
simply a matter of knowing or not knowing certain facts about the guy. Rather the phrase expresses 
something about the situation you find yourself in with this guy. 'With this guy, things are always tricky. 
you never quite know what's going on': the social situation is difficult to interpret. Similarly with 
Heidegger's use of the idiom: Dasein doesn't so much understand what it is; rather, to use another English 
idiom, Dasein understands where it is at [i*'oran es ist]. And this "wOhere" clearly foreshadows the "there" 
to which understanding belongs. 
a' Being and Time, p. 171. 
as Being and Time, p. 171. 
'In letting entities be involved so that they are freed for a totality of involvements, one must have 
disclosed already that for which they have been freed. But that 
for which something environmentally 
ready-to-hand has thus been freed [... ] cannot itself 
be conceived as an entity with this discovered kind of 
Being. It is essentially not discoverable, if we henceforth reserve "discoi'eredness" as a term 
for a 
possibility of Being which every entity i ithout the character of 
Dasein may possess. ' (Being and Time, p. 
118. ) 
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emphasises that, "`Disclose" and "disclosedness" will be used as technical terms in the 
passages that follow, and shall signify "to lay open" and "the character of having been 
laid open. " -)66 Dasein discloses itself to itself in its `there. ' Dasein is its `there, ' because 
it discloses itself precisely there, unfolds itself as its situatedness. If Dasein is capable of 
being clear about itself, i. e. of understanding itself, it is because it is `there' for itself 
What is crucial here is not just the insistence that Dasein's happening, its historical 
existence, and its understanding cannot be separated out, as if on the one hand there 
were the sequence of events that went to make up Dasein's life, and on the other hand 
there were Dasein's understanding of those events, but that what ensures that Dasein 
discloses itself in happening, and happens as understanding, is that it is Being-in-the- 
world. `Dasein is its disclosedness, ' as Heidegger insists. 67 But equally, `In the "for-the- 
sake-of-which", existing Being-in-the-world is disclosed as such, and this disclosedness 
we have called "understanding". ' 68 Dasein discloses itself as Being-in-the-world by 
disclosing itself in the world. 
All of this becomes less obscure, when we grasp what Heidegger means by world. 
Dasein, Heidegger tells us, always assigns itself to an `in order to' in terms of a 
possibility for the sake of which it itself is. This assignment to a "context of 
involvements is what constitutes an act of understanding. The possibility for the sake of 
which Dasein itself is, is disclosed in such an act of understanding. Now Heidegger goes 
on to say: 
That wherein [Worin] Dasein understands itself beforehand 
in the mode of 
assigning itself is that for which [das Woraufhin] 
it has let entities be 
encountered beforehand. The "wherein" of an act of understanding which 
assigns or refers itself, is that for which one 
lets entities he encountered in the 
66 Bein and Time, p. 105. 
67 Being and Time, p. 171. 
" Being and Time. p. 182. 
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kind of Being that belongs to involvements, and this "wherein " is the 69 phenomenon of the world. 
Dasein discloses itself to itself in the world because the world is, if you like, the medium 
of that disclosure. Dasein understands itself in terms of the world precisely because the 
world as that structured context of meanings that Dasein projects itself upon provides 
the `terms' in which Dasein is able to articulate itself. That hackneyed Elizabethan 
metaphor is reversed. If all the world is a stage, then it is not man that appears on it. 
Rather entities appear upon the stage, and man understands himself in the staging. The 
world is, if you like, the language in which we write ourselves, but it is the stage upon 
which other entities perform. This means that world is nothing like a world-view, indeed 
quite to the contrary it is much more something like a self-view, aself-understanding - 
we understand ourselves in terms of the world. `With equal primordiality the 
understanding projects Dasein's Being both upon its "for-the-sake-of-which" and upon 
significance, as the worldhood of its current world. '70 
What we have so far, then, is an analysis of existentiell understanding, that is to say the 
understanding Dasein has of itself in and as the pursuit of its own existence articulated 
in terms of the worldhood of the world. But does this analysis suffice for understanding 
as such? After all existentiell understanding is only one kind of understanding. On the 
face of it the analysis will have to be extended in two directions: both broadened to 
include the understanding of beings other than Dasein, and deepened to include the 
understanding of Being that is the fundamental ontological characteristic of Dasein. 
How does Heidegger approach this problem? In two ways. 
69 Being and Time, p. 119. 
70 Being and Time, p. 185. Even more explicitly, Heidegger says in the 
1927 lecture course, ', Since in 
understanding world the relations of the in-order-to, of 
functionality and being-for-the-sake-of are 
understood, it is essentially self-understanding, and self-understanding 
is Dasein understanding. ' BPP. p 
296. 
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In the first place, Heidegger attempts to formalise what has been learnt about the 
structure of understanding as such in the course of the analysis of existentiell 
understanding. Understanding is projection, but projection has been shown to be a 
disclosive unfolding in which Dasein articulates itself in terms of the significance 
relations that go to make up the worldhood of the world. `Meaning is that wherein the 
intelligibility [Verständlichkeit] of something maintains itself. That which can be 
articulated in a disclosure by which we understand, we call "meaning". '71 Meaning, 
then, is the other essential element in the structure of understanding. It is that which is 
available for articulation, that in and in terms of which the projection proceeds, that 
upon which the projection depends. `Meaning is the "upon-which " [das Woraufhin] of 
a projection in terms of which something becomes intelligible as something. [ ... 
] 
"meaning" must be conceived as the formal-existential framework of the disclosedness 
which belongs to understanding. '72 But it must be stressed that the `upon-which' is not 
to be thought of as the place where something happens to be thrown, as an image is 
thrown up upon a screen; rather it is that on the basis of which projection itself can 
occur. (In German auf etwas hin means `on the basis of something. ') This is why later 
on in Being and Time Heidegger will associate the `upon-which' with the condition of 
possibility of something. 73 
This formal-existential definition of meaning completes the analysis of the structure of 
the understanding. `The phenomenon of projection contains two things. First that upon 
which the Dasein projects itself is a can-be of its own self. [... ] Secondly, this projection 
upon something is always a projecting of. ... 
'' ' The formal-existential structure of 
" Being and Time, p. 193. 
72 Being and Time, p. 193. [SZ, p. 151. ] 
73 `To lay bare the "upon-which" of a projection, amounts to disclosing that which makes possible what 
has been projected. ' Beine and Time, p. 371. 
74 BPP, p. 277. 
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understanding can now be applied to both ontical understanding and the understanding 
of Being. `A being of the nature of equipment is thus encountered as the being that it is 
in itself if and when we understand beforehand the following: functionality 
[Bewandtnis], functionality relations, functionality totality. In dealing with equipment 
we can use it as equipment only if we have already beforehand projected this entity 
upon functionality relation. '75 Understanding of beings consists of projection of those 
beings upon their Being. Moreover, understanding of Being as such also has this 
structure of projection of.. upon.... `In the understanding of Being there is present a 
further projection: Being is understood only as, on its own part, it is projected upon 
something. '76 Hence Heidegger's ultimate claim that the meaning of Being is time; i. e. 
time is that something which Being has to be projected upon so as to be understood as 
Being. 
But we must be careful here. Projection is, after all, the manner of Dasein's occurrence. 
The projection of beings upon their Being is not another projection alongside and 
independent of Dasein's projection upon its own possibilities. Rather, there is only one 
projection, Daseins happening as Being-in-the-world. This is, no doubt, what 
Heidegger had on his mind when he said later in 1930, `projection is world. -projection. 
World prevails in and for a letting prevail that has the character of projecting. With 
respect to our previous terminology, projection is only this originary occurrence, and no 
longer to be taken as our specifically factical and concrete planning, deliberation, and 
understanding. '" The projection of Dasein into its own possibilities 
is simultaneously 
the condition of possibility of Dasein's own 
disclosure and of the discovery of entities. 
As we have formulated it ourselves, world 
is both the language in which Dasein 
's BPP, p. 293. 
76 BPP, p. 280. See Chapter 6 for a discussion of what 
is meant and entailed by this claim. 
77 FCM, p. 362. 
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articulates itself, and the stage upon which entities appear. But this does not mean, 
Heidegger insists, that the Being of beings is somehow constituted in or by world- 
projection. `Not only is the world, qua world, disclosed as possible significance, but 
when that which is within-the-world is itself freed, this entity is freed for its own 
possibilities. 08 
In order to understand what is going on here we need to analyse more closely the 
structure of the Woraufhin - the "upon-which" of projection. The term does not make its 
first appearance in Being and Time in the formal-existential definition of meaning. It has 
already made a double appearance in Heidegger's definition of the world as the 
"wherein" of an act of understanding. Significantly enough Macquarrie and Robinson 
translate these two appearances of the same term in adjoining sentences differently. We 
have already seen its first appearance. `Tie "wherein " of an act of understanding [ ... 
] is 
that for which [Woraufhin] one lets entities be encountered [... ] this "wherein " is the 
phenomenon of the world. ' But in the sentence immediately following Heidegger goes 
on to say, `And the structure of that to which [woraufhin] Dasein assigns itself is what 
makes up the worldhood of the world. '79 As Macquarrie and Robinson's sensitive 
translation implies, the world is the "upon-which" of both Dasein's disclosure and the 
discovery of entities, but the manner in which it serves as the "upon-which" of an 
understanding in each case differs. So as to incorporate this double aspect of the "upon- 
which" into the analysis, Heidegger now introduces a new and complementary 
terminology to that of projection. It is signalled by the phrase `letting be encountered' 
(Begegnenlassen). In projecting itself into its possibilities Dasein allows entities to be 
encountered as the entities which they are. And 
it is this notion of 'allowing' that 
Being and Time, p. 184. 
Being and Time, p. 119. The first sentence was embedded 
in the passage already quoted on page 80, see 
fn 69. 
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Heidegger now firmly hangs onto in providing an interpretation of the understanding of 
the Being of beings that underlies all comportment. 
Previously letting something `be' does not mean that we must first bring it into 
its Being and produce it; it means rather that something which is already an 
`entity' must be discovered in its readiness-to-hand, and that we must thus let 
the entity which has this Being be encountered. This 'a priori' letting- 
something-be-involved [Bewendenlassen] is the condition for the possibility of 
encountering anything ready-to-hand. 80 
In Basic Problems of Phenomenology Heidegger states quite clearly that this `a priori' 
is the understanding of beings already interpreted as projection upon their Being: 'This 
antecedent understanding of functionality [Bewandtnis], this projecting of equipment 
onto its functionality character, we call letting function [Bewendenlassen]. 'h' What does 
this letting-be amount to? In general the letting-be of a projection designates the fact 
that projection unfolds the `space' in which entities may be encountered. This does not 
mean that the projection constitutes the Being of the entities encountered. Rather the 
projection itself constitutes the lee-way (Spielraum) for the encounter, but the Being of 
the entities determines the kind of `upon which' which the projection provides for 
encounter. This is why Heidegger consistently, not just in the later work but already in 
Being and Time, links Being not to meaning but to truth as unconcealment. Being is not 
meaning, it is the possible relation to meaning. 
This is the second way in which Heidegger approaches the problem of extending the 
analysis of understanding, eventually so as to include the understanding of Being. In 
Being and Time this approach runs unacknowledged in tandem with the formalisation of 
the concept of projection. But in Basic Problems of Phenomenology it is made explicit. 
80 Being and Time, p. 117. 
8! BPP, p. 293. There, is of course, an unresolved tension in this double characterisation of understanding 
as projection and letting-be, a tension that comes explicitly to the 
fore when understanding of Being - that 
letting-be contained in projection as its condition of possibility - 
is itself characterised as projection. We 
shall examine this tension later on in chapter 6, when we come to examine more closely the understanding 
of Being. 
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`An understanding of the being of existence in general is enclosed [beschlossen] in 
every existentiell understanding. ' Moreover, `the Dasein understands, in equal 
originality with its understanding of existence, the existence of other Daseins and the 
being of intraworldly beings. '82 Thus the understanding of Being lies somehow enclosed 
within the existentiell understanding, that is to say, inherent within Dasein's projection 
into its possibilities. `But, ' Heidegger goes on to tell us, `we do not wish to explain the 
understanding of being in regard to existentiell understanding [... ] We shall try to 
clarify the understanding of being which relates to beings which are not of the nature of 
Dasein. '83 In other words, the extension of the analysis of understanding is to proceed in 
this approach by examining how the existentiell projection of Dasein into its own 
possibilities already necessarily allows entities to be encountered. When it is seen how 
this is so, then the understanding of Being enclosed within existentiell understanding 
will have been uncovered. 
This suggests that `letting-be' is not merely an effect of projection, but rather that the 
understanding of Being enclosed within it, itself allows projection to be. In Being and 
Time the existentiell understanding has already been characterised as a letting-be: 
`projection, in throwing, throws before itself the possibility as possibility, and lets it be 
as such. '84 What is existentiell about the projection is that it discloses Dasein to itself as 
this possibility. What is existential about it is that lets the possibility be as possibility. 
Letting-be expresses the ability-to-be of projection. Dasein is not merely able to be 
letting-be; letting-be is the only way in which Dasein could be ability-to-be. The 
temptation is always to think of projection as something which happens first, unfolding 
a network of significance relations upon which subsequently entities are allowed to 
82 BPP, p. 279. 
83 BPP, p. 291. 
84 Being and Time, p. 185. 
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appear; but this is to forget that the possibilities into which Dasein projects itself are 
always possibilities of letting-be. World is indeed the self-understanding of Dasein, but 
Dasein is nothing other than the letting-be of other entities. This is no doubt what 
Heidegger means when he says that, `Dasein only "has" meaning, so far as the 
disclosedness of Being-in-the-world can be "filled-in" by the entities discoverable in 
that disclosedness. '85 Dasein discloses itself to itself as what it is in letting entities be - 
there is nothing else to be disclosed. This is why disclosure is nothing like the discovery 
of an entity. If Dasein could disclose itself apart from and prior to any discovery of 
entities, then disclosure would just be another kind of discovery. The essential 
difference between disclosure and discovery entails that there cannot be one without the 
other. 
It now becomes clear why it was so important and so difficult to make the distinction 
between the context of involvements and the context of significance. 86 They are not 
separately existing frameworks, one framework within which Dasein understands itself, 
another within which it understands the ready-to-hand. Rather, the two `exist' only 
insofar as they interpenetrate each other. Each is a context of relations to the other. 
Significance relations are assignments by Dasein of itself to involvement relations. 
$5 Being and Time, p. 193. Macquarrie and Robinson call this sentence 'puzzling' in a footnote, and offer 
the following gloss: "`erschliessen" ("disclose") is used in the sense of "opening something up" so that its 
contents can be "discovered". What thus gets "opened up" will then be "filled in" as more and more of its 
contents get discovered. ' But what Macquarrie and Robinson mean by 'contents' is not at all clear. If they 
mean the contents of what is disclosed, the content of Dasein, as it were, the meaning that is articulated in 
the disclosure, then this is precisely what is not and cannot be 'discovered. ' If on the other hand they mean 
the entities which are discovered in the context of Dasein's own disclosure, then these entities are not the 
contents of disclosure; if anything they are the contents of discovery. In fact, the very talk of 'content' 
points to a fatal misapprehension. The world does not have any content. World is not what Donald 
Davidson would call a conceptual scheme, rather world is Heidegger's way of getting out of the whole 
scheme-content way of thinking. 'Thus the significance-relationships which determine the structure of the 
world are not a network of forms which a woridless subject has laid over some kind of material. ' Wune 
and Time, p. 417. 
86 That this distinction was hard for Heidegger himself to make, we may suppose from the fact that, as 
Theodore Kisiel reports from his labyrinthine investigations into the 
Heidegger archive, the term 
Bewandtnis makes a very late entry into Heidegger's terminology, and was, moreover, at the start meant 
to replace the term Bedeutsamkeit ('significance') rather than be distinguished 
from it. Kisiel tells us that 
........ ý, _. -87- 
`Dasein always assigns itself from a "for-the-sake-of-which" to the "with-which" of an 
involvement. ' 87 `The understanding lets itself make assignments both in these 
relationships and of them. The relational character which these relationships of 
assigning possess, we take as one of signifying, 88 Letting-something-be-involved means 
that Dasein in projecting itself into its possibilities assigns itself to a context of 
involvements, and this is what constitutes significance, that is to say the worldhood of 
the world. This is why Heidegger says, `Dasein, in so far as it is, has always submitted 
itself already to a `world' which it encounters, and this submission belongs essentially to 
its Being. '89 Heidegger has already told us that when the term "world" appears in single 
quotation marks, he is using it in the everyday ontical sense of the totality of beings 
which can found within the world (in the existential sense). 9° World, then, would be 
nothing other than Dasein's submission to the `world, ' beings as a whole. But the 
distinction between involvement and significance does not simply ward off the threat of 
subjective idealism. As we shall see in the next chapter, it opens up the necessary space 
within which the claim that there are different kinds of Being can be made at all 
comprehensible. 
Bewandtnis makes its first public appearance as an `oral interjection' in the 1925 summer semester lecture 
course (The Genesis of Being and Time, p. 389. ) 
87 Being and Time, p. 119. 
88 Being and Time, p. 120. This makes it clear, I take it, that the relation of signifying is precisely one of 
assignment to a relation of involvement. 
89 Being and Time, pp. 120-21. 
90 Being and Time, p. 93. Commentators regularly complain that Heidegger fails to stick to this rule and 
appears to stick the word into inverted commas fairly arbitrarily. But it may be that their interpretation of 
the existential meaning of world is blinding them to the possibility that Heidegger is being consistent, but 
simply saying something they don't expect. 
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Chapter Three 
The Existential Conception of Science 
How, then, does science emerge from everyday circumspective concern? One 
possibility, advanced by Hubert Dreyfus, is that scientific activity depends upon the 
adoption of a peculiar attitude towards the entities that we otherwise encounter in our 
absorption in the everyday. `Unlike the pragmatists, Heidegger accepts the Greek view 
that human beings are capable of getting into a mood of pure equanimity and wonder in 
which they can form theories that do not have any relation to their needs and purposes. ' i 
Let us call this attitude the theoretical attitude for convenience. The theoretical attitude 
is achieved - and only achieved. let it be said, at some cost - through a process of 
decontextualisation, whereby entities are progressively stripped of their involvements in 
our affairs, so that they may simply be observed. This account relies heavily upon 
paragraph 13 of Being and Time, where Heidegger first raises the question of the 
relation between knowing and Being-in-the-world. Not without justice, it has to be said. 
After all, Heidegger does declare at the end of the paragraph, `this makes it plain that in 
knowing, Dasein achieves a new status of Being [Seinsstand] towards a world that has 
already been discovered in Dasein itself. This new possibility of Being can develop 
itself autonomously; it can become a task to be accomplished, and as scientific 
knowledge it can take over guidance for Being-in-the-world. '2 This new stance towards 
the world treats entities in a completely different way from everyday concern. Entities 
are no longer encountered as ready-to-hand, but rather as simply there, lying before us in 
their brute bodily presence; no longer zuhanden, but vorhanden, present-at-hand, or 
Hubert Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World, p. 253. 
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occurrent, as Dreyfus prefers to translate it. `In this kind of "dwelling" as a holding- 
oneself-back from any manipulation or utilisation, the perception of the present-at-hand 
is consummated. '3 The present-at-hared, then, is the object of our perceptions, and 
perception is a cognitive comportment towards entities, that is arrived at by dwelling on 
them, that is to say, by holding back from one's usual heedless rush onwards in the 
course of one's pursuits, so as to stop off and tarry for a while at this one spot in the 
network of involvements, a stopping off that itself arrests, as it were, the normal 
movement of the entity in and out of the field of concerns, and that makes it in some 
sense containable, that is to say, delimitable as this element in the field of view. ` 
Science, then, would be the progressive development and expansion of this `objective' 
stance, until perhaps, having started forth from the intermittent and isolated perception 
of individual items of equipment in the course of our affairs, it might perceive 
everything as present-at-hand, and indeed become the guiding light for Dasein's Being- 
in-the-world. Heidegger certainly appears to confirm this interpretation, when later on in 
paragraph 69b, having dubbed the totality of ways in which science articulates itself 
`thematization, ' he baldly states, `Thematizing Objectifies. '' Science is in the business 
of objectification, and objectification makes things present-at-hand. This view has now 
been enshrined in the text itself with the decision by Joan Stambaugh to translate 
Forhandenheit by the term "objective presence" in her new translation of Being and 
Time. 6 
2 Being and Time, p. 90. 
3 Bein; and Time, p. 89. 
4Sc Macquarrie and Robinson's illuminating footnote on the multiple meanin4, s embedded in the 
Genpan word .1 ufenthalt, "d,. ellin,,. 
" which is hybridised from the verbs aufhalten and enthalten (Being 
and Time, tn. 2, p. 89). 
Being and Time, p. 414. 
tics Joan Stambaugh translator's foreword. 
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Decontextualisation and Pragmatism 
The term "decontextualisation" itself is not Heideggerian. It is Dreyfus' gloss for the 
German Entweltlichen, which he translates as "dewworlding. "' Though the term 
"deworlding" hardly features in Being and Time itself, Heidegger does use it on several 
occasions in the 1925 lecture course, which as we have already seen served as a first. 
and fairly substantive draft for division I of Being and Time. There it gets translated by 
Theodore Kisiel as `unworiding. ' What Heidegger has to say about Entweltlichen seems 
to fit very neatly with paragraph 13 of Being and Time, and to confirm Dreyfus' 
contention that science arises through a process of decontextualisation: 
It is only when we absent ourselves from the environing world by stepping out 
of it, as it were, that we gain access to the presumably authentic reality of the 
primary thing of nature. The mode of encounter of the natural thing in the 
character of bodily presence, a characteristic obtrusiveness which things of the 
world show insofar as they are merely perceived, this character of bodily 
presence has its basis in a specific "unwvorlding" of the environing world, a 
deprivation of its worldhood. Nature as the object of natural science is in 
general discovered only in such an "unworlding. "' 
According to Dreyfus, however, decontextualisation is not enough in itself to account 
for scientific activity. In order for scientific investigation to proceed coherently, some 
order must be imposed upon the plethora of `facts' now lying indifferently before us as 
present-at-hand. This order is provided by a theoretical framework. `Laws and formal 
models provide a new, essentially meaningless, context for occurrent properties. '9 Only 
within such a context could a scientist decide what was worthy of investigation and 
what was not, what relevant to an explanation or an experimental set-up, and what not. 
`Scientifically relevant "facts" are not merely removed from their context by selective 
Being-in-the-world, p. 256. 
8HCT, p. 196. 
9 Being-in-the-World, p. 81. 
-91- 
seeing; they are theory-laden, i. e. recontextualised in a new projection. ' 10 Dreyfus takes 
it that having dealt with decontextualisation in paragraph 13, Heidegger goes on to 
examine this second necessary condition for scientific activity in paragraph 69b of Being 
and Time. In this paragraph, Heidegger tells us, `we are asking which of those 
conditions implied in Dasein's state of Being are existentially necessary for the 
possibility of Dasein's existing in the way of scientific research. ' 11 A paradigmatic 
example of such research is the development of classical mechanics from Gallileo to 
Newton. `What is decisive for its development does not lie in its rather high esteem for 
the observation of "facts", nor in its "application" of mathematics in determining the 
character of natural processes; but rather in the mathematical projection of Nature 
itself. ' 12 This projection is a priori in the sense that there could be no experimental 
facts, nor indeed any natural processes to which a mathematical description could 
subsequently be applied, without it. `Only "in the light of' of a Nature which has been 
projected in this fashion can anything like a "fact" be found and set up for an 
experiment regulated and delimited in terms of this projection. The "grounding" of 
"factual science" was possible only because the researchers understood that in principle 
there are no "bare facts". ' 13 Scientific research can only proceed on the basis of such a 
projection, which Heidegger dubs a scientific projection. Now, Dreyfus is very quick to 
insist that scientific projection has nothing whatsoever to do with the notion of 
projection developed by Heidegger in his discussion of understanding. 14 Though 
Dreyfus, significantly, does not explain or justify himself at this point, presumably this 
is because scientific projection as the projection of a theoretical framework is an 
10 Being-in-the-World, p. 81. 
Being and Time, p. 408. 
12 Being and Time, pp. 413-14 (trans. slightly altered. The last clause reads in German, `sondern im 
mathematischen Ennvurf der Natur selbst. ' SZ, p. 362). 
13 Being and Time, p. 414. 
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example of just that sense of projection which Heidegger explicitly excludes when 
introducing the notion of projective understanding - the sense of projection as a plan. ', 
In understanding, Dasein projects itself upon its own possibilities as possibilities, arid it 
is this projection that constitutes the intelligibility of the world. Scientific investigation, 
on the other hand, has the unintelligible as its object. In the absence of intelligibility, it 
must provide itself with an explanatory framework, but precisely a framework not 
another projection. Otherwise, in Dreyfus' view, the objects of scientific investigation 
would reveal themselves in exactly the same way as the ready-to-hand, and Heideg`Ler's 
account of science would be misinterpreted as being purely pragmatist. Heidegger is not 
a pragmatist, however, but what Dreyfus terms `a minimal hermeneutic realist' -a 
position which he compares to Arthur Fine's defence of the `Natural Ontological 
Attitude' or NOA. A minimal realist does not feel the need for, nor accept the 
possibility of, a metaphysical demonstration that science really does describe reality. '`' 
A hermeneutic realist accepts that science is embedded within our socia; practices and 
cannot extricate itself from its background, but denies that its theories are therefore 
determined by those practices: `shared scientific background skills are necessary for 
deworlding nature and for testing theories, but these skills do not determine what is to 
count as the objects of the theory. The scientists' background skills function precisely to 
free the science's objects from dependence on all practices, including the practices that 
reveal them. They thus reveal incomprehensible nature. ' 17 
" '(Note that Heidegger's account of theoretical projection has nothing to do with the notion of projection 
introduced in chapter 11. )' Being-in-the-World, p. S2. 
15 'Projecting has nothing to do with comporting oneself towards a plan that has been thought out. and in 
accordance with which Dasein arranges its Being. ' Being and Time, p. 18 . 
16 '\Vhat then of the realist, what does he add to his core acceptance of the results of science as really true? 
My colleague, Charles Chastain, suggested what I think is the most graphic way of stating the ans\%er - 
namely, that what the realist adds on is a desk-thumping, foot-stamping shout of "Really! "' (Arthur Fine, 
'The Natural Ontological Attitude, ' The Philosophy of Science, ed. by Richard Boyd, Philip (; aper, and 
J. D. Trout, (Cambridge MA, and London; The MIT Press; 1991), p. 271. ) 
17 Beimin-the-\V'orld, p. 207. 
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But a pragmatist, according to Joseph Rouse and William Blattner, is precisely what 
Heidegger should have been. These two commentators do not question the accuracy of 
Dreyfus' account of the early Heidegger's conception of science. Rather, accepting that 
account as Heidegger's own, they see Dreyfus as having, albeit unknowingly, exposed a 
fundamental incoherence in Heidegger's thinking on science. The problem, as far as 
they are concerned, is that decontextualisation makes no sense. In his book Knowledge 
and Power, Joseph Rouse claims that Heidegger is `disturbingly vague about... how one 
can get from a breakdown of practical involvement to the theoretical attitude. '1g This 
vagueness is due to the fact that Heidegger cannot actually follow his analysis through. 
In an earlier paper, Rouse declares, `Heidegger does not account for the transition to a 
decontextualised viewing of the present-at-hand, because he cannot; it does not occur. 
Theoretical science does not decontextualise things from the world in which they are 
ready-to-hand... Science, we shall argue, discovers not the present-at-hand but new 
ways (that is, new contexts) in which things around us can be ready-to-hand. "9 How is 
the present-at-hand supposed to emerge from our everyday dealings with the ready-to- 
hand? Heidegger most famously describes this process in his discussion of the 
breakdown of ready-to-hand equipment. But, according to William Blattner, if w7e 
consider carefully what actually happens when a piece of equipment breaks down, we 
see that something like the present-at-hand does not in fact emerge. `Say my hammer 
breaks so severely that I can no longer go on with it as a hammer. What would I then be 
staring at? Presumably, the wood and metal out of which it is made. But that wood and 
metal are ready-to-hand, as Heidegger carefully points out in `1 (pp. 99-100). '20 To see 
'ý Joseph Rouse, hno led e and Poýýer Toward a Political Philoso hti of ctence, (Ithaca and Landon, 
Cornell University Press, 1987), p. 75. 
19 Joseph Rouse, 'Science and the Theoretical "Discover-C of the Present-at-Hand, ' Descriptions, ed. by 
Doti lhde and Hugh J. Silverman, (Albany NY. State University of New York Press, 19$5. p. 
203. 
William D. Blattner, 'Decontextualization, Standardization, and Deweyan Science. ' Stan and World, 
vol. 28. issue 4.1995, p. 325 
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entities as material is precisely not to decontextualise them, but to see them as material 
for our activities, stuff to be worked on and used. The ways in which we categorise and 
identify materials are determined by the uses we put them to and the activities we 
engage in. The hammer, now that it is broken, has not lost all involvement in our 
everyday activity, but rather acquired a new involvement in a new task - precisely the 
task of fixing the hammer so that we can get on with the old task. To be sure, the entity 
is no longer treated as a tool, but rather as material to be worked upon by other tools, but 
nonetheless it is still equipment, in the broad sense that Heidegger gives to that term. 
Even if the hammer proves irreparable that does not mean that we treat the stuff of 
which it is made as simply present-at-hand. `It is not strong enough to get the job done. 
We then set out to study other metals with an eye to which ones could be strong enough. 
Language such as "strong enough for this task" is prototypical practical language. '`' 
Entities are never entirely released from their involvement in our activities - rather the 
context of that involvement may change from the workshop of the carpenter to the 
laboratory of the metallurgist, say. Decontextualisation of entities cannot occur because 
an entity that was completely decontextualised would quite simply be unencounterable. 
The only complete decontextualisation that Heidegger envisages in Being and Time is 
that experienced in the state of anxiety. `Here the totality of involvements... is, as such, 
of no consequence; it collapses into itself, the world has the character of completely 
lacking significance. ' 22 But as Blattner observes, `It is hard to see how the genesis of 
science could pass through anxiety on the way to the mathematical projection of 
nature. ' 23 
'' Blattner, op. Cit., p. 328. 
22 Being and Time, p. 23 1. 




Dreyfus himself appears to give the game away when, in describing the process of 
decontextualisation, he says, `Once characteristics are no longer related to one another 
in a concrete, everyday, meaningful way, as aspects of a thing in a particular context, the 
isolated properties that remain can be quantified and related by scientific covering laws 
and thus taken as evidence for theoretical entities. '24 But this surely prompts the 
question: Why should one think that any properties would remain, unless one 
presupposed that entities really were present-at-hand substances underneath the purely 
surface appearance of instrumental characteristics imposed upon them by their 
involvement in our affairs? An assumption that Heidegger is himself keen to disavow. 
`The kind of Being that belongs to these entities is readiness-to-hand. But this 
characteristic is not to be understood as merely a way of taking them, as if we were 
talking such "aspects" into the "entities" which we proximally encounter, or as if some 
world-stuff which is proximally present-at-hand in itself were given "subjective 
colouring" in this way. ' 25 Perhaps troubled by this question, Dreyfus later on tells us 
that `we use skills and instruments to decontextualise things and their properties, which 
then appear as meaningless objects, colours, shapes, sounds, etc. Such data are 
independent of our for-the-sake-of-whichs but not independent of our senses. '26 But this 
necessarily implies that our senses are independent of our for-the-sake-of-whichs (else 
the data dependent upon them would also be dependent upon our for-the-sake-of- 
whichs). And that would seem to make a mockery of Heidegger's claim in paragraph 13 
of Being and Time that cognitive comportment towards entities in the form of 
perception is a founded mode of Being-in-the-world. We would seem to have fallen 
right back into a very traditional dualism of the practical and theoretical that has no very 
24 Being, -in-the-World, p. 81. 
25 Being and Time, p. 101. 
26 Being-in-the-World, p. 256. 
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clear idea of how to reconcile these two aspects of human being. Drevfus's equanimity 
about the possibility of `a mood of pure equanimity and wonder' in w hich entities could 
manifest themselves as entirely detached from our concerns is based upon arg 
equivocation about the meaning of Being. On the one hand, Dreyfus equates Being 
unreservedly with intelligibility, so that he can write for instance, `That would be to treat 
Being - intelligibility - as if it were in itself. '27 On the other hand, he is quite willing to 
accept that the occurrent - the unintelligible - nevertheless has some kind of Being. So, 
for example, he quotes Heidegger's comment in The Basic Problems of Phentomentologv 
that `intraworldliness does not belong to nature's Being, ' without appearing to realise 
that this necessarily means that Being cannot simply be equated with intelligibility, 
since on Dreyfus' account intelligibility is tantamount to worldliness. 
28 The sleight of 
hand is achieved by the judicious juggling of the two terms `occurrent' and 
`unintelligible' depending on whether the occurrent is being contrasted with the ready- 
to-hand or treated as something that has independent existence. `But nature as a being, 
or as a set of beings, does not depend on us, for one way that Dasein can make sense of 
things - find them intelligible - is as occurrent, 
i. e. as not related to our everyday 
practices. '29 In other words, one way in which Dasein can find things intelligible is that 
it finds they are unintelligible! But at least Dreyfus appears to have Heidegger's backing 
on this point. `It should be observed here that all propositions and proofs given 
in 
physics or mathematics are certainly comprehensible as propositions, as 
discourse about 
something, but that about which they speak is itself the incomprehensible. 
3D No doubt 
the idea of a proposition about the incomprehensible is itself comprehensible: 
but one 
has to as ask, exactly how many propositions could there be about the 
27 Being, -in-the-World. p. 257. 
2' Bill), p. 169. Quoted by Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World, p. '55. 
Being-in-the-World, p. 25(x. 
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incomprehensible? The notion of the unintelligible certainly has its place within the 
context of intelligibility, but only as a transcendental X pointing to that about which 
nothing further can be said. What is unintelligible about the concept of the unintelligible 
is how there could be anything intelligible to say about the unintelligible except that it is 
unintelligible. One might well experience anxiety in the face of the incomprehensible, 
but it is difficult to see how one could have a theory about it. 
Dreyfus' younger colleagues, with a greater thirst for consistency, recognise the 
antimony and reject wholesale the very notion of the present-at-hand. Rouse boldly 
declares at the beginning of his paper outlining the inadequacy of Heidegger's 
philosophy of science: 
I will propose not only that science does not discover things present-at-hand, 
but there is no genuine phenomenon corresponding to presence at hand. Being 
and Time can be read as the final development of the ontology of presence-at- 
hand. Heidegger still mistakenly reserves a place for the present-at-hand in his 
interpretation of what it means to be, but he also provides the basis for finally 
abolishing that place. 31 
Instead of decontextualisation, Rouse and Blattner prefer the idea of `standardisation. ' 
Science does not reveal entities as they are independent of human practices, but rather 
focuses upon characteristics of the ready-to-hand that are portable between different 
situations, features that are robust to context variation but not context-independent per 
se. Chairs and electrons are not ontologically different, electrons are simply more 
ubiquitous - which in the end simply means more useful. Whereas a chair is good for 
not much more than sitting in, electrons are good for just about everything, not just 
projecting TV images or transmitting power or even storing information, but, given our 
understanding of molecular bonding, gluing things like chairs and TV sets together. Of 




which we get on with our everyday lives, but then neither, presumably, have chairs. Ian 
Hacking provides a useful rule of thumb, when dealing with the entities discovered by 
science. Entities remain theoretical as long as one only performs experiments on them. 
As soon as one starts to experiment with those entities, however, they have become real. 
`Electrons are no longer ways of organising our thoughts or saving the phenomena that 
have been observed. They are ways of creating phenomena in some other domain of 
nature. Electrons are tools. '32 
Scientific research uncovers standardised features within standardised environments. 
This is what laboratories are - equipmental contexts which guarantee that experimental 
results will be the same (within some generally agreed margin of error) in each and 
every one of them. Moreover when entities and phenomena discovered by scientific 
research get incorporated into the world of everyday concern, it is not just a matter of 
the theories that describe them becoming sophisticated enough to deal with the 
complicated circumstances outside of the limited and constrained environment of the 
experimental set-up, it is also a matter of standardising the everyday environment so as 
to allow standardised phenomena to show up within it. The everyday world is now 
littered with mass-produced laboratories - light bulbs, cathode ray tubes, hard disk 
drives, internal combustion engines, refrigeration and heating systems, along with the 
offices whose temperature and humidity they maintain - which keep the conditions just 
right for standardised phenomena to occur. Indeed, Joseph Rouse points out that 
Heidegger's own description of the relation between mass production and craft 
production offers a far better account of the relation between scientific research and 
everyday circumspective concern than does any reliance upon some putative theoretical 
31 Rouse, Descriptions, p. 200. 
32 Ian Hacking, Representin and Intervening, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 263. 
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attitude. 33 Just as mass produced clothing is no less ready-to-hand than a hand-tailored 
suit, just because it bears reference not to a particular human being, but to a standard 
size, so too the products of scientific research. Indeed both Blattner and Rouse agree, 
that the logic of Heidegger's own methodology does not point towards the account of 
science he actually gives, but rather towards the conception that they espouse. Blattner 
can therefore claim that, `We have found an internal critique of Heidegger that points 
towards Dewey's pragmatism. '34 While Rouse believes that Heidegger himself rapidly 
came to realise the incoherence inherent in his earlier account of science, and sought in 
his later thinking to eliminate its dependence upon the traditional concept of presence- 
at-hand. By the late 1930s Heidegger, he writes, `has abandoned the claim that science 
decontextualises things, and allows us to see them as merely present-at-hand. Instead, 
science is our way of practically engaging the world. '3- This is indicated by the fact that, 
`Heidegger no longer employs the same terminology as in Being and Time. Instead of 
"presence-at-hand" (Vorhandenheit) and "readiness-to-hand" (Zuhandenheit), he uses 
the terms Gegenstand (object) and Bestand (standing-reserve). But the important point 
is that he insists that the interpretation of things as autonomous objects (Gegenstände) is 
a misunderstanding which conceals their belonging to the essence of technology. We 




Dreyfus, Blattner, and Rouse all agree, then, that Heidegger's account of science as 
given in Being and Time relies upon the notion of decontextualisation. Blattner and 
33 Knowledge and Power, p. 113. 
Blattner, op. cit., p. 322. 
35 Joseph Rouse, 'Heidegger's Later Philosophy of Science. ' The Southern Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 23 
No. 1,1985, p. 79. 
36 Rouse, Descriptions, p. 207. 
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Rouse simply disagree with Dreyfus that this idea of decontextualisation makes anv 
sense. And given Dreyfus' own identification of Being with intelligibility, their critique 
appears watertight. If, however, we now examine carefully what Heidegger has to say 
about science in paragraph 69b of Being and Time and in other texts from the same 
period, Dreyfus' account begins to unravel. And it unravels because the notions of 
objectivity and presence-at-hand are quite explicitly decoupled. Once cut at this crucial 
point, Dreyfus' account unravels in two directions: both towards the description of the 
present-at-hand as the product of a decontextualisation and the description of scientific 
projection as the projection of a formal and arbitrary theoretical framework. This gives 
us three negative theses, which clearly need to be demonstrated, but that will help guide 
us to a richer and more coherent account of how Heidegger thought science emerges as 
an existential possibility for Dasein out of everyday circumspective concern. First, 
objectivity and presence-at-hand have nothing to do with one another. This means that 
science, which always does objectify beings; does not have to deal exclusively with the 
present-at-hand. Nor does the present-at-hand always have to be encountered as an 
object. Second, scientific projection does contra Dreyfus turn out to be intimately 
connected with the conception of projection detailed by Heidegger in his analysis of 
understanding. Third, decontextualisation is a bad, if understandable, gloss on 
Heidegger's own term deworiding. (One of the reasons why Heidegger barely uses the 
term in Being and Time after having used it extensively in the 1925 lecture course may 
be precisely because it proved susceptible to such misinterpretation. ) Presence-at-hand 
is not the result of a decontextualisation. This third thesis does not simply undermine 
Blattner and Rouse's arguments against the coherence of the notion of the present-at- 
hand, it exposes a blindness in their own pragmatist account of science -a 
blindness to 
the genuine phenomenon of presence-at-hand which is masked 
by their enthusiastic 
critique of the flawed notion of decontextualisation. 
-101 - 
The Formal-Existential Definition of Science 
In the very middle of paragraph 69b Heidegger asks rhetorically, `But if. instead of 
deliberating circurnspectively about something ready-to-hand, we "take" it as something 
present-at-hand, has a scientific attitude thus constituted itself? Moreover, even that 
which is ready-to-hand can be made a theme for scientific investigation. ' 3- The 
implication is clear. There is no necessary linkage between science and the present-at- 
hand. On the one hand, we can and do encounter the present-at-hand, say, the hammer 
as merely heavy - not as too heavy for this or that task - prior to any scientific 
investigation of it as heavy. On the other hand, we can scientifically investigate entities 
that are not present-at-hand without thereby making them present-at-hand. Heidegger 
rubs this last point home by going on to say. `The ready-to-hand can become the 
"Object" of a science without having to lose its character as equipment. '38 This last 
remark has generated a certain amount of furore. Rainer A. Bast, for example, in his 
book Der Wissenschaftsbegriff Martin Heideggers, cites it with an exclamation mark, 
and considers that it marks a `break' in Heidegger's thinking in which the earlier 
vocabulary of `concern' and `knowing' is illicitly replaced by the vocabulary of `theory' 
and `praxis' resulting in a degeneration of the originally serious attempt to grapple with 
the problem of world discovery into a commonplace separation of the theoretical and 
practical. 39 Hermann Philipse, similarly wedded to a `patchwork' reading of Being and 
37 Being and Time, pp. 412-13. 
38 Being and Time, p. 413. 
39 'The break at SZ p. 361 is flagrant. There Heidegger against everything already said, observes "even the 
ready-to-hand [can] be made the theme of scientific investigation and determination" and: "The ready-to- 
hand does not need to lose its equipment character [! ] to become the 'Object' of a science. " The original 
problem 'Concern'-'Knowing' is not coarsened, but rather shifted over to the problem 'Praxis'-'Theory' 
until finally in GA25, where the term 'concern' no longer even occurs, the single process of levelling 
down the problem to one of "prescientific" - "scientific" reaches its end. The original serious problem: 
What is still ready-to-hand, what already present-at-hand? is replaced by 
handy, because diametrically 
opposed vocabulary. Thus, (1. ) the originally contrary opposition of beings not of the character of 
Dasein 
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Time, thinks that Heidegger's `equivocation' over what can and cannot be the object of 
scientific knowledge is the result of an undigested incorporation of incompatible Neo- 
Kantian (transcendental) and Husserlian (regional ontological) motifs. -"' Joseph 
Kockelmans, on the other hand, clearly perturbed by the implications of a too literal 
reading of this passage, wriggles uncomfortably: 
From this text one might derive the view that in Heidegger's conception any 
scientific thematization is objectifying. With the help of the hints found in his 
later work, however, it can be made perfectly clear that already in 1927 
Heidegger was convinced that not all thematization was objectifying and, 
secondly, that this particularly is not the case for our historical research. 41 
Whatever the later Heidegger may or may not have thought, it is perfectly clear on the 
contrary that Heidegger in 1927 did precisely think that all scientific thematization was 
objectifying, history included. In the 1927 lecture course, The Basic Problems of 
Phenomenology, he states categorically, `The essential feature in every science [... ] is 
that it constitutes itself in the objectification of something already in some way 
(readiness-to-hand - presence-at-hand) is replaced by a contradictory opposition of ways of being human 
(prescientific - scientific); (2. ) in consequence of the bursting apart of the concept of concern through the 
extreme widening of its extension and finally its dissolution by the Praxis vocabulary, the originally fully 
untheoretical world-knowing gets narrowed down to theory; the concern-knowing opposition, which is at 
first still attached to the elementary level of world discovery and is employed in SZ §§ 12ff as such and 
with much weight, becomes in §69b the commonplace of theory and praxis. ' ['Eklatant ist der Bruch dann 
SuZ 36119ff, wo Heidegger wider alles bisher Gesagte konstatiert, auch Zuhandenes [könne] zum Thema 
wissenschaftlicher Untersuchung und Bestimmung gemacht werden" und: Das Zuhanden 
braucht seinen 
Zeugcharakter [! ] nicht zu verlieren, um Objekt` einer Wissenschaft werden zu können. " Das 
ursprüngliche Problem , Besorgen`-, 
Erkennen` ist nicht vergröbert, sondern vielmehr verlagert zum 
Problem 
, 
Praxis`-, Theorie`, bis schließlich in GA25, wo es den Terminus Besorgen` schon gar nicht mehr 
gibt, die einlinige Nivellierung auf ein , vorwissenschaftlich`-, wissenschaftlich` zu 
ihrem Ende kommt. Das 
ursprünglich schwierige Problem: Was ist noch zuhanden, was schon vorhanden? Ist durch griffige, weil 
Diametrale Vokabeln ersetzt. So ist (1. ) der ursprünglich konträre Gegensatz von nichtdaseinmäßigem 
Seiendem (Zuhandenheit-Vorhandenheit) durch einen kontradiktorischen Gegensatz der menschlichen 
Seinsweise ersetzt (vorwissenschaftlich-wissenschaftlich); (2. ) im Gefolge der Sprengung des 
ursprünglichen Besorgensbegriffs durch extreme Extensions-Erweiterung und schließlich seiner Ablösung 
durch die Praxis-Vokabel wird das ursprünglich völlig untheoretische Welterkennen zur Theorie verengt; 
der zunächst noch der elementaren Welt-Entdeckungs-Ebene verhaftete und in SuZ 12ff als solcher 
und mit viel Gewicht verhandelte Besorgen-Erkennen-Gegensatz wird in 
§ 69 b) zum Theorie-Praxis- 
Gemeinplatz. '] Rainer A. Bast, Der Wissenschaftsbegriff Martin Heide ers, (Stuttgart-Bad Canstatt, 
Friedrich Frommann Verlag, Günther Holzboog GmbH, 1986), pp. 165-66. 
40 See Hermann Philipse, Heidegger's Philosophy of Being -A Critical Interpretation, (Princeton, New 
Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1998), pp. 38-39 and pp. 144-45; but the whole book is dedicated to 
rooting out such supposed confusions. 
+1 Joseph J. Kockelmans, Heidegger and Science, (Lanham, MD.; University Press of America; 1985), p. 
204. 
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unveiled, antecedently given. '42 And in the course he gave on Kant the next semester, he 
cites history specifically: `For example, the task of historical objectification of beings as 
history thus requires in itself an explicit understanding of what belongs to history as 
such. A3 The discomfort or the glee, depending on the commentator's disposition, that 
these assertions elicit is due solely to the stubborn persistence of the idea that 
objectification must have something to do with making entities present-at-hand by 
deworlding them; as Kockelmans amply demonstrates when he continues: 
Only where the thematization implies a transition from the ready-to-hand to the 
present-at-hand and, thus, only where the thematization implies a 
demundanization, is the thematizing project objectifying. However, where the 
ready-to-hand is made a theme of scientific investigation and, a fortiori, when 
man himself or his world is made a subject of scientific research, no 
objectivation can take place because no demundanization is necessary or even 
possible. 44 
The point that, as Heidegger himself observes, `many and entirely different areas of 
beings can become an object of scientific investigation, '45 may appear trivial. but it 
highlights a fundamental ambiguity. It will have been apparent that in the discussion so 
far no very clear distinction has been made between science and natural science. The 
impossibility of making such a distinction is endemic to any account of science that 
confuses science as such with simply treating entities as present-at-hand. It is clear, for 
example, that Dreyfus, Blattner and Rouse, bolstered no doubt by the connotations the 
word `science' has acquired in the English language, are all primarily thinking of natural 
science when they describe science in terms of either decontextualisation or 
standardisation. What remains very unclear, however, is whether they think this 
description of science could be extended to other disciplines such as history or 
philology, disciplines which in German would be numbered amongst the 
42 BPP, p. 281. 
" PIK, p. 20. 
4' Kockelmans, Ibid. 
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Geisteswissenschaften, and if so, how; or whether on the contrary they are willing to bite 
the bullet and declare that the only real science is natural science. 46 Heidegger himself, 
however, is quite clear: the term Wissenschaft applies to all the academic disciplines 
traditionally designated as such in German, not just mathematics and the natural 
sciences, but history, philology, and even theology. In a lecture entitled `Phenomenology 
and Theology' delivered at Tübingen in 1927, Heidegger steadfastly insists, `Our thesis, 
then, is that theology is a positive science... It is immediately clear from the thesis that 
theology, as a positive science, is in principle closer to chemistry and mathematics than 
to philosophy. '47 Moreover, lest anyone such as Kockelmans still hope that theology 
will be distinguished from the natural sciences as at least non-objectifying, Heidegger 
goes on to say, `In summary, then, theology is a historical science, in accordance with 
the character of the positum objectified by it. '48 The existential conception of science 
that Heidegger is seeking to clarify in paragraph 69b is, therefore, a conception that 
includes all the Wissenschaften, be they Naturwissenschaften or Geisteswissenschaften. 
Nonetheless, and this no doubt has helped to foster the confusion, the science which 
Heidegger chooses to, examine as `paradigmatic' of science as such is mathematical 
natural science - undoubtedly a science of the present-at-hand, given the fact that at least 
during this period Heidegger considered the kind of Being belonging to Nature to be 
indeed presence-at-hand. There is, however, nothing necessarily problematic about this 
45 PIK, p. 19. 
46 Blattner, interestingly enough, early on in his paper lights upon Heidegger's claim that even the ready- 
to-hand can become the object of scientific investigation to bolster his argument against Dreyfus: `The 
emergence of science and the emergence of the present-at-hand do not necessarily coincide. ' (Blattner, 
op. cit., p. 324. ); but appears to have forgotten about it later on when presenting the argument against the 
possibility of the present-at-hand: `He [Rouse) too repudiates the "change-over" from the objects of 
practical use (the ready-to-hand) to the objects of pure, theoretical cognition (the present-at-hand). ' (Ibid, 
p. 330) The reason is clear. If the emergence of science does not coincide with the emergence of the 
present-at-hand, then the critique of the present-at-hand misses its target, namely the demonstration that 
science must be pragmatic. 
47 Martin Heidegger, `Phenomenology and Theology, ' Pathmarks, (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1998), p. 41. 
48 Ibid, p. 47. 
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choice of exemplar, as long as what is scientific about natural science can be separated 
out from what is specific to it as a science of the present-at-hand. What Heidegger is up 
to in paragraph 69b is akin methodologically to the procedure he adopts when analysing 
the phenomenon of guilt in paragraph 58. There he starts by examining the ordinary 
signification of the word and its relation to such notions as `debt' and `responsibility. ' 
But he then goes on to warn: 
The phenomenon of guilt, which is not necessarily related to "having debts" 
and law-breaking, can be clarified only if we first inquire in principle into 
Dasein's Being-guilty... If this is our goal, the idea of "Guilty! " must be 
sufficiently formalized so that those ordinary phenomena of "guilt" which are 
related to our concemful Being with Others will drop out... Hence we define 
the formally existential idea of the "Guilty! " as... 19 " 
In precisely the same way, Heidegger is seeking in paragraph 69b to arrive at a Joi-Inal 
existential definition of science, that is to say, of science as a possibiliti of Dasein 's 
Being, on the basis of an examination of a concrete science, which has then allowed all 
its `ontical' characteristics, determined by its relation to its subject matter - in this case 
the present-at-hand - to `drop out. ' And indeed the formal existential definition that he 
ends up with makes no reference to the present-at-hand, just as the formal existential 
definition of guilt ends up making no reference to factical debts or responsibilities. 
Thus, in O9b, having examined the way in which the mathematical projection of Nature 
discloses something a priori about the present-at-hand, Heidegger makes the following 
generalisation: 
The scientific projection of any entities, which we 
have somehow encolintcrcd 
already, lets their kind of Being be understood explicitly and in such a manner 
that it thus becomes manifest what ways are possible for the pure discovery of 
entities within-the-world. 50 
4Q Being and Time, pp. 32S-29. 
50 Being Time, p. 414. [dtv emphasis. ] 
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Contrary, then, to what Dreyfus is forced to claim by his insistence upon the link 
between decontextualisation and scientific projection, namely that scientific projection 
has nothing to do with projective understanding, it turns out that scientific projection 
has everything to do with projective understanding: it is precisely the explicit 
development of that projection of beings upon their Being that Heidegger has analysed 
in terms of `letting-be. ' That this is so, is made even clearer by Heidegger in The Basic 
Problems of Phenomenology, where he provides the following formal definition of 
objectification: `The basic act of objectification [... ] has the function of explicitly 
projecting what is antecedently given upon that on which it has already been projected 
in pre-scientific experience or understanding. ' 51 The very use of the Kantian term 
`experience' [Erfahren] in the phrase `pre-scientific experience or understanding' 
should alert us to the fact that the `cognitive perception' of the present-at-hand just as 
much precedes scientific investigation as does our everyday dealings with the ready-to- 
hand. 52 Natural science is the science of the present-at-hand, but that means that it 
objectifies the present-at-hand, not that the present-at-hand is the result of 
objectification as such. Both the natural and the historical sciences are included within 
the formal existential definition of science and proceed on the basis of an 
objectification. `The genesis of a science originates in the objectification of a realm of 
beings, that is, in the development of an understanding of the constitution of the being 
of the respective beings. )53 Contrary to what Kockelman believes, the difference 
between the natural and the historical sciences does not, according to Heidegger, lie in 
s1 BPP, pp. 281-82. 
52 In the introduction to Being and Time, Heidegger says that, `the positive outcome of Kant's Critique of 
Pure Reason lies in what it has contributed to the working out of what belongs to any Nature whatsoever, 
not in a "theory" of knowledge. His transcendental logic is an a priori logic for the subject-matter of that 
area of Being called "Nature". ' (Being and Time, p. 31. ) These remarks, along of course with the whole 
ontological interpretation of the first critique elaborated in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, clearly 
indicate that the conditions of possibility of experience are thought of by Heidegger at this time in terms 
of the ontological constitution of the present-at-hand. (None of this, of course, commits Heidegger once 
and for all to a `Kantian' determination of that constitution. ) 
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the fact that one is objectifying while the other is not, but rather in the fact that the 
entities which they objectify have different kinds of Being. 
That Heidegger should have been anxious to avoid a methodological distinction 
between the natural and the historical sciences, and should have sought instead to firmly 
entrench their difference in ontology itself, should not surprise us. The notion that the 
natural sciences are based upon an objectifying decontextualisation, while the historical 
sciences somehow manage to thematize the specific context of a unique historical 
situation without robbing it of any of its individuality, has an oddly familiar ring to it. It 
reproduces, within a pragmatic account of the constitution of meanings, the distinction 
between the nomological and the idiographic sciences first advanced by Wilhelm 
Windelband, and brought to its greatest theoretical coherence by Heinrich Rickert. 54 
This distinction was introduced precisely so as to avoid an ontological demarcation of 
the natural and historical sciences. Windelband considered that the two kinds of science 
do not differ because of their subject matter, but rather because of their aims, or 
cognitive interests. These cognitive interests then determine the kind of concept 
formation proper to the two different kinds of science. The natural sciences aim at 
general laws and arrive at them through a process of conceptual abstraction. The 
historical sciences by contrast seek to preserve the singularity of individual events. The 
problem for Windelband was in explaining how there could be any kind of conceptual 
knowledge of individual phenomena if concepts were always abstractions. Rickert then 
set about solving this problem by a constructing a theory of the historical individual that 
revolved around the notion of value. But Rickert's theory of natural science, which he 
`3 PIK, p. 20. 
'' See Heinrich Rickert, The Limits of Concept Formation in Natural Science, trans, by Guy Oakes, 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1986). The introduction to this translation by Guy Oakes 
contains a useful summary of Windelband's own formulation of the distinction, and its subsequent 
development by Rickert. 
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no doubt thought was relatively uncontroversial, was subjected to devastating critique 
by Ernst Cassirer in his book Substance and Function, first published in 1910. And we 
get some idea of what Heidegger himself thought of Rickert's theory of the sciences, if 
not the reasons why, from the following acerbic comments in the 1925 lecture course: 
The initiatives of the Marburg school and of Dilthey were then taken up by 
Windelband and Rickert, who levelled and trivialized them and twisted their 
problems beyond recognition. In other words, inquiry understood as the 
theoretical clarification of science is reduced by this school to an empty 
methodology. The structure of knowledge itself, the structure of research, of the 
access to the realities in question, are no longer investigated, much less the 
structure of these realities. The sole theme is the question of the logical 
structure of scientific representation. This is carried to such an extreme in 
Rickert's philosophy of science the sciences under study are no longer even 
ss recognizable. 
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The formal existential definition of science does not, however, help answer the question 
with which we started this chapter: how does science emerge from everyday pre- 
scientific comportment? Indeed, insofar as it simply underlines the fact that the 
emergence of science does not coincide with the emergence of the present-at-hand, it re- 
opens it. The formal definition simply tells us, `In other words, the core of 
objectification, its way of being, lies in the explicit enactment of that understanding of 
being by which the basic constitution of those beings which are to become objects 
becomes intelligible. ' 56 The question that interests us is what does it mean to enact an 
understanding of Being explicitly? How is such an enactment possible? We have seen 
already that Heidegger characterises understanding as Dasein's fundamental mode of 
happening, but this was with reference to Dasein's existentiell understanding in which it 
projects itself upon its own possibilities. Concomitant with this existentiell 
understanding, Dasein projects entities upon their own kind of Being; in the case of the 
55HC., p. 17. 
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ready-to-hand, upon their involvement relations. Heidegger calls this optical 
understanding letting-be; again in the case of the ready-to-hand, letting-be-involved 
[bewenden lassen]. Dasein's projection of itself onto its possibilities in the world allotit's 
entities to be encountered within the world as the entities that they are. Understanding 
`is as such the condition of possibility for all of Dasein's possible manners of 
comportment. '57 The explicit enactment of the understanding of the Being of beings 
would seem to involve a step back from Dasein's comportments to their conditions of 
possibility. `Thus an activity lies in scientific action, which has the character of stepping 
back before beings. '58 Looking back at the structural schema of encountering 
comportment and the understanding that underlies it, we can see that the change from 
pre-scientific to scientific activity does not seem to involve a shift within the 
`horizontal' plane of possible comportments, a shift from encountering one kind of 
entity to encountering another, but rather a step back from that plane to the plane of 
understanding, a step back from comportment to its condition of possibility. 
Nevertheless, if as Heidegger also tells us, `the encounter of entities is the phenomenal 
basis, and the sole basis, upon which the being of entities can be grasped, '59 then this 
step back is only possible on the basis of something already embedded within the plane 
of comportments. The condition of possibility of stepping back to the level of the 
condition of possibility must lie at the level from which one steps back. Moreover since 
the step back is itself an enactment by Dasein of its constitutive understanding of Being, 
the step back does not step out of the plane of comportments, but rather constitutes a 
modification of Dasein's comportment, a modification of the existentiell understanding 
of Dasein in which it projects itself upon its own possibilities. The step back amounts to 
`6 PIK, p. 20. 
57 BPP, p. 276. 
58 'Eine Aktivität liegt also im wissenschaftlichen Handeln, die den Charakter des Zurücktreten vor dem 
Seienden hat. ' G27, p. 183. 
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a structurally inherent deformation of the structure of comportment -a torsion that turns 
the plane of comportments on its axis and undermines the notion that conditions of 
possibility underlie that which they make possible. The condition of possibility of the 
transcendental is the difference that already inhabits the plane of immanence. The 
manifold is the condition of possibility of the unity of apperception. 
The Genesis of Objectification - Paragraph 69b of Being and Time 
Heidegger's discussion of `the ontological genesis of the theoretical attitude 60 in 
paragraph 69b is quite complex even though it only occupies 6'/2 pages of Being and 
Time. There are at least three stages in the discussion, each of which seeks to pick out 
and analyse a particular kind of `change over' in the way that Dasein comports itself. 
Each of these change-overs might individually be mistaken for the emergence of 
scientific activity itself, or indeed mistaken for each other. This explains the confusion 
that has arisen about Heidegger's account of the ontological genesis of science. But we 
should not congratulate ourselves on having identified three necessary steps on the path 
to science. As always with Heidegger, it is not simply a question of analytically 
distinguishing elements that have tended to be confused, more importantly it is a 
question of understanding the relational unity of the elements once they have been 
distinguished. 
Step 1: Deliberation - Making present the ready-to-hand 
Heidegger begins by disabusing the reader of the impression that his account of the 
emergence of science rests upon a traditional distinction between theory and praxis. `In 
characterising the change-over... to "theoretical" exploration, it would be easy to 
59 HCT, p. 217. 
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suggest that merely looking at entities is something which emerges when concern hoh c 
back from any kind of manipulation. ' 6' But isn't this precisely what t Heidegger himself 
suggested when discussing the possibility of cognition as a founded mode of Beine-in- 
the-world in paragraph 13? `When concern holds back from any kind of producing, 
manipulating, and the like, it puts itself into what is now the sole remaining mode of 
Being-in, the mode of just tarrying alongside.... This kind of Being towards the world 
is one which lets us encounter entities within-the-world purer in the wc» thei look 
(ci5oc), just that [... ] In this kind of "dwelling" as a holding-oneself-back from any 
manipulation or utilisation, the perception of the present-at-hand is consummated. '`'` On 
this account, `What is decisive in the "emergence" of the theoretical attitude %%ould then 
lie in the disappearance of praxis... the ontological possibility of "theory" will be due to 
the absence of praxis - that is, to a privation. "" Or in other words. as Heidegger put it 
paragraph 13, `If knowing is to be possible as a way of determining the nature of the 
present-at-hand by observing it, then there must first be a de ficic'ncv in our having to do 
with the world concernfully. '64 Nevertheless, despite this earlier, apparently unequivocal 
assertion, Heidegger now holds that this account of theory as the simple absence of 
praxis - an account which suggests itself naturally [liegt nahe] - is at best naIvp. Holding 
back from practical activity has nothing to do with the emergence of science - and not 
just because science has its own forms of praxis. 
On the contrary, the tarrying which is discontinued when one manipulates. can 
take on the character of a more precise kind of circumspection, such as 
"inspecting", checking up on what has been attained. or looking over the 
"operations" which are now "at a standstill. " Holding back from the use of 
equipment is so tar from sheer 'theory" that the kind of circumspection that 
`'" Being and Time. p. 408. 
6' Beins, and I irre, p. 409. 
62 Bein and Time. pp. 88-89. 
Being; and Time, p. 409. 
Beinhand lIime, p. 88. 
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tarries and "considers", remains wholly in the grip of the ready-to-hand 
equipment with which one is concerned. 65 
But before we congratulate ourselves on having caught Heidegger out in a contradiction. 
and agree with Rainer Bast that Heidegger is attempting to juggle two mutually 
incompatible accounts of the emergence of the theoretical attitude, we should look at the 
evidence more carefully. In the first place, the very use of the vocabulary of 'holding 
back' [sich enthalten] and `tarrying' [verweilen] here in paragraph 69b demonstrates 
that at the very least Heidegger is not guilty of unconsciously contradicting himself or 
surreptitiously substituting conceptual structures, but on the contrary is quite 
deliberately referring back to the account given in paragraph 13, so as perhaps not to 
contradict or disavow it, but instead to revise and sharpen it. Secondly, we should 
remember that paragraph 13 occurs very early on in the exposition, only just after the 
introduction of the concept of Being-in-the-world in paragraph 12, and before there has 
been any detailed exploration of the structure of circumspective concern or worldhood. 
At this stage, the present-at-hand and Dasein's comportment towards it cannot even be 
contrasted with the ready-to-hand since the latter term has not even been introduced. It 
is only to be expected, then, that paragraph 13 is only meant to provide a preliminary 
sketch of the relation between concern and cognition, not the definitive existential 
analysis. Thirdly, a close reading of the relevant passage in paragraph 13 indicates that 
at the very least Heidegger is keeping his options open there. Heidegger does not say 
that `just tarrying alongside.... ' [das Nur-noch-verweilen bei.... ] amounts in itself to 
knowing, or perceiving the present-at-hand. Rather, he says a good deal more 
judiciously: `on the basis of this kind of Being, and as a mode of it, looking explicitly at 
what we encounter is possible. Looking at something this way is sometimes a definite 
way of taking up a direction towards something - of setting our sights towards what is 
65 Being and Time, p. 409. 
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present-at-hand. )66 So even here in paragraph 13, the possibility of cognitive 
comportment towards the present-at-hand is separated by at least two steps from simply 
holding back from manipulative activity - first there has to be a modification of 
`tarrying' into looking at something explicitly, and second there is the qualification that 
even then in looking at something we only sometimes set our sights on the present-at- 
hand, and so presumably sometimes look explicitly at the ready-to-hand also. `Practical 
dealings have their own ways of tarrying. '67 To be sure, these two steps are not spelt out 
in paragraph 13, nor are they analysed, but the paragraph certainly keeps the space open 
for the more detailed analysis to come in 69b, and ensures that Heidegger cannot later be 
summarily accused of completely contradicting everything he has said earlier. 
In the first instance, then, prior to any further modification, holding back from one's 
activities does not allow entities to manifest themselves as present-at-hand. `Rather, our 
concern then diverts itself specifically into a just-looking-around [ein Nur-sich- 
umsehen]. '68 This is what we do when we pause to consider how to carry on with a 
task. We stop to take our bearings, to look back and see how far we have come, to get 
some idea of what still lies ahead. Heidegger calls this circumspective tarrying 
`deliberation' [Überlegung]. It is characterised by the `if... then' schema. "If I am to do 
this or that, then I will need the following. " Even though it is a kind of holding back, 
deliberation brings the ready-to-hand closer. Deliberation allows the ready-to-hand to be 
seen as the particular piece of equipment needed for this task, to work on this thing, 
with these other tools. In other words, deliberation is a form of interpretation (seeing 
something as something), and interpretation makes understanding explicit. Heidegger 
says: `The involvement-character of the ready-to-hand does not first get discovered by 
66Being and Time, p. 88. 
67 Being and Time, p. 409. 
Being and Time, p. 409. 
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deliberation, but only gets brought close by it in such a manner as to let that in which 
something has an involvement, be seen circumspectively as this very thing. '69 Because 
the ready-to-hand is not something that happens to be embedded in a network of 
involvements, but rather is those involvements, it only gets discovered through them 
when it is seen as them. Now deliberation, in bringing the ready-to-hand closer, 
allowing it to be seen as what it is, is a making-present (Gegenwärtigen). `It is grounded 
in a retention of that context of equipment with which Dasein concerns itself in 
awaiting a possibility. ' 70 In other words, the making present of the ready-to-hand is only 
possible because the ready-to-hand is involved in the accomplishment of a future 
possibility of Dasein's own existence, an involvement that is itself only possible 
because a context of other equipment in which the ready-to-hand can function has been 
established. This is, so to speak, the temporal interpretation of the `if... then' schema. 
The `if... then... ' makes the ready-to-hand `present' on the basis of Dasein's thrown 
projection into the world. 
Step 2: The change-over [Umschlag] in the understanding of Being 
But where does this discussion of deliberation get us with regard to science? Heidegger 
says: `Only that this elucidates the Situation in which circumspective concern changes 
over into theoretical discovery. '7' The situation is precisely one of deliberation. The 
change is not from entirely unreflective absorption in the world, that dazed fixation 
Heidegger calls fascination (Benommenheit) with the world. That change has already 
occurred within circumspective concern through holding back from manipulation, and it 
has resulted in deliberation. The change over to theoretical discovery is rather a change 
from one kind of explicit awareness to another. It is deliberation itself, the making 
a9 Being and Time, p. 411. 
70 Being and Time, p. 411. 
71 Being and Time, p. 412. 
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present of the ready-to-hand as ready-to-hand through the `if.. then' schema, that gets 
modified. The question is how? 
Heidegger takes as his example the deliberative assertion: "The hammer is too heavy. " 
This says something about the hammer in its involvement in a task. It is part perhaps of 
a deliberation about whether to use this hammer or another one. The assertion could be 
modified into "The hammer is heavy, " and we might still be deliberatively weighing up 
its suitability for the task. But saying, "The hammer is heavy" can also mean simply that 
the hammer has weight or mass. The hammer is now being talked about not in terms of 
its involvements, but as a thing with properties. How is this possible? Heidegger says. 
`Not because we are keeping our distance from manipulation, nor just because we are 
looking away from the equipmental character of this entity, but rather because we are 
looking at the ready-to-hand thing which we encounter, and looking at it `in a new way' 
as something present-at-hand. The understanding of Being by which our concernful 
dealings with entities within-the-world have been guided has changed over [hat 
umgeschlagen ] ., 
72 
It is at this point that Heidegger's account of the emergence of scientific research from 
everyday circumspective concern departs radically from the account given by Blattner 
and Rouse. Contrary to Dreyfus' version of what Heidegger has to say about the 
adoption of a `theoretical attitude, ' Blattner and Rouse were correct to maintain that, on 
Heidegger's own account, holding back from manipulation and taking a detached view 
of things can only wider the horizon of one's concerns; it cannot step outside of that 
horizon so as to discover the present-at-hand per se. On this basis, Blattner and Rouse 
discount any idea of something like presence-at-hand as incoherent. But it can now be 
seen that in his account of deliberation Heidegger has already pre-empted everything 
'Z Being and Time, p. 412. 
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Rouse and Blattner have to say about science in terms of standardisation. In other words, 
Heidegger would accept that what Rouse and Blattner describe can serve as the spring 
board for scientific research, but would insist that they fail to account for the specific 
difference between the deliberative `if... then... ' schema which still operates within the 
horizon of circumspective concern, and the kind of understanding that looks at entities 
as present-at-hand. This is made very plain in the lecture course Heidegger gave upon 
his return to Freiburg in 1928. There, in introducing once again the notion of a change- 
over in our understanding of Being, Heidegger explicitly contrasts the mere widening of 
the circumspective horizon, which would be equivalent to the identification of aspects 
of the ready-to-hand that are `portable' between different contexts, through the 
establishment of `rules' [Regeln] for comportment, and the establishment of `laws' 
[Gesetze] that are universally valid for all `material' entities whether or not they happen 
to be ready-to-hand. Heidegger takes as his example the resistance that the earth offers 
to a plough. Corresponding to this resistance the ploughshare must have a certain 
hardness and solidity in order to do its job. There is therefore a correlation between the 
earth and the ploughshare, but no further heed is usually paid to this correlation, and it 
does not need to be reflected upon as such. `It is simply familiar within a particular kind 
of profitable use and working of the soil, the earth. '73 The same relation between 
pressure and counter-pressure can be found, however, in many other contexts, house or 
bridge building, for example, where the foundations or the piers also require a 
corresponding solidity. In this way, Heidegger tells us, `a certain savvy 
forms for 
dealing with things: As a rule it is ordered thus and thus with things. 
But this 
rulelikeness behaves less as a characterisation of things themselves, than as 
the guiding 
73 `[E]r is nur bekannt innerhalb einer bestimmten 
Nutznießung und Bearbeitung des Bodens, der Erde. ' 
G27, p. 181. 
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thread for comportment in the face of them. '74 Nonetheless Heidegger insists that in 
addition to this gradual garnering of rules for comportment, `the possibility persists of 
contemplating the relations between pressure and counter-pressure without any 
consideration of the fact that account is taken of them in using things. "' This means 
that, `These relations, which befit every material thing, every mass, can come to light as 
such, and indeed so that they stand at the same time under a universal law of gravity. ''" 
How is this possible? What is happening when entities reveal themselves as material 
bodies subject to natural laws? Heidegger asks rhetorically, `Is it enough to say: 
practical technical experience has been widened beyond the narrow circle of view 
offered by tilling the soil, or building houses and bridges? '77 But that would simply 
mean that the sphere of application for the handy rules of comportment had been 
extended to include new activities and pieces of equipment. `Mere widening of the 
sphere of experience leads continuously only to things of use. '78 
At first sight it might seem as if Heidegger's objection to this notion of widening is that 
it is not wide enough. `If a widening plays a primary role here at all then it is obviously 
in the sense that it is said: these relations are not only present-at-hand where ground and 
stone are manipulated by us in practical working, but also there where our business 
doesn't reach, and where also we do not need to get to... here the discourse is also about 
74 `So bildet sich für den Umgang mit den Dingen ein gewisses Sichauskennen in ihnen: In der Regel ist es 
mit den Dingen so und so bestellt. Diese Regelhaftigkeit gibt sich aber weniger als ein Charakter der 
Dinge selbst, denn als Leitfaden des Verhaltens ihnen gegenüber. ' G27, p. 181. 
75 `[E]s besteht die Möglichkeit, die genannten Beziehung von Druck und Gegendruck ohne Rücksicht 
darauf ins Auge zu fassen, daß ihnen in der Verwendung Rechnung getragen wird. ' 
G27, p. 181. 
76 `Diese Beziehungen können sich als solche herausstellen, die jedem materiellen Ding, jeder Masse 
zukommen, und zwar so, daß sie dabei unter einem allgemeinen 
Gesetz der Schwerkraft stehen. ' G27, p. 
181. 
" `Genügt es zu sagen: Die praktische technische 
Erfahrung wurde erweitert über den engeren 
Gesichtskreis hinaus, den Landbestellung, Haus- und Brükkenbau bieten? ' G27, p. 181. 
78 `Bloße Erweiterung des Erfahrungsbezirks fuhrt stets nur zu Gebrauchsdingen. ' 
G27, p. 185. 
- 118- 
things which indeed cannot and need not be affected by such comportment. '79 But surely 
this appeal to entities that stand outside the circle of our concerns is naive and simply 
begs the question of whether or not there is any phenomena akin to presence at hand, 
rather than answering it? Blattner and Rouse would no doubt claim that in speculating 
about the density of the chalk buried deep within a cliff face, or indeed the density of 
matter at the centre of a neutron star, one is already considering the entity as if it were, 
or at least might at some future date be, available for use. This would simply be a case 
of what Heidegger himself calls `envisaging' [Vergegenwärtigung], which he says is 
just a special case of the kind of making present [gegenwärtigen] that belongs to 
deliberation. `In envisaging, one's deliberation catches sight directly of that which is 
needed but which is un-ready-to-hand. '80 What would it matter if the widening of the 
sphere of experience only ever led to things of use, if there were after all only things of 
use? But this is to misunderstand the point of Heidegger's argument. He is not interested 
in identifying some set of entities that happen to fall outside of the current range of our 
concerns, rather he is interested in how it is that we can talk about them at all. In order 
to be able to envisage something as a possible object of future use, there must after all 
be something the same about it as those things which are already of use, and this 
something which is the same must transcend all determinations in terms of use, since it 
cuts right across them in pointing beyond them. `To lay bare what is just present-at-hand 
and no more, cognition must first penetrate beyond what is ready-to-hand in our 
concern. '81 The very fact that we can thus gather in entities that lie beyond the horizon 
of our concern, points to something about those entities that already lie within the 
79 `Wenn überhaupt hier eine Erweiterung primär eine Rolle spielt, dann doch offenbar in dem Sinne, daß 
gesagt wird: Diese Beziehungen sind nicht nur da vorhanden, wo 
Boden und Gestein uns bei der 
praktischen Bearbeitung zu schaffen machen, sondern auch 
dort, Nvo wir gar nicht hingelangen mit unseren 
Geschäften, und wohin wir auch gar nicht hinzugelangen 
brauchen. [... ] auch von den Dingen, die gar 
nicht von solcher Verhaltung betroffen werden 
können und brauchen, ist hier die Rede. ' G27, p. 182. 
80 Bein and Time, p. 410. 
- 119 - 
horizon of our concern that nevertheless exceeds it. In talking about entities in terms of 
mass rather than in terms of their suitability for this or that task, we rely upon a different 
way of determining them. `It is a determination of beings qua nature. We do not bring 
any new beings thither, we do not turn ourselves towards other things, but rather that 
which is already manifest is newly determined, and indeed with regard to its Being-what 
and its Being-how, with regard to Being. '82 The widening of the sphere of reference, 
whether it be merely the widening of the sphere of applicability of a rule for 
comportment or whether it be the widening to the sphere of all material things, widening 
as such is only possible because there is a way of determining things that runs counter to 
their involvements. `Now does the new determination of beings as nature develop 
through the widening of the sphere, or on the contrary is the widening of the sphere a 
necessary consequence of the new determination of beings. Obviously the lat: er. '83 But 
in what does this new determinability of things consist? Precisely in those correlations 
such as the correlation between the resistance of the earth and the hardness of the 
ploughshare which Heidegger identifies as inhabiting interstitially as it were the 
contexts of involvement. These relations are, if you like, second order relations. They 
are relations between entities already determined as their involvement relations; and this 
is what guarantees that they cannot themselves be involvement relations, not even as 
abstracted or standardised involvement relations. Abstraction or standardisation of 
involvement relations relies implicitly on such second order relations. These relations 
guide the process of abstraction or standardisation, show the way in which different 
aspects of different involvements may be gathered together. The earth insofar as it is to 
81 Being and Time, p. 101. 
82 'Es ist eine Bestimmung des Seienden qua Natur. 
Wir bringen nicht neues Seiendes hinzu, wir wenden 
uns nicht anderen Dinge zu, sondern die schon offenbaren selbst werden neu 
bestimmt, und zwar 
hinsichtlich ihres Was- und Wie-seins, hinsichtlich des Seins. ' 
G27, p. 185. 
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be tilled corresponds in its heaviness, its stickiness, its intractability, to the weight, the 
sharpness, and the shape of the plough that is for tilling; and this correspondence is quite 
different from the reference relations between plough and earth within the context of 
tilling. It opens up a dimension that runs across every field and every plough. These 
correspondence relations run through the context of involvement, knitting together 
contexts in a pattern quite different from that hierarchical embedding of involvements 
that points towards a for-the-sake-of-which. On the basis of these relations entities can 
be determined in quite new configurations. This is, I take it, the point of Heidegger's 
somewhat cryptic remarks in Being and Time on the distinction between the ready-to- 
hand and the present-at-hand: `the following structures and dimensions of ontological 
problematics... must be kept in principle distinct: 1. The Being of those entities within- 
the-world which we proximally encounter - readiness-to-hand; 2. The Being of those 
entities which we can come across and whose nature we can determine if we discover 
them in their own right by going through the entities proximally encountered - presence- 
at-hand. )84 Going through [Durchgang] does not mean here something like going 
through a curtain to reach what lies on the other side; rather the present-at-hand itself 
goes through the ready-to-hand as the warp goes through the woof in a woven fabric. 
(This is partly indicated by the word itself, which means primarily `passage' or `way 
through' without any necessary connotation of exiting or leaving. A sign saying `Kein 
Durchgang! ' does not tell you that there is no exit, it tells you that you are not allowed 
on a piece of land, are not allowed to walk across it. ) One does not arrive at the present- 
at-hand at the end of a line that penetrates beyond the ready-to-hand, rather one 
encounters the present-to-hand in following the line which it itself traces through the 
83 `Erwächst nun die neue Bestimmung des Seienden als Natur durch die Erweiterung des Bezirks, oder ist 
umgekehrt die Erweiterung des Bezirks eine notwendige Folge der neuen Bestimmung des Seienden? 
Offenbar gilt das letztere. ' G27, p. 185. 
" Being and Time, p. 121 (my emphasis). 
- 121 - 
fabric of the ready-to-hand; a line that, if it can be said to penetrate the ready-to-hand, 
does not do so once and for all so as to make it clear to the other side, but punctures it 
repeatedly as it threads its way in and out of it, never getting clear of it. 85 
At this point we might recall that William Blattner, when describing the process of 
standardisation, claims that what science focuses upon are aspects of the ready-to-hand 
that are `portable' between pragmatic contexts and which are in this sense somehow 
`durable. ' Now it may well be that such aspects could still be determined in terms of 
involvement, but what cannot be determined in terms of involvement is precisely their 
portability and durability. We can now see that it is `portability' and `durability' 
themselves that are present-at-hand determinations of entities. And it can be no accident 
that the concepts `portable' and `durable' echo so closely the very concepts that 
Heidegger identifies as fundamental to modern physics' objectification of the present-at- 
hand: motion as change of place, and mass as inertial resistance to change. What we are 
looking at when we look at entities as present-at-hand is precisely the portability and 
durability of ready-to-hand aspects, not the aspects themselves. We are looking at what 
makes standardisation possible, not standardisation itself. We are looking precisely at 
that which makes any substitution of one piece of equipment by another, any evaluation 
of better or worse, possible in the first place. To discard this hammer for that one, is 
already to move `outside' the reference relations because it is to move between them, to 
switch tracks, as it were. This hammer is not related to that hammer by a for-which or an 
in order to (except perhaps when one uses a hammer to repair a hammer). This hammer 
does not have that hammer as its towards-which, rather both hammers move within their 
own involvements in parallel, as it were. The patterns of involvements that determine 
Heidegger does speak earlier on in terms of penetration. `To lay bare what is just present-at-hand and no 
more, cognition must first penetrate beyond [dringt fiber] what is ready-to-hand 
in our concern. ' [Being 
and Time, p. 101. ] 
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them as what they are, prove in some respects similar; they can be more or less mapped 
onto one another. The overall fabric of involvements in which both lie embedded - the 
context of the workshop in which both reside for example - can be folded to bring these 
two regions face to face and momentarily fuse. What else happens when one tool is 
substituted for another? How else to explain the possibility of those hyper-contextual 
leaps from one region of the environing world to another? As Heidegger himself says, 
`The insight dawns that practical measures are therefore taken because in the end all 
material things have such properties. '86 This insight is tantamount to the change-over in 
our understanding of the Being of beings. `In distinction from things of use, there 
suddenly appears a universal sphere of material things, called physical nature. This 
changeover is thus based on a change in the determination of the Being of beings. "8' 
The `if... then... ' schema of deliberation proves to be ambiguous. On the one hand it 
speaks of the structure of involvements. On the other hand it contains hidden within 
itself a reference to the correlations that run through the context of involvements. This 
ambiguity is revealed in the difference between the two assertions `The hammer is too 
heavy' and `The hammer is heavy. ' What has changed here is not simply the loss of an 
adverb, but the nature of the `is' itself, that is to say, what is being determined, as well 
as how it is being determined. In the first assertion the hammer, still determined as a 
hammer by its functionality, is considered `too heavy for this work. ' The assertion 
occurs as one side of an `if.. then... ' schema ('If I'm going to hammer in this fragile pin, 
then this hammer is too heavy. ') In the second assertion the hammer is no longer 
determined as something ready-to-hand at all, but rather is determined as simply heavy. 
86 'Es dämmert jetzt die Einsicht, daß die praktischen Maßnehmen deshalb getroffen werden, weil am 
Ende alle materiellen Dinge solche Eigenschaften haben. ' G27, p. 182. 
87 'Im Unterschied zu den Gebrauchsdingen zeigt sich plötzlich ein universaler Bereich von materiellen 
Dingen, genannt physische Natur. Dieser Umschlag beruht also auf einem 
Wandel der Bestimmung des 
Seins des Seienden. ' G27, p. 189. 
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What does this mean? The assertion no longer occupies a place in an `if... then... ' 
schema. ('If I'm going to hammer in this pin, then this hammer is heavy' makes no 
sense), but rather spans it. The second assertion refers to what binds the two places of 
the `if... then... ' schema together, what correlates them - heaviness. The second 
assertion occurs in schexnas of the form `Since the hammer is heavy, i. e. is the kind of 
thing for which heaviness is an appropriate predicate, as opposed to assertions, say, 
which are neither heavy nor not heavy, considerations such as "if I want to do X, then 
this hammer is too heavy" are possible. ' The assertion `the hammer is heavy' tells you 
something about the kind of `if... then... ' schemas that are possible when considering 
what to do with hammers. 
Step 3: Scientific projection - the interpretation of the change-over 
But this change over [Umschlag] in our understanding of Being is still not what 
constitutes the scientific attitude, because, as we have already seen, on the one hand, 
taking something as present-at-hand is not necessarily scientific - you don't have to do 
physics, to know that the hammer is heavy; while, on the other hand, it is possible for 
any kind of being, not just the present-at-hand, to become the object of a science. `A 
modification of our understanding of Being does not seem to be necessarily constitutive 
for the genesis of the theoretical attitude "towards Things". Certainly not, if this 
"modification" is to imply a change in the kind of Being which, in understanding the 
entity before us, we understand it to possess. '88 Why then bother to describe so 
painstakingly deliberation about the ready-to-hand and its modification into assertions 
about the present-at-hand? Because the example chosen to illuminate the genesis of the 
scientific attitude is mathematical physics, the science of Nature understood as present- 
at-hand. Heidegger's point is this: The change over to understanding the entities before 
" Being and Time, p. 413. 
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us as present-at-hand simultaneously affords us the opportunity, as it were, of modifving 
the understanding of the present-at-hand, that is to say, of making that understanding 
itself explicit. This `secondary' modification is precisely a modification of the 
understanding of Being, which does not imply any change in the Being of the entities 
before us. They simply remain present-at-hand before us, whether or not we I nvest 
them scientifically. But this change in the understanding of the present-at-hand is 
dependent upon the change over to understanding them so. and not just for the trivial 
reason that a change in the understanding of the present-at-hand is clearly dependent on 
that understanding having actually occurred. 
What does it mean to look at the hammer as present-at-hand. rather than deal With it as 
ready-to-hand? As well as ignoring the fact that it is a tool, it means overlooking its 
quite specific place within the context of involvements. Heidegger says, `Its place 
becomes a matter of indifference. ' 89 The entity has been released from its confinement 
within the totality of involvements. Instead of having a proper place determined by its 
specific relations with other tools and materials, the hammer now occupies a spatio- 
temporal position that is inherently arbitrary. Because of this arbitrariness, one present- 
at-hand thing can be replaced by another. They are inherently interchangeable; and 
because they are interchangeable, if you have one, essentially you have them all. 
Heidegger says: `The aggregate [das All] of the present-at-hand becomes the theme. '(') 
Now, in fact, in German das All is not used to mean `the all, ' `the aggregate' - though 
that of course is what it would mean from its etymology. What it actually means in 
ordinary usage is the universe, or space - the cosmos. Indeed in modern usage it denotes 
specifically outer space (for example Spaziergang im . "1II means "space walk: 
"). Das All 
is the physical universe that Heidegger always contrasts with the phenomenon of the 
89 Being and Time, p. 413. 
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world. For example, in Basic Problems of Phenomenology: `What we call the universe 
[ Weltall] is, like everything that may be important or not important, not the world. 
Rather, the universe [das All] of beings is - or, to speak more carefully, can be - the 
intraworldly, what is within the world. '91 What Heidegger is saying, then, in Being and 
Time is that das All, space as a whole, and the whole as space, the concept of the 
universe as a homogeneous totality belongs inherently to the meaning of the present-at- 
hand. It is not as if one first looks at something present-at-hand, and then one chooses or 
chooses not to think of it as belonging to a homogeneous spatial whole, rather to 
encounter something as present-at-hand is to encounter it as belonging to such a whole 
because it is interchangeable. 
This need not, however, ever be explicit. After all, the statement `The hammer is heavy' 
says nothing about the aggregate of the present-at-hand. The cosmos as a whole would 
not seem to be involved (unless, of course, one were a Machian, but one can't be a 
Machian without being a physicist) in deciding the issue. 92 But what does concern itself 
explicitly with the aggregate of the present-at-hand, and necessarily so, is physics. If the 
aggregate of the present-at-hand becomes the theme then one is doing physics. And this 
begins to indicate what constitutes science as science. 
Any science whatsoever takes a `whole' as its theme. But it takes a specific type of 
`whole' as its theme, a `whole' inherent to the Being of the beings under investigation. 
90 Being and Time, p. 413. 
91 BPP, p. 165; `Was wir Weltall nennen, ist wie jedes belanglose oder belangvolle Ding nicht die Welt. 
Das All des Seienden ist vielmehr das Innerweltliche, vorsichtiger gesprochen, kann dieses sein. ' G24, p. 
235. 
92 In fact das All was precisely the term that Mach himself chose to use in expressing his holistic 
empiricism. `Nature does not begin with elements, as we are obliged to begin with them. It 
is certainly 
fortunate for us, that we can from time to time, turn aside our eyes from the over-powering unity of the 
All, and allow them to rest on individual details. But we should not omit, ultimately, to complete and 
correct our views by a thorough consideration of the things which 
for the time being we left out of 
account. ' (Ernst Mach, The Science of Mechanics, trans. T. J. McCormack, (Chicago, 
Open Court, 1907), 
pp. 287-88; quoted in Pierre Kerzberg, The Invented Universe, (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 1989), 
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The fact that this particular kind of `whole, ' in this case das All, is inherent to the Being 
of the beings under investigation, in this case the present-at-hand, follows from the way 
in which the entities are determined. Science engages explicitly with what belongs 
inherently to the meaning of the beings with which it deals. In the case of physics, it 
deals explicitly with what belongs inherently to the meaning of the present-at-hand: 
interchangeability and aggregate. The crucial question is: How? The release of the 
ready-to-hand from its confinement within the context of involvements is part and 
parcel of the way in which the understanding of Being changes over to looking at 
entities as present-at-hand. This release from confinement is what determines that the 
aggregate, das All, belongs to the meaning of the present-at-hand. Therefore, Heidegger 
says, this release can become `at the same time a delimitation of the "realm" of the 
present-at-hand, if one now takes as one's guiding clue the understanding of Being in 
the sense of presence at hand. '93 Science can only proceed on the basis of such a 
delimitation. 
If one looks at the historical beginnings of modem physics, then, according to 
Heidegger, what is decisive for its constitution as a science, is not so much its 
empiricism, nor even its application of mathematical methods, but rather `the 
mathematical projection of Nature itself. 94 This mathematical projection uncovers the 
present-at-hand as such, along with the various basic attributes that make it 
quantitatively determinable. Only on the basis of such a projection is anything like a 
physical fact discoverable, or a physical experiment performable. `[W]hat is decisive is 
not primarily the mathematical as such; what is decisive is that this projection discloses 
p. 83. ) It may be that Heidegger's use of the term is a 
deliberate allusion to the Machian tradition m 
German physics, in particular Einstein - see next chapter. 
93 Being and Time, p. 413. 
" Being and Time, p. 413-14; trans slightly altered, 'nnathematischen 
Entwurf der Natur selbst. ' SZ, p. 
362. 
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something that is a priori. Thus the paradigmatic character of mathematical natural 
science [... ] consists in the fact that the entities which it takes as its theme are 
discovered in the only way in which entities can be discovered - by the prior projection 
of their state of Being. '95 
Now it is important to realise that Heidegger is not proposing here something like a 
constructivist philosophy of science; that is to say, a philosophy of science which claims 
that, since there are no `bare facts, ' no empirical data without some backing theory, 
every science, or at least every scientific investigation, rests in the end upon an 
irreducible core of presuppositions about its subject matter, which themselves can never 
be fully justified. Heidegger's concept of scientific projection would in that case be 
something like Thomas Kuhn's notion of a paradigm. But that would be to assume that 
Heidegger's idea of the a priori is Kantian, i. e. that it is epistemological, something like 
the necessary conditions for empirical knowledge. A better example of the kind of a 
priori Heidegger has in mind is the truism, `You can't make an omelette without 
breaking eggs. ' Translated into philosophical jargon, this means that breaking eggs is a 
condition of possibility for an omelette, i. e. a necessary a priori. But this a priori is not 
epistemological. If anything it is ontological: there can be no omelette otherwise. 
Similarly, the a prioris disclosed by scientific projection might be of this kind, for 
example: `You can't treat something as present-at-hand without releasing it from its 
involvement in your everyday concerns. ' Our acceptance of, indeed certainty about, the 
impossibility of it being any other way rests in both cases upon the fact that we already 
know to some extent what it means to make an omelette or treat something as present- 
at-hand. Any kind of encounter with a being already demonstrates an implicit 
understanding of its kind of Being. But making this understanding of Being explicit in a 
9s Being and Time, p. 414. 
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scientific projection can only follow on after the encounter with beings, and it can only 
follow on after because the encounter already involves a change over in the 
understanding of Being. It is not enough that the encounter be based upon an 
understanding of Being, that understanding must somehow be enacted in the encounter, 
not just passively relied upon. The change over is precisely that enactment. And 
scientific projection is the explicit enactment of the change-over. Scientific projection is, 
if you like, deliberation about the change-over: "If I am to view things as present-at- 
hand, then I must do so and so. " 
To get a clearer understanding of what might be involved in an explicit enactment of the 
change-over to understanding an entity as present-at-hand we need to reconsider what 
Heidegger might have meant by the term `deworlding. ' The word has largely dropped 
out of Heidegger's vocabulary by the time of Being and Time, but he does use it on just 
three occasions. They are interesting because they link the talk in paragraph 69b about 
the aggregate [das All] of the present-at-hand back to the examination of the most 
familiar ways in which presence-at-hand shows up within the everyday world of 
circumspective concern. In paragraph 24 on `Space and Dasein's Spatiality, ' Heidegger 
tells us, `The homogeneous space of Nature shows itself only when the entities we 
encounter are discovered in such a way that the worldly character of the ready-to-hand 
gets specifically deprived of its worldhood. '96 The homogeneous space of Nature is 
precisely that aggregate [das All] of the present-at-hand in which entities are inherently 
interchangeable because they are determined as their correlations. But how does the 
worldly character of the ready-to-hand get deprived of its worldhood? The most familiar 
and everyday situations in which this happens, are when the ready-to-hand breaks down, 
gets in the way of what we are doing, or is found to be simply missing. In such events 
96 Being and Time, p. 147. 
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the ready-to-hand loses that peculiar invisibility that is attendant upon the smooth 
running of our affairs. We do not notice the ready-to-hand until it stops, in various 
different ways, being handy. `The modes of conspicuousness, obtrusiveness, and 
obstinacy all have the function of bringing to the fore the characteristic of presence-at- 
hand in what is ready-to-hand. '97 And Heidegger adds later, `whenever the world is lit 
up in the modes of concern which we have been Interpreting, the ready-to-hand becomes 
deprived of its worldhood so that Being-just-present-at-hand comes to the fore. '98 In its 
most everyday and familiar guise, deworlding happens despite our best efforts. Only an 
armchair pragmatist could suppose that our practical activities are only ever suspended 
when we take a tea-break and lean back to take disinterested, but no doubt complacent 
look at the results of our efforts. We might remember at this point that both Rouse and 
Blattner dismiss this example of an enforced interruption in our activities as an example 
of `decontextualisation' because they claim that the ready-to-hand does not thereby 
become present-at-hand. Rather the ready-to-hand becomes ready-to-hand in a different 
way, within a different context. We start trying to repair it, or set about looking for it, or 
simply shove it out of the way; all of which are ways of dealing with it. But Heidegger 
is, of course, aware of this. `Pure presence-at-hand announces itself in such equipment, 
but only to withdraw to the readiness-to-hand of something with which one concerns 
oneself - that is to say, of the sort of thing we find when we put 
it back into repair. '" 
Heidegger's point is not that the ready-to-hand becomes present-at-hand when it breaks 
down, or is found to be missing, or gets in the way, as though readiness to hand and 
presence-at-hand were states of a thing which itself persisted through the process of 
change. Rather, Heidegger's point is that the present-at-hand announces 
itself in 
97 Beingrand Time, p. 104. 
98 Being and Time, p. 106. 
99 Beingrand Time, p. 103. 
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breaking down, in being missing, in being in the % ay. Deworlding does not clear the 
stage of all involvements so that the bare present-at-hand thing may then appear. Rather 
deworlding itself is the way in which the present-at-hand con fronts us. Deworldingg is 
the Being of the present-at-hand. 
Where both Dreyfus and his more pragmatist disciples go wrong in their account of the 
present-at-hand is revealed perhaps by Dreyfus' use of the concept of deworlding. For 
Dreyfus it is entirely clear, indeed so clear that he never explicitly comments upon it. 
that deworlding, or decontextualisation, is an activity carried out hi' Dasein. `Occurent 
beings are revealed when Dasein takes a detached attitude towards things and 
decontextualises them - in Heidegger's terms, deworlds them. '10° But perhaps this is 
precisely what doesn't happen. If the present-at-hand is precisely that which is not 
necessarily intraworldly, and thus `unworldliness' belongs to the very Being of the 
present-at-hand, then perhaps the `agent' of de-worlding is not Dasein itself, which is 
after all condemned to be in the world whether it likes it or not, but the present-at-hand 
itself. The present-at-hand is not reached at the end of a process of de-worlding 
(initiated by a Dasein who suddenly and for no apparent reason decides to stop being in 
the world, as if we could, and become a classical subject confronted by, objects of 
cognition), rather the present-at-hand is deworlding. The Being of the present-at-hand is 
that it deworlds itself - and of course there are many ways in which it may deworld. 
But how is this description of the Being of the present-at-hand to be reconciled with that 
description we have already obtained in terms of the correlations within a context of 
involvements that correspond across contexts'. ' Deworldincy doesn't destroy the world. In 
fact, according to Heideg`ger, it announces it. When an item of equipment is unavailable 
or unusable, its assiwnment within the context of involvements becomes explicit. The 
10° Being-in-the-World, p. 256. 
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prefix Ent- in Entweltlichung may be similar to the ent- in entfernen and entschlossen. 
i. e., both privative and intensifying. A ready-to-hand thing is perceived, becomes 
conspicuous, when it `leaps out' out of its context of involvements. It does not, to be 
sure, leap nowhere. Blattner and Rouse are right in suggesting that it must leap into 
another context. But what is the line that it follows in so leaping from one context to 
another? The line mapped out by the correspondence relations. Just as Dasein de-severs 
[entfernt] a distance by crossing it, that is to say by eliminating and enacting it, so the 
present-at-hand de-worlds the environment. This would mean that just as the Umwelt is 
the arena of our dealings with the ready-to-hand, the Entwelt is the `arena' of our 
perception of the present-at-hand. But the Entwelt is not outside the Unnt c'lt, nor is it 
nowhere, rather it lies `perpendicular' to the Umwelt on the axis of the 
conspicuous/inconspicuous that pierces and runs through everything ready-to-hand. 
The relation between deworiding and the correspondence relations that have already 
been used to characterise the Being of the present-at-hand is the same as that between 
readiness-to-hand and involvement: deworlding characterises the `how' of presence-at- 
hand, correspondence relations characterise the `what. ' The present-at-hand manifests 
itself in deworlding; it is determined as what it is by the correspondence relations that 
run through the contexts of involvement. The fact that the determinations of the present- 
at-hand show up both within the philosophical tradition and common sense as 
`properties' is phenomenologically due, I take it, to the prior constitution of the entity as 
an entity by its involvement relations. Heaviness looks like a property which attaches to 
a thing because in the assertion, `The hammer is heavy, ' the hammer is already 
implicitly interpreted as ready to hand. It is instructive, that in the history of modern 
mathematical physics there has been a progressive move away from such `properties' to 
purely functional descriptions, until finally in quantum mechanics entities themselves 
become eigenfunctions of operators which represent `observables' such as energy and 
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momentum, i. e. what in classical physics were still regarded as the properties of 
occurrent things. 
The explicit enactment of the change-over in the understanding of Being should not. 
then, be read as a process of decontextualisation initiated by a Dasein, who happens for 
whatever reason to have a predilection for the theoretical attitude, but rather- as 
something more like the interpretation of break down. Heidegger famously- introduces 
his notion of interpretation in terms of repairing or improving something ready-to-hand. 
`All preparing, putting to rights, repairing, improving, rounding out, are accomplished in 
the following way: we take apart in its "in-order-to" that which is circumspectively 
ready-to-hand and we concern ourselves with it in accordance with what becomes 
visible through this process. That which has been circumspectively taken apart with 
regard to its "in-order-to", and taken apart as such - that which is explicitly understood - 
has the structure of something as something. 'i0' Interpretation [Auslegungj lays out the 
structure of involvement which determines the ready-to-hand as the entity which it is, so 
as to see how it is involved in its involvements. `The "as" makes up the structure of the 
explicitness of something that is understood. It constitutes the interpretation. ' 102 
Interpretation is the articulation of an understanding, both its development, that is to 
say, its working out and its laying out in disclosure. But here it is not a question of an 
interpretation of the ready-to-hand that is implicit in repairing or setting the ready-to- 
hand to rights; it is a question of the interpretation of the break down itself, an 
articulation and working, out of those modes - conspicuousness. obtrusiveness, and 
obstinacy, among others - in which presence-at-hand shows itself. Heidegger, unlike 
Cassirer, is not just interested in the lo, ical theory of the concept form atioin appropriate 
to different kinds of scientific research, he is also, as he tells us in the 1925 lecture 
101 being and Tina:, p. 180 
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course, interested in exhibiting `the kind of access which they have to the pre-given 
reality. ' 103 And indeed it is the kind of access that determines the kind of concept 
formation that accrues to such research. Access to the present-at-hand is gained by 
interpreting the modes in which it comes to the fore, and interpretation does not just 
mean a discursive interpretation; it means primarily the kind of interpretation 
exemplified by repairing or setting to rights a piece of equipment. We begin to see why 
natural science is not just mathematical but also and necessarily experimental. 
Experimenting interprets the conspicuousness of the present-at-hand by laying out and 
going through the structure of breaking-down. Experimental apparatus are carefully 
constructed items of equipment designed to elicit failure. They are machines for 
failure. 104 
But why is the scientific projection of the present-at-hand, that is to say. the explicit 
enactment of the change over in the understanding of the Being of entities within the 
world from letting-be-involved to letting-be-deworlding, a mathematical projection of 
Nature? On what basis does Heidegger assume that the Being of the present-at-hand is 
in fact articulated by mathematics? Is he just taking it for granted because in fact natural 
science has `successfully' operated with a mathematical projection of Nature? Or has he 
in mind some alternative definition of mathematics that would make the scientific 
102 Being and Time, p. 189. 
103 HCT, p. 2. 
104. This phrase is meant to echo Nancy Cartwright's term of art "nomological machine". Cartwright 
argues that natural laws do not obtain universally, but rather occur only within and as a result of fixed 
arrangements of components with stable capacities that allow regular behaviours to arise. `Sometimes the 
arrangement of the components and the setting are appropriate for a law to occur naturally, as in the 
planetary system; more often they are engineered by us, as in a laboratory experiment. But in any case, it 
takes what I call a nomological machine to get a law of nature. ' The Dappled World -A Study of the 
Boundaries of Science, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 49. Cartwright, then, takes 
capacities to be basic, and laws to result only when we use our knowledge of the capacities that entities 
have to construct situations in which they will behave with law-like regularity. `What is important about 
capacities is their open-endedness: what we know about them suggests strategies rather than underwriting 
conclusions. ' Ibid, p. 59. In coining the phrase "machine for failure" all I am trying to suggest is that the 
only kinds of capacity that an entity could display within the context of ready-to-hand involvements would 
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projection of Nature inevitable. The answer lies, I think, in a highly coded passage at the 
end of Heidegger's analysis of the worldhood of the world in Being and Time. 
And only if entities within-the-world can be encountered at all, is it possible, in 
the field of such entities, to make accessible what is just present-at-hand-and- 
no-more. By reason of their Being-just-present-at-hand-and-no-more. these 
latter entities can have their `properties' defined mathematicall`v in 'functional 
concepts. ' Ontologically, such concepts are possible only in relation to entities 
whose Being has the character of pure substantiality. Functional concepts are 
never possible except as formalized substantial concepts. 105 
The reference here is to Ernst Cassirer's Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegrif of 1910, 
the work which, as we have already noted, provided such a devastating criticism of 
Rickert's theory of concept formation within the natural sciences. Cassirer opposes the 
traditional theory of concept formation through abstraction, in which concepts arc 
treated as genera formed by the progressive elimination of specificities. The most 
universal concept is also the most empty. This theory only has meaning, according to 
Cassirer, within Aristotelian metaphysics. There the hierarchy of abstractions reflects 
the real `form of things. Substance really can be articulated in terms of generic 
commonalities and specific differences. Thus the definition of the concept through 
abstraction only has meaning for a metaphysics of substance, where the properties of 
things are fundamental, relations between them merely secondary. But the theory of 
concept formation by the isolation of similarities hides within itself its undoing. In order 
for two impressions to be found similar they must first be compared, i. e. they must be 
selected. They must be run through one by one, i. e. ordered in a series, and this 
presupposes a principle of selection. According to Cassirer, it is the identity of the 
generating principle that constitutes the concept. Instead of vaguely describing the 
organising principle of the series as 'similarity'. which merely obscures the issue and 
be the capacities to surprise us, to disappoint us, or to annoy us - those capacities to 
disrupt our activities 
that Heidegger refers to as conspicuousness, obtrusiveness and obstinacy. 
105 Being and Time, p. 122. 
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begs the question, the point of logical theory is to set out the possible categorical 
functions, that is to say, ordering principles. The functional concept has what Cassierer 
calls 'concrete universality' as opposed to the abstract and empty universality of the 
generic concept. In mathematics, for example, a general formula does not lose any of the 
content of the specific instances which it covers, because they can all be derived from it. 
A mathematical concept gives a rule for the particularities covered by it. The more 
universal the concept, the richer it is in content. This is the concept thought of on the 
model of the mathematical function. In this model particularities are not erased in a 
process of abstraction but retained and organised as variables of the function; these 
variable will always be defined over some concrete range. 
The implied criticism in Heidegger's comments on `functional concepts' is not, I take it, 
that the traditional notion of the concept in terms of abstraction wins out, but that 
Cassirer's theory of the concept remains a theory of `substantial' concepts, albeit a 
theory that deals with the matter better than an Aristotelian theory of generic concepts. 
Heidegger's argument with Cassirer is not over his theory of mathematics and natural 
science, but over Cassirer's claim that the notion of the functional concept is capable of 
synthesising via a theory of symbolic forms the whole disparate field of cultural activity. 
This is because, at the very least, the relations determinative of the context of 
involvements are not of the kind that can be expressed in functional concepts. `The 
phenomenal content of these `Relations' and `Relata' - the "in-order-to", the "for-the- 
sake-of', and the "with-which" of an involvement - is such that they resist any sort of 
mathematical functional ization. 
" 06 But these comments indicate equally that within the 
realm of the present-at-hand Heidegger is perfectly happy to accept 
Cassirer's notion of 
the functional concept. 
106 Being and Time, pp. 121-22. 
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As we have seen, `heaviness' is not a predicate of the hammer, but a word for a 
correlation, perhaps one among many, between the hammer and what it is hammering. 
Present-at-hand `properties' are correlations within contexts of involvement that run 
through all contexts of involvement. It is this `running through' that makes functional 
concepts appropriate for their expression. The functional concept is the generating 
principle of a series, it has concrete universality because the particularities it subsumes 
are maintained within it as variables. But this describes precisely the structure of the 
present-at-hand relations. The property `heaviness' is something like the generating 
principle for each of the correlations within specific contexts of involvement which 
when run through as a series give the correspondence across contexts. The correlations 
can be expressed as the variable of a functional concept because they are already 
levelled off from the context references themselves. 
Mathematics then would be nothing other than the formal articulation of possibilities of 
functional relations, relations that are equivalent to the correspondence relations 
Heidegger has already identified as the possible determinations of the present-at-hand. 
Hence mathematics would be nothing other than the formal articulation of the possible 
determinations of the present-at-hand. And if one wanted then a more detailed analysis 
of the kinds of relations constitutive of the present-at-hand one could do worse than go 
away and read Cassirer's Substance and Function -a book well worth reading anyway. 
Conclusion 
It looks, then, as if Heidegger's account of the way in which the possibility of scientific 
research emerges from everyday practical activity has three stages, and that part of the 
problem with previous readings of this account has been that they have either focused 
only on one of the stages or confused two or more of them. 
This confusion arrises, in 
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turn, because the concepts of objectification and presence-at-hand are taken to he 
noetically-noematically correlative. The identification of objectivity and pre, ýcncc-at-hand 
appears to have become structurally engrained within the An`glo-Saxon reception of 
Heidegger's work, no doubt because that reception was backwards and large 1ý- 
determined from the start by the later Heidegger's strictures against 'ohjectitVing 
thinking. ' Matters are only made worse when full account is not taken of the distinction 
between natural science and science in general. Heidegger's account of the ontological 
genesis of mathematical physics is then taken to be an existential description of science 
per se, with no recognition of the fact that the formal-existential dd finition of science 
must be extracted from the phenomenological account of natural science by allowing all 
reference to the present-at-hand to drop out. Summarising schematically, then, the 
ontological genesis of mathematical physics looks like this: 
absorbed concern 
I (holding back from manipulation) 
deliberation 
I (change-over in the understanding of Being) 
discovery of the present-at-hand 
1 (scientific projection) 
objectification 
But this linear sequence does not fully capture the situation. It gives the impression that 
the various stages in the sequence might be simply amplifications of an underlying and 
single tendency - towards `greater and greater objectivity. sad . 
It does not express the tact 
that deliberation as the making-present of the ready-to-hand and the change-over 
in the 
understanding of Being are modifications that occur 
in completely independent 
dimensions. A better way of schematising what is going can, then, would 
be perhaps- 
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Umschlag 
understanding readiness-to-hand presence-at-hand 
encounter absorbed concern -ý discovery of the present-at-hand 
(dealing with the ready-to-hand) 
1 (holding back) 
making-present deliberation 
change-over 
i (scientific projection) 
objectification 
However this still doesn't do justice to what is going on. From this schema it looks as it' 
objectification is to the present-at-hand as deliberation is to the ready-to-hand. Scientific 
projection would as far as the discovery of the present-at-hand is concerned be 
something like the holding-back from manipulation that allows circumspective concern 
to interpret the ready-to-hand, and make it present through deliberation. Scientific 
projection still appears to be specifically linked to the present-at-hand, not to be sure as 
that which constitutes it as present-at-hand, but rather that which brings it closer 
through interpretation. Objectification would simply be the thematic articulation of the 
present-at-hand based upon an explicit understanding of its kind of Being. But this 
contradicts Heidegger's assertion that objectification is not restricted to the present-at- 
hand, but is a possible mode of comportment towards beings with many diferent kinds 
of Being. What is missing in this schema is any indication of the connection between the 
change-over in the understanding of the Being of beings and the possibility of scientific 
projection at all. It looks as if scientific projection could occur simply on the basis of a 
primary encounter with the present-at-hand and the understanding of Being that such an 
encounter presupposes. That there can be a change-over in the understanding of Being is 
simply a consequence of the fact that there is more than one way of determining what 
and how a being is, but it appears to be strictly irrelevant to the question of making a 
particular understanding, of Being explicit. That appears to occur within the ontological 
region itself as the result of something like a reflection about the encounter with beings 
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allowed by such an understanding of Being. But for Heidegger there could be no such 
`reflection' if it weren't for the change-over in the understanding of Being. There could 
be no access whatsoever to Being, if Being were monistic. If there were only one 
background for our comportments within the world then that background would 
necessarily always be in the background. It is only because the background changes that 
backgrounds can come to the fore. The stepping-back from the encounter with beings to 
its condition of possibility occurs only as a turning back to the change-over -a twisting 
round from the encounter with entities to the passage from one kind of encounter to 
another. Scientific projection is not simply another kind of deliberation conducted 
within the confines of another ontological region - the field of present-at-hand entities as 
opposed to the field of ready-to-hand ones, say - rather it is something like a deliberation 
about the change-over itself. Scientific projection follows on after both deliberation and 
the change-over in the understanding of Being in the linear sequence we started out 
with, because it is dependent upon both, but is not simply a version of either. To borrow 
an analogy from mathematics, scientific projection is something like the vector cross- 
product of the two: 
deliberation 
As in the second schema, deliberation and the change-over in the understanding of 
Being occupy separate dimensions, but now scientific projection is not portrayed as the 
result of doing one then the other, i. e. their vector addition, but as their vector product, 
occupying a third and independent dimension which is nonetheless determined by the 
`plane' which the first two occupy. This third dimension is, perhaps, the `step 
back' 
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scientific projection 
from the plane of comportments which Heidegger tells us is inherent in scientific 
activity. 
There is, however, one kind of encounter that doesn't seem to involve any change over, 
and that is precisely the encounter we first have with beings, the encounter out of which 
all other kinds of encounter seem to arise, namely the encounter with the ready-to-hand. 
And this is, in a sense, true. It explains precisely the peculiar `shyness' of the ready-to- 
hand, and provides an answer to the question Heidegger poses at the end of Being and 
Time: `Why does Being get "conceived" "proximally" in terms of the present-at-hand 
and not in terms of the ready-to-hand, which indeed lies closer to us? ' 107 Precisely 
because we "proximally and for the most part" (zunächst und zumeist) encounter the 
ready-to-hand, we "proximally and for the most part" objectify the present-at-hand as 
the product of that change over in our understanding of Being that "proximally and for 
the most part" occurs in our everyday comportment. Scientific projection of the ready- 
to-hand could only occur by going backwards, as it were, through the change over to the 
present-at-hand. This would be dependent not only upon a prior projection of the 
present-at-hand, but also upon an explicit understanding of that projection's dependence 
upon the change over. This means that a science of the ready-to-hand wou'd exhibit a 
peculiar reliance upon the kinds of investigation that make up the existential analytic 
itself. 
But far more worrying than the tardiness of a science of the ready-to-hand, is the 
premature exhaustion of a science of nature. If scientific projection simply makes 
explicit an understanding of Being that is already fully enacted in our pre-scientific 
encounter with beings, then it seems that there is very little for science actually to 
do. As 
in some peculiarly trite subjective idealism in which the I posited whatever 
it liked as 
107 Being and Time, p. 487. 
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the not-I, science would seem to be completed by and within its initial projection. 
Scientific projection, however, even of the present-at-hand, does not happen in one fell 
swoop. Rather the articulation of the understanding of Being, tied as it is to the 
continual encounter with beings, has a history. For example, the history of physics from 
Galileo to Einstein is not simply an accumulation of successful results all based on the 
same initial projection, rather it should be viewed largely as the struggle to articulate 
that projection, i. e. the gradual and arduous laying out of what exactly it means to treat 
something as present-at-hand. This process of articulation is what Heidegger calls 
thematization. 
In the development of this understanding of being, those concepts emerge 
which circumscribe what is, for instance, historical reality as such, or what 
basically distinguishes a being as a living being, i. e., the basic concepts of the 
respective sciences. With the development of the basic concepts the respective 
basis and ground of a particular science and its realm become circumscribed. 
What is determined thus through objectification as a realm can now, as object, 
become a theme. The objective context can be investigated in various aspects 
and be established as the object of investigation. The respective thematization 
is built upon objectification as such. 108 
Objectification, even the objectification of physics, does not make things present-at- 
hand. Rather beings, whether or not present-at-hand, have already been encountered; 
scientific projection by making their kind of Being explicit allows them-to become 
objects. 
"Beings" becoming objects" does not mean that through this objectification 
beings become beings for the first time. Rather, as the beings which they 
already are, beings are to respond to the knowing which is making the inquiry. 
By responding to the question as to what, how, and whence beings are, they 
stand vis-a-vis the inquiry which reveals them. 
With objectification we face the task of demonstrating, i. e. determining, 
beings which encounter us from out of themselves, of their own accord as they 
stand over against us. 
109 
los PIK, p. 20. 
109 PIK, p. 19. 
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It is this `standing over against us' that constitutes the beings as objects (Gegenstände). 
This concept of object (Gegenstand) then does not arise in contrast with the concept of 
subject, but rather in contrast with the encounter (Begegnung) out of which it arises. 
Like deliberation, then, objectification is a kind of making-present, but it is a distinctive 
kind of making-present. 
Being which Objectifies and which is alongside the present-at-hand within-the- 
world, is characterized by a distinctive kind of making-. present. This making- 
present is distinguished from the Present of circumspection in that - above all - 
the kind of discovering which belongs to the science in question awaits solely 
the discoveredness of the present-at-hand. This awaiting of discoveredness has 
its existentiell basis in a resoluteness by which Dasein projects itself towards 
its potentiality-for-Being in the `truth'. This projection is possible because 
Being-in-the-truth makes up a definite way in which Dasein may exist. We 
shall not trace further how science has its source in authentic existence. ' 10 
A superficial reading of this passage would assume that the making present of 
objectification is to be distinguished from the making-present of circumspection in that 
one is the making-present of the present-at-hand, the other the making-present of the 
ready-to-hand. But all making-present is inauthentic. ' 11 What on earth then can this 
distinctive kind of making-present belonging to science have to do with authenticity and 
resoluteness? All the more so in that all that distinguishes it from the inauthentic 
making-present of circumspection is an awaiting - precisely the inauthentic mode of the 
futural. The key to this bizarre about turn (the inauthentic present becomes authentic 
through being inauthentically futural! ) is that the discovering which belongs to the 
science in question - i. e. mathematical physics - awaits solely the discoveredness of the 
present-at-hand. Here we see the turn about, and why science has its source in authentic 
existence. The making present of circumspection, that is to say deliberation. conforms 
`to what is encountered within the horizon of awaiting retaining', but what is awaited is 
1 10 Being and Time, p. 415. 
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the towards-which of the piece of equipment's involvement. ' 12 Now, on the contrary, 
what is awaited is discoveredness itself, not some entity that may or may not be 
discovered; what is awaited is the unconcealment of the present-at-hand as such, as it is 
laid out in the movement of the Umschlag. Thus, when Heidegger says that this 
awaiting has its existentiell basis in a resoluteness by which Dasein projects itself 
towards its potentiality-for-Being in the truth, he is saying the same thing as when in the 
winter of 1928/29 he says, `Science means: To be in the unconcealment of beings for 
the sake of the unconcealment. ' 113 The question of how science can be resolute and 
project itself upon the possibility of unconcealment as such will be our concern in the 
next chapter. 
11 When we use the expression "making present" without adding anything 
further, we always have in 
mind the inauthentic kind, which is irresolute and does not 
have the character of a moment of vision. ' 
Being and Time, p. 388. 
112 Being and Time, p. 411. 
113 `Wissenschaft besagt: In der Unverborgenheit des Seienden sein um 




Science and Crisis 
Throughout the 1920s Heidegger was fond of making, by way- of an introductory 
preamble, passing reference to the contemporary crisis afflicting seemingly every one of 
the sciences from mathematics to theology. But how significant, really, were these crises 
to Heidegger's analysis of scientific activity? What role is crisis supposed to play in the 
existential conception of science? In 1925 Heidegger tells his students that the crisis in 
the sciences attests to the fact that even the sciences themselves admit `that they are in 
need of an original interpretation which they themselves are incapable of carrmi ng out. " 
So recently boasting of their independence, the sciences are back, tugging at their 
mothers apron strings. Crisis merely licenses philosophy to take charge again. Yet, in 
the opening paragraphs of Being and Time Heidegger observes, almost incidentally, 
that: `The "real" movement of the sciences takes place when their basic concepts 
undergo a more or less radical revision which is transparent to itself. The level which a 
science has reached is determined by how far it is capable of a crisis in its basic 
concepts. '2 This has a definite Kuhnian ring to it. Science is not simply the 
accumulation of data, nor even the articulation of ever more sophisticated and general 
theories. Science has its own `real' movement, independent one assumes of the urgings 
of philosophy, but it does not simply progress. Its history is punctuated b periods of 
revolutionary change. when theories are not refined or broadened but thrown a%\ ay. 
I 1o\ß cvcr, the remark is off the cuff. The thought is not expanded and apparentl\ leads 
nowhere. Indeed, as we have seen, when Heideg`zer does at last discuss science 
in 
1HC, p. 3. 
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paragraph 69b, the concept of crisis does not figure in his description at all. This might 
be because the discussion focuses upon the genesis of a science, while crisis is supposed 
to be an aspect of its maturity. But, even odder, it seems as if the concept of scientific 
projection elaborated there is in fact antithetical to any notion of scientific crisis. This is 
because scientific projection is supposed to make explicit the understanding of Being 
already implicit in our everyday comportments. Given that the basic concepts of a 
science articulate the conditions of access in pre-scientific activity to the entities under 
investigation, it is difficult to see how these basic concepts could ever be subject to 
radical revision, unless the way in which we encountered beings in everyday pre- 
scientific existence were itself subject to radical change. Quite apart from the question 
of whether Heidegger did or did not think that such radical changes in the structure of 
our everyday existence were even possible, this means that crisis could never strictly 
speaking be scientific crisis. A crisis in the foundations of the sciences would onºy ever 
be a reflection of an existential crisis in the manner of our comportments towards beings 
as a whole. A crisis in science would attest to a more profound crisis of Being-in-the- 
world. It would be impossible, then, for crisis to determine anything about a science at 
all, let alone the level it had reached, since crisis would be essentially pre-scientific, and 
science would only ever react to it as and when it happened. 
But, then again, this may be all that Heidegger really meant by crisis. It is, after all, well 
known that `crisis' was a popular, well-nigh inescapable, motif for academic hand- 
wringing in Weimar Germany. In the chaos following the first world war everything 
appeared to be in crisis, and throughout the twenties no intellectual, academic, or 
scientist seems to have been able to refrain from writing at least one article on the crisis 
in something or other. This truly astonishing flood of publications has been well 
2 Being and Time, p. 29. 
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documented by, amongst others, Fritz Ringer in his book Decline of the German 
Mandarins and the historian of science, Paul Forman, in his long article `Weimar 
Culture, Causality, and the Quantum Theory, 1918-1927. ' 3 And funnily enough, 
Forman's thesis, which he argues at length in his essay, is precisely that this cultural 
crisis had nothing intrinsically to do with science at all. Natural science, in Germany in 
the twenties, simply got infected by the enthusiasm for crisis raging all around, and felt 
compelled, for appearance's sake, to put one on, with the admittedly unfortunate 
consequence, according to Forman, that it really did, thereby, fall into a crisis from 
which it has not yet recovered; namely, the incorporation at its very centre of an 
irrational and unscientific element represented by Heisenberg's uncertainty principle. As 
early as 1921 the political economist, A. Salz, was already complaining that, `The 
phrase "Krisis der Wissenschaft" had already become a popular slogan in everyone's 
mouth. '4 Given the climate of the times, it may simply have been impossible to have 
delivered a lecture course devoid of any reference to the crisis facing the sciences for 
fear of inciting student unrest. Heidegger's brief comments on the crisis in the sciences 
might be nothing other than genuflections to the national mood. 
Crisis Rhetoric and the Revolution in the Sciences 
As Fritz Ringer has emphasised, one of the chief characteristics of the crisis mentality 
that beset Weimar Germany, was an extreme vagueness as to what exactly constituted 
crisis. `Nobody felt the need to define the exact nature of the crisis, to ask where it came 
} Fritz Ringer, Decline of the German Mandarins, (Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 1969); Paul 
Forman, `Weimar Culture, Causality, and the Quantum Theory, 1918-1927, ' Historical Studies in the 
Physical Sciences, Vol. 3,1971; see also Charles R. Bambach, Heidegger. Dilthey, and the Crisis of 
Historicism, (Ithaca and London, Cornell University Press, 1995), pp. 37-47. 
A. Salz, Für die Wissenschaft - Gegen die Gebildeten unter ihren Verächtern, (Munich, 1921). Quoted 
by Paul Forman, Ibid, p. 27. 
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from or what it involved. -)5 Nor could anybody agree on what the crisis signified for 
Germany or the academic disciplines. For some, such as Oswald Spengler, it was a 
symptom of a more general and inevitable decline. For others, such as Arthur Liebert, in 
his book Die geistige Krisis der Gegenwart ['The Spiritual Crisis of the Present'], it was 
a condition of vitality. `A time without crisis, ' he exclaimed, `is a dead time, as a man 
without crisis is a dead man. '6 What is certain, however, is that the phrase `crisis in the 
sciences' did not denote, at first at least, a revolution in the sciences, such as we now see 
relativity theory and quantum mechanics to have been. From Max Weber's influential 
and pessimistic address `Wissenschaft als Beruf, ' given in 1919, it was taken for granted 
that the crisis in the sciences was a crisis of confidence and of standing. Through ever 
increasing specialisation the individual sciences were losing all contact with the public 
realm. Esoteric and increasingly scholastic, they were in danger of losing any living 
meaning. In a way that was never very clearly explained, speciaiisation and 
professionalisation were supposed to lead inevitably to ossification. The sciences were 
not caught up in a ferment of revolutionary change; they were dying on their feet. The 
young especially were supposed to be tired of science, to have rejected its ideals, and 
turned instead to various forms of irrationalism that promised more excitement. Science 
and rationality were popularly identified with the old, discredited order that had led the 
nation to disaster. The Social Democrat education minister, Carl Heinrich Becker, for 
example, could write in a report on reform of secondary schools, `The basic evil is the 
overvaluing of the purely intellectual in our cultural activity, the exclusive 
predominance of the rationalistic mode of thought, which had to lead, and has led, to 
egoism and materialism of the crassest form. '' In his autobiography, the retired Nobel 
5 Fritz Ringer, op. cit., p. 245. 
6 Arthur Liebert, Die geistige Krisis der Gegenwart, (Berlin, Pan-Verlag Rolf Heise, 1924), p. 5; quoted in 
Charles R. Bambach, op. cit., p. 39. 
7 Carl Heinrich Becker, Gedanken zur Hochschulereform, (Leipzig, 1919), p. ix. Quoted in Forman, p. 24. 
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laureate for chemistry, Wilhelm Ostwald, warned, `In Germany today we suffer again 
from rampant mysticism, which [... ) turns against science and reason as its most 
dangerous enemies. '8 In 1922 the physicist, Max von Laue, felt compelled to publish an 
attack upon the anthroposophical school of Rudolf Steiner, which, he claimed, `raised 
the most serious charges against today's natural science. It is represented as bearing the 
guilt for the world-crisis in which we stand at present, and the whole of the intellectual 
and material misery bound up with that crisis is charged to natural science's account. '9 
Whether the crisis is applauded or decried, it is seen as a crisis that threatens science's 
very future, a crisis that might mark the end of science as such. 
The most extreme example of the apocalyptic tone was also one of the earliest, and by 
far the most successful. Oswald Spengler's The Decline of the West, published just 
before the end of the war in July 1918, had sold 400,000 copies by the time of the 
revised second edition in 1923.1° The sensation that this work caused was immense. 
Everybody, even the natural scientists who one would have thought would be most 
antipathetic to it, seems to have read it, and been fascinated by it. Einstein, writing to 
Max Born in 1920, captures nicely the insidious appeal of this monumentally over- 
researched amalgam of omniscience and fatalism: `Spengler has not spared me either. 
Sometimes in the evening one likes to entertain one of his propositions, and in the 
morning smiles about it. '" 
8 Wilhelm Ostwald, Lebenslinien. Eine Selbstbiographie, (Berlin, 1926-27), Bd. 2, p. 442. Quoted in 
Forman, p. 12. 
9 Max von Laue, `Steiner und die Naturwissenschaft, ' Deutsche Revue, 47 (1922), pp. 41-9, reprinted in 
von Laue, Aufsätze und Vorträge [Gesammelte Schriften, Bd. 3], (Braunschweig, 1962), pp. 48-56. 
Quoted in Forman, p. 12. 
10 Oswald Spengler, The Decline of the West, trans. by Charles Francis Atkinson, (London, George Allen 
and Unwin Ltd., 1926), 2 Vols. First published in German as Untergang des Abendlandes, (Berlin, 1918, 
2"w ed. 1923). 
11 `Der Spengler hat auch mich nicht verschont. Man laßt sich gern manchmal am Abend von ihm etwas 
suggieren und lächelt am Morgen daruber... ' Einstein to Born, 27 
June 1920, in Albert Einstein, Hedwig 
und Max Born, Briefwechsel, 1916-55, ed. and annotated by Max 
Born, (Munich, 1969), pp. 42-5. 
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Spengler's thesis is as startlingly simple as it is elaborately developed. Every aspect of 
human cultural life, all art and all science, all religion and all politics, is the product of a 
single animating idea, strictly one per Culture. This idea, or Soul-image as Spengler 
calls it, first arises in a myth of becoming. This myth of origin founds a specific Culture. 
Gradually the Soul-image works itself out of the realm of pure becoming into the 
various realms of `the become, ' that is to say, of reality; this constitutes the history of 
the Culture. Once this elaboration of the Soul-image into concrete forms has been 
completed, and the possibilities of its manifestation have been exhausted, the Culture is 
finished and declines into impotent old age. Cultures, therefore, follow a strict cycle 
from spring through summer and autumn into winter; and every aspect of the Culture 
marches in strict step. 12 There is, no advance guard and there are no stragglers. Like an 
infantry assault in the 1 S` World War, everything goes over the top together, and plods in 
melancholy line towards oblivion. 
The crisis in the sciences is simply one sign among many that we are now entering into 
the winter of our Culture. Spengler, it is true, cites relativity theory and certain aspects 
of the old quantum theory as proof of the crisis in the sciences, but only because he does 
not regard them as revolutionary theories, but rather as self-evident absurdities that 
illustrate science's inability to remain true to its own ideals of objectivity and rigour. 1 3 
12 For example, the sciences always progress in tandem with the arts: `If, then, we review the successive 
stages through which the central idea of force has passed since its birth in the Baroque, and its intimate 
relations with the form-worlds of the great arts and mathematics, we find that (1) in the 17`h Century 
(Galileo, Newton, and Leibniz) it is pictorially formed and in unison with the great art of oil painting that 
died out about 1630; (2) in the 18`h Century (the "classical mechanics of Laplace and Lagrange) it 
acquires the abstract character of the fugue style and is in unison with Bach [... ]. ' The Decline of the 
West, Vol. 1, p. 417. 
13 The following quotes give the flavour of Spengler's diatribe against contemporary physics as being in 
fact the destruction of the spirit of Western science: `the ruthlessly cynical hypothesis of the Relativity 
theory strikes to the very heart of dynamics. [... ] it has abolished the constancy of those physical 
quantities into the definition of which time has entered, and [... ] the Western dynamics knows only such 
quantities. ' Ibid, p. 419. 'if we observe how rapidly card-houses of hypothesis are run up nowadays, every 
contradiction being immediately covered over by a new hurried hypothesis; if we reflect on how little heed 
is paid to the fact that these images contradict one another [... ] we cannot but realise that the great style of 
ideation is at an end. ' Ibid, pp. 419-20. `Above all, this is manifested in the bizarre hypotheses of atomic 
disintegration [... ] according to which uranium atoms that have kept their essence unaltered, in spite of all 
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Science was once great and noble, but today it is a sorry sham. Thus Spengler is, on the 
face of it, not so much anti-science as anti-now. Spengler's hatred for everything 
modern is only alleviated by his insistence that nothing can be done about it - `all these 
things betoken the definite closing-down of the Culture and the opening up of a quite 
new phase of human existence - anti-provincial, late, futureless, but quite inevitable. "' 
Since this is an inevitable stage in the cycle of cultures, blame can hardly be laid at 
science's door. It is a destiny that befalls science along with everything else, rather than 
an event caused by science. One might even suppose that what Spengler was impotently 
railing against was precisely our modem culture's rejection of scientific objectivity and 
decline into irrationality and superstition, what Spengler himself calls `second 
religiousness. ' However, according to Spengler, it is precisely science that causes a 
Culture's decline, because it is science that is opposed to destiny. `In the Destiny-idea 
the soul reveals its world-longing, its desire to rise into the light, to accomplish and 
actualize its vocation. ' 15 Destiny is the force of history. But in driving the Soul-image 
of a Culture out into concrete expression in the realm of Nature, destiny itself becomes 
concrete. Causality, `is - so to say - destiny become, destiny made inorganic and 
modelled in reason-forms. ' 16 Science, as the actualisation of the principle of causality, 
represents the death of destiny; it is the motor of decline. 
-0- 
Paul Forman in his detailed examination of German natural scientists response to the 
endemic sense of crisis in the surrounding culture, is keen to cast Spengler as the arch- 
villain in the sorry tale. It is not just that Spengler wilfully misdiagnosed the caiuses of 
external influence, quite suddenly without assignable cause explode [... ] Only a few individuals in an 
aggregate of radioactive atoms are struck by Destiny thus [... 1 Here too, then is a picture of history and 
not "Nature. "' Ibid, p. 423. 
" Ibid, p. 34. 
15 Ibid, p. 118. 
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the crisis to suit his own ends. Spengler did not misinterpret the crisis in the sciences at 
all; he created it. Forman argues that the revolutionary change in the theoretical content 
of physics was, at least as far as quantum mechanics is concerned, the direct causal 
result of the sense of crisis in the sciences triggered by the hostile, irrationalist 
intellectual milieu. '7 Thus the introduction of quantum indeterminacy into physics was 
never scientifically justified but resulted from the philosophical prejudices of scientists 
who had been exposed to and educated within an intellectual culture dominated by 
Spenglerian thinking. Forman, thereby, hopes to pull the rug from beneath the feet of 
those modem day heirs of Spengler who claim that their relativism is backed up by the 
16 ibid, p. 119. 
17 For detailed historical criticism of Forman's argument, see John Hendry, `Weimar Culture and Quantum 
Causality, ' Darwin to Einstein - Historical Studies in Science and Belief, ed. by Colin Chant and John 
Fauvel, (Harlow, Longman in assoc. with the Open University Press, 1980), pp. 303-326. But Forman 
highlights a more basic problem in his own summation of his thesis. `The readiness, the anxiousness of the 
German physicist to reconstruct the foundations of their science is thus to be construed as a reaction to 
their negative prestige. Moreover the nature of that reconstruction was itself virtually dictated by the 
general intellectual environment: if the physicist were to improve his public image he had first and 
foremost to dispense with causality, with rigorous determinism, that most universally abhorred feature of 
the physical world picture. And this, of course, turned out to be precisely what was required for the 
solution of those problems in atomic physics which were then at the focus of the physicist's interests. ' 
Forman, pp. cit., pp. 7-8. The `of course' heavily sign posts the hinge and lacuna in Forman's argument. 
His supposedly causal explanation for the incorporation of acausality into physics in fact relies upon a 
synchronicity (between external and internal pressures) that cannot itself be explained causally without 
jettisoning either the claim that the external milieu was irrational or the claim that it caused the 
fundamental revision. (To explain the synchronicity causally either one has to assume that the internal 
dynamic of physics caused the external milieu to be in sync with it, in which case the supposed 
irrationalism of the milieu was in fact a rational response to developments within physics, or one has to 
assume that physics was already contaminated with the irrationalism that is supposedly only incorporated 
at the moment when the external and internal pressures coincide. ) Here we find inscribed within the 
structure of the argument its motivation. Forman turns back to the twenties so as to show how a 
hostile 
intellectual milieu can force science to incorporate irrational ideas, because in his own 
day, the early 
seventies, a hostile intellectual milieu (represented by enviromentalism and feminism) is using those very 
irrational ideas embedded in the sciences as a justification for its attack upon them. If only those 
ideas 
could be rooted out, be shown to have been somehow improperly planted, then the 
hostile milieu will have 
no purchase upon the sciences, its attacks will wash off them like water off a duck's 
back. And yet, even at 
the moment when supposedly for very the first time science allowed itself to 
be swayed from its proper 
path, Forman finds that it was, of course, that is to say, as a matter of course (its own proper course, of 
course) perfectly ready to be swayed. Forman, therefore, seems at the very moment of cause and effect 
to 
invoke something very like the notion of destiny in Spengler, who he so savagely pillories - that 
is to say 
the notion of an acausal harmony between all aspects of a culture, which means that they march rigorously 
in step on the long slope of decline. But this notion of destiny does not merely contaminate 
Forman's own 
historiology, belying his claim to be writing a causal history, it contaminates the very 
idea of science, 
whose course of development can no longer be seen as autonomous, 
dictated solely by the demands of its 
own investigations, and therefore rational, but now must 
be seen as following a mysterious line somehow 
destined for it by the machinations of wicked fairies such as Spengler. It 
hardly need be said that this 
contamination cannot condemned without incurring the risk of similar contamination. 
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latest scientific theory. The irony is, of course, that Forman's article is now regularly 
cited by the very cultural relativists he so despises, as proof that scientific theory is not 
rationally justified but socially determined. And why not? That is after all, what he set 
out to prove so as to defend the autonomy of the sciences. Clearly, a scientific purist 
such as Forman is always on the look out for social determinations of scientific practise 
precisely in order to keep science pure. But what the social determinist doesn't notice in 
her eagerness to turn the tables on the scientific purist is that it takes a scientific purist 
like Forman to `prove' that science is socially determined. How else is one supposed to 
detect the social forces working within and on a science except by measuring the 
`deviations' these forces impose on the science's `natural' path, the path that it would 
have followed just as a science. 
However what Forman does demonstrate convincingly enough in the course of his 
perversely self-defeating argument is that German scientists not only responded to the 
anti-scientism of the times, but in fact embraced the idea of crisis as a way of making 
science more acceptable to the general mood. But in so doing, they altered the sense of 
the crisis afflicting the sciences. No longer was the crisis seen to be one of ossification 
and loss of meaning, rather the crisis was itself to be salvation from ossification. Crisis 
demonstrated science's ability to transform itself, and promised to set science on a new 
footing that would better please its critics. There can be little doubt, reading the material 
that Forman amasses, that the physicists' appropriation of the rhetoric of crisis was 
initially at least a quite craven attempt to curry favour and garner funding, but that it 
then provided opportunely enough a model to understand and justify what was going in 
the field itself. After all, German physics had just been through one major conceptual 
transformation, which, whether coincidentally or not, had become public knowledge and 
the subject of fevered debate at the very same time that Spengler published The Decline 
of the West. 
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Forman does not consider relativity theory in his examination of the cultural pressures 
on German science because as far as he is concerned, being fully deterministic, it is 
unobjectionably objective and scientific. But this is not how it seemed to many people at 
the time. The news of Sir Arthur Eddington's confirmation of the gravitational bending 
of light in November 1918 made the front page of The New York Times. The 
controversy which it stirred, and the flood of publications denouncing or celebrating 
Einstein's theory that followed in its wake, were at least as great as the furore generated 
by Spengler's work. Indeed, while every German intellectual worth his salt appears to 
have published an article on the crisis facing Western culture, everybody throughout the 
world, from leading philosophers such as Cassirer and Bergson to simple madmen, 
appears to have published a book on relativity theory. The chief criticism levelled at the 
theory was that it defied common sense. '8 Put more philosophically, it appeared that the 
theory relativity could not be objectively true because it contradicted the very conditions 
of objective experience. Oskar Krauss, a neo-Kantian in the school of Hans Vaihinger, 
claimed for instance, `The statement that the relative velocity of light, unaffected by the 
motion of the light source, remains the same with respect to every system which is in 
rectilinear uniform motion is false. It does not violate our thinking habits, but violates a 
priori necessary judgements. ' 19 The criticism was not restricted to neo-Kantianism, 
however. In 1921, Ernst Mach, whose own positivism had been the acknowledged 
18 This criticism had already been levelled, within the scientific community at least, at the special theory of 
relativity. In 1911 William F. Magie in his presidential address to the American Physical Society, 
complained that special relativity did not conform to the standards required for a physical model of 
reality: `The elements of which the model is constructed must be of types which are immediately 
perceived by the senses and which are accepted by everybody as the ultimate data of consciousness. It is 
only out of such elements that an explanation, in distinction from a mere barren set of formulae, can be 
constructed. [... ] A solution to be really serviceable must be intelligible to everybody, the common man as 
well as the trained scholar. All previous physical theories have been thus intelligible. ' William F. Magie, 
`The Primary Concepts of Physics, ' Relativity Theory: Its Origin and Impact on Modern Thought, ed. by 
L. Pearce Williams, (New York, John Wiley and Sons Inc., 1968), pp. 119-120. 
19 Oskar Krauss, `Fiktion und Hypothese in der Einsteinchen Relativitätstheorie, ' Annalen der 
Philosophie, vol. II, No. 3, pp. 335-96, Leipzig 1921, pp. 363-4. Jonathan Ree has pointed out to me that 
this is odd since Vaihinger's own doctrine of the categories as necessary fictions would seem to allow 
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inspiration for Einstein's work, publicly disassociated himself from the theory in the 
introduction to his The Principles of Physical Optics . 
20 Joseph Petzold, Mach's chosen 
successor, objected to the theory, on the grounds that it went beyond the 'range of our 
sense organs. '21 Both the assertion of the impossibility of faster than light travel in 
special relativity, and the possibility of a finite unbounded geometry for space-time in 
the general theory, constituted a `retrogression to the rationalistic mistake of Kant. 22 
The problem for the scientific community, and those philosopher's who chose to 
champion relativity theory, such as Cassirer and the nascent logical empiricists, such as 
Moritz Schlick, Rudolf Carnap, and Hans Reichenbach, was not just to provide a 
philosophical justification for the transformation of the basic concepts of space and 
time, but also to find a redescription of scientific activity, insofar as reformulation of 
basic concepts had not hitherto been seen as a proper part of that activity. Justification 
of the reformulation could not occur without such redescription. And the vocabulary of 
crisis picked up from the surrounding culture provided just the tools for such a 
redescription. This explains the otherwise completely bizarre fact that Forman ends up 
in his article accusing even logical-empiricists, such as Reichenbach, of having 
succumbed to the anti-rationalist contagion because of their adoption of `crisis rhetoric. ' 
Forman cannot admit that there could have been any good `internal' reasons for 
adopting crisis thinking in the sciences, for fear of losing his argument that the 
irrationality supposedly inherent in quantum mechanics was entirely caused by 
`external' factors. But what in fact seems a good deal more credible is that driven by the 
internal pressures of a `crisis' that predates crisis rhetoric, and which Forman refuses to 
precisely for such transformations of the conditions of possibility of experience. Nevertheless 
it appears 
that his disciples did not think so, in this case at least. 
20 Ernst Mach, The Principles of Physical Optics, trans. by John S. Anderson and A. F. A Young, (New 
York, Dover Publications, 1953), p. 13. 
21 Joseph Petzold, `Kausalität und Relitivitätstheorie, ' Zeitschrift für Physik, 1920, p. 473. 
22 Ibid. 
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consider, the physicists were forced to do things that did indeed seem in some sense 
unscientific, and that flailing around for some justification of their desperate measures 
they gratefully grabbed the idea of crisis from their enemies. By the mid-twenties the 
scientists' reinterpretation of the crisis as a transformative and creative crisis had itself 
been reincorporated into the general sense of crisis, complicating it still further. 
-0- 
The sense of crisis prevailing in Weimar Germany appears to have been thoroughly 
confused. Moreover attempts to disentangle the confusion, to distinguish the genuine 
crisis from a mere sense of crisis, or to impute that there was in fact no crisis, only a 
sense of crisis that led to crisis, appear to fall prey to the very confusion they strive 
against. Forman adopts relativism to denounce relativism. Spengler ends up the epitome 
of the late Alexandrian scholar, a mere collector and arranger of fossilised knowledge, 
that he mocks in the present age. 23 All of which suggests that when it comes to scientific 
crisis, it could never be a question of social causation nor the mere working out of a 
cultural destiny. As Heidegger himself says: 
This transformation of seeing and questioning is misunderstood when it is 
taken as a change of standpoint or as a shift in the sociological conditions of 
science. It is true that this is the sort of thing which mainly or exclusively 
interests many people in science today - its psychologically and sociologically 
conditioned character - but this is just a facade. Sociology of this kind relates to 
real science and its philosophical comprehension in the same way in which one 
who clambers up a facade relates to the architect or, to take a less elevated 
example, to a conscientious craftsman. 24 
And equally witheringly on Spengler: 
Yet we ourselves are not at all concerned, let alone affected by this world- 
historical determination of where we are, by the settling of accounts with our 
culture. On the contrary, the whole affair is something sensational, and this 
23 `In physics as in chemistry, in biology as in mathematics, the great masters are dead, and we are now 
experiencing the decrescendo of brilliant gleaners who arrange, collect and finish-off like the Alexandrian 
scholars of the Roman age. ' Spengler, op. cit., p. 424. 
24 FCM, p. 261. 
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always means an unconceded, yet once again illusory appeasement, albeit of a 
merely literary and characteristically short-lived kind. The whole approach of 
cultural diagnosis, which is non-binding and is interesting for just this reason. 
then becomes even more exciting by being developed and reconstituted. 
whether explicitly or not, into prognosis. Is there anyone who does not wish to 
know what is coming, so that they can prepare themselves for it, so as to be less 
burdened, less pre-occupied and affected by the present! These world-historical 
diagnoses and prognoses of culture do not involve us, they do not attack us. On 
the contrary, they release us from ourselves and present us to ourselves in a 
world-historical situation and role. 25 
None of which is to say that there is no connection between `internal' and `external' 
crises -that scientific crisis is an entirely internal affair - just that in their interconnection 
the two might have to be rethought, because the connection might be more `internal. ' 
more central to the determination of what scientific crisis actwalkv i. ý, than was cvcr 
thought. 
The Three Crises of Science 
In 1928 Heidegger returned to the University of Freiburg to take up the chair vacated by 
Husserl upon his retirement. A year and a half after the publication of Being and Time 
and now ensconced in one of Germany's most prestigious academic positions, it was a 
good time to sit back and reflect upon what had been achieved and what still remained 
to be done. Interestingly, in both the inaugural address to the university, published as the 
essay `What is Metaphysics? ', and his first lecture course, entitled Einleitung in die 
Philosophie, Heidegger chose to concentrate upon the relation between philosophy and 
science. 26 In the opening sessions of the lecture course he allows himself the indulgence 
25 FCM, p. 75. This should scotch the temptation to think of Heidegger as simply an academically 
sanitised version of Spengler, as Forman accuses him of being. 
26 As an introduction [Einleitung] to philosophy, or rather, since as 
he explains in the introduction 
[Einführung] an introduction assumes that what it is introducing already exists and therefore 
is already 
determined, as an initiation [Einleiten] into philosophising, 
Heidegger proposes at the beginning of the 
lecture course to examine the relation between philosophy and science, world-view, and 
history (see G27. 
p. 10). Characteristically, however, two thirds of the course 
is devoted to the question of science. while 
the final question of the relation between philosophy and 
history is never even touched upon. 
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of reminiscing a little about his own student days, the intellectual milieu before the war, 
and the growing sense even then that there was something moribund, and increasingly 
irrelevant about the academic disciplines. `It could no longer remain hidden that, despite 
all the progress of the individual sciences, the connection between them and their 
content on the one hand, and on the other a living powerfully effective cultural ideal had 
been torn asunder; and that this rift was only artificially hidden. ' 2' But for his own 
generation this unease had not lead to a rejection of science or its ideals, but on the 
contrary to a renewed dedication. `This uncertainty as to the existentiell position of 
science in Dasein was especially sharp for us before the war, since we were convinced 
of the positive inner possibilities of science and its central function for Dasein, and 
therefore did not allow ourselves to slacken the intensity of our work, even if it were 
participation in ossified specialisations. '28 Heidegger makes this personal confession in 
order to emphasise two points. First, the crisis in the sciences `is not an accidental post- 
war phenomenon, as most think, but lies latent in science. '29 But second, this means that 
the impression that the crisis is a crisis which threatens science or somehow invalidates 
it, is a consequence of the peculiar transformation the crisis underwent after the war. 
`After the war the critical situation was not strengthened, but only so to speak 
popularised. These internal troubles with respect to science, which we did not play off 
against it, now became the theme of pamphlets, and soon, as such infection spreads, 
everybody was dissatisfied with science. [... ] The crisis was not sharper or more 
27 `Es konnte nicht länger verborgen bleiben, daß bei allen Fortschritten der Einzelwissenschaften der 
Zusammenhang zwischen den Wissenschaften und ihrem Gehalt auf der einen und einem lebendigen 
wirkungskräftigen Bildungsideal auf der anderen Seite abgerissen war, und dieser Riß nur noch künstlich 
verdeckt wurde. ' G27, p. 28. 
28 'Diese Unsicherheit in der existenziellen Stellung der Wissenschaft im Dasein hatte aber für uns vor 
dem Krieg dadurch noch eine besondere Schärfe, als wir von den positiven inneren Möglichkeiten der 
Wissenschaft und ihrer zentralen Daseinsfunktion überzeugt waren und uns 
deshalb die Intensität der 
Arbeit, auch der Mitarbeit im Erstarrten und Spezialisierten, nicht abschwächen 
ließen. ' G27, p. 28. 
29 'diese Krisis keine zufällige Nachkriegserscheinung ist, wie die meisten meinen, sondern latent in der 
Wissenschaft liegt. ' G27, pp. 26-27. 
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serious, but had become only louder. '30 Thus the sense of crisis is a double-edged 
sword. On the one hand: `If the crisis belongs to the essence of science, a reflection 
upon it can bring us closer to the essence of science. '31 On the other hand, the sense of 
crisis has become so confused and multifarious in its popularisation, the slogan and the 
weapon of so many pamphleteers and propagandists ('the momentary disruption due to 
Oswald Spengler'32), that it is as likely to obfuscate as to clarify. This is why Heidegger 
now undertakes a lengthy and painstaking examination of what the crisis in the sciences 
might actually mean. 
He starts by distinguishing three different senses in which the phrase is used: 
1. The crisis in the internal construction of the essence of science itself. 
2. The crisis of science with regard to its position in the whole of our historical- 
social Dasein. 
3. The crisis in the relation of the individual to science itself. 33 
Heidegger then proceeds to consider these crises in reverse order. At first it seems that 
each crisis taken in this order is a product of the next, and upon reflection dissolves into 
it. Thus the crisis of the individual's relation to science turns out `in the end to be 
grounded upon the fact that it is entirely unclear and undetermined how science stands 
essentially in human Dasein as such. '34 i. e. the second crisis in the list. The crisis of the 
individual's relation to science arises as a kind of misinterpretation of the second crisis, 
30 `Nach dem Krieg wurde diese kritische Situation nicht verschärft, sondern gleichsam nur popularisiert. 
Diese innere Not gegenüber der Wissenschaft, die wir nicht gegen sie ausspielten, wurde jetzt Thema von 
Broschüren und nun, wie solche Ansteckung sich verbreitet, war jeder mit der Wissenschaft unzufrieden. 
[... ] Die Krisis war nicht schärfer und ernster, sondern nur lauter geworden. ' G27, p. 29. 
31 `Wenn die Krisis zum Wesen der Wissenschaft gehört, kann eine Besinnung auf sie uns dem Wesen der 
Wissenschaft näherbringen. ' G27, p. 27. 
32 '[die] Krisis der Geisteswissenschaften in der momentanen Erschütterung durch Oswald Spengler. ' 
G27, p. 26. 
33 `1. Die Krisis im inneren Wesensbau der Wissenschaft selbst. 
2. Die Krisis der Wissenschaft hinsichtlich ihrer Stellung im Ganzen unseres geschichtlich- 
gesellschaftlichen Daseins. 
3. Die Krisis im Verhältnis des Einzelnen zur Wissenschaftselbst. ' G27, p. 27. 
34 `Daß die Stellung der einzelnen Existenz zur Wissenschaft in eine 
Krisis kommen kann, hat doch am 
Ende darin seinen Grund, daß überhaupt unbestimmt und ungeklärt 
ist, wie denn so etwas wie 
Wissenschaft im menschlichen Dasein als solchem wesensmäßig steht. 
' G27, p. 29. 
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or rather as a mistaken solution to the second crisis. Science's place in the cultural 
whole is in doubt, therefore it must be given a place. Science must be forcibly 
reincorporated into the fabric of our lives. But this effort to give science some meaning. 
what Heidegger describes as `the romantic attempt to reorganise science from the 
outside through an artificial overpowering and surmounting with worldviews and 
suchlike, ' is based upon `the fantastic belief in the ability to change science according to 
a programme. '35 This is a quite impossible task, and all that is actually achieved is a 
sense that science is something with which the individual has a personal relation as he 
or she sees fit. What the crisis in this individual relation speaks of, just as much as it 
disguises, is not whether or not this relation can be forged or the danger that it might be 
broken, but that irrespective of such relation and indeed despite it, `the essence of 
science obviously must be understood in connection with the human Dasein and in 
terms of its essential constitution, that therefore all definitions of science, which are not 
created in this direction, are essentially misguided. -)36 In other words the crisis in the 
individual's relation to science is not that such a relation is difficult to forge, but that the 
very idea of forging such a relation involves treating science as something in the first 
place outside of human Dasein. Therefore, the relation between the individual and 
science is always in crisis precisely because it always offends, obscurely at least, against 
the truth of the matter. The crisis is not in the relation, rather the very idea of a relation 
is symptomatic of a crisis quite outside the relation. 
Similarly, when Heidegger comes to examine the second crisis, the crisis in the position 
of science within culture as a whole, the crisis from which the third crisis, the crisis of 
3s `die romantischen Versuche [... ], Wissenschaft von außen her und gar durch eine künstliche 
Uberwaltigung und Überwindung nit Weltanschauung und dergleichen umbilden zu wollen. ' G27, p. 30 
`dem phantastischen Glauben, mit Hilfe von Programmen die Wissenschaft ändern zu können. ' p. 29. 
36 `das Wesen der Wissenschaft offenbar im Zusammenhang des menschlichen Daseins als solchen und 
aus dessen Grundverfassung begriffen werden muß, daß demnach alle Definitionen der Wissenschaft, die 
nicht in dieser Richtung geschöpft sind, in einem Wesentlichen versagen. ' G27, p. 30. 
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the individual's relation to science, arises as a symptomatically misconceived solution, 
here too he finds that the crisis arises from a misconception. `Thus the crisis with regard 
to the position of science in the whole of culture springs from a peculiar misjudgement 
of the essence of science, of the essence of the truth peculiar to it. '37 Heidegger reaches 
this conclusion by focusing upon one of the chief symptoms of the crisis: the constant 
demand, and the ever renewed attempts, to popularise science. This desire to popularise 
is a genuine response to the feeling that science has lost its cultural importance. It is as 
ardent today as it clearly was back in the twenties, and yet seems to have made 
surprisingly little progress. The complaints by scientists that the liberally educated 
cultural elites actually take pride in their ignorance of science remain as loud today as 
ever. 38 Maybe a few more people have heard of the second law of thermodynamics than 
in C. P. Snow's time, but who really has any clear understanding of, say, modern 
genetics? And yet the need to communicate these things, to place science right back in 
the centre of our cultural activity, is clearly urgent. What could be more pressing than 
the practical consequences of gene technology? This connection between the practical 
consequences of science and the need for its popularisation is so self-evident as to go 
almost unnoticed, and yet it is the source, according to Heidegger, of the very crisis 
which popularisation is supposed to solve. Popularisation does not merely inform the 
public, it gives to science once more the chance of meaning - that meaning, the meaning 
it has for us, is precisely the impact it has upon us. `This tendency to popularise is 
37 `So entspringt auch die Krisis hinsichtlich der Stellung der Wissenschaft im Ganzen der Kultur aus 
einer eigentümlichen Verkennung des Wesens der Wissenschaft, des Wesens der ihr eigentümlichen 
Wahrheit. ' G27, p. 33. 
38 For a not untypical example, I promise you, take this: The linguist and evolutionary psychologist 
Steven 
Pinker writes, `In a gathering of today's elite, it is perfectly acceptable to laugh that you 
barely passed 
Physics for Poets and Rocks for Jocks and have remained ignorant of science ever since, 
despite the 
obvious importance of scientific literacy to informed choices about personal health and public policy. 
But 
saying that you have never heard of James Joyce or that you tried listening to 
Mozart once but prefer 
Andrew Lloyd Webber is as shocking as blowing your nose on your sleeve or announcing that you employ 
children in your sweatshop, despite the obvious unimportance of your tastes 
in leisure-time activity to just 
about anything. ' How the Mind Works, (Harmondsworth, Penguin 
Books, 1997), pp. 522-23. 
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supposed to remedy a clearly felt and understood need and create a replacement for what 
is lacking, providing science in turn with meaning, in actual fact by means - this is 
almost self-evident - of documenting its practical consequences. ' 39 But in spite of its 
genuine motivation and all its serious intent, popularisation in fact represents 'a growing 
annihilation and burial [Verschüttung] of the possibility of giving back to it [science] the 
primordial position in the history of Dasein; ' and this is because `it fails to understand 
that science may never be equated with its results, which can then be passed around 
ready-prepared in any old mixture. '4° Popularisation, in its urge to make science 
relevant, in fact latches onto what is most irrelevant to it as science. In its urge to make 
science living, it ensures that all that is preserved is what is dead in it. And yet there 
would be no crisis, if science were simply dead and the attempt to revive it, therefore, 
merely wrong-headed. In fact, the attempt is not wrong-headed, but perverse, speaking 
eloquently of something alive in science as surely as it buries it, therefore burying it 
alive [verschüttet]; and conversely, what is living in science remains living, despite the 
misconceived attempt to revive it, precisely because it is not something that can be 
added on to science, or injected into it, applied or administered in any way, but rather is 
essential to it. 
Popularisation goes against the essence of science because the essential thing 
about science does not lie in what is merely tradable, what can be passed from 
hand to hand, but rather in that which is always appropriated anew. This 
primordial appropriation of the essential is only possible, however, in the 
method which is inseparably bound up with, and deeply rooted in subject 
matter and results. Admittedly method means more than is commonly 
4' designated by it; method is itself more than technique [Technik]. 
39 `Diese Tendenz zur Popularisierung soll einer deutlich gespürten und verstandenen Not abhelfen, für 
einen Mangel einen Ersatz schaffen und der Wissenschaft wiederum Bedeutung verschaffen, und zwar auf 
dem Wege, der fast selbstverständlich ist, indem man ihre praktische Wirkung ausdrücklicher 
dokumentiert. ' G27, pp. 31-32. 
40 `weil sie verkennt, daß die Wissenschaft nie gleichgesetzt werden darf mit ihren Resultaten, die dann in 
irgendeiner Zubereitung von Hand zu Hand weitergegeben werden. ' G27, p. 32. 
41 `Popularisierung geht gegen das Wesen der Wissenschaft, weil das Wesentliche der Wissenschaft nicht 
in dem liegt, was bloß tradierbar ist, von Hand zu Hand gegeben werden kann, sondern was immer neu 
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The truth which the urge to popularisation expresses is that science cannot be purely 
theoretical, it must have some essentially practical nature. `The question remains, 
however, whether the genuinely practical character of science consists of its possible 
benefits. '42 The crisis, which popularisation is both a symptom of and response to, itself 
attests to deeply held assumptions about the theoretical that, as a matter of course, make 
it seem `removed from life. ' But the problem is that these unexamined and implicit 
notions ensure that any attempt to reintegrate science with life always appear to force it 
to deviate from its theoretical nature. On the other hand: `If our assertion that science is 
in itself practical is correct, then it must have its own explanation [Bewandtnis] in the 
theoretical character of science. A3 But this in turn means that the `theoretical' no longer 
necessarily means what we have always assumed it to mean. It has been opened up to 
question. `What "theoretical" means must itself be determined then from the essence of 
the truth of science. '44 In this way, the second crisis of science, the crisis of its 
separation from the rest of culture, the crisis of its practical import, points back to the 
first crisis of science - the crisis in the internal construction of its essence. This crisis, 
Heidegger tells us, `announces itself in what today we like to epitomise by a slogan as 
foundational crisis. '45 It seems pretty clear, therefore, that though Heidegger is keenly 
aware of the many meanings attaching to the phrase `crisis of science, ' and indeed the 
historical priority of those which high light the social and `existential' crisis of science, 
angeeignet wird. Diese ürsprungliche Aneignung des Wesentlichen ist aber nur möglich in der mit 
Sachgehalt und Resultat unzertrennlich verwachsenen Methode. Methode meint freilich mehr, als was 
gemeinhin damit bezeichnet wird; Methode selbst ist mehr als Technik. ' G27, p. 32. For an extended 
discussion of what Heidegger means by `verwachsen mit Sachgehalt' see the next chapter, pp. 209ff. 
42 `Die Frage bleibt aber, ob der eigentliche praktische Charakter der Wissenschaft in der möglichen 
Nutznießung besteht. ' G27, p. 33. 
43 `Wenn unsere Behauptung, daß die Wissenschaft in sich selbst praktisch ist, zurecht besteht, muß es mit 
dem theoretischen Charakter der Wissenschaft eine eigene Bewandtnis haben. ' G27, p. 34. 
'm `Was >theoretisch< besagt, muß sich dann aus dem Wesen der Wahrheit der Wissenschaft bestimmen. ' 
Ibid. 
45 `Die Krisis im Wesensbau der Wissenschaft bekundet sich in dem, was man heute mit einem Schlagwort 
gern als Grundlagenkrise bezeichnet. ' G27, p. 35. 
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he is intent upon wrestling from them the sense of crisis as foundational crisis. This 
sense will be the primary and original one, from which all the others stem. `It appears, 
therefore, that we hit upon the root of the crisis immediately, if we reflect upon the first 
crisis listed. '46 
However, this first crisis will prove no more immune to critical questioning and 
reduction than the other two. It too will turn out to be something of a misunderstanding - 
not this time a crisis that arises, as both symptom and exacerbation, out of a 
misunderstanding of the essence of science, but rather a misunderstanding of crisis, 
which will turn out to be the essence of science. To begin with, though, as was the 
schema with the other crises, the crisis of foundation calls into question our concept of 
foundation. 
Outwardly it seems curious at first that the sciences which are subject to 
foundational crisis [Grundlagenkrisis] don't cave in upon themselves, but on 
the contrary - we only have to think of contemporary physics and also biology - 
often undergo major development. One speaks of a crisis of ground laying 
[Grund-lagen-krisis], shaking of the foundations, and yet the structure does not 
begin to totter. Because the picture of basis, foundation, and structure does not 
say too much, it is right to determine more closely what basis of a science 
means here. 47 
The structure does not totter, not because the crisis is illusory, nor even because the 
crisis is not in fact in the foundations, but because the relation between the foundations 
and the structure is not that in a building, because what we confidently call foundation 
may be very different from what we thus take it to be, because the basis of a science (not 
what makes up the basis, but what constitutes its `basisity' as such) remains clouded in 
mystery. However, because the picture of basis, foundation, and structure is compelling 
46 `Es scheint demnach, daß wir die Wurzel der Krisis unmittelbar treffen, wenn wir uns auf 
die an erster 
Stelle genannte Krisis besinnen. ' G27, p. 35. 
;7 'Von außen gesehen ist es zunächst merkwürdig, daß die Wissenschaften, 
die der Grundlagenkrisis 
unterliegen, nicht in sich zusammenbrechen, sondern im Gegenteil oft - 
denken wir nur an die heutige 
Physik und auch die Biologie - in einer großen Entwicklung stehen. 
Man spricht von Grund-lagen-krisis, 
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and clear, even if upon inspection it doesn't turn out to say too much, the solution to the 
crisis of foundations appears self-evident: new foundations. The only question is, who is 
to provide them? The scientist, appalled at the prospect of the reintroduction of 
metaphysics and mysticism, the hazy, ill judged, enthusiastic babble about a change in 
world-views, which in fact grounds nothing but only muddies the waters, either denies 
that any fundamental revision is necessary, or `believes that the already available means 
developed by science so highly on its own, will suffice to carry out this work itself - 
thus, for example, the essence and basis of mathematics is capable of being known 
mathematically. '48 The philosophers, for their part, balk at this effrontery, and laugh at 
the idea of a mathematically founded mathematics, and indeed the scientists find that to 
get anywhere they have to make use of concepts and ideas imported from outside their 
science. But this does not confirm those who believe that the sciences need a 
philosophical foundation. -'Neither the individual science from out of itself in its 
customary self-knowledge, nor a philosophy brought in from the outside, can so much 
as awake the crisis. This either-or does not get to the root of the crisis at all.... both 
philosophy and science operate with an idea of science which is not sufficient to 
understand the problem. '49 Part of the problem is that precisely by trying to solve it, 
neither takes the crisis seriously enough. `The crisis should not be overcome, but rather 
should become alive, and not only so that the sciences should become better and faster 
Erschütterung der Fundamente - und dennoch gerät der Bau nicht ins Wanken. [... ) das Bild von 
Grundlage, Fundament und Bau nicht allzuviel aussagt. ' G27, p. 35. 
48 `glaubt man jedoch, die bisherigen Mittel der so hoch entwickelten eigenen Wissenschaft reichten aus, 
diese Arbeit selbst zu erledigen - also z. B. das Wesen und die Grundlagen der Mathematik mathematisch 
begreifen zu können. ' G27, p. 37. 
49 'Vielleicht ist es in der Tat so, daß weder die einzelne Wissenschaft von sich aus in der üblichen 
Selbstkenntnis noch eine von außen herangebrachte Philosophie die Krisis auch nur wecken kann. Mit 
diesem Entweder-Oder wird die Wurzel der Krisis überhaupt nicht erreicht. Die Frage bleibt freilich, ob 
es nur das Versagen der Philosophie auf der einen und das Nichtwollen der Wissenschaft auf der anderen 
Seite sind, was die echte Krisis nicht wach werden läßt, - oder aber ob es daran liegt, daß sowohl die 
Philosophie als auch die Wissenschaften mit einer Wissenschaftsidee operieren, die nicht zureicht, das 
Problem zu verstehen. Das letztere ist in der Tat der Fall. ' G27, p. 38. 
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and more unimpeded in their progress, but so that the sciences may become existent in 
accordance with their essence at all. '50 
`We must first learn to understand what foundation of a science means and to what 
extent crisis of foundations reveals directly the essential limits of a science. ' 51 
Heidegger's examination of the three crises is not designed to decide in favour of one or 
the other. Rather, he shows how each is the product of a misconception about the 
essence of science generated by the next one in the sequence, and that the relation is 
circular. The misconception about foundational crisis in the end leads back to the 
existential conception of science attested to by the first. `This foundational crisis is the 
one, which if it is rightly understood, makes clear the finitude of science in a primordial 
sense, i. e. it makes obvious the fact that science is an essential possibility of the 
existence of men. '52 
In the lecture course given the following year (WS 1929-30) Heidegger is still insisting 
upon the same ambiguity. On the one hand, science thrives on crisis. It is only in crisis 
that it can transform its fundamental conceptions. `This transformation of seeing and 
questioning is always the decisive thing in science. The greatness and vitality of a 
science is revealed in the power of its capacity for such transformation. '53 Yet science is 
always trying to avoid crises. It seems positively embarrassed by them, as though they 
might bring it into disrepute, or call the validity of its results into question. As soon as it 
gets into one it tries to get out of it again as quickly as possible. `[C]risis cannot break 
50 'Denn die Krisis soll nicht überwunden, sondern lebendig werden, und nicht dazu, daß Wissenschaften 
nur besser und in ihren Fortschritten ungehemmter und schneller würden, sondern 
dazu, daß die 
Wissenschaften überhaupt so existent werden können, wie sie es ihrem Wesen nach wollen. ' G27, p. 39. 
51 `Wir müssen erst verstehen lernen, was Grundlage einer Wissenschaft 
heißt und inwiefern Krisis der 
Grundlage gerade die wesenhaften Grenzen der Wissenschaft als solcher offenbart. 
' G27, p. 39. 
52 `Diese Grundlagenkrisis ist diejenige, die, wenn sie recht verstanden wird, die Endlichkeit der 
Wissenschaft in einem ursprünglichen Sinne klarmacht, d. h. sie macht offenbar, 
daß die Wissenschaft eine 
wesenhafte Möglichkeit der Existenz des Menschen ist. ' G27 p. 
41. 
53 FCM, p. 261. 
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through in the serious and above all enduring manner that is required, because we are 
not sufficiently willing to let ourselves be shaken. ' The scientific reaction to scientific 
crisis, just as much as the philosophical or general cultural reaction, is by and large 
conservative. `Today admittedly - contrary to the situation a few years ago - it is once 
again clearly recognisable that one tries to avoid this dawning crisis and keep one's 
distance from all disquiet. The general conservatism has once again the upper hand. '55 
And this conservatism does not just apply to those scientists, such as Mach, who cling 
on to the old ways, and never accept the new theories, rather new theory itself is to some 
extent always a conservative response to crisis. As we shall see in the next section, 
Heidegger has a profoundly ambiguous attitude towards the theoretical products of 
scientific crisis. On the one hand they are its only document, on the other they inevitably 
cover it up. 
Science is as regressive as it is progressive. It consolidates and stabilises, even as it 
drives for constant change. But this stability, which Heidegger always equates with 
ossification, comes not so much from a rigid adherence to fixed fundamental principles 
and concepts, but is due rather to a kind of evacuation of the metaphysical ground floor, 
a running away into the upper storeys of science. 
The regressions of a science are not generally obvious, but they are much more 
central than the advances, insofar as they always involve a failure of proper 
questioning in the science concerned. They imply a displacement of the proper 
metaphysical import of the science onto the outer surface of more specific areas 
of research, areas that may be left to support one another in mid-air. 56 
Clearly all our usual pictures have been inverted. What is most stable has no 
foundations but floats contentedly in mid-air. What has foundations is in crisis yet does 
S4 FCM, p. 191. 
ss 'Freilich heute - gegenüber der Lage vor wenigen Jahren - 
ist schon wieder deutlicher zu erkennen, daß 
man versucht, dieser erwachenden Krisis auszuweichen und alle Beunruhigung fernzuhalten. Die 
algemeine Biederkeit hat wieder die Oberhand. ' G27, p. 26. 
% FCM, p. 188. 
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not fall. `What announces itself in the slogan foundational crisis, belongs to the essence 
of science. '57 But this means that in some sense crisis is itself foundational. The slogan 
"foundational crisis" would no longer refer to a crisis besetting a foundation thought of 
as a framework of concepts and fundamental principles upon which the rest of science 
could be built, but rather crisis would be seen now as lying at the very basis of science. 
But if science arises on the basis of an initial scientific projection, as detailed in the 
previous chapter, then crisis must inhabit, must be part and parcel of, scientific 
projection, not just something that happens to it. Crisis must be an inherent part of the 
very idea of scientific projection. To return to the question posed at the very beginning 
of this chapter: How can this be so? 
Unfortunately Heidegger never returns to the question explicitly. In the 1928/29 lecture 
course, he concludes his discussion of the three crises in science by extracting three 
questions that will guide the subsequent investigations into the essence of science. 
1. ) How overall does something like science stand in human Dasein? 
2. ) In what sense is science "practical"? 
3. ) What does foundation of science mean, and to what extent is there revealed 
by it an inner limit in the essence of science? 58 
However, just as in Being and Time, when he finally uncovers scientific projection, that 
is to say the antecedent projection of the constitution of the Being of the beings to be 
investigated, as the founding basis of science, he does not then return to the question of 
crisis, that is to say, how foundational crisis can be said to inhabit this founding 
projection, but moves on instead to the question of transcendence. that is to say, 
51 '\Vas sich in dem Schlagwort Grundlagenkrisis anzeigt, gehört zum Wesen der Wissenschaft. ' G27, p. 
' 1. \Vie steht so etwas wie Wissenschaft überhaupt im menschlichen Dasein'' 
2. In welchem Sinne ist die Wissenschaft »praktisch«. ' 
3. Was heißt Grundlage der Wissenschaft, und inwiefern offenbart sich an ihr eine innere Grenze im 
Wesen der Wissenschaft? ' (2 1, p. 40. 
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understanding of Being as such. 59 This means that it is necessary to reconstruct the role 
that crisis plays within scientific projection. 
The Philosophical Interpretation of Relativity Theory 
For Heidegger, like all his philosophical contemporaries in the 1920's, the crisis in 
physics was represented by relativity theory. Though it was generally known that there 
were problems in the old quantum theory and with the Bohr theory of the atom, in other 
words, that something was going on in atomic physics, quantum mechanics itself was 
only first formulated in 1927/28 and did not begin to receive widespread philosophic 
attention until the mid thirties. 60 Heidegger too appears not to have considered the 
59 See §26, `The change in the understanding of Being in scientific projection. The new determination of 
being as Nature. ' [`Der Wandel des Seinsverständnisses im wissenschaftlichen Entwurf. Die neue' 
Bestimmung des Seienden als Natur'] G27; pp. 185-97. Heidegger sums up his investigation at the 
beginning of the next chapter thus, `We have now indeed achieved an elucidation of the essence of 
science: it is positive knowledge and has the character of positivity [... ] we do not say simply: scientific 
knowledge as theoretical is positive, but rather we have emphasised what belongs to positivity; i. e. we 
have found what makes positivity possible as such.. It is the antecedent, unobjective, founding projection 
of the state of Being of beings, which stakes out a field. This projection is, as projecting of the Being of 
beings, nothing other than the letting-be of beings which we were asking after. This projecting as letting- 
be of beings is the primordial action of Dasein we sought after, in which the theoretical attitude, i. e. the 
making manifest of beings for the sake of their unconcealment, is alone made possible. In the projection 
which makes positivity possible, lies the primordial praxis, the primordially practical character of the 
theoretical. Still more: The projection of the state of Being of beings as the inner making-possible of 
positivity, i. e. the essence of science, is nothing other than the primordially grasped essence of the 
theoretical. ' [`Zwar gelang uns jetzt eine Erhellung des Wesens der Wissenschaft: Sie ist positive 
Erkenntnis und hat den Charakter der Positivität. [... ] Wir sagen ja nicht einfach: Wissenschaftliche 
Erkenntnis als theoretische ist positive, sondern wir haben herausgestellt, was zur Positivität gehört, d. h 
wir haben das gefunden, was die Positivität als solche ermöglicht. Es ist der vorgängige, 
ungegenständliche, feldabsteckende, begründende Entwurf der Seinsverfassung des Seienden. Dieser 
gekennzeichnete Entwurf ist als Entwerfen des Seins des Seienden nichts anderes als das Seinlassen des 
Seienden, dem wir nachfragten. Dieses Entwerfen als Seinlassen des Seienden ist die gesuchte 
Urhandlung des Daseins, in der theoretische Einstellung, d. h. Offenbarmachen des Seienden umwillen 
seiner Unverborgenheit allein ermöglicht wird. Im Entwurf, der die Positivität ermöglicht, liegt der 
ursprüngliche npaýtS, der ursprünglich praktische Charakter des Theoretischen. Mehr noch: Der Entwurf 
der Seinsverfassung des Seienden als innere Ermöglichung der Positivität, d. h. des Wesens der 
Wissenschaft, ist nichts anderes als das ursprünglich gefaßte Wesen des Theoretischen. '] G27, pp. 198-99. 
The move then on to transcendence, and the ontological understanding of Being ['ontologisches 
Seinsverständnis'], is the same move made in Being and Time from ¶69b to 169c. 
60 Reichenbach provides a good example, as he can hardly be accused of being unaware of contemporary 
developments in physics. During the twenties he concentrates his attention upon relativity theory, 
publishing Axiomatik der relativistischen Raum-Zeit-Lehre (1924) [Axiomatization of the theory of 
relativi , trans. and ed. 
by Maria Reichenbach, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969)] and 
Philosophie der Raum-Zeit-Lehre (1928) [The Philosophy of Space and. Time, trans. by Maria 
Reichenbach and John Freund, (New York, Dover Publications, 1957)]. It is not until the thirties that he 
addresses the problem of probabilistic causality, culminating after he had left Germany in the publication 
of Philosophic Foundations of Quantum Mechanics, (Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California 
Press, 1944). 
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implications of probabilistic quantum theory until 1936, when at his request a series of 
meetings were arranged between him and Werner Heisenberg by Carl von Weisäcker. 61 
It is hardly surprising then that in the lecture courses of the `20s and in Being and Time, 
Heidegger should have consistently cited relativity theory when referring to the crises in 
the sciences. What is interesting, however, is that what he had to say about it was quite 
unlike the rest of the contemporary philosopical discussion. In fact, as we shall see, it 
was much more like what some of the scientists were saying themselves. 
Of course, much of the philosophical (and non-philosophical) discussion centred on the 
counter-intuitive and supposedly paradoxical aspects of the theory: time dilation, the 
equivalence of energy and mass, the non-Euclidean geometry of space-time. Both 
Cassirer and the nascent logical empiricists were interested in relativity theory as a 
successor to the Euclidean geometry of absolute space and time underlying Newtonian 
mechanics because it demonstrated, as far as they were concerned, that there are no a 
priori forms of intuition.. Cassirer, because he had already rejected the Kantian dualism 
of sensibility and understanding, and opted instead for what he himself called logical 
idealism, interpreted relativity theory as confirmation of his own epistemology. 62 The 
logical-empiricists, who called themselves logical empiricists precisely because they all 
started out as logical idealists, wished to demonstrate that even the form of the manifold 
is empirically determined. Strictly speaking then both Cassirer and the logical 
empiricists are philosophically neutral about relativity theory as a theory of nature. As 
61 Sce Carl Friedrich von Weisäcker, 'Beziehungen der theoretischen Physik zum Denken Heide_, cr, '. 
Martin Heideggers Einfluss auf die Wissenschaften, (Bern, A Francke AG Verlau, 1949), pp. 172-174. 
Catherine Chevalier provides an interesting interpretation of the effect this encounter had on Heidegger's 
thinking in her article, 'Heidegger and the Physical Sciences', trans. by Christopher %1acann, Martin 
Heidegger - Critical Assessments: 1'01.11' Reverberations, ed. 
by Christopher \lacann, (London, New 
York, Routledge, 1992), pp. 342-364. 
62 Going so far as to publish in 1921 a supplement to his Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegri11 ut 
1910 
entitled Zur Einstein'schen Relativitatstfieorie [see Substance and Function and 
Einstein's Theory of 
Relativity. trans. by William Curtis Swabey and Mane Collins Swabey, (New York, Dover Publications. 
1953)]. 
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an event in the history of science it simply provides the opportunity to break the 
stranglehold of more traditional neo-Kantian epistemology. 
Cassirer sees the historical progress of science as the embedding of formal reLtional 
structures one within the other. This series is convergent to a limit and is gov*enned by 
regulative principles. Thus, though it is never possible at any stage in the progress of 
science to say what the `content' of the a priori form of space is, nevertheless the form 
of space is still governed by a priori principles, precisely those regulative principles 
governing the series within which the historically specific formal structure of the science 
is embedded. 
Rudolf Camap by contrast begins on the slow road to the rejection of a priori form 
altogether by distinguishing in his doctoral dissertation between formal, physical and 
intuitive space. 63 Physical space, as an object of sensible intuition, must share the form 
of intuitive space, but this does not exhaust the form of physical space. As intuitivf_ 
space, space is necessarily infinitesimally Euclidean, but this says nothing about the 
metrical form of physical space. The metric is determined neither by empircal evidence 
nor by a priori principles, but rather is conventionally chosen. It cannot arise from 
empirical observation because empirical observation depends itself upon a choice of the 
method of physical-spatial measurement. The method of physical-measurement and the 
metrical form of space are mutually determinative, and thus are determined together 
only by convention. 
Cassirer's notion of a convergent series of embedded formal relational structures clearly 
still clings to a structural notion of the a priori. But what persists even in the lo`gical- 
empiricists' attempts to break with the Kantian concept of the s\1 thetic a priori right up 
63 Michael Friedman, A Parting of the Ways - Carnap Cassirer, and Heidegier, 
(Chicago and Fa ', alle. 
Open Court Publishing Company, 2000) p. 66 
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to the end point of Carnap's Logical Syntax of Language is the idea, the prejudice that 
what is a priori is form - even if form is relativised to the point where all that can be 
stipulated is that the syntactic rules of various logical forms be at least clearly and 
unequivocally expressed. But what is here missing is any consideration of the 
`motivation' for the adoption of a particular formal relational structure in the description 
of nature. Moritz Schlick, for instance, in a very early paper from 1915 is unable to find 
any criteria for the adjudication of which theoretical description of the results of the 
Michelson-Morley experiment, special relativity or a modified aether theory, is the 
better, and so falls back upon a form of conventionalism. 64Yet, nonetheless, it is a brute 
`empirical' fact that the scientists themselves were in no doubt as to which was the 
better `theory. ' The scientists must have been applying, tacitly at least, some set of 
criteria which remain entirely outside the purview of the logical empiricists. Schlick in 
1915 admits this. Einstein's theory appears to be `simpler' and less `ad hoc' than its 
aether theory rivals, and that is no doubt why the scientific community has adopted it. 
But there appears to be no way of giving these purely subjective criteria real 
epistemological meaning. The logical empiricists do not however pursue this problem, 
rather they set about codifying and formalising their indifference to it. The 
conventionalism which they picked up from Poincare via Hugo Dingier hardens by the 
end of the 20s into the verifiability principle, which states that you shall know a theory 
by its consequences. Two theories which make exactly the same empirical predictions 
are in fact equivalent, and therefore not conflicting. Whatever differences there are 
between them are either differences in the definition of higher level orderings of the 
basic empirical facts, that are therefore purely conventional and will reduce out upon 
64Moritz Schlick, `Die philosophische Bedeutung des Relitivitätsprinzips', Zeitschrift für Philosophie und 
philosophische Kritik, Vol. 159, no. 1 (1915), pp. 129-175. [See Michael Friedman, 
`Philosophy and the 
Exact Sciences - Logical Positivism as a Case 
Study', Inference Explanation, and Other Frustrations - 
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analysis, or are extraneous metaphysical interpretations that are to be discarded as 
meaningless. 
The scientists, on the other hand, knew that Einstein's general theory of relativity was 
the better theory because it explained the identity of inertial and gravitational mass. 
Now, strictly speaking, the general theory does not itself explain this identity; rather it is 
in a sense the consequence of the identification. What explains the identity is the 
necessity of such an identification within a new articulation of the notion of universal 
law. The identification of gravitational and inertial mass is necessary because within 
non-inertial frames of reference the difference cannot be measured. But that this fact 
should matter is due to an extension or modification of the notion of universality to 
include non-inertial frames of reference. 
How does Heidegger interpret relativity theory`? The evidence is sparse, but in the end I 
think adequate. From what little Heidegger has to say about relativity theory, I think it is 
clear that he relies upon Hermann Weyl's interpretation of relativity theory, principally 
worked out in his book Space, Time, Matter. That this is historically plausible is shown 
both by Heidegger's remarks about Weyl in the context of the debate between 
intuitionism and formalism in the foundations of mathematics, and the fact that \Vevl 
was also one of Husserl's research students. In the end though the proof of the pudding 
«will be in the eating. The interpretation of relativity theory produced will be 
recognisably, I think, Heideggerean. 
The first thing to notice is that true to his word Heidegger does not concern himself with 
thhc rc'. sults of relativity theory. This does not just Rican its empirically verifiable 
predictions, nor any of its more counter-intuitive claims about the structure of space- 
I slays in the Philosophy of Science, ed. by John Farman, (Berkeley, 
Los An eles, Oxford, University of 
California Press, 1992), p 91. 
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time that excited so much comment elsewhere. Rather it above all means strangely that 
Heidegger does not concern himself with the theory of relativ-it,,,, at all. if by that %\e 
mean the mathematical formulation of both the special and general theories, i. e. in the 
case of the general theory the mathematical formulation in terms of tensor calculus or 
the relation between mass distribution and space-time curvature - those equations whose 
solutions would in normal parlance be said to be the results of relativity theory. - 
In this 
Heidegger appears to be quite distinct from all other philosophers of the time who 
concerned themselves with understanding relativity theory, rather than merely railing 
against it (Cassirer, Carnap, Schlick, Reichenbach, Bergson, et. al. ) and he seems to 
have set himself apart from all other philosophers precisely by taking a lesson from the 
scientists themselves, Einstein and Weyl in particular. What concerns him is the specific 
relation between the principle of relativity and the theory of relativity. This represents 
for him a specific transformation not of scientific theory but rather of the concept of 
scientific explanation. In 1924 Heidegger, addressing a bunch of Marburg theologians, 
provided the following brief digression on relativity theory: 
Space is nothing in itself; there is no absolute space. It exists merely by way of 
the bodies and energies contained in it. (An old proposition of Aristotle's: ) 
Time too is nothing. It persists merely as a consequence of the events takin 
place in it. There is no absolute time and no absolute simultaneity either. In 
seeing the destructive side of this theory, one readily overlooks what is positiv e 
about it, namely, that it demonstrates precisely the invariability, with respect to 
arbitrary transformations, of those equations describing natural processes. 65 
It is not very much, but it is enough. In a very characteristic manner, ww ithout any 
trumpets blaring, with a matter of factness that belies the extreme conceptual 
distillation, Heidegger goes right to the heart of the matter. He simply by-passes 
evcrything that at the time, and indeed still now, was well-known and controversial 
about the theory - space and time dilation, the relativity of simultaneit}, the twins 
65 Martin Heidegger. The Concept of I: jmc, trans. by William McNeill, (Oxford. Blacký; ell, 1992). r3 
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paradox (known then as the voyage au boulet after a thought experiment proposed by 
Paul Langevin in 1911) that exercised Bergson so much, 66 and the use of non-Euclidean 
geometry - in other words, all those aspects which were supposed to constitute the 
revolutionary, and indeed as Heidegger wryly notes `destructive', character of the 
theory. Instead Heidegger focuses entirely upon the fact that relativity theory 
`demonstrates precisely the invariability, with respect to arbitrary transformations, of 
those equations describing natural processes. ' Now this is an extremely accurate 
paraphrase of the principle of relativity, the absolute keystone of both theories. 67 In the 
special theory of relativity, the constancy of the speed of light in all inertial frames, from 
which all the other consequences , even e= mc2, flow, is itself merely a special case of 
the principle of relativity. Since the speed of light is a physical constant determined by 
Clerk Maxwell's equations for the electromagnetic field, it must share in their 
invariance. In the general theory, the requirement that there be no privileged frames of 
66 Paul Langevin, `L'Evolution de 1'espace et du temps, ' Revue du Metaphysique et de Morale, Vol. XIX 
(1911), pp. 124-125. The date is significant because it means that the paradox became well-known prior to 
the publication of the general theory of relativity. This means that confusion reigned over whether the 
paradox was to be resolved, or indeed could be, using only the resources of special relativity. But those 
who sneer at Bergson for not having understood that general relativity, and its treatment of acceleration, 
resolve the apparent contradiction between the equivalence of the two frames of reference and the 
difference of outcome in each frame, should consider that since the paradox arises within the special 
theory, it is reasonable to assume that it should be resolved within it. For a full discussion of Bergson's 
arguments with the physicists see Milic Capek, Bergson and Modern Physics: a Reinterpretation and Re- 
evaluation, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science Vol. VII, (Dordrecht-Holland, D. Reidel 
Publishing Co., 1971), and Robin Drurie's introduction to Bergson's Duration and Simultaneity. 
67 A typical text book formulation of the special principle is: `The laws of nature are identical in form for 
any two observers S, S' who are in relative uniform motion. ' [R. H. Atkin, Mathematics and Wave 
Mechanics, (London, William Heinemann Ltd., 1956), p. 154. ] Einstein provides a non-technical 
formulation of the general principle of relativity as follows: `All bodies of reference K, K' etc., are 
equivalent for the description of natural phenomena (formulation of the general laws of nature), whatever 
may be their state of motion. ' [Albert Einstein, The Special and General Theories -A Popular Exposition, 
trans. by Robert W. Lawson, (London, Methuen and Co., 1920), p. 61. ] Equivalence between frames of 
reference is translated into talk of invariance under arbitrary transformation for technical reasons. Briefly 
put, the set of all possible transformations between frames of reference form a mathematical object known 
as a group (in special relativity the Lorentz group). The structure of this group governs invariance under 
the transformations belonging to it. The notion of invariance is crucial to relativity theory, because in 
some sense it replaces the notion of property. To take the most obvious and 
basic example, the 
Minkowski interval between two events in space-time (dx2 + dy2 + dz' - c2dt2) is often introduced as being 
the relativistic replacement for the distance between two points in Euclidean geometry. 
But the reason that 
the Minkowski interval says something about space-time as such is not that it is a geometrical property of 
the `real' space-time underlying all the frames of reference, 
but merely the fact that it is the same in all 
frames of reference. 
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reference at all, that the laws of nature should appear the same for all observers, 
irrespective of their relative motions, whether uniform or not, means that inertial and 
gravitational forces are equivalent. For an observer only able to make local observations, 
there is no way of telling if the weight that keeps him anchored to the floor, is due to the 
gravitational attraction of a large mass beneath him, or the fact that the room he is 
standing in is moving with constantly increasing velocity through space. As Einstein 
says, `we see that our extension of the principle of relativity implies the necessity of the 
law of the equality of inertial and gravitational mass. Thus we have obtained a physical 
interpretation of the law. 68 Einstein's use of the word `physical' here is interesting. It 
reveals a lot about what he thinks physics does. The equality of inertial and gravitational 
mass does not receive a physical explanation by being grounded in some other physical 
fact, nor. even by becoming a special instance of some wider ranging pattern found in 
physical phenomena, but rather is physicalh' interpreted as the direct consequence of the 
invariance of law across all observations. It is often pointed out that in the general 
theory of relativity gravitation is no longer treated as a force exerted by bodies on one 
another but instead is interpreted as a curvature of the geometry of space-time that is 
determined by the mass distribution through space-time. But what is not so often 
pointed out is that this curvature is not arbitrarily posited, so as for instance to produce 
68 Einstein, op. cit., p. 69. Of course, what we have here is Einstein's own account of the development of 
general relativity as an extension of special relativity designed after the event to make the extension 
appear as natural as possible. In particular, the extension of the special principle of relativity to the general 
principle of covariance under arbitrary transformations is presented as primary and as providing the 
physical explanation for the equivalence of inertial and gravitational mass. In fact, the route to general 
relativity was not that easy, and while the principle of equivalence was held 
fast throughout as the guiding 
light of Einstein's theoretical efforts, it was not until 1915 that he realised covariance was even possible 
for the equations of the gravitational field. In other words, for most of the time 
Einstein was working on 
general relativity, he was searching for a theory of gravitation that would not 
have satisfied the general 
principle of relativity, though it was supposed to show why inertial and gravitational mass were 
wesensgleich (essentially equal). (see Pierre Kerszberg, The 
Invented Universe, (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1989), pp. 68-78. ) But this does not affect the importance of 
Einstein's testimony for the 
story I am telling here. I take it that Heidegger's interpretation of relativity 
theory was based on an 
understanding gleaned precisely from the published works of 
Einstein and Weyl in which the general 
principle of relativity was presented as the natural extension of the special principle. 
The more 
-176- 
results that fit with the observed orbits of the planets round the sun, rather it is precisely 
this curvature that is invariant under arbitrary transformation of the frame of reference, 
in much the same way that the interval between space-time points (defined as ds2 - 
c2dt2) is invariant in special relativity. In other words, space-time has to be curved in 
order to look the same from all points of view. Gravitation is just the observed result of 
this requirement that space-time `look' the same in all frames of reference. And it turns 
out that this invariance condition, the condition that the relation between mass 
distribution and space-time curvature should be invariant under arbitrary transformation 
of the frame of reference, is strong enough to determine what that relation actually is. 69 
Now given this description of the structure and logical motivation of relativity theory - 
the fact that it arises from a sustained reflection upon the consequences of a very 
abstract, what one might even want to call, a metaphysical principle about the 
constitution of natural law - it is not surprising that many have reacted against the idea 
of relativity theory as revolutionary, particularly in the Kuhnian sense of representing an 
incommensurable paradigm shift. Thus the historian of science Gerald Holton declares, 
on the basis of his examination of the genesis of the special theory, that `the so-called 
scientific "revolution " turns out to be at bottom an effort to return to a classical 
complicated story of Einstein's solitary struggle to formulate the general theory between 1907 and 1915 
only emerged from historical research conducted in the 1980s. 
69 Einstein thought that the tensor equations given in the general theory arose uniquely from the general 
principle of relativity. In fact, a whole class of theories is compatible with the general principle, as was 
shown in the '60s and 70s by Robert Dicke, Carl Brans, and Nathan Rosen among others. But the class is 
extremely restricted and all theories within it share certain basic characteristics with general relativity. In 
particular, the following conditions must apply: 1. ) Space-time has a curved, i. e. non-Euclidean geometry; 
gravitation is the observed consequence of this curvature. 2. ) Free, unperturbed motion is along the 
shortest distance between points as determined by this curved geometry. 3. ) In freely moving frames of 
reference special relativity determines the mechanics of a system. Technically, the different theories arise 
as the result of different possible parameterizations of the tensor field that defines the relation between 
mass and space-time curvature. Nonetheless, the general principle still massively restricts, prior to all 
experimentation and theoretical speculation, the possible descriptions of nature. [see Clifford Will, The 
Renaissance of General Relativity, The New Physics, ed. by Paul Davies (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1989), pp. 8-12] 
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purity. ' 70 Clearly for Holton a return to classical purity and revolution are incompatible 
descriptions, the one replacing the other. But Heidegger seems to accept relativity 
theory's classicism, while never abandoning the characterisation of it as revolutionar\. 
In which case, what kind of return to classical purity does relativity theory represent? 
A year after his lecture to the theologians, at the beginning of the summer semester of 
1925, Heidegger provides another succinct description of relativity theory: 
Relativity theory is a theory of relativities, a theory of the conditions of access 
and modes of conception, which are to be arranged so that in this access to 
nature, in a specific mode of space-time measurement, the invariance of the 
laws of motion is preserved. Its aim is not relativism but just the opposite. Its 
real aim is to find the in-itself of nature by way of the detour through the 
problem of gravitation, concentrated as a problem of matter. 71 
Here the emphasis upon the principle of relativity is paired with something else, the 
claim that the theory of relativity is `a theory of the conditions of access. ' These 
conditions of access are themselves linked to `a specific mode of space-time 
measurement. ' What Heidegger has in mind is clearly the way in , vhich much of 
relativity theory proceeds by a careful consideration of exactly how physical 
measurements can be made. Indeed the concept of a frame of reference itself arises 
precisely out of the realisation that the measurement of a physical event is always itself a 
physical process. A frame of reference is not simply a co-ordinate system, instead it 
should be thought of as an actual physical framework, a set of measuring rods extended 
throughout space with clocks located at every intersection. In fact, in his own popular 
expositions, Einstein prefers the term `reference body' to `frame of reference' so as to 
emphasise the fact that the length, say, of some physical body can onh' be measured by 
70 Gerald Holton, On the Origin of the Special Theory of Relativity. ' pp. 100- 107, Relativity Theory It, 
, 
ht, ed. by L. Pearce Williams. (New York, John Wiley and Sons, Origins and Impact on Modern "Ihoup 
Inc., 1968), p. 10 3. _ 
HCT, p. 4. 
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comparing it to the length of some other physical body, that is to be taken as a unit. '2 
Similarly the time of some physical event can only be measured by comparing it to some 
other regular physical event, that is to be taken as a clock. It is from this ineluctable fact 
- that the means of measurement are always themselves physical, always embedded in 
the world they measure - that time and space dilation, for instance, get deduced in 
special relativity. It seems then that the theory of relativity in fact rests upon two quite 
separate things: one, a principle about the mathematical expression of natural law; the 
other, an insistence upon the materiality of measurement. Not only is it difficult to see 
what they have got to do with one another, but each is in some danger of seeming 
arbitrary. Why after all should the mathematical expression of natural laws be 
equivalent in different frames of reference? Is there any justification for this principle, or 
is it merely a dogmatic claim? And surely the insistence that physical measurement is 
always itself physical can have no real content unless one arbitrarily closes off the 
possibility of further physical discovery. Who is to say that faster than light 
communication might not be possible, thus making the observation of simultaneity in 
other frames of reference possible? 
Heidegger, however, clearly links the two issues together. It is precisely, so, he claims, 
the theory of the conditions of access that preserves the invariance of the laws of 
motion. In Being and Time, where a condensed version of these remarks appears, the 
linkage is even clearer. `As a theory of the conditions under which we have access to 
Nature itself, it [relativity theory] seeks to preserve the changelessness of the laws of 
72 Another reason why Einstein prefers the idea of a reference body, is that the notion of a frame doesn't 
work too well for general relativity. The geometry of an inertial frame in special relativity is Euclidean, 
and so the frame of reference can be conceived of a rigid lattice work of inextensible rods of unit length. 
This corresponds with our common sense notion of a frame. But in a general non-inertial frame the 
geometry is non-Euclidean. Both time and space are warped, and there are dilation affects within the 
frame, not just between frames. The notion of a rigid frame no longer has any meaning. One 
has to try and 
conceive of a non-rigid frame. Einstein comes up with the truly inspired notion of a mollusc. 
The non- 
rigid reference body, which might appropriately be termed "reference-mollusk", 
is in the main equivalent 
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motion by ascertaining all relativities, and thus comes up against the question of the 
structure of its own given area of study - the problem of matter. '73 The principle of 
relativity is not arbitrarily posited, but rather is justified by the theory of the conditions 
of access to nature itself. What does this mean? Well, it could mean something like this. 
The principle of relativity does not specify a condition to which natural laws are 
supposed to hold in addition to being already natural laws, rather the principle of 
relativity specifies what it means to be a natural law at all. A natural law, if there are 
such things, is universally valid - that means it holds in all instances. Force aiwai s 
equals mass times acceleration. But the question that arises is - universal over xvhat? 'I o 
Newtonian science the answer was obvious - nature, and that meant absolute time and 
space. A natural law holds throughout the whole of time and space. It inheres, if you 
like, in the fabric of the universe; that is its universality. Dispensing with the notion of 
absolute time and space, Einstein has to reopen the question of the universality of 
natural laws. Starting from the Machian proposition that natural laws are nothing more 
than generalisations from empirical data, finally reducible to that data, Einstein then 
stands this position on its head, producing what might be called a realist interpretation 
of Machian empiricism, by recognising that every observation must be the result of a 
I? /. sical measurement. Since a physical frame or body of reference is necessary for such 
measurement, natural laws are by definition so to speak universal over all such frames 
of reference. Laws of nature do not inhere in frames of reference, they are what is 
common to them - and this means are features of the group algebra 
describing the 
transformations between them. The mathematician and physicist. Hermann WW'e\ 1. 
attempted in 1918 to extend this way of founding natural law upon the means of 
measurement via invariance conditions to electroma,, nctism. `What is done by 
to a (aussian tour-dimensional co-ordinate system chosen arbitrarily 
(... ] the laws them el, es mu, i be 
quite independent of the choice of mollusk. ' (Einstein, op. cit., p. 99) 
-1 `0 - 
Einstein's theory of gravitation with respect to the equality of inertial and gravitational 
matter, namely, that it recognises their identity as necessary but not as a consequence of 
an undiscovered law of physical nature, is accomplished by the present theory with 
respect to the facts that find expression in the structure of Maxwell's equations and the 
laws of conservation. ' 74 In so doing he came to a very strong formulation of the way in 
which natural laws are nothing more than the expressions of the conditions of physical 
measurement. `We thus arrive at the inference: The world is a (3+1) dimensional 
metrical manifold; all physical field phenomena are expressions of the metrics of 
the world. (Whereas the old view was that the four-dimensional metrical continuum is 
the scene of physical phenomena; the physical essentialities themselves are, however, 
things that exist "in" this world, and we must accept them in type and number in the 
form which experience gives us cognition of them: nothing further is to be 
"comprehended" of them. )'75 
As Einstein himself expressed it, if all objects were to be removed from the universe, 
`According to Newton the Galilean space of inertia remains, while according to my 
conception nothing at all. '76 The space-time manifold and the collection of objects 
within it are inseparable aspects of the same phenomenon, which can justly therefore be 
designated by the one term, das All. General relativity and its proposed extension to 
electro-magnetism by Weyl make explicit the fact that the theme of physical research is 
the aggregate of the present-at-hand, and that all physical phenomena are determinate 
manifestations of the structure of the aggregate. Moreover the structure of the aggregate 
73 Being and Time, p. 30. 
70 Hermann Weyl, Space-Time-Matter, trans. by Henry L. Brose, (London. Methuen and Co., 4`h ed. 1922 
republished unaltered and unabridged, New York, Dover Publications Inc., 1952), p. 294. Originally 
published in German as Raum, Zeit Materie - Vorlesungen über allgemeine Relativitätstheorie, (Berlin, 
1918,3d ed. 1919,4`h ed. 1920). 
75 Space-Time-Matter, pp. 283-284. 
76 Letter from Einstein to K. Schwarzschild, 9 Jan. 1916, quoted in Pierre Kerzberg, The Invented 
Universe (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 82. 
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is not discovered within the field of the present-at-hand upon inspection, rather as the 
metrical structure of the aggregate it is precisely the structure of discovery - the structure 
of possible access to the present-at-hand through measurement. As Pierre Kerzberg 
points out it in his book examining the genesis of modern cosmology, `it is essential to 
realise that, if Einstein did undoubtedly move on to the recognition of principles of 
rational significance as forming the root of all physical science, he did not depart, at 
least in the first instance, from the conviction that these principles somehow 
communicate with the `All' as it was envisaged by Mach. '77 The communication is 
effected through the problem of physical measurement, a problem that unites the 
`rational' with the `empirical. ' Measurement is a rational activity, indeed it might be 
said to be the institution of rationality in human behaviour, but at the same time it is 
only rational insofar as it submits itself to the physical exigencies of the situation. 
Measurement is not the arbitrary imposition of a rational ordering upon an inchoate 
manifold of sense data, rather it is measuring one's own activity by a yardstick found 
within the field one is working in. 
Crisis as Repetition 
How does this interpretation of relativity theory help us to determine what Heidegger 
understood by scientific crisis? In physics, Heidegger tells us, `the aggregate [das All] of 
the present-at-hand becomes the theme. '78 Now clearly relativity theory represents a 
reworking of the notion of das All, space, the universe, the specific universality of the 
present-at-hand. And this new explicit notion of the 
kind of universality inherently 
belonging to the present-at-hand is arrived at through a reflection precisely upon what 
77 Pierre Kerzberg. op. cit., p. 83. 
78 Being and Time, p. 413. 
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happens in the encounter with the present-at-hand, what it is that allows the present-at- 
hand to be encountered rather than the ready-to-hand, the conditions of access to the 
present-at-hand, as Heidegger puts it, that is to say, a reflection upon what it means, 
what it entails to measure something. But this is precisely what scientific projection 
accomplishes. Therefore, relativity theory is, speaking purely formally for the moment, a 
repetition of the initial scientific projection founding modem mathematical natural 
science. But a repetition in what sense? 
For Heidegger, repetition [Wiederholung] denotes an authentic mode of Dasein's 
temporality. Repetition is the way in which Dasein makes its past its own. It is authentic 
having-been. 79 What this authentic mode of having-been actually consists of is laid out 
in Being and Time in chapter 5 of division 2, which deals with Dasein's historicality. 
There the historicality of Dasein is seen to lie in what Heidegger dubs fate [Schicksals]. 
`This is how 'we designate Dasein's primordial historizing [Geschehen], which lies in 
authentic resoluteness and in which Dasein hands itself down to itself. free for death, in 
a possibility which it has inherited and yet has chosen. '80 Fate, therefore, does not 
designate some implacable and exterior force that determines what Dasein will become 
despite all its better efforts; rather fate is an expression of Dasein's thrownness. After 
all, Dasein does not decide to be the being that it is, it finds itself to be `there' in a world 
not of its own making, but it may take responsibility for the being that it finds itself to 
be. In so `choosing' Dasein takes its thrownness up into existence, that is to say, Dasein 
takes its `that it is' up into projection. This peculiar relation between past and future, in 
which Dasein comes back to its past precisely for the sake of its 
future, is what 
constitutes the happening [Geschehen] of existence. In other words, the `life-history' of 
Dasein is not pieced together after the event from a series of 
fragmented experiences and 
79 `If Being-as-having-been is authentic, we call it "repetition". ' Being and 
Time, p. 388. 
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isolated incidents, but rather in happening Dasein is already fully stretched between 
`birth' and `death' at every moment. By and large, however, this stretching along of 
existence in happening is hidden by Dasein's absorption in its everyday affairs. `it is 
driven about by its "affairs". So if it wants to come to itself, it must first pull itself 
together from the dispersion and disconnectedness of the very things that have "come to 
pass". '8' It is only within the horizon of everyday inauthenticity that the question of 
Dasein's `connectedness' can even arise. On the other hand, however, Dasein is capable 
of being authentic, that is to say, of happening authentically. Dasein's happening as fully 
stretched between birth and death can become fully `present' to it in what Heidegger 
calls a moment of vision [Augenblick]. This does not mean that one's whole life flashes 
before one's eyes, however. Rather, it would be better to say, that in the moment of 
vision one acts for the sake of one's whole existence, thereby making that existence 
present in so happening. In the moment of vision the way in which Dasein happens 
becomes explicit. `The resoluteness which comes back to itself and hands itself down, 
then becomes the repetition of a possibility of existence that has come down to us. 
Repeating is handing down explicitly - that is to say, going back into the possibilities of 
the Dasein that has-been-there. '82 
Now, this whole discussion may seem as if it has taken us a very long way from science. 
The concept of repetition is bound up with the question of authenticity, and authenticity 
surely has nothing to do with the purely ontical discovery of entities that are not of the 
nature of Dasein. Authenticity is, rather, the way in which Dasein 
becomes transparent 
to itself It is an existentiell matter. Moreover, inauthenticity is often characterised by 
Heidegger in terms of the way Dasein loses itself in its concern for the entities it 
80 Being and Time, p. 435. 
81 Being and Time, pp. 441-42. 
82 Beingrand Time, p. 437. 
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discovers in its everyday affairs. Science, to be sure, discovers entities in a way quite 
different from the everyday discovery of the ready-to-hand, but as Heidegger tells us in 
paragraph 69b of Being and Time the theoretical discovery of the present-at-hand 
remains a `distinctive kind of making-present. '83 And `making-present, ' Heidegger tells 
us, is always to be distinguished from the authentic moment of vision. 
In contradistinction to the moment of vision as the authentic Present, we call 
the inauthentic Present "making present". Formally understood, every Present 
is one which makes present, but not every Present has the character of a 
`moment of vision'. When we use the expression "making present" without 
adding anything further, we always have in mind the inauthentic kind, which is 
irresolute and does not have the character of a moment of vision. 84 
Nonetheless, matters are not quite so clear cut. As we saw at the end of the last chapter, 
Heidegger also maintains that `science has its source in authentic existence. '8 The 
specific kind of making-present that belongs to science appears to occupy an ambiguous 
place in the supposedly clear-cut. distinction between the authentic and inauthentic 
because it is, dependent upon and explicitly enacts a change-over in Dasein's own 
understanding of Being. `Science means: To be in the unconcealment of beings for the 
sake of unconcealment. 'ß6 In other words, science in explicitly enacting the change over 
from one kind of understanding of Being to another projects itself upon the 
unconcealment of beings as such; but unconcealment belongs essentially to the Being of 
Dasein. In scientific projection, then, Dasein makes one of its essential possibilities its 
own - and this is precisely what is meant by authenticity. As Heidegger says of authentic 
historicality, `the possible is made one's own by repetition. '87 The German verb 
aneignen, which is translated here as `make one's own, ' is translated elsewhere in Being 
83 Beine, and Time, p. 414. 
84 Bein and Time, p. 388 
SS Being and Time, p. 415. 
$8 `Wissenschaft besagt: In der Unverborgenheit des Seienden sein um der Unverborgenheit willen. ' G27, 
p. 179. 
97 Being and Time, p. 446; 'In der wiederholenden Aneignung des Möglichen' 
SZ, p. 396. 
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and Time as the verb `to appropriate. ' The importance which Heidegger attaches to the 
concept of `appropriation' is attested to by the fact that he uses it to characterise his own 
procedure. For example, in paragraph 44 on truth as unconcealment, Heidegger says, An 
proposing our `definition' of "truth" we have not shaken off the tradition, but we have 
appropriated it primordially. ' 88 In the context of Heidegger's own engagement with the 
traditional concept of truth the meaning is clear. The radical transformation of a basic 
concept such as `truth' is not achieved by discarding the tradition, but rather by making 
it one's own. And this is not done 'outside' the tradition but by attending closely to it. 
This is because the tradition is itself a history of repeated appropriations. This gets 
forgotten if we view the tradition merely as a history of disagreements between 
generations who have all proven to be mistaken. The tradition preserves, while covering 
up, the struggle of each new generation against the very complacency the tradition gives 
rise to. In a way, then, by appropriating it for oneself, the tradition is made its owls, or 
more its own. It is freed for its ownmost possibility: what it claims to be, and what it has 
always wanted to be. 'Wanting to have a conscience' is what gets defined by Heidegger 
as resoluteness, and resoluteness is what makes possible the choice of following 'in the 
footsteps of what can be repeated. '89 Not just our resoluteness, but the resoluteness of 
that which, preserved in the tradition, can be repeated, precisely because it was itself an 
appropriation. Authenticity does not consist of fleeing from the `they-self back into 
some sphere of pure autonomy, but rather of throwing oneself into the co-historizing - 
what Heidegger calls the destiny, of a community that shares a tradition. `Our fates havc 
already been guided in advance, in our Being with one another in the same world and in 
our resoluteness for definite possibilities. Only in communicating and in struggling does 
" Being and Time, p. 262. `Die vorgelegte »Definition« der Wahrheit ist kein Abschütteln der I radition, 
sondern die ursprüngliche Aneignung. ' SZ, p. 220. 
89 Being and Tine-, p. 437. 
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the power of destiny become free. Dasein's fateful destiny in and with its "generation" 
goes to make up the full authentic historizing of Dasein. '90 
Now, remarkably enough, `appropriation' is precisely the concept that Heidegger comes 
back to in the 1928/29 lecture course when attempting to locate the source of the crisis 
in the sciences: `the essential thing about science does not lie in what is merely tradable, 
what can be passed from hand to hand, but rather in that which is always appropriated 
anew. This primordial appropriation of the essential is only possible, however, in that 
method which is inseparably bound up with, and deeply rooted in the subject matter and 
results. '91 The ambiguity that surrounds the distinctive making-present belonging to the 
sciences appears to revolve around the permanent possibility of mistaking science for its 
results, a possibility to which science itself is not immune. That way what is essential 
about science will never be picked up. 92 But neither will it be picked up by simply 
observing science from the outside and dismissing it as the imposition of a theory- 
loaded method upon its subject 'matter. What is essential about science is only 
appropriated in the method of science itself. Here method clearly does not mean what is 
commonly meant by scientific method. It does not refer to the way in which theories get 
confirmed or disconfirmed by experiment, nor to any of the modelling procedures 
whereby theory can be brought into contact with empirical results in the first place. It 
refers rather to the rigorous way that theoretical activity already binds itself to the 
subject matter in a scientific projection so that it can come up with a theory of anything 
at all. Method means here something like theorising itself thought of as appropriation, 
that is to say, repetition of scientific projection. 'This projecting as letting-be of beings 
90 Being and Time, p. 436. 
91 `Popularisierung geht gegen das Wesen der Wissenschaft, weil das Wesentliche der 
Wissenschaft nicht 
in dem liegt, was bloß tradierbar ist, von Hand zu Hand gegeben werden 
kann, sondern was immer neu 
angeeignet wird. Diese ürsprungliche Aneignung des Wesentlichen 
ist aber nur möglich in der mit 
Sachgehalt und Resultat unzertrennlich verwachsenen Methode. ' 
G27, p. 32. 
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is the primordial action of Dasein we sought after, in which the theoretical attitude, i. e. 
making manifest of beings for the sake of their unconcealment is alone made possible. 
In the projection which makes positivity possible, lies the primordial praxis, the 
primordially practical character of the theoretical. ' 93 But theorising precisely because it 
is scientific activity must be understood in its historicality, that is to say, theorising must 
be understood as the way in which science historizes itself. As Heidegger reminds us, a 
year later, in the 1929/30 lecture course: 
In what we have said so far, right from the beginning, we have avoided the 
erroneous idea that science is a nexus of valid propositions behind which there 
lies something else in turn that claims validity. Rather, we understand science 
as one possibility of the existence of human Dasein, one that is not necessary 
for the Dasein of man but represents a free possibility of existence. In this 
connection we can see that the fundamental character of this free possibility 
lies in historicity, and that the way in which it unfolds is not a matter of 
organization or of any dominant philosophical system, but a matter of the 
specific fate of Dasein in each case. 94 
The question of science's possible authenticity or inauthenticity, then, is not to be 
answered by looking to its results, neither so as to establish once and for all their 
correctness, nor so as to summarily dismiss it for preoccupying itself with them as a way 
of avoiding the perennial existential angst of a truly authentic existence. Rather the 
question is always a historical question, and that means a contingent one. It is always a 
question of what science is up to at the time; a question of whether science is capable of 
appropriating once again what is most essential to it, that is to say, the scientific 
projection of the Being of the beings in question. 
92 Two other possible meanings of the reflexive verb sich aneignen, as well as to appropriate' or 
to 
acquire, ' are 'to learn' and `to pick up' in the sense of becoming au 
fair with something. 
93 'Dieses Entwerfen als Seinlassen des Seienden ist die gesuchte Urhandlung 
des Daseins, in der 
theoretische Einstellung, d. h. Offenbarmachen des Seienden umwillen seiner 
Unverborgenheit allein 
ermöglicht wird. Im Entwurf, der die Positivität ermöglicht, 
liegt der ursprüngliche tpaýtS, der 
ursprünglich praktische Charakter des Theoretischen. ' G27, p. 
199. 
94 FCM, p. 191. 
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In the same lecture course, while discussing the fundamental transformations in seeing 
and questioning, i. e. the crises, that are decisive for science, Heidegger makes the 
following remark about the originality necessary to effect such transformations: 
Originality consists in nothing other than decisively seeing and thinking once 
again at the right moment of vision that which is essential, that which has 
already been repeatedly seen and thought before. Human history is such that it 
ensures that what is seen again in this way gets buried once more in time. 95 
It seems pretty clear, then, that Heidegger did indeed conceive of scientific crisis in 
terms of repetition. But if scientific crisis is repetition of a possibility that has been 
handed down, specifically the repetition of a founding scientific projection, does this 
really tell us anything about its nature as crisis? This depends upon what it means to 
repeat a possibility. Heidegger stresses that it cannot mean the rote repetition of 
something already accomplished, and gives the following lively characterisation: 
The repeating of that which is possibic does not bring again [Wiederbringen] 
something that is `past', nor does it bind the `Present' back to that which has 
already been `outstripped'. Arising, as it does, from a resolute projection of 
oneself, repetition does not let itself be persuaded of something by what is 
`past', just in order that this, as something which was formerly actual, may 
recur. Rather, the repetition makes a reciprocative rejoinder [erwidert] to the 
possibility of that existence which has-been-there. But when such a rejoinder is 
made to this possibility in a resolution, it is made in a moment of vision, and as 
such it is at the same time a disavowal of that which "today", is working itself 
out as the `past'. Repetition does not abandon itself to that which is past, nor 
does it aim at progress. In the moment of vision authentic existence is 
indifferent to both these alternatives. 96 
Crisis, then, thought of as repetition, would make a reciprocative rejoinder to the initial 
scientific projection, that would amount to a disavowal of the way in which that 
scientific projection was working itself out in the present. Thus crisis would manifest 
itself as an opposition to the tradition, while at the same time being a genuine return to 
the source of that tradition. Here return would be a translation of erºt'idern, a return as in 
95 FCM, p. 260. 
96 Being and Time, pp. 437-38. 
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a return of fire, a retort in an argument, but a return that was not simply sparked off by 
what it opposed, not simply a come back, but a going back over that which it is against 
in order to be against it. This is what Heidegger calls `the struggle of loyally followingg 
in the footsteps of that which can be repeated. '97 
In authentically seizing upon the possibility that has been as possibility, Heidegger says, 
`Dasein brings itself back "immediately" - that is to say, in a way that is temporally 
ecstatical - to what has already been before it. But when its heritage is thus handed down 
to itself, its "birth" is caught up into its existence in coming back from the possibility of 
death. '98 Dasein frees itself from history by making that history its own; the moment of 
vision spans the `duration' from the possibility of death which is not to be outstripped 
back to the possibility that has been. Heidegger's contention seems to be that this is how 
Dasein happens freely. It is not fatalistically determined by its history because it is able 
fatefully to be that history. Here in the case of scientific crisis, repetition of scientific 
projection recasts the present state of the science on the basis of its past so as to open up 
its future. The innovative power of repetition lies in the fact that the past can neither be 
discarded in order to start from scratch, nor be held onto as a secure foundation 
completely determining the future, but must rather be gathered up into the full stretch of 
the moment that projects again into the possibility that is repeated. 
This gathering up in repetition is what I take Heidegger to mean by method. It is what 
constitutes genuine scientific theorising. The theorising which led to relativity theory, 
say, was not determined by its historical context. It is not as if relativity theory were just 
something which we could deduce as the inevitable consequence of its specific socio- 
historical conjuncture. Rather, relativity theory, insofar as it is the repetition of the 
founding of mathematical natural science, spans the history of natural science. That 
97 Being and Tim, p. 437 [my emphasis]. 
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history is caught up into the theorising that produces relativity theory, so that relativity 
theory projects that history into its future course. The spectre of historicism is not 
banished by insisting upon eternal truths or the possibility of transcendental validation; 
it is banished by realising that scientific theorising is authentically historical, that theory 
happens [geschehen] by making its history its own. Theory escapes the history that 
weighs down on it by appropriating it, by being it. Genuine scientific method is 
historico-critical engagement with scientific tradition. `As authentic [it] is necessarily a 
critique of the "Present". '99 
Crisis does not occur in the sciences because science is afflicted by historical factors, 
nor is the objectivity of science to be safeguarded by insisting upon the continuity of the 
sciences; rather science is objective to the extent that it is authentically historical, that is 
to say, takes its history up into its existence as theoretical activity, through repetition of 
its origin in scientific projection. But history of science, Forman's say, tends to be the 
concealment of science's historicality. `in the end, the emergence of a problem of 
"historicism" is the clearest symptom that historiology endeavours to alienate Dasein 
from its authentic historical ity. '10° It is not history of science that grasps science in its 
historicality, it is science in crisis that escapes the history of science by becoming once 
again authentically historical. 
9s Being and Time, p. 443. 
" Being and Time, p. 449. Heidegger is talking here of an authentic science of 
history, but the remark 
applies, I take it, to any science that is authentic. 
10° Being and Time, p. 448. 
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Chapter Five 
Science and its Foundations 
The existential conception of science, which interprets science as a particular way in 
which human Dasein can exist and comport itself towards the entities it comes across 
within the world, quite explicitly refrains from looking at science as a body of results, as 
an already constituted theoretical framework. This would seem to imply that the proper 
business of a philosophical interpretation of science is simply to examine and clarify the 
way in which science originates from out of everyday non-scientific activity and 
subsequently goes about its business. Philosophy can say what science is, but it cannot 
tell science anything about its subject matter. This restriction appears to be similar to the 
one that logical positivist philosophy of science imposed upon itself as it sought to 
wrestle free from its neo-Kantian origins, namely that philosophy of science should only 
concern itself with methodological issues rather than substantive ones. But despite this 
apparent restriction of an existential conception of science to the interpretation of 
science as a way of existing, Heidegger also appears to consider that philosophy is duty 
bound to provide science with its foundations. The purely existential analysis of 
scientific activity appears to have indicated that philosophy cannot remain on the 
sidelines. 
Scientific projection is still conceived of as an a priori projection of the Being of the 
beings under investigation, which delimits the field of scientific investigation and 
founds the possibility of the objectification of beings. But precisely because science 
objectifies beings on the basis of a projection of their Being, the projection of Being 
itself remains unobjective; `an antecedent projection of the constitution of 
Being takes 
place, but not so that the constitution of Being becomes an object; consequently 
it is an 
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unobjective projection of the constitution of Being. ' The full formal-existential 
definition of scientific projection is thus given by the following formula: The 
antecedent-unobjective yet founding-field-marking-out projection of the constitution of 
Being'2 Because science objectifies beings on the basis of an unobjective projection of 
their Being, Being itself remains concealed from it. 
Just through the fact that science gives itself up to making beings in themselves 
manifest, it must execute the ontological projection, i. e. comport itself in 
essence to that which is no longer accessible to it by its own means, thus to that 
which is at bottom concealed. Thus science must necessarily venture into an 
area of concealment which constantly surrounds it. [... ] What gives science 
light, in the sense of the manifestness of beings, transplants it at the same time 
into darkness, in the sense of the concealment of Being. The relative clarity of 
scientific knowledge of beings is pressed around by the darkness of the 
understanding of Being. 3 
The basic concepts which delimit a field of scientific investigation. precisely because 
they are basic to all scientific research, cannot themselves be investigated any further. 
`With regard to the science in question they provide an adequate characterisation of its 
field, but it remains obscure what these concepts mean at bottom; they figure just as the 
most general concepts concerning beings (Nature, for example). What is meant by these 
concepts is itself not asked about any further. '4 Though the sciences do in fact engage in 
periodic bouts of self-reflection, when basic concepts are indeed subject to fundamental 
revision, this self-reflection is still conducted within the conceptual boundaries laid out 
1 `vollzieht sich ein vorgängiger Entwurf der Seinsverfassung, aber so, daß die Seinsverfassung nicht 
Gegenstand wird, also ein ungegenständlicher Entwurf der Seinsverfassung. ' G27, p. 195. 
2 'So ergibt sich im Ganzen: Der vorgängig-ungegenständliche, aber 
doch feldabsteckend-begründende 
Entwurf der Seinsverfassung' G27, p. 196- 
3 `Gerade dadurch, daß die Wissenschaft sich aufgibt, das Seiende an ihm selbst offenbar zu machen, muß 
sie den ontologischen Entwurf vollziehen, d. h. im Wesen zu solchem sich verhalten, was 
ihr selbst mit 
ihren Mitteln nicht mehr zugänglich, im Grunde also verborgen ist. 
So muß die Wissenschaft notwendig 
sich hinein wagen in einen Umkreis des Verborgenen, der sie ständig umgibt. 
[... ) Was der Wissenschaft 
die Helle gibt, im Sinne der Offenbarkeit von Seiendem, versetzt sie zugleich 
ins Dunkel - im Sinne der 
Verborgenheit des Seins. Die relative Helle wisenschaftlicher Erkenntnis des Seienden ist umdrängt vorn 
Dunkel des Seinsverständnisses. ' G27, pp. 212-13. 
4 `im Hinblick auf das Feld der betreffenden Wissenschaft geben sie 
hinreichende Charakteristik 
derselben. Aber es bleibt dunkel, was diese Begriffe 
im Grunde meinen; sie figurieren eben als die 
allgemeinsten Begriffe bezüglich des Seienden 
(Natur, z. B. ). Dem, was in diesen Begriffen gemeint ist, 
wird selbst nicht weiter nachgefragt. ' G27, pp. 
193-94. 
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by the delimitation of the field itself. `If the physicist goes beyond his definition, which 
is necessary for his posing of physical questions, then the more penetrating 
determination of that which he defines is also determined from out of the viewpoint 
which is given here through mathematical physics. '5 In self-reflection, science comes up 
against its most basic concepts only to be reflected back, as it were, into the field which 
is thus delimited. The implication of all this seems pretty clear. Science falls into crisis 
when it pushes up against its own necessary internal limit, which proves to be the very 
delimitation of the field that is basic to all its investigations. At this point it has to hand 
the baton on to philosophy which will push beyond the limit, and make Being as such 
the object of thematization. 
Laying the foundations [Grundlegung] for the sciences in this way is different 
in principle from the kind of "logic" which limps along after, investigating the 
status of some science as it chances to find it, in order to discover its "method". 
Laying the foundation as we have described it, is rather a productive logic - in 
the sense that it leaps ahead, as it were, into some area of Being, discloses it for 
the first time in the constitution of its Being, and, after thus arriving at the 
structures within it, makes these available to the positive sciences as 
transparent assignments for their inquiry. 6 
The existential conception of science appears, therefore, to be still wedded to a very 
traditional conception of the purpose of a philosophy of science: 
The question of Being aims therefore at ascertaining the a priori conditions not 
only for the possibility of the sciences which examine entities as entities of 
such and such a type, and, in so doing, already operate with an understanding of 
Being, but also for the possibility of those ontologies themselves which are 
prior to the ontical sciences and which provide their foundations. 
7 
Understandably many have taken this to mean that Heidegger is still intent on 
demonstrating that science remains permanently subordinated to philosophy. From 
S `Wenn der Physiker über seine Definition, die für seine physikalische 
Fragestellung notwendig ist, 
hinausgeht, dann ist auch die weiterdringende Bestimmung 
dessen, was er definiert, von dem Blickpunkt 
aus bestimmt, der hier durch die mathematische 
Physik gegeben ist. ' G27, p. 194. 
6 Being and Time, pp. 30-31. 
7 Bein and Time, p. 31. 
- 194- 
opposite sides of the divide we have agreement at least on this. David Farrell Krell, a 
reverent Heidegger reader, declares, for example, that it is `a gesture he [Heidegger] will 
make repeatedly throughout his career, insisting always on the priority of philosophy 
over the sciences. '8 Hermann Philipse, an arch-critic, provides almost exactly the same 
formulation: `We are justified in concluding that Heidegger maintained the Aristotelian 
thesis of the primacy of philosophy and of the question of being in relation to the 
sciences during his entire philosophical career. '9 According to Philipse this adherence to 
the thesis of philosophical primacy is inherited directly and unreflectively from Husserl. 
Commenting upon the passage from Being and Time just cited, Philipse says, `This 
passage could have been endorsed by Husserl as it stands, and indeed Heidegger derived 
his idea of a three-story edifice of knowledge from Husserl's mature philosophy. 
According to both Husserl and Heidegger in Sein und Zeit, the special sciences are 
founded on regional ontologies, which, in turn are founded on transcendental first 
philosophy. ' 10 Now this directly conflicts, Philipse insists, with Heidegger's realisation 
that the history of a science is regularly punctuated by fundamental revisions to its basic 
concepts. 'Husserl's notion of science is fundamentally static. As soon as the 
philosophical foundation of a special science has been made explicit by means of a 
regional ontology, it has been laid out once and for all, because it is a priori, and 
scientific progress can only consist in accumulating empirical results obtained within the 
conceptual framework of the relevant regional ontology. '" `Unfortunately, Heidegger 
does not explain how he intends to resolve the tension or even contradiction between the 
8 David Farrell Krell, Daimon Life - Heidegger and Life Philosophy, (Bloomington and Indianapolis, 
Indiana University Press, 1992), p. 38. 
9 Hermann Philipse, Heidegger's Philosophy of Beinges A Critical Interpretation, (Princeton, Princeton 
University Press, 1998), p. 87. 
'o Hermann Philipse, p. cit, p. 39. 
11 Hermann Philipse, p. cit, p. 38. 
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Husserlian and the Kuhnian aspects of his philosophy of science. ' 12 Heidegger not only 
fails to incorporate the idea of crisis into his description of science even though he 
insists upon it, he fails even to notice that it is incompatible with that description. This 
demonstrates conclusively, as far as Philipse is concerned, that Heidegger was 
permanently blind to a gaping hole in his own thinking, namely an adequately worked 
out philosophy of science. He remained for the whole of his career blithely satisfied 
with a `rudimentary philosophy of science' uncritically inherited from the tradition. It is 
Philipse's pious hope that the revolution in philosophy of science necessitated by the 
revolution in the sciences themselves, does not so much undermine Heidegger's project 
as render it unnecessary. 13 
Still - even if we are rather more cautious than Philipse about ascribing other people's 
doctrines to Heidegger - he does seem to have identified a genuine dilemma in 
interpreting Heidegger's conception of science. Developments in philosophy of science. 
in the first half of the 20th century, whether in Anglo-German logical empiricism or in 
the French tradition of conventional rationalism initiated by Bachelard and Canguilhem, 
can be seen as a response to the empirical disconfirmation, graphically provided by the 
history of science, of the claim that there are anything like synthetic a priori truths at all. 
Each time the philosophers have demonstrated that a particular concept or principle is 
necessarily a priori, the scientists have simply, without a by your leave, abandoned it. 
The only function transcendental philosophy has ever served, has been to pinpoint 
12 Ibid. 
13 `Because Heidegger never reflected on the connection between the primacy thesis and Aristotle's 
philosophy of science, he did not bother to rethink his own rudimentary philosophy of science, although 
he was acutely aware of the scientific revolutions of the first half of this century, revolutions that in fact 
necessitated a revolution in the philosophy of science as well. This revolution in the philosophy of 
science, which in fact took place in the works of many philosopher's of science in this century, dethroned 
metaphysics and the Aristotelian question of being from the position of first philosophy. As a 
consequence, Heidegger is faced with a dilemma. Either the justification for the primacy of the question of 
being is derived from Aristotle. If so, the primacy thesis is refuted by the later developments in the 
philosophy of science. Or the primacy of Heidegger's question of being, and perhaps this question 
itself, 
was not derived directly from Aristotle, ' Hermann Philipse, op. cit., p. 87. 
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precisely those concepts and principles which the sciences do not need. As Hans Georg 
Gadamer has wryly noted of his own neo-Kantian apprenticeship, `My own teacher, 
Natorp, even tried to demonstrate a priori and conceptually the three dimensionality of 
space, just as Hegel had done with the sevenfold count of the planets. All that is over 
and done. ' 14 And yet here we have, just as neo-Kantianisrn collapses in the face of 
science's obstinate refusal to conform to its strictures, Heidegger apparently quite 
cheerfully resurrecting the whole idea of an a priori ground for the positive sciences, 
even though he appears to be as acutely aware as anyone that the sciences have no 
permanent foundations. ' 5 
14 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Reason in the Age of Science, trans. by Frederick G. Lawrence, (Cambridge MA 
and London, The MIT Press, 1982), p. 11. Gadamer's example is nicely judged. Neo-Kantianism was 
already well aware by the beginning of the 20th century of the pitfalls surrounding any attempt to identify 
particular a prioris, as opposed to making the general claim that there must at least be some, and had 
become cautious about which concepts, or indeed facts, must remain immune to scientific revision. They 
were not likely to risk the ridicule that seems to have inevitably followed upon Hegel's speculative 
rearticulations of natural science. (It is a curious fact, one perhaps that can be expanded into some sort of 
historical law, that every element of natural science that Hegel attempted to speculatively reinterpret, had 
very shortly beforehand been jettisoned by science itself: c. f. Hegel's insistence upon the necessity of 
conceiving gases as a continuous fluid in the Logic (1812), two years after the first publication of Dalton's 
atomic theory (1810) [G. W. F Hegel, Science of Logic, trans. by A. V. Miller, (Atlantic Highlands, NJ; 
Humanities Press International Inc.; 1969), pp. 496-98. ]) Still what could be more self-evident than the 3- 
dimensionality of space, what less open to any kind of scientific or empirical attack? It might not be 
obvious why space was 3-dimensional, but at least it was obvious that it was. But, as we know now, very 
shortly after Gadamer's prudent remark, developments in the unification of quantum field theories did 
precisely call into question the 3-dimensionality of space, and by means very similar to the -way in which 
relativity theory called into question the Euclidean geometry of space. These means, as we saw in the last 
chapter, steal a leaf from idealism's book. By positing that the geometry of space-time is a consequence of 
the gravitational field, a posit that is itself justified on the basis of a general principle concerning the 
universality of natural law, as is the case in relativity theory, or by deducing the dimensionality of space 
from the topological constraints imposed by the theory itself, as in string theory, theorising achieves a 
radical independence from the supposed givenness of the phenomena themselves. The problem with the 
Kantians, and indeed Hegel, turns out to be that they were too empirical. They relied upon experience to 
provide them with their a priori truths (or with Hegel, admitted that the empirical sciences provided the 
necessary material for speculative thinking), and then cast about for arguments justifying them that were 
bound to look suspiciously ad hoc and ex post facto. Science proceeds more boldly. It realises that there is 
no reason why the a priori, if it truly is a priori, should conform to experience. If experience contradicts 
the results, then so much the worse for experience, it will just have to catch up. In this sense, modern 
physics has proved to be more Hegelian than Hegel. 
15 To be sure, Heidegger wishes to distinguish his own conception of the regional ontological 
founding of 
the sciences rigorously from the Kantian conception of a transcendental deduction, 
but equally there is no 
denying that he considers the notion of the a priori to be Kant's crucial insight, an insight which 
he 
wholeheartedly endorses. `Certainly this Kantian presentation of the connection - which we 
have already 
discussed - between the preontological understanding of 
being and the objectification and the 
thematization of beings is not only given in another linguistic formulation; but underlying the 
Kantian 
presentation there lies a certain conception of the problem which we shall subject to a positive critique. 
However, leaving this aside, Kant saw again quite clearly the Platonic problem, namely that underlying all 
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The contradiction in Heidegger's position appears to arise from two conflicting 
tendencies within fundamental ontology itself. On the one hand, fundamental ontology 
is to be pursued via the existential analytic. 16 This means that science, insofar as it is 
one of the ways in which Dasein exists and comports itself towards other beings, is to be 
taken as indicative of the constitution of Dasein's Being. At this stage of the project, 
then, science can be said to call the shots. A phenomenological interpretation sensitive 
to science's historicality discovers that science has no fixed foundation. On the other 
hand, fundamental ontology is meant to broach the question of the meaning of Being in 
general, and is thereby supposed to provide in particular a phenomenological 
interpretation of the various different kinds of Being. At this stage of the project, science 
will be subordinated to philosophy, insofar as the question of the modality of Being is 
not even accessible to the individual sciences. The reason why this contradiction 
manifests itself specifically in the analysis of the sciences is that science is conceived of 
by Heidegger as a middle term. Approached from everyday absorption with the ready- 
to-hand, science appears to display an explicit understanding of the Being of the beings 
it investigates. Approached from the side of fundamental ontology it appears that this 
understanding is still preontological and that science remains an aspect of the everyday. 
Science and philosophy are allied from the point of view of the everyday. Science and 
the everyday are lumped together from the point of view of philosophy. Of course one 
can wash one's hands of the contradiction by pointing out that Heidegger never in fact 
managed to make the leap from existential analysis to the question of Being in general. 
In which case, one might argue, given that we only have the existential analytic, all 
beings are the principles of their being. This insight of Kant led him to the 
discovery of the central 
problem which has to be posed in the task of laying the foundation of a science of 
beings in general. [ ... 
I 
In the sciences of beings something is fixed about the objects before they are given to us. 
This fixing 
which is a priori and free from experience - occurs prior to all experience - makes possible that 
these 
objects be given to us as what they are. ' (PIK, p. 32. ) 
-198- 
question of an ontological foundation for the sciences goes by the wayside, and we can 
safely ignore all claims to such founding as merely so much rhetoric. But this would be 
to ignore the special role that science is supposed to have in the turn from the question 
of the Being of Dasein to the question of Being in general. Science serves as an 
existentiell attestation of the fact that the understanding of Being is precisely that, and 
not merely something like a self-understanding or self-interpretation, the free projection 
of any meaning whatsoever. `Mathematical natural science gives an indication of this 
fundamental connection between ontic experience and ontological knowledge. 
However, its function... exhausts itself therein, for the reference to this conditional 
connection is not yet the solution to the problem. ' 17 This does not just mean, however, 
that the possibility of science is crucial to the turn from the analysis of the Being of 
Dasein to the question of Being in general. It also means that the distinction between 
science and everyday dealings with the ready-to-hand would evaporate with the 
dissolution of the question of Being in general. To leave matters as they stand at the end 
of the existential analytic is to risk falling back into pragmatism. Science is only saved 
from the pragmatist reabsorption back into circumspective concern, if it can be 
grounded, that is to say, given its own ground by the question of Being in general. 
Science becomes merely one activity among others if its affiliation to ontology is lost. 
And what would be wrong with that? Only that every human activity would then be 
essentially indistinguishable, and the existential analytic itself would collapse into the 
tautology of calling activity activity. `At this point it becomes clear that science is not 
just something with which one can also occupy oneself along with all the other 
16 `Therefore fundamental ontology, from which alone all other ontologies can take their rise, must 
be 
sought in the existential analytic of Dasein. ' Being and Time, p. 
34. 
17 Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, p. 7. 
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possibilities, but rather that in order to be what it is, it must have struck its roots into the 
primordial essence of Dasein itself, into transcendence. "8 
The Founding and Self-founding of the Sciences 
In the introductory passages to the 1927/28 lecture course on Kant's Critique of Pure 
Reason Heidegger attempts to reconcile these two aspects of his philosophy of science. 
He does so by distinguishing between self-founding and founding. Self-founding 
corresponds to the scientific projection which first opens up a field of entities to 
scientific investigation. Heidegger, therefore, begins by providing a succinct but entirely 
standard summary of the existential account of science to be found in Being and Time. 
`The genesis of a science originates in the objectification of a realm of beings, that is, in 
the development of an understanding of the constitution of the being of the respectivc 
beings. ' 19 Scientific projection, that is to say, the explicit understanding of the spc cites 
ontological constitution of the beings in question, which opens up the field to 
investigation, is accomplished by the sciences themselves. Consequently, it is what 
Heidegger here calls the self-founding [Selbstbegründung] of science. `Through 
objectification, i. e. through opening up the ontological constitution, science first obtains 
a basis and a ground and circumscribes its field of investigation at the same time. 
Science founds itself in the manner by which it obtains its basis and field. 
20 But 
Heidegger immediately goes on to ask: 
is this self-founding of the science which occurs in its beginning already a 
founding of science? Yes and no. Yes, insofar as science obtains its basis and 
realm by opening up the ontological constitution in general. No, insofar as 
18 `Nunmehr wird deutlich, daß die Wissenschaft nicht etwas ist, was es eben unter vielem anderen, womit 
man sich beschäftigen kann, auch gibt, sondern daß sie, um zu sein, was sie 
ist, ihre Wurzeln im 
ursprünglichen Wesen des Daseins selbst, in der Transzendenz, geschlagen 
haben muß. ' G27, p. 211. 
19 PIK, p. 20. 
20 PIK, p. 23. 
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precisely such an opening up within the particular science pushes against a 
necessary limit, i. e., insofar as this self-founding of science requires a more 
original founding. The founding of the projection of the ontological 
constitution of the field of a science -a projection that science itself makes - cannot be accomplished by the sciences themselves; and it is in accord with the 
way in which this founding comes forth that science itself cannot do it. 21 
The equivocation here is not merely rhetorical. Heidegger is not first entertaining the 
possibility that science might really be self-founding and then rejecting it in favour of a 
philosophical founding, so that by the end of the argument we are convinced that 
science really is after all dependent upon a philosophical justification of its foundations. 
That the yes and no is not just a rhetorical device or an argumentative strategy but the 
answer is indicated by the following remark Heidegger makes elsewhere: `The human 
being is not primarily the nay-sayer (as Scheler said in one of his last writings), but just 
as little is the human being a yea-sayer. The human is rather the why-questioner. But 
only because man is in this way, can he and must he, in each case, say not only yes or 
no, but essentially yes and no. '22 Heidegger is suggesting, then, that we must take 
seriously the possibility that science is both genuinely self-founding and genuinely in 
need of some kind of founding that it itself cannot provide. This already begins to 
indicate that self-founding and founding are not to be thought of as simply different 
versions of the same thing, one merely less adequate and more provisional than the 
other. 
At this point, however, Heidegger launches into what amounts to no more than a 
standard reprise of his by now familiar claim that the sciences are dependent upon 
philosophy for the clarification of their basic concepts. As usual the crisis 
in the sciences 
2, p. 23. 
22 Martin Heidegger, The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, trans. by Michael Heim, (Bloomington and 
Indianapolis, Indiana University Press, 1984, pbk 1992). p. 216 - hereafter referred to as 
MFL. This is the 
text of the lecture course given at Marburg in the summer of 
1928, first published in German as volume 26 
of the Gesamtausgabe, Metaphysische Anfangsgründe 
der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz, ed. by Klaus 
Held, (Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio Klostermann. 1978). 
-201- 
is supposed to demonstrate this dependence. `All of this makes clear that the self- 
founding that the sciences do - which is necessary and justified within science - this self- 
founding falls into ambiguity and uncertainty. Suddenly there is no secure method for 
inquiring into what is meant by the basic concepts as such; suddenly there is no ground 
for demonstrating these basic concepts themselves. '23 Scientific investigation into the 
field itself cannot inquire into what is actually meant by the concepts which open up the 
field, because it presupposes it. `It becomes clear that what lies on the limit of science's 
deliberations is the thematic reflection of the being as such which is meant in the 
projection and opening up of the ontological constitution. ' 24 What is required is 
precisely thematic reflection upon the Being of beings. But thematization, as we already 
know, `is built upon objectification as such. '25 Thus the founding of scientific projection 
rests upon the objectification of the Being of the beings in question. Heidegger says as 
much: `If this is to happen, then what we need is not to objectify a being, e. g., the 
existing nature as a whole, but the ontological constitution of nature or the being of that 
which exists as historical. '26 But this thematic inquiry into the constitution of Being, 
which transforms the preontological understanding of Being into an explicit ontological 
understanding, is precisely ontology. And since for scientific projection it is always a 
question of the kind of Being of a realm of beings, this inquiry is more precisely 
regional ontology: 
Since every science always has its field and its region of beings as object, the 
corresponding ontological reflection will always refer to the regional 
constitution of being. Latent in every science of a realm of 
beings there always 
lies a regional ontology which belongs to this science, 
but which never can in 
principle be developed by this science. 
27 
23 PIK, p. 24. 
24 PIK, p. 25. 
25 PIK, p. 20. 
26 PIK, p. 25. 
27 PIK, p. 25. 
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Regional ontology, then, provides an explicit thematization of the kind of Being of a 
realm of beings. As such it founds the self-founding of the sciences in scientific 
projection, by explicitly displaying that projection's genuine roots in the understanding 
of the Being of the realm of beings it objectifies. This means, it seems, that regional 
ontology will lay out securely for the first time the foundations of a science - those 
foundations from which the original scientific projection springs, and in which it finds 
its grounds. `This necessary founding of science's self-founding is actualli' the laying of 
the foundation of science. '28 However regional ontology, insofar as it relies upon some 
understanding of Being as such in its investigation into the kind of Being of a certain 
realm of beings, has its own lacuna, that is structurally analogous to the lacuna at the 
heart of science: namely, the understanding of Being as such with which regional 
ontology implicitly operates cannot ever be justified by an investigation that depends 
upon it. Consequently regional ontology is itself in need of a more original founding, 
which will be carried out by fundamental Ontology. In sum, then: 
The founding of self-founding of the sciences of beings takes place in regional 
ontologies. Thus ontology is what first accomplishes the laying of the 
foundation of an ontic science. Laying the foundation of a science of beings 
means founding and developing the ontology which underlies this science. In 
turn, these ontologies are grounded in fundamental ontology, which constitutes 
the centre of philosophy. 29 
What are we to make of the distinction between founding and self-founding, then? Has 
it really made any difference to our understanding of the relation between science and 
first philosophy, or is it simply a case of having your cake and eating it? It is difficult to 
see how the notion of self-founding is anything more than a stop-gap, a provisional and 
ultimately inadequate version of the founding that only regional ontology can genuinely 
28 PIK, p. 24. 
29 PIK, p. 27. 
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provide. But in that case are we to assume that laying the foundations30 of a science will 
eliminate once and for all the possibility of further scientific crises? Does science only 
suffer from crisis to the extent that it presumes to be autonomous? In which case, crisis 
would be the price science pays for its arrogance. Or, on the contrary, does the foundingy 
of scientific projection by regional ontology, bind scientific projection to crisis as the 
ground of its foundation? In which case the elimination of crisis would not be the sign 
of a science's successful founding by a regional ontology, but quite the opposite - the 
sign that it lacked, or had suppressed, any such ontological founding? Is this what 
Heidegger is getting at, when he says, `In some sense, one can exist in the sciences 
without philosophy. Things work without philosophy, and one can sneak away from 
philosophy. [... ] One can sneak away from philosophy, and then everything is left as it 
is. '31 But then we are at a loss to understand what Heidegger means by regional 
ontology at all. The founding which it provides is not simply a better version of the self- 
founding the sciences themselves accomplish in scientific projection; it is rather a 
founding of that self-founding. Moreover the ontological constitution of the realm of 
beings which regional ontology is supposed to subject to explicit thematization, does not 
correspond to the conceptual delimitation of the field accomplished in scientific 
projection, so that the delimitation could be shown to be correct simply by comparing it 
with the ontological constitution of the beings in question. In which case, since it is no 
30 The translation of Grundlegung by `laying the foundation, ' which is the translation used both in Being 
and Time and the translation of the Kant lecture course (PIK), is made extremely problematic by 
comments made about the term in the introduction to the Kant book. `The general meaning of the term 
"laying the ground" [Grundlegung] must first be clarified. The expression's meaning is best illustrated if 
we consider the building trade. [... ] As a consequence laying the ground for metaphysics can mean to lay 
a foundation [Fundament] under this natural metaphysics, or rather to replace one which has already been 
laid with a new one through a process of substituting. However, it is precisely this representation that we 
must keep out of the idea of ground-laying, namely, that it is a matter of the by-product from the 
foundation [Grundlagen] of an already constructed building. Ground-laying is rather the projecting of the 
building plan itself so that it agrees with the direction concerning on what and how the building will be 
grounded. ' [Martin Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, trans. by Richard Taft, 
(Bloomington and Indianapolis, Indiana University Press, 1990, revised 1997), pp. 1-2) 
31 PIK, p. 27. 
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longer a question of justifying science's presuppositions, there must be some other 
reason why science is prohibited in principle from developing its own regional ontology. 
A whole new series of disturbing questions have, thus, posed themselves: 
1. What kind of founding does regional ontology provide for the self-founding 
of the individual sciences? 
2. What is meant by the ontological constitution of a realm of beings, and how is 
it to be thematized? 
3. Why is science prohibited in principle from developing its own regional 
ontology? 
These questions cannot be answered at the level of abstraction of Heidegger's remarks 
about regional ontology in general. What we need is an example of regional ontology in 
practice, an example of Heidegger actually doing regional ontology, from which we 
might be able to work out what he actually means by founding the self-founding of a 
science, or the thematization of the ontological constitution of a realm of beings. 
Fortunately Heidegger provides just such an example with the discussion of animality to 
be found in the lecture course given at Freiburg in the winter of 1929/30, published as 
The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics. But to demonstrate this, will require some 
discussion. 
The Ambiguous Relation between Science and Metaphysics 
To begin with, at least, explicit confirmation of the fact that Heidegger does not 
subscribe to the simple "three-story edifice" model of the relation between 
first 
philosophy, regional ontology and science comes in a section of the lecture course, in 
which he deals with the relationship between metaphysics and the positive sciences 
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(§45). Here Heidegger quite explicitly rejects the idea that regional ontology provides 
the `conceptual framework, ' while science is left merely to fill in the facts: 
We cannot separate metaphysics and positive research, playing them off against 
one another in this manner. They are not two consecutive phases of a 
production process. The relation between them cannot be established in a 
rationalized, technical sort of way, as if science and metaphysics simply. 
represented two branches of a single industrial concern, the former supplying 
the facts and the latter providing the fundamental concepts. 32 
Indeed, true to form, Heidegger insists that it is the sciences themselves which need to 
produce new fundamental concepts in periods of crisis. Talking of the crisis besetting 
contemporary biology in its struggle to differentiate itself from physics and chemistry, 
Heidegger says, `The task confronting biology as a science is to develop an entirely new 
projection of the objects of its inquiry. ''- It's worth underlining that Heidegger is quite 
precise here: the task of developing a new scientific projection is one that confronts 
biology as a science - and this agrees «vith Heidegger's insistence in the lectures on 
Kant that scientific projection is `a projection that science itself makes. 34 Moreover, the 
transformation by a science of its own basis can and usually does occur without any 
explicit philosophical support. Later on in the lecture course, after having summarised 
what he takes to be the major tendencies of a scientific revolution unfolding within 
biology, Heidegger comments, `The fact that such overcoming has happened through 
concrete investigation and experiment is all the more valuable, valuable at any rate in 
relation to the possibility of a transformation within positive science itself, which would 
prefer, largely with good reason, to keep itself free from the apron strings of 
philosophy. '35 The possibility of fundamental transformation, that 
is to say, using the 
terminology developed in the last chapter, the possibility of a repetition of scientific 
32 FCM, p. 189. 
33 FCM, p. 188. 
sÄ PIK, p. 23. 
35 FCM, p. 260. 
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projection in scientific crisis, is a matter of fate, that is to say, of science's historicalitv*. 
It has nothing to do with whether philosophy has managed to provide `a satisfactory 
metaphysical theory' of the relevant subject area. Rather everything 'depends on 
whether or not in a given era leading researchers emerge alongside the countless 
workers and technical experts who are also required. '36 And what is crucial about these 
researchers, what it is that allows them to assume leadership and drag the whole body of 
their discipline into new ways of seeing and asking about their field quite alien to the 
traditional ways of going about things, is not that they happen to make new or even 
startling discoveries, but that they display what Heidegger calls `an original solidarity 
with the most elementary content of their respective fields. ' 37 In a perfectly 
characteristic move, Heidegger appears to have shifted focus from the theoretical 
structure of a science to the behaviour of its practitioners. Thomas Kuhn has noted that 
new paradigms often get adopted by a scientific community on the very flimsiest of 
evidence. 38 It is not just that the new paradigm has little or no experimental 
confirmation. Often the new paradigm has less explanatory power than the old one - it is 
often narrower, less predicative, and more unwieldy than older and better established 
theories and techniques. It can even conflict with well-established evidence in a greater 
number of cases than the old paradigm. A new paradigm is not even necessarily more 
successful than the old one in explaining the anomalies that sparked off a scientific 
crisis in the first place. Yet nonetheless, new paradigms do get adopted, and often with 
startling rapidity. Indeed if it were not for the fact that new paradigms do get adopted 
prior to proving their worth, at least by a section of the scientific community, they could 
never be developed sufficiently to prove their worth. The adoption of a new paradigm 
36 FCM, p. 189. 
3' FCM, p. 189. 
38 See Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, (London, The University of Chicago 
Press, 1962,2nd. enlarged ed. 1970), Chapter XII, especially pp. 150-159. 
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appears to be little more than a leap of faith, and a collective leap of faith at that. Kuhn 
himself still thinks, however, that scientists have faith in the paradigm itself, partly on 
the basis of vague and scarcely articulable aesthetic intuitions, but above all because 
they have some inkling of its future worth. `A decision between alternate ways of 
practising science is called for, and in the circumstances that decision must be based less 
on past achievement than on future promise. The man who embraces a new paradigm at 
an early stage must often do so in defiance of the evidence provided by problem-solving. 
He must, that is, have faith that the new paradigm will succeed with the many large 
problems that confront it, knowing only that the older paradigm has failed with a few. '39 
New theories get adopted because they appear - for whatever reasons - more attractive 
than the old ones. Now Heidegger would seem to be saying, on the contrary, that it is 
not the attractiveness of theories that counts, but rather the attractiveness of the theorist. 
Scientists do not place their faith in new theories, but in leading researchers. Leading 
researchers, it would seem, are those who have the charisma to gather an entire 
scientific community together and persuade, perhaps even inspire, them to take a 
collective leap into the dark. But isn't this just an even greater regression into mass 
psychology than that which Imre Lakatos complained of in Kuhn? We should ask 
ourselves, though, what is it about these leading researchers that persuades the rest of 
the scientific community to go along with them? `An original solidarity with the most 
elementary content of their field. ' And what precisely does that mean? The word 
`solidarity' seems on the face of it an odd word to use in this context. Solidarity means 
standing shoulder to shoulder in the face of the enemy; it means being united in a 
common cause, and not allowing personal differences or qualms to split the united front 
or sap the strength of numbers; it means freely submitting oneself to a collective goal. 
39 Ibid, p. 158. 
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One can imagine a solidarity of the scientific community as whole in the face of outside 
hostility, from the church, say, or even a solidarity of a vanguard of researchers in the 
face of the conservatism of their colleagues, but a solidarity with the scientific field 
itself? But solidarity is in fact a rather peculiar translation of the German, which runs: 
`Führerschaft eines Forschers besteht nicht im Überraschenden und Ungewöhnlichen 
seiner Entdeckungen, sondern in der Ursprünglichkeit seines Verwachsenseins mit dem 
elementarsten Sachgehalt seines Gebietes. 40 The verb verwachsen means literally to 
grow together, ' `to grow into one, ' and is the word used, for instance, to describe the 
healing of broken bones when they fuse back together. Used figuratively, it means `to 
feel at home' in a place or with a group of people, `to become bound up with 
something. ' This figurative meaning is carried over into the adjectival phrase 
`verwachsen mit etwas sein' from which Heidegger clearly derives his noun 
'Verwachsenseins. ' The phrase means `to be deeply rooted in something, ' one's country 
or tradition, as the dictionary helpfully suggests - altogether a very Heideggerian word, 
then - or `to be completely bound up with' one's work or loved one. The solidarity that 
Heidegger is talking about then is both a total commitment to the field, a passionate 
devotion to one's discipline, no doubt to the exclusion of all else, and a complete 
identification with it. The leading researcher is at home in his field. She is in her 
element - which means not just that the researcher inhabits her 
field, but that the field 
inhabits her. The researcher does not look upon the field as upon a landscape from 
above, but rather is immersed in it and imbued with it. The researcher does not just 
move about within the field as within a perfectly familiar environment, but, as with the 
individual in Hegel's ethical order, is constituted as a harmonious element of the field 
which finds its satisfaction in the whole. Dasein allows itself to be wholly configured by 
40 G29/30, p. 279. 
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the field within which it moves. It is interesting to note that the adjective verwachsen as 
a technical term in botany means `adnate' or `connate, ' literally to be joined together 
from birth. The field and the researcher are fused into one. I, at least, am irresistibly 
reminded at this point of all the romantic stones about Einstein and his thought 
experiments, at the age of 16 imagining himself riding the crest of a wave of light, 
becoming in thought at least the wave front itself. In their work, leading researchers 
display - and let it be said, display perhaps only to those who also work within the field, 
in the same way that perhaps a great musician can only really be recognised by another 
musician, somebody who has some common experience of what they are trying to do -a 
commitment to the field, an empathy for it, a peculiar fidelity, a rapport, an affinity, that 
persuades their colleagues in the absence of any `objective' criteria to trust them. An 
Einstein or a Darwin can change the course of a science's history not because the radical 
new theories which they come up with are demonstrably better, or even demonstrably 
more likely to prove better than the. old ones, but because in the very working out of 
those theories they display a peculiar and exceptional attachment to the field, an ability 
to move within it, almost perhaps to inhabit it, that other researchers within the field are 
quick to recognise. Scientists know their field, know it in their bones, as it were, and 
here is somebody who they know (precisely because they know their field, know what it 
feels like to do work in it) knows it more deeply, more passionately than they. 
But can we make any clearer sense of this rather vague talk of affinity and solidarity? 
Much later in the lecture course Heidegger sums up what has been learnt from the 
prolonged examination of actual scientific research he has just completed. Here he 
introduces the notion of `fundamental relationships' [Grundverhältnisse) to beings - 
`those fundamental relationships that correspond to the peculiar character proper to the 
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beings in question'41. These fundamental relationships are to be contrasted with our 
everyday comportments [Verhalten] towards beings, in which we move amongst beings 
in an entirely undifferentiated way. Nonetheless these fundamental relationships which 
correspond to the distinct manifestness of different kinds of beings can be awakened. 
Here it is clearly a question of awakening a relationship to beings that is in accordance 
with the manner of their Being, and we are at once reminded of the Umschlag in our 
understanding of Being which Heidegger set so much store by in his account of the 
genesis of scientific activity in Being and Time. One could say then that original 
solidarity with the most elementary content of the scientific field could only be 
displayed if the fundamental relation with the beings in question had indeed been 
awakened, if the Umschlag had indeed occurred, and only then could a radical 
transformation of the conceptual framework underpinning the field of investigation be 
undertaken. Original solidarity with the field means that the entities under investigation 
are encountered not within the context of our everyday comportments but rather on the 
basis of a fundamental relation which corresponds with their particular kind of Being. 
But it is not even as if this original solidarity can be provided by philosophy. `It is not 
the proper purpose of the latter [i. e. philosophy] to be instantly applied like a medicine, 
but rather, irrespective of any possible immediate application, to perform the 
incalculable task of preparing Dasein for that readiness on the basis of which such 
natural originality thrives. A2 Philosophy can only prepare the ground, as it were, 
cultivate the situation in which such original solidarity can flourish. This cannot be left 
to the scientists themselves because the readiness for originality has nothing to do with 
the field of scientific investigation itself, but rather is a function of the situation 
in 
which scientists find themselves. This situation clearly transcends the neat 
demarcations 
1 FCM, p. 276. 
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of the individual disciplines; it is a matter of the historical situation of Dasein as whole. 
It is in this plane, the plane in which Dasein finds itself, rather than any transcendental 
plane, that the link between fundamental ontology and the positive sciences is to be 
forged by regional ontology. Moreover science itself is ambiguous. On the one hand, 
science thrives on crisis. It is most truly what it is only in crisis. Yet science is always 
trying to avoid crises. It seems positively embarrassed by them, as though they brought 
it into disrepute. As soon as it gets into one it tries to get out of it again as quickly as 
possible. `[C}risis cannot break through in the serious and above all enduring manner 
that is required, because we are not sufficiently willing to let ourselves be shaken. '43 
Perhaps, it is the job of metaphysical questioning to make us willing. 
On the face of it, this does not seem to be a particularly promising suggestion. 
Metaphysical inquiry, Heidegger tells us, concerns itself with entities as such. It seeks to 
say something about their essence. One would have thought that a determination of 
essence would put a stop to any vacillation, and fix our conception of the entities in 
question, securing once and for all a science's methodology and conceptual foundations. 
But determinations of this kind have a peculiar and unsettling characteristic. `We seem, ' 
Heidegger says, `to take them from the relevant sciences [.. .] and, at the same time, we 
try to use them to first secure a specific domain for the science in question and thus to 
secure its possibility as a science. Thus it is that we find ourselves moving in a circle. '" 
The double bind arises thus. If the statement is to be truly one of essence, then it must be 
a priori. Zoology deals with animals, and in so dealing 
it demonstrates an initial 
discernment that precedes any investigation: this dog is an animal, this stone is not. 
45 
42 FCM, p. 189. 
" FCM, p. 191. 
44 FCM, p. 187. 
 This is not to deny of course that what passes 
for an animal may change in the course of investigation - 
though the examples usually given, viruses, 
bacteria, etc.. quite apart from being neither animals nor 
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This is the side of the double bind that people normally latch onto, and which gives 
Heidegger the reputation for having claimed like all good neo-Kantians that philosophy 
comes first. But the other side is this: No doubt, there is indeed something that allows 
the zoologist, indeed allows all of us, to discriminate the dog from the stone. Perhaps it 
could even be stated, more or less roughly. But just because there potentially is a 
statement of essence, doesn't mean that it is this one, the one the philosopher plucks 
confidently out of thin air. 
... what possible criterion do we then possess for the truth of our thesis? Where 
do we draw that thesis from in the first place? Is it an arbitrary one, or is it a hypothesis, the truth of which can be confirmed only by a specific 
investigation? 
It is neither of these. The proposition does not derive from zoology, but it 
cannot be elucidated independently of zoology either. " 
The relation between philosophy and the sciences is not, therefore, one of priority, but 
one of ambiguity. `We can see that the relation between metaphysics and the positive 
sciences is and must be an ambiguous one if our thesis is a metaphysical rather than a 
zoological one. '47 This is not an ambiguity, Heidegger tells us, that can be cleared up, 
rather it is a burden that must be shouldered by metaphysical inquiry itself. Metaphysics 
takes responsibility for the ambiguity that appears to be inherent in the very idea of 
determining the essence of a realm of beings. `Thus we find ourselves constantly 
moving in a circle. And this is an indication that we are moving within the realm of 
plants according to modern taxonomy, are not entities whose classification has changed, but ones that 
have been discovered, and whose classification has therefore had to be decided upon discovery. Rather, it 
is only to say that there are certain kinds of reascription so radical as to be inconceivable. Does anybody 
really believe that one day zoologists will discover after extensive experimentation that the guinea pig is 
not after all an animal but a kind of suitcase? The very fact that the guinea pig is used as a guinea pig 
attests to the scientists' certainty that it is an animal. One experiments on a guinea pig to find out about 
animals in general, not to find out whether the guinea pig is an animal. That's what being a guinea pig 
means. Moreover it is not a matter of choice that one kind of experiment - guinea pig experiments - rather 
than another kind - classificatory experiments - takes place. The guinea pig could not 
be used as a guinea 
pig in experiments if even the possibility subsisted of experiments that might disconfirm its animality. 
That would be enough in itself to discredit its use as a guinea pig - which is wh}- entities whose 
classification is still in doubt are not used as guinea pigs. 
46FCM, p. 187. 
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philosophy. '48 The ambiguity, precisely by being ambiguous, double-edged, two-faced, 
provides the space within which something like shaking, an oscillation between 
foundational certainty and critical doubt, might take place. Metaphysics shoulders the 
burden of ambiguity - it does not strive to dissolve it. But this assumption of the burden 
of ambiguity cannot take place in isolation. It can only occur by placing oneself in an 
ambiguous relation to science - both before and after science, both dependent upon and 
grounding for science. The circle itself is ambiguous, both a circling which insofar as it 
is properly metaphysical underlies science, and proves to be the movement which 
founds scientific research, and the circling between metaphysics and science. This is 
why the relation between science and metaphysics does not get described as simply 
reciprocal. Heidegger is not just saying that metaphysics and science feed off each other; 
rather he is saying that the relation is ambiguous because it is undecidable whether it is 
one of simple dependence or one of pure reciprocity. Metaphysics is underlying, because 
it- shoulders the burden of circularity. The relation is circular because metaphysics is 
underlying, and imposes its circularity upon the relation. 
Perhaps, it is, after all, a question of solidarity - solidarity for those who themselves 
demonstrate solidarity with the most elementary content of their field. Metaphysical 
questioning about the essence of a realm of beings relies upon and supports those 
leading researchers who are capable of throwing their discipline into crisis. Like a 
Sartrean intellectual, Heidegger feels compelled to throw his weight, however meagre, 
behind a cause that he supports. This is surely what Heidegger means when he says that 
`the inner unity of science and metaphysics is a matter of fate. '49 That 
is to say, a matter 
of historicity, a matter of decision within a concrete historical situation. 
Philosophy 
47 FCM, p. 188. 
48 FCM, p. 180. 
'9 FCM, p. 189. 
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cannot provide absolute grounds for conceptual revision within the sciences, but neither 
can it stand aloof and grandly declare that all frameworks are equal, equally valid or 
invalid, objective or subjective, a matter of indifference. This washing one's hands of 
the whole grubby business would be just another way of asserting the limitless 
superiority of philosophy over the sciences. Rather, the proper relation between 
metaphysics and the positive sciences is one of mutual co-operation. The inability of 
science to sustain its crisis in an enduring manner is, however, a sign that both sides are 
unwilling to enter into such a relation. 
There are characteristic signs on both sides that such readiness [for communal 
co-operation] is lacking. On the part of philosophy this is represented by that 
peculiar hyper-sophistication which allows us to imagine ourselves to be in a 
superior position merely on the basis of a second-hand philosophical 
knowledge of concepts and conceptual formulae that we have merely heard 
about or read in books, and which causes us to lecture the special sciences in a 
supercilious manner. Philosophical knowledge is supposed to be superior 
because of its more universal character. Yet this hyper-sophistication, this 
vacuous cleverness, is not a mature understanding that has been wrested from 
the matter itself. Corresponding to this hyper-sophisticated pseudo-philosophy, 
what we find in the field of research is a stubborn appeal to the so-called facts 
and an inability to understand that a fact yields nothing by itself, that every fact 
that we can produce has always already undergone a process of interpretation. 
Between them the hyper-sophistication of philosophy and the intransigence of 
the sciences create the hopeless situation in which both parties obstinately 
persist in talking past one another and foster the spurious freedom in which 
5° each eventually leaves the other to its own devices. 
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These remarks on the relation between metaphysical inquiry and scientific research, 
remarks that, Heidegger is quick to tell us, `will be valid for the relationship between 
philosophy and all the sciences, '51 are made at the beginning of Heidegger's lengthy 
investigation into the essence of animality which makes up the middle third of the 
1929/30 lecture course, but their potential significance for any interpretation of this 
c50 FCM, p. 190. 
51 FCM, p. 188. 
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investigation has tended to be overlooked. Ever since the publication of Derrida's 0 
Spirit, the critical reception of this section of the 1929/30 lecture course has been 
dominated by the furore over the supposed scandal of Heidegger's insistence that 'an 
abyss of essence' separates man from the animal. 52 This insistence, it is alleged, marks a 
peculiar aporia in Heidegger's thinking; an inability to extricate himself from the very 
metaphysical tradition that he seeks to overcome. Thus, David Farrell Krell, in his book 
Daimon Life, opines magisterially, `When Heidegger tries to separate Dasein from the 
animal, or to dig an abyss of essence between them, he causes the whole of his project to 
collapse back into the congealed categories and oblivious decisions of ontotheology. '53 
This concern with the content of Heidegger's investigation has tended to obscure its 
methodology. But this failure to examine the methodology in turn affects the 
interpretation of the content. In particular, the fact that the investigation relies so heavily 
upon the `results' of an experimental science is regarded as nothing less than 
astonishing. 54 David Farrell Krell, for instance, can scarcely believe Heidegger's 
naivete. `Heidegger does not scorn zoology or any other science. He realises that 
without the discourse of the sciences he has nothing to say about beings. '55 This reliance 
is simply another symptom of Heidegger's perverse relapse back into ontotheology. 
`What Heidegger here ignores is the metaphysical commitment that such empirical 
information already embraces. '56 But the remarks on the essentially ambiguous relation 
between metaphysics and science, should alert us to the fact that Heidegger is not 
ignoring these metaphysical commitments, but rather is taking them very seriously 
s` Jacque Demda, Of Spirit - Heidegger and the Question, trans. 
by Geoffrey Bennington and Rachel 
Bowlby, (Chicago and London, The University of Chicago Press, 1989), see pp. 39-72. 
53 Daimon Life, p. 105. 
54 `Third, the 1929-30 course shows Heidegger venturing into the realm of positive science - specifically 
biology - and doing so at great 
length. The move is astonishing, because Heidegger will nowhere else take 
the experimental results so seriously in support of possible metaphysical claims. 
' Translator's Foreword, 
FCM, p. xx. 
5` Daimon Life, p. 114. 
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indeed. Indeed, the remarks on the relation between metaphysics and science are clearly 
meant to guard against the highly traditional assumption, which Krell himself appears to 
take for granted, that the `metaphysical' commitments of a science can somehow be 
isolated and subjected to entirely independent evaluation and adjudication. 
The question that nobody seems to have asked is, why does Heidegger begin his 
investigation into the essence of animality with a discussion of the relation between 
metaphysics and science? Heidegger introduces the discussion of animality in the 
context of an overarching metaphysical question, `What is world? ' On the face of it, this 
only confirms the preoccupation with the content of Heidegger's interpretation of 
animality. An essence -a determination of what it is to be an animal - will be extracted 
in the course of the investigation and presented as a result for comparison with other 
essences - the essence of man, the essence of the stone - similarly extracted. In the 
context of the governing question `What is world? ' the result is all that matters. But this 
is not, in fact, how the investigation works. The investigation into animality is followed 
in the lecture course by a long concluding section which examines the possibility of 
propositional assertion as such, that is to say, the possibility of determining something 
as something; but that is precisely the possibility of conducting the kind of investigation 
that has just been carried out. In the course of the investigation into animality our 
attention has somehow been diverted or twisted around so that by the end we are 
focused upon the investigation itself. The investigation into animality does not throw 
light on the question of world simply by determining what the animal is, and therefore, 
since the animal cannot properly be said to have a world, telling us something, 
negatively at least, about the world. Rather the investigation as an 
investigation into a 
particular kind of being toward which we can comport ourselves and to which we can 
56 lbid, p. 117. 
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have some kind of access precisely on the basis of Being-in-the-world. tells us 
something about world as such. The performative character of the investigation, the fact 
that it shows us something precisely by enacting it, cannot be ignored. And what the 
investigation performs is precisely an exercise in regional ontology. This is signposted 
clearly enough when, at the very end of the investigation, Heidegger looks back and 
says: 
An understanding for the fact that there are fundamentally different specific 
manners of being itself, and accordingly fundamentally different species of 
beings, was precisely sharpened for us through our interpretation of animality. 
Thus our entire preliminary investigation takes on a new function. [... ] In this 
connection we should remember this: animality no longer stands in view with 
respect to poverty in world as such, but rather as a realm of beings which are 
manifest and thus call for a specific fundamental relationship toward them on 
57 our part, one in which at least initially we do not move. 
If the investigation into the essence of animality is meant to be read as an exercise in 
regional ontology, then clearly Heidegger intends to illustrate by it the possibility of 
founding an individual science. But the remarks on the relation between metaphysics 
and science that introduce the discussion remind us that the relation between the 
founding of a science by regional ontology and the self-founding of that science in a 
scientific projection is itself still to be determined. The investigation does not 
presuppose this relation, but rather explores it. This explains the otherwise utterly 
inexplicable fact that the investigation is split into two. In the course of the discussion, 
Heidegger appears to pursue two quite different formulations, and indeed conceptions, 
of the essence of animality. On the one hand, we have what 
Heidegger calls the 
statement of essence - the notorious thesis that the animal 
is poor in world. Some 30 
pages are devoted to trying clarify what this thesis might mean, without, 
it has to be 
said, much apparent success. On the other hand, we 
have 60 pages devoted to a detailed 
elaboration of what Heidegger calls the essential conception 
of the organism. This 
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elaboration, though it is drawn exclusively from empirical scientific research, does not 
concern itself with the `results' of such research. Rather Heidegger is intent upon 
articulating the new scientific projection that is. as he sees it, being hammered out in 
contemporary biological research. Provisionally at least, then, we can make the 
following identifications. The statement of essence represents an articulation of the 
ontological constitution of a particular mode of Being. It falls to regional ontology to 
provide such an articulation, and this articulation will be founding for the individual 
science which investigates the particular beings in question. The essential conception, 
on the other hand, corresponds to the scientific projection which constitutes the 
contemporary self-founding of the individual science. What is at issue in the 
investigation is not just the content of these two `rival' interpretations of animality, but 
their relation, or rather, to put it more emphatically, their interaction. The initial remarks 
on the relation between metaphysics and science have already made it abundantly clear 
that scientific crisis does not represent the passage from a provisional self-founding to a 
properly philosophical founding, but rather the site of this interaction, the nexus of 
founding and self-founding. Regional ontological founding does not replace scientific 
self-founding, rather it somehow makes it possible. But in order to see this concretely, 
we need to examine what a statement of essence actually says, and more importantly 
how it says it. 
The Propositional Character of the Statement of Essence 
The statement that everybody seems to find so objectionable is: The animal is poor in 
world. Where does Heidegger get it from? The answer, disconcertingly, is nowhere. It is 
not arrived at through an investigation, nor as the result of an argument; rather 
51 FCM, p. 276. 
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Heidegger appears to pluck it out of thin air at the very moment he introduces animality 
as a topic for discussion. `However crudely, certain distinctions immediately, manifest 
themselves here. We can formulate these distinctions in the following three theses: [ 1. ] 
the stone (material object) is worldless; [2. ] the animal is poor in world; [3.1 man is 
world-forming. '58 It is hard not to suspect, therefore, that the thesis pre-empts the entire 
investigation, and prejudges any possible result. Heidegger already knows what an 
animal essentially is, and we shall have to accept it simply on his say so - provided, of 
course, that the statement of essence is actually supposed to assert something. But this is 
precisely what Heidegger immediately calls into question. 
Every term employed in the thesis is problematic and indeterminate. We already know 
that the comparative examination of human, animal, and stone is supposed to throw 
some light on the notion of world. But that means that we do not know as yet what the 
word means in the thesis that the animal is poor in world. Heidegger then goes on to 
demonstrate that we have as just as little clue what the word `poor' might mean. 
Comparing the animal with human beings, we might be tempted to suppose that the 
animal is poor in world because the animal's world is less rich, less diverse than ours. 
But a moment's consideration proves such a simplistic rank ordering tQ be highly 
dubious. Who is to say that the `world' revealed by the snake's sense of smell or the 
dolphin's sonar is less rich or diverse than ours? This does not lead Heidegger to claim 
that animals therefore also have worlds. On the contrary the very fact that animals 
cannot be said to have a paler or thinner or less diverse version of the world we 
have, 
suggests that they are in fact deprived of world, insofar as world 
denotes that which we 
as humans have. They have something altogether different and 
in order to emphasis this 
difference, we say that animals do not have world at all. 
However, when we come to 
58 FCM, p. 177, [first emphasis mine). 
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compare the animal with a rock, say, we are led equally naturally to the opposite 
conclusion. A lizard lying upon a rock that is itself lying upon the ground, has a quite 
different relation to the rock than the rock does to the ground. The rock, Heidegger says, 
has no access to the ground it lies upon, and by this he means that the rock is in some 
sense indifferent to what it lies upon. It cannot matter to it. `The it'orldlessness of a 
being can now be defined as its having no access to those beings (as beings) amongst 
which this particular being with this specific manner of being is. ' `9 Conversely, then, 
world will surely have something to do with having access to things; things mattering 
for one. But the rock does indeed matter to the lizard. Picked up and removed from the 
rock, it will scuttle back to it. The rock is not simply what the lizard lies upon; it is what 
it basks upon. The lizard does not so much put itself into spatial relation with the rock as 
put itself into beneficial relation with the spatial relation between rock and sun. We feel 
compelled then in the face of the worldlessness of the stone to ascribe something like a 
world to the animal, a set of relations wherein it accommodates and manoeuvres itself. 
We are thus faced by a contradiction. `The animal thus reveals itself as a being which 
both has and does not have world. 1'60 This contradiction ensures that we do not know 
what the word `poor' means in the thesis that the animal is poor in world. But at the 
same time, it points toward the meaning of the thesis as a whole. 
The statement of essence is not meant simply to identify some characteristic feature of 
animals which happens to distinguish them from human beings or stones, it is meant to 
somehow encapsulate the ontological constitution of these kinds of beings. 
61 But, as we 
59 FCM, p. 197. 
60 FCM, p. 199. 
41 `And this does not mean finding out how humans and animals are distinguished from one another 
in this 
or that particular respect. It means finding out what constitutes the essence of the animalitv of the animal 
and the essence of the humanity of man and through what sort of questions we can 
hope to pinpoint the 
essence of such beings at all. ' FCM, p. 179. The last part of this sentence 
in particular should alert us to 
the fact that no explicit decision, at least, has been made about what 
it is that constitutes the essence of a 
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saw with the analysis of the ready-to-hand and the present-at-hand in Being and Time, 
Heidegger holds that the Being of an entity comprises both the way in which it 
manifests itself, and the kind of determinability that belongs to it; that is to say, the 
ontological constitution of a particular kind of entity is always articulated in terms of its 
how-Being and its what-Being. The statement of essence, then, must concern itself with 
both. But insofar as it is a single statement it can only do so by expressing the 
articulation of the `what' and the `how'. This articulation, this connection between the 
determinability of an entity and its mode of manifestation, is the problem of essence -a 
problem which Heidegger tells us in the last lecture course he gave at Marburg has 
bedevilled traditional metaphysics because it has not been properly recognised. 
This is, in general, a difficulty prevalent in traditional metaphysics and 
ontology and in the consideration of essences, particularly in Husserl. By 
suspending what is actual (in the phenomenological reduction) the what- 
character is set forth - but in suspending the actual, the actuality, i. e., the modus 
existendi, and its intrinsic connection with the essential contents in the 
narrower sense is not suspended. Essence has here a double meaning: it means 
the a priori of essentia and of existentia. 62 
In introducing the task of inquiring into the essence of animality, Heidegger once again 
raises this dual aspect of any investigation into essences, but here the dual aspect is 
slightly inflected. It is no longer a question simply of the how and the what of Being 
itself, but rather a question of how we should approach the matter and what the matter 
itself gets determined as on the basis of this approach: 
Yet the difficulty here is not merely one of content with respect to what life as 
such is but is equally and almost more emphatically a methodological one: 
by 
what path can and should we gain access to the living character of the 
living 
being in its essence? [... ] We are thus confronted by two fundamental 
difficulties: [I. ] What are we to determine the essence of life in general as? [2. ] 
particular kind of entity, and indeed that the investigation will 
be as much about how one goes about 
'isolating' the essence of something as about determining it 
hat that essence turns out to be. 
62 MFL, p. 178. 
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How are living beings as such - the animality of the animal and the plant- 
character of the plant originarily accessible? 63 
The statement of essence encapsulates the articulation of how-Being and what-Being by 
shuttling us back and forward between the question of content and the question of 
access. But this does not mean that what-Being is determined by the way in which we 
choose to approach the question. Rather it means that the questioning is thrown into the 
question. The way that we should question gets caught up in the question of essence, the 
question of the connection between the how-Being and the what-Being of the entity. In 
our bewilderment at the contradiction exposed in the what-determination (the animal 
does and does not have world), we shift our attention to the question of access. 
The animal unlike the stone has some kind of access to the things around it, but this 
access is unlike that which we have to things. The task, therefore, is determine what this 
access is like. But how? How are we to gain access to this access? But here, now that we 
are asking how we have access to that access which animals have to the things around 
them, the link between what and how has got much tighter: 
Thus once again we find ourselves immediately confronted by a 
methodological question, but one which is quite unique in kind. Basically, 
every methodological question, that is, every question which concerns how we 
should initially approach and subsequently pursue a given subject matter, is 
directly connected with the question concerning the substantive character of 
the subject matter itself. But here this is the case in a quite exceptional sense. 
For the substantive problem with which we are concerned is precisely that of 
accessibility itself, the question concerning the potential access that man and 
animal characteristically have to other beings. Strictly speaking, therefore, this 
methodological question is a substantive one. 64 
The important thing to note is that whereas the circularity implied by the link between 
method and substance is intrinsic to all metaphysical inquiry into essences, and therefore 
to all regional ontology, we have stumbled here upon something that is unique to 
63 FCM, p. 179. 
64 FCM, p. 201. 
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animality itself: the methodological question is not merely linked to questions of 
substance, co-determining them; rather, it is a question of substance. And this, precisely 
because it is unique to the question of animality, says something about the animal as 
such. 
At first glance there seem to be two obvious objections to this. First, just because the 
substantive question is a question about access, does not mean that the methodological 
question of access is itself substantive. That would be, surely, to confuse two kinds of 
access: the kind of access that we have to the animal in its animality, which is the 
subject of the methodological question, and the kind of access which animals have to 
the things in their environment, which is the subject of a substantive question; kinds of 
access that Heidegger has already insisted are completely different. But Heidegger's 
point is not purely formal. It is not that access to access somehow collapses to the same 
thing as access, that a kind of algebraic substitution can be performed so as to prove the 
identity of the question of methodology and the question of substance; rather, it is that it 
is in the nature of the concept of access that the question of access to any particular 
access should elicit immediately a counter question, namely: to what extent does that 
access permit, resist, or possibly forbid access to it. It is this question that is substantive 
insofar as it is a question of the kind of access belonging to the animal. Access is such 
that access to it must be an entering into it, and this is because access is always 
necessarily access to... . In other words, access to access cannot simply 
be a going over 
to it. In a sense, there is nothing to go over to; the lizard's access to the stone upon 
which it basks is not something there in the sense that the spatial relation of the stone to 
the ground upon which it stands is there. Rather the lizard's access to the stone can only 
be accessed by going along with it. This means that access to the animal must always be 
what Heidegger calls a transposition. `Transposing oneself into this being means going 




how it is with this being, discovering what it is like to be with this being v'ith which we 
are going along in this way. '65 Because the animal has some kind of access to the things 
around it, it is in itself a way of going about things. It is only by going along with this 
way of going about things that we can find out what the animal is. Our access to the 
animal will not therefore be merely an access to its access, but a going along with its 
access. And that is why in the end there is not merely a connection between the 
methodological and substantive questions, but a correspondence. And this 
correspondence bites both ways: Can we go along with such going along? Does such 
going along allow us to go along with it? 
This brings us to the second objection. If the methodological question of access to the 
animal comes down to the problem of transposition, then surely it can hardly be unique 
to the animal. Doesn't exactly the same problem arise in our access to the access which 
other human beings have to things? Don't we have to transpose ourselves into their 
dealings with the world in order to know what they are like? And what precisely stops 
there being a similar question when it comes to stones? Just because it seems very 
difficult to imagine what such a transposition would be like, doesn't mean surely that 
the question is ruled out altogether. However, Heidegger insists that the question of 
transposition simply does not arise in either of these cases; and this is the crux of his 
claim that the methodological question of access to the animal is unique. 
In both cases, Heidegger says, the question simply isn't a question. In the case of the 
stone there is no question of transposition at all. `The question: Can we transpose 
ourselves into a stone?, is impossible in principle, and the question about how we might 
go about factically transposing ourselves is consequently quite meaningless here. '66 It is 
impossible in principle because there is nowhere to transpose oneself into. In 
6$ FCM, p. 202. 
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transposing ourselves, we remain ourselves while going along with some other's access 
to things. The stone offers us no sphere in which we could be ourselves, and so forbids 
the very idea of transposition. 67 
In the case of human beings, on the other hand, transposition is not questionable 
because, in a sense, it has already happened. We are tempted to think that transposition 
into an other Dasein's relations with the world might be a problem because we imagine 
that it is a question of imaginative sympathy, or of empathy, as Heidegger says. Kant, 
for example, who Heidegger identifies as responsible for a peculiar intensification of 
this view, says in the second paralogism of reason, `It is obvious that, if I wish to 
represent to myself a thinking being, I must put myself in his place, and thus substitute, 
as it were, my own subject for the object I am seeking to consider. '68 But though 
obvious, this step is in fact mistaken. It arises from the assumption that other human 
beings appear to us first of all as objects like any other, which we must somehow, and 
only later impute something like consciousness to. `This apparently natural and 
immediate point of departure from a manifold of homogeneous givens is in fact an 
illusion. '69 We have `access' to the way other human beings relate to the things around 
them not because we relate to those things in the same kind of way, and can therefore, 
by a sort of analogy, imagine what it would be like to be in that other person's shoes, but 
6FCM, p. 207. 
67 However, Heidegger appears to want to keep his options open here. When he first introduces the 
question of transposition into the stone he says, `Now we generally have a quick and ready answer to this 
question: No, we reply, we cannot transpose ourselves into the stone. ' But, after briefly outlining why this 
should be impossible, he is quick to insert a caveat. `I say emphatically that we usually answer in this way 
because in fact there are ways and means belonging to human Dasein in which man never simply regards 
purely material things, or indeed technical things, as such but rather "animates" them, as we might 
somewhat misleadingly put it. There are two fundamental ways in which this can happen: first when 
human Dasein is determined in its existence by myth, and second in the case of art. ' (FCM, p. 204. ) And 
Heidegger is insistent that these two possibilities are neither illusory nor metaphorical. '\\'hat is at issue 
here is not the opposition between actual reality and illusory appearance, but the distinction between quite 
different kinds of possible truth. ' (Ibid. ) But in that case, in what sense can transposition into the stone be 
said to be impossible in principle? 
68 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 336. 
b9 FCM, p. 207. 
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because the relation we have to things and the relation the other has to them are the 
same relation. 
[A] number of human beings not only have the same comportment toward the 
same things, but can also share one and the same comportment %vith one 
another, without this shared experience being fragmented in the process; it 
appears that it is possible, accordingly to go along [Mitgang] with others in 
their access [Zugang] to things and in their dealings [Umgang] with those 
things. This is a fundamental feature of man's own immediate experience of 
existence. 70 
This point is crucial. Heidegger is not merely claiming that this going along with others 
is a constitutive feature of the Being of Dasein; he is claiming that our own access to 
beings is already and necessarily such a going along with. It is not just that in Being- 
alongside things, things manifest themselves to us as things, and in Being-with others, 
those others manifest themselves as Daseins, as if these two phenomena were simply 
two independent dimensions of the general disclosiveness of Dasein. Rather the two are 
bound together, they are not just equiprimordial. they are co-dependent. There can be no 
Being-with others except in the shared manifestation of beings. There can be no 
manifestation of beings except in Being-with others. In the previous year's lecture 
course, that of 1928/29, which as we saw in the last chapter deals primarily with the 
essence of science, Heidegger spends over sixty pages banging this point -relentlessly 
home: 
Every Being alongside the present-at-hand, even when alone, is a Being-with- 
one-another. Accordingly, Being alongside the present-at-hand is not an 
isolated possibility in which Dasein exists, and Being-with-one-another an 
other [such possibility], but rather every Being alongside... is Being-with-one- 
another. Conversely every Being-with-one-another is according to its essence a 
Being alongside the present-at-hand. The latter is no less essential than the 
former. " 
70 FCM, p. 205. 
71 `Jedes Sein bei Vorhandenem, auch das alleinige, ist ein Miteinandersein. Das Sein bei Vorhandenem 
ist demnach nicht eine isolierte Möglichkeit, in der das Dasein existiert, und das Miteinandersein eine 
andere, sondern jedes Sein bei ... 
ist Miteinandersein. Umgekehrt ist jedes Miteinandersein seinem 
-?? 7 - 
The reason why is that this inseparability of Being alongside and Being-with is central 
to Heidegger's concept of truth as unconcealment. Truth is what binds the two together. 
Being-with-one-another is never in the first place knowledge or consciousness of one 
another. Heidegger, typically enough, uses the example of two hikers who, suddenly 
coming upon a panorama of the mountains, stand side by side in silence, enraptured by 
the view. 
There is then no trace of mutual comprehension, rather each stands 
dumbfounded [benommen] by the view. Are the two now merely beside one 
another like two boulders, or are they at this moment with one another in just 
such a way that they could not be if they were continuously chattering away 
together, or indeed mutually understanding one another by sniffing out each 
other's complexes. '72 
Being-with-one-another is always a sharing in something; in this case, the view; in the 
case of preparing the evening meal, the task. But what is shared, is not shared out. Even 
the task, which one might say is broken up into various sub-tasks that are then 
apportioned out, is as the task, which each is fully involved in, held in common. What is 
held in common is the disclosedness of the task. Being-with-one-another is a sharing in 
truth. The unconcealment of beings is common to us, and that does not mean that in 
each case there is an unconcealment that is the same, in the sense of exactly similar 
[gleich], but that unconcealment is for all of us who are with one another the same [das 
Selbige]. It is one and the same unconcealment in which we share. Thus for human 
Dasein transposition is probably a misleading term, if by transposition we mean a 
transference of ourselves into the relations which others have with things. It is not that 
we are called upon to enter into the other's comportments toward things, rather our 
Wesen nach ein Sein bei Vorhandenem. Das letztere ist nicht minder wesentlich als das erstere. ' G27, p. 
118. 
72 'Es ist dann keine Spur von gegenseitigem Sicherfassen, jeder steht vielmehr benommen von dem 
Anblick. Sind die beiden jetzt nur noch nebeneinander wie die beiden Felsblöcke, oder sind sie in diesem 
Augenblick gerade in einer Weise miteinander, wie sie es nicht sein können, wenn sie unentwegt 
zusammen schwatzen oder gar sich gegenseitig erfassen und auf ihre Komplexe beschnüffeln? ' G27, p. 
86. 
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comportments - that is, ours and theirs - take place in and on the basis of the same 
unconcealment, and it is this common ground [Gemeinsamkeit] that constitutes our 
Being-with-one-another. The question of transposition into another human being's 
access to things, therefore, turns out to be meaningless, both because it is redundant and 
because it misconstrues the situation. `With respect to man and the human potential for 
self-transposition into another human being, it transpired that the question is superfluous 
because in a sense it does not know what it is asking. '73 
This means that the question of transposition remains a question only for animals. The 
fact that it remains a question, its questionableness, indicates something about animals 
as such. On the one hand animals invite transposition. It seems self-evident that some 
kind of going along with the way they behave toward things must be possible - 
Heidegger cites as an example the way we live with domestic animals - and yet, on the 
other hand, this transposition, precisely because it has to be a transposition, a going over 
into something that we are not already in, and that we can never be sure we have 
successfully entered into, cannot simply be a going along with, that sharing in the truth 
with other Dasein which in fact obviates the need for any transposition. The substantive 
nature of the methodological question has now become much clearer. `From the side of 
the animal, what is it that grants the possibility of transposedness and necessarily 
refuses any going along with? What is this having and yet not having? '74 We have 
arrived back at the contradiction that was first rather vaguely expressed by saying that 
the animal has and does not have world; and in so doing we have tied a peculiar knot, a 
knot that ties the substantive contradiction to the methodological aporia. It is precisely 
this knot which the statement of essence is supposed to express. `Nevertheless we have 
found the place where such elucidation must begin and have identified the knot which 
73 FCM, p. 207. 
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we must first strive to undo. We shall only be able to do so if we pursue its intricate 
entanglements and the convolution of the proposition that the animal has and does not 
have world. '75 The knot is not undone in the sense that it is disentangled, rather it is 
loosened so that the structure of its entanglement may become visible. The statement of 
essence is, if you like, the knot which needs to be loosened, opened up to scrutiny 
without cutting through it. This loosening is what Heidegger means by the unfolding of 
the question. `Proper metaphysical comprehension lies in the correct unfolding of the 
question. Or, to put it another way, metaphysical questions do not receive an answer, if 
that means communicating some known fact or other. '76 
The elucidation of the statement of essence has shown the way in which the how-Being 
and the what-Being are tied together by the question. `And not-having in being able to 
have is precisely deprivation, is poverty. Thus the transposability of the animal, which 
again is a not going along with, is grounded in the essence of the animal. And it is this 
essence that we have attempted to capture with the thesis concerning the animal's 
poverty in world. '77 The question whether the animal has a world or not is constitutive 
as a question of animality as such. But precisely because this question is a question, the 
temptation is always to answer it yes or no, i. e. to slip either into anthropomorphism or a 
mechanistic reductionism. 
Throughout the long history of the problem of life we can observe how the 
attempt has been made either to interpret life - that is, the kind of being that 
pertains to animals and plants - from the perspective of man, or alternatively to 
explain life by means of laws adopted from the realm of material nature. Yet 
both of these erstwhile forms of explanation produce an inexplicable residue 
which in general is simply explained away. What is lacking in all this is insight 
74 FCM, p. 210. 
7 FCM, p. 199. 
76 FCM, p. 185. 
77 FCM, p. 211. 
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into the necessary task of securing above all else the essential nature oj_life in 
and of itself and a resolute attempt to accomplish it. 78 
But answering the question closes off, or even better perhaps switches off, as in 
switching off a light, the kind of Being that belongs to the animal, since the question 
belongs to its essence. The animal only presents itself as animal, rather than as a 
complicated kind of stone, or a simplified human being, insofar as access to it as an 
animal remains questionable. This means that the attempt to secure the essence of the 
animal far from answering the question whether it has a world or not, must resolutely 
keep it open. 79 `It is certainly true that this questioning, in contrast to all scientific 
investigations, can never be accommodated within a determinate domain. This 
questioning must first form its own interrogative space in the act of questioning, and 
only in the act of questioning is it capable of keeping this interrogative space open., %"() 
The question must remain open because in cuestioninv the questioner throws himself 
into question. The peculiar doubling of the question of essence is not merely a question 
of the what-Being and how-Being of the entity, but insofar as these two questions are 
interwoven, a reversal, a constant switching of questioning from the entity to Dasein and 
back again. The question `How are we to approach the subject matter? ' is conditioned 
by the what-Being of the subject matter. Conversely the what-Being of the subject 
matter is conditioned by the How-question. In metaphysical questioning, Dasein must 
throw itself into question - and what is more, into the same question. Here we have the 
knot of projection and thrownness. In projecting the Being of any entity whatsoever, 
78 FCM, pp. 191-92 . 
79 It is here that the peculiar negativity of the Heideggerian a priori begins to show itself. What is a priori 
for Heidegger is not some categorial concept without which experience, say, would not be possible, but 
rather an injunction that certain presuppositions not be made, certain questions be held open, if a 
distinction is to be respected. In other words, the region of animality, say, is held open by a refusal, rather 
than constituted by a determination. Of course, one can choose not to respect the distinction. but then all 
that can be said is that one no longer treats the animal as an animal, and all that can be asked is whether it 
is factically possible to abide by such a decision. 




Dasein must throw itself into the question. Here some light is shed on the Heideggerian 
meaning of transcendence. It is not a question of determining entities over and above 
how they may happen to appear to us, but rather a question of a questioning that exceeds 
the entities in question and engulfs the questioning itself. Questioning not entities is 
transcendent, and questioning is only transcendent only insofar as it throws itself into 
question. Dasein is transcendent only insofar as it makes itself immanent to the 
question. Transcendence is making immanent. The question exceeds itself only by 
inserting itself into itself: `fundamental ontology comprises problems which, in their 
problematic character, themselves belong to the existence of human beings, to the 
metaphysical essence of Dasein'8' This is what Heidegger means when he says that 
Dasein is outside itself in and for itself. 
-0- 
But even if we accept Heidegger's analysis and agree that the statement of essence says 
nothing positive, but rather expresses, as it were, the persistence of a problem, can we 
really be said to have learnt anything about regional ontology in general? Doubt arises 
precisely because of the singularity of the example. If the animal is the entity for which 
uniquely the question of access to the kind of Being that it is, is essentially constitutive 
of its Being, i. e. is determinative of its essence, then surely the case of animality can tell 
us nothing about any other case of regional ontological determination. What possible 
lessons could we learn from this peculiar kind of being, which is poised over the abyss 
meant to separate Dasein from all other entities, that could be applied to those other 
entities? The regional ontological determination and delimitation of the animal on the 
basis of its singular and equivocal position between Dasein and non-Dasein would seem 
on the face of it to preclude any other regional delimitation on the same basis. It is not 
81 MFL, p. 155. 
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just that the example of the delimitation of animality gives us no clue in its singularity 
as to how any other delimitation might take place. It is rather more that the delimitation 
of the animal as neither material object nor human Dasein appears to exclude the 
possibility of any further delimitation at the same ontological level at all. The regional 
delimitation of the animal works only as a simultaneous tripartite division of beings as a 
whole. Are we meant to conclude that there are in fact only three ontological regions - 
namely, the human, the animal, the inanimate? And that Heidegger takes himself to 
have demonstrated this along with his uncovering of the essence of animality? 
Certainly, any determination of an ontological region will involve some background 
partition of beings as a whole, but this does not necessarily imply that the partition 
determines all the regions simultaneously and beforehand. Each partition might be 
specific to the singular manner in which any particular region is determined. In other 
words, there is no reason to assume that the various modes of Being impose compatible 
categorisations upon the totality of beings - and indeed this is one of the reasons that 
they are modes. One mode of Being may simply exclude the possibility of another 
mode, even as another separate region, precisely because of the background partition 
that it assumes. And indeed one of the lessons that Heidegger takes the investigation 
into animality to have taught us, is that the cartographic imagery of regions and realms 
is quite inadequate to represent the modality of Being. 
From this quite rough and ready characterization of the specific manner of 
being that belongs to living nature we can already see that in future we must 
not permit ourselves to speak of the totality of beings as if this were a 
collection of certain realms or other. Accordingly, the manifoldness of the 
various specific manners of being with respect to their possible unity poses a 
quite specific problem, one that can only be tackled as a problem once we have 
developed a satisfactory concept of world. 
82 
82 FCM, p. 279. 
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No doubt, the investigation into animality provides no general rules or guidelines on 
how to conduct regional ontology as such. The lesson of the investigation will surely 
have been that the delimitation of a particular kind of Being will always be singular and 
unique. This is because what differentiates one kind of Being from another cannot 
simply be a difference in essence - where essence is thought of as what makes 
something what it is; rather it must be a difference of essence, where essence denotes the 
peculiar and specific connection between how-Being and what-Being that belongs to a 
particular kind of Being that is to say a difference in the manner and way in which 
something like essence determines and delimits the kind of entities belonging to the 
particular region. That is to say, what differs from one mode of Being to another is the 
articulation of Being into something like what-Being and how-Being. `The articulation 
of being varies each time with the way of being of a being. '83 
Founding and Attunement 
But what is the relation between the statement of essence and the self-founding of the 
sciences? Are we seriously to believe that the statement of essence, expressing as it 
does nothing but a question, constitutes the founding that the science's cannot 
themselves accomplish. Here we have to return to the question of what constitutes 
original solidarity with the most elementary content of the field; that original solidarity 
which appeared to let the sciences found themselves and get on without philosophy. 
Original solidarity with the most elementary content of the field, does not mean 
something like sticking to the facts. The most elementary content of the field is not the 
simplest or most easily accessible facts, but rather what is most basic to that field - its 
essence. Original solidarity with the elementary content of zoology means something 
Si BPP, p. 120. 
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like being bound by the essence of animality. This solidarity with the things themselves 
is clearly what Heidegger means at the end of the investigation, when, as we have 
already seen, he talks of `those fundamental relationships that correspond to the peculiar 
character proper to the beings in question' - fundamental relationships which our 
everyday comportments towards beings do not for the most part exemplify or rely upon, 
and which need somehow to be awakened. 84 Now what is it that makes possible such a 
fundamental relationship, such original solidarity with the way things are? The clue lies, 
I think, in the use of the word `awaken. ' This is part of the same vocabulary as that used 
throughout the first part of the lecture course to designate the task of `awakening a 
fundamental attunement [Stimmung] in our philosophizing' - namely the attunement of 
fundamental boredom. 85 This is not likely to be a coincidence because `awakening' 
[ Weckung] is used systematically and has the status of something like a technical term. It 
is used to indicate the fact that an attunement is not something which is either present or 
not-present. `Thus we shall not speak at all of "ascertaining" a fundamental attunement 
in our philosophizing, but of awakening it. Awakening means making something 
wakeful, letting whatever is sleeping become wakeful. '86 `Awakening' designates the 
peculiar mode in which an attunement comes to be there [da-sein], and thus is bound as 
a term to the structure of attunement, which is itself `the fundamental way in which 
Dasein is as Dasein. '87 We can take it then, I think, that what makes original solidarity 
[ Verwachsen] with the elementary content of a scientific field possible, what binds us to 
84 'We should merely learn to see that from out of this everydayness - although certainly not grounded or 
sustained by it -fundamental relationships of human Dasein towards 
beings amongst which man himself 
belongs, are possible, i. e. are capable of being awakened. ' FCM, p. 276. 
85 FCM, p. 59. 
R6 FCM, p. 60. `Weckeng ist ein Wach-machen, ein Wach-werden-lassen dessen, was schläft. ' (G29/30, p. 
91. ) And , 
infact, it is this definition of awakening as letting become wakeful [Wach-werden-lassen] that is 
echoed in later when Heidegger claims that `fundamental relationships of human Dasein toward 
beings 
[... ] are possible, i. e. are capable of being awakened [d. h. wach werden können]. ' (FCM, p. 276; 
G29/30, 
p. 400. ) 
87 FCM, p. 67. 
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the beings as they are themselves, the fundamental relation that corresponds to their 
essence, is something in the nature of an attunement - Stimmung - or, in the translation 
favoured in Being and Time, mood. An attunement or mood `is not - is never - simply a 
consequence or side effect of our thinking, doing, and acting. It is - to put it crudely - the 
presupposition, the "medium" within which they first happen. '88 
In Being and Time mood is primarily characterised as being disclosive of Dasein's 
thrownness. In mood Dasein finds itself already given over to a concrete situation that it 
is already in some way sensitive or attuned to. The fact that Dasein always finds itself 
thus embedded in the middle of things that already matter to it, and, thus finding itself, 
already discloses to itself that it is, prior to any act of conscious self-reflection, is an 
existential and fundamental characteristic of Dasein, which Heidegger calls 
Befindlichkeit, playing on the multiple uses of the verb sich befinden -a synonym for the 
verb to be, as well as meaning more specifically `to be located, ' while used 
idiomatically in the standard greeting and conversation opener, `Wie befinden Sie sich? ' 
('How are you doing? '). Mood is in each case the existentiell expression of Dasein's 
Befindlichkeit. Since mood discloses to Dasein that it is, only by disclosing how it finds 
itself in this particular situation, mood is disclosive not just of Dasein's `that it is' but of 
Being-in-the-world as a whole. But, equally, mood is disclosive of beings within the 
world insofar as they matter to Dasein. Indeed Heidegger insists that mood is originarily 
disclosive, since entities could not be encountered at all, if they did not matter to us 
somehow. If something did not matter to us, we would have no reason for noticing it; it 
would quite simply pass us by, as it were. Mood makes mattering possible. `Under the 
strongest pressure and resistance, nothing like an affect would come about, and the 
resistance itself would remain essentially undiscovered, if Being-in-the-world, with its 
88 FCM, pp. 67-68. 
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state-of-mind [Befindlichkeit], had not already submitted itself to having entities within- 
the-world "matter" to it in a way which its moods have outlined in advance. '89 
Now it is very easy to read this analysis of mood as fitting snugly in with the 
interpretation of understanding as projection. Both would be dimensions of Dasein's 
transcendence; both would provide, no doubt each in its own way, something like a 
horizon of intelligibility for beings. Thus Dreyfus writes, `Moods provide the 
background on the basis of which specific events can affect us. [ ... 
] Mood colours the 
whole world and everything that comes into it. '90 But what is the model underlying this 
metaphor? Projective understanding constructs the set, perhaps, whereas mood paints it. 
But if mood merely colours the world, then it is very hard to see how it could be 
anything like the condition of possibility of encountering an entity. On the one hand. the 
encounter could already take place within the horizon provided by projective 
understanding alone - surely this is precisely how the ready-to-hand is encountered as 
the ready-to-hand thing that it is within the context of its involvements. It is this context 
and not mood that allows it to be encountered. On the other hand, mood would be 
incapable of distinguishing any particular entity as the entity encountered. Dreyfus 
himself makes this abundantly clear in the sentence missed out in the ellipsis. `If I am in 
a frightened mood, every particular thing shows up as fearsome. '91 In which case no 
particular thing would show up as a particular thing, unless distinguished by something 
else apart from the all pervasive mood. But this is not how it is phenomenologically, nor 
how Heidegger interprets it. Rather fear, although no doubt all pervasive and somehow 
89 Being and Time, p. 177. 
90 Hubert Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World, p. 174. 
91 Ibid. Admittedly Dreyfus immediately appends a footnote, `Of course, I can be frightened even when 
not in a fearful mood. This is because the capacity to be frightened belongs to my affectedness [Dreyfus' 
translation of Befindlichkeit). ' (Ibid., fn. 5, p. 353. ) But this only begs the question. How does the capacity 
to be frightened belong to Dasein's Befindlichkeit, if not as a particular mode of mood? But there seems to 
be no way that mood as Dreyfus conceives it could ever modify itself into an affect, and therefore no 
reason to assume that the two belong together as forms of Befindlichkeit. 
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disclosive of one's Being-in-the-world. precisely picks out that entity which is 
frightening. If the mood of fear is what allows something to be encountered as 
frightening, it is not because it makes it frightening, paints it all over with the colour of 
fear; rather, this thing, this wolf, is frightening, and fear allows us to encounter it as that 
frightening thing which it is. 92 Mood, or rather the extravagantly complex panoply of 
moods, do not colour the world, rather they tune it to the frequency of things so that thev 
may resonate in it. 'Dasein's openness to the world is constituted existentially by the 
attunement of a state-of-mind. )93 But this means that mood, if it is bound up in the 
transcendence of Dasein, is not merely another dimension of world-building alongside 
projection, but is rather its opposite. Mood is the pre-Copernican moment, if you will, 
which precisely does not compel the witness to answer questions of its own devising, 
but rather listens as a pupil to everything that its teacher has to say. `Existentially, a 
state-of-mind [Befindlichkeit] implies a disclosive submission to the world, out of which 
we can encounter something that matters to us. '94 This submission to the world, this 
dependence upon it [Angewiesenheit auf Welt] is a submission precisely to its 
instruction [anweisen means among other things to instruct' a pupil or an apprentice]. 
As Klaus Held and Michel Haar have seen, Heidegger's true radicality in his treatment 
92 To the objection that fear is only an inauthentic mood, and that when it comes to authentic moods such 
as anxiety, or the fundamental mood of profound boredom, it is always a matter of disclosing Being-in- 
the-world as a whole, what can one say except so what? The fact that fear is an inauthentic mood does not 
invalidate it, it merely characterises what kind of mood it is, and what kind of thing it discloses, i. e. beings 
within the world. That other kinds of mood are better suited to disclosing the existential structure of 
Dasein itself, does not mean that the analysis of that structure can stop with those moods. 
93 Being and Time, p. 176; 'Die Gestimmtheit der Befindlichkeit konstituiert existenzial die Weltoffenheit 
des Daseins. ' (SZ, p. 137). Gestimmtheit is a synonym for Stimmung, but formed from the past participle 
of the verb stimmen it would mean literally something like 'tunedness' - hence Macquarrie and 
Robinson's translation 'attunement' - and clearly calls attention to the way mood (Stimmung) is to be 
thought of as something like an harmonic 'accordance. ' It should not be forgotten that stimmen does not 
just mean 'to tune, ' but used intransitively - and this is the far more common usage - it means 'to be 
correct, ' 'to be right, ' as in the phrase 'Das stimmt. ' ('That's right. ') It is precisely this usage which 
Heidegger exploits at the beginning of his essay 'On the Essence of Truth, ' when he examines the 
ordinary conception of truth. 'The true, whether it be a matter or a proposition, is what accords, the 
accordant [das Stimmende]. ' (Basic Writings, p. 117; Pathmarks, p. 139. ) More on this connection in the 
next chapter. 
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of moods lies not so much in his emphasis upon their publicness, their non-interiority, 
nor even in the fact that they are for him disclosive, but rather upon his insistence that 
they are precisely what is binding for thought, i. e. what ensures that projection is not 
arbitrary. `The bindingness of philosophical propositions is thereby placed on an entirely 
new foundation that runs counter to the tradition. When truth basically takes place 
prepredicatively as world-openness in moods, every predicative truth - including the 
truth of philosophical propositions - is ultimately dependent upon how the mood 
primarily opens the world to us. ' 95 But this does not mean, Heidegger insists, that 
objectivity is sacrificed to whim. `Any cognitive determining has its existential- 
ontological Constitution in the state-of-mind [Befindlichkeit] of Being-in-the-world; but 
pointing this out is not to be confused with attempting to surrender science ontically to 
'96 `feeling' [Gefühl]. 
Admittedly, a certain ambiguity surrounds the notion of submission to the world in a 
mood, since `world' does not mean - at least here in Being and Time -a collection, or 
even totality, of beings, but rather `that "wherein" a factical Dasein as such can be said 
to "live". '97 World is an existentiell affair of Dasein; its possibility belongs to the 
existential constitution of Dasein as Being-in-the-world. Dasein's submission to the 
world in mood might then look suspiciously like a self-submission, a submission only to 
what it had itself projected. But in his long essay On the Essence of Ground Heidegger 
94 Being and Time, p. 177. This use of the term 'submission' puts the analysis of mood into 
communication with the "letting-be" we uncovered in the analysis of understanding in Chapter 2. 
95 Klaus Held, 'Fundamental Moods and Heidegger's Critique of Contemporary Culture, ' trans. by 
Anthony J. Steinbock, Reading Heidegger - Commemorations, ed. by John Sallis, (Bloomington and 
Indianapolis, Indiana University Press, 1993), p. 288. See also Michel Haar, 'Stimmung et pensee, ' 
Heidegger et l'idee de la phenomenologie, ed. by F. Volpi, (Dordrecht, Kluwer, 1988), p. 267. 
"Being and Time, p. 177. 
97 Being and Time, p. 93. But in 1929/30 lecture course, for instance, the distinction between world and 
the totality of beings is more subtle. 'What do we mean by this expression "as a whole"? How can Dasein 
find itself placed in this way among beings as a whole? [... ) We shall designate the expanse of this "as a 
whole", which manifests itself in profound boredom, as is orld. ' (FCM, p. 169. ) 
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introduces a new way of formulating the way things can matter for us which makes 
clearer the binding nature of mood. 
Yet in the projection of world, such beings are not yet manifest in themselves. 
Indeed, they would have to remain concealed, were it not for the fact that 
Dasein in its projecting is, as projecting, also already in the midst of such 
beings. Yet this "in the midst of... " refers neither to a cropping up among other 
things, nor even to a specific self-directedness toward this particular being in 
comporting oneself toward it. Rather this being in the midst of... belongs to 
transcendence. That which surpasses, in passing over and beyond and thus 
elevating itself, must find itself [sich befinden] as such among beings. As 
finding itself, Dasein is pre-occupied [eingenommen] by beings in such a way 
that, in its belonging to beings, it is thoroughly attuned [durchstimmt] by them. 
Transcendence means projection of the world in such a way that already that 
which projects is governed in the manner of mood [gestimmt durchwaltet] hi' 
those beings that are surpassed. With this pre-occupation by beings that 
belongs to transcendence Dasein has taken up a basis within beings, gained 
"ground. v, 98 
Granted that original solidarity with the elementary content of a field is given by 
awakening something like an attunemeni. with the beings in the midst of which Dasein 
finds itself, what has any of this got to do with the statement of essence ('The animal is 
98 Martin Heidegger, 'On the Essence of Ground, ' trans. by William McNeill, Pathmarks, ed. by William 
McNeill, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 127-28. [Originally published in German 
as Wegmarken, (Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio Klostermann, 1967, rev. and exp. 1976), published also in 
the Gesamtausgabe, as Band 9. ] Also translated as The Essence of Reasons, trans. by Terence Malick, 
(Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1969), pp. 107-109. [This is a bilingual edition, incorporating 
the German text of the 4th edition of Vom Wesen des Grundes, (Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio 
Klostermann, 1955), originally published in 1929 as part of a Festschrift for Edmund Husserl on his 70th 
birthday - Erganzungsband zum Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung, (Halle, 
1929). ] 1 have altered the translation as it appears in Pathmarks slightly, so as to take advantage of some 
of Terence Malick's translating decisions. In particular, I have adopted his translation of eingenommen as 
'preoccupied' instead of McNeill's choice of 'absorbed' because I think it better captures the various 
senses of the verb. Eingenommen is indeed used to mean 'enamoured of or 'taken by' but the preposition 
used is für not von - the phrase is für etwas eingenommen sein. This arises from the active use of the verb 
to mean `to win over' as in such sentences as 'er hat alle für seine Pläne eingenommen' ('he won 
everybody over to his plans'). But einnehmen is also used simply to mean 'to occupy' a place or site, as 
when a foreign army occupies a town. Since Heidegger says 'Das Dasein wird als befindliches vom 
Seienden eingenommen' and not 'Dasein ist als befindliches für Seiendes eingenommen' it is clear that 
eingenommen is being used passively and not adjectivally, and that the sense of beings actual occupying, 
of filling the site of Dasein, should be heard at least as loudly as the sense of Dasein bestowing its 
attention upon those beings. I have therefore taken the liberty of inserting a hyphen into pre-occupy, so as 
to draw attention to this occupation by beings prior to projection. To avoid confusion I shall carry this 
translation of einnehmen and eingenommen over into the 1929, '30 lecture course (The Fundamental 
Concepts of Metaphysics) where McNeill has also translated them as 'absorb' and 'absorbed'. 
I have also altered the translation of the italicised and crucial sentence, 'Transzendenz heiß WW'eltentwurrf 
so zwar, daß das Entwerfende voni Seienden, das es fiberstiegt, auch schon gestimmt durch waltet ist. ' 
McNeill translates durchivaltet by 'pervades, ' but this fails to capture the sense of walten as 'to reign' or 
'to prevail'. Gestimmt is used normally in phrases such as froh gestimmt ('in a cheerful mood') and so 
would seem to be used adverbially here to indicate the manner in which beings govern or prevail. 
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poor in world') and the essential conception of the organism given by the scientific 
projection underlying zoology? A clue is given at the end of the investigation into 
animality, when Heidegger attempts to adumbrate at least what the fundamental 
relationship to the realm of living beings might look like. It is significant. however, that 
this adumbration relies upon the very description of animality extracted from scientific 
research, which itself is supposedly only made possible by the awakening of the 
fundamental relationship thus adumbrated. 
The details of this description and the manner in which Heidegger derives it from 
contemporary developments in embryology and ecology are not too important, but some 
of the technical vocabulary accumulated along the way needs to be explained. Briefly 
then, the animal is essentially conceived of in terms of its behaviour [Benehnrenz]. This is 
not to be confused, however, with human "behaviour" or comportment towards things 
[Verhalten]. Behaviour is characterised and made possible by Benommenheit, which the 
translators render as `captivation'. But this term on its own is not very helpful. 
Heidegger is insistent that what captivation means as an essential determination of 
animality cannot be drawn from any of the normal uses of the word to denote various 
states of human confusion, benumbment, or even compulsive behaviour. Rather the 
term captivation is used to `describe the specific way in which the animal remains with 
itself [... ] this way in which the animal is preoccupied with itself [in sich 
eingenommen]. '99 Now, as we have just seen, Heidegger also characterises Dasein as 
irrgenommen, pre-occupied, but in its case pre-occupied by beings. The animal, by 
contrast, is pre-occupied with itself. But what does this mean? It means that insofar as 
the animal is essentially characterised by its behaviour, behaviour simply leads to more 
behaviour, and cannot be counted as comportment toward beings. Hic animal's 
" F(', %1_, pp. '3S-39 (trans. slightly altered, see footnote 98). 
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behaviour is a set of drives [Trieben] that interlink, and successively take each other's 
place - which is of course one of the senses of einnehmen. Behaviour is always pre- 
occupied by other behaviour and articulates itself in a self-enclosed structure of 
feedback relations that Heidegger calls a ring. This ring of instinctual drives does not, 
however, "encapsulate" the animal, closing it off entirely from the outside world and 
leaving it to its self-preoccupation. `On the contrary, the encirclement is precisely drawn 
about the animal in such a way that it opens up a sphere within which whatever 
disinhibits can do so in this or that manner. ' 100 Disinhibition is the manner in which the 
animal is related to things: `Related to other things - although these other things are not 
manifest as beings. ' 101 Things affect the animal by triggering, i. e. disinhibiting the 
capability for, its various different behaviours; and this means that the potential stimuli 
for any particular animal are rigidly determined by the structure of the ring of 
interlinking behaviours. Moreover, Heidegger irisists that the relation between stimulus 
and behaviour is characterised by a peculiar withdrawal. That which disinhibits in this 
way, and stands in relation to behaviour only insofar as it is disinhibiting, constantly 
withdraws [entzieht sich] from behaviour as it were and does so necessarily on account 
of its own manner of "showing itself'. ' 102 This withdrawal corresponds to the animal's 
self-preoccupation. The stimulus only intervenes so that one behaviour can take the 
place of another. There is no place as such within the instinctual ring for the stimulus 
itself. The animal is not to be thought of as sheltered within the ring, nor the ring as the 
animal's carefully filtered mediation with the world. Rather the animal is the ring, and 
its self-preoccupation is nothing other than the continual struggle [Ringen] to maintain 
itself as this ring of potential disinhibitions which it constantly cycles through. Thus the 
1°" FCM, p. 255. 
101 FCM, p. 254. 
'o' FCM, p. 254. 
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relations between animals, the structure of the animal kingdom, as it were, is determined 
by the peculiar characteristics of the animal ring. 
But these encircling rings belonging to the animals, within which their 
contextual behaviour and instinctual activity moves, are not simply laid down 
alongside or in between one another but rather intersect one another. The 
woodworm, for example, which bores into the bark of the oak tree is encircled 
by its own specific ring. But the woodworm itself, and that means together with 
this encircling ring of its own, finds itself in turn within the ring encircling the 
woodpecker as it looks for the worm. 103 
This intersection will clearly be characterised by the nature of the disinhibiting rings - 
that is to say self-preoccupation and withdrawal. It is here that Heidegger returns to the 
vocabulary of transposition first employed when delineating the problem of our access 
to the animal realm so as to articulate the statement of essence. `The animal realm 
demands a quite specific kind of transposedness from us and within the animal realm 
the encircling rings of captivation are transposed into one another in a peculiar and 
prevalent way. It is the fundamental trait of this transposedness that first constitutes the 
specific character of the animal realm as a realm. ' i04 Our transposedness, that 
transposedness whose questionability is expressed in the statement of essence, has now 
been linked, perhaps even identified, with a transposedness constitutive of the realm of 
animality as such. The `how' has once again been linked with the `what' - but this time 
the implication is clearly that the `what' is determinative of the `how'. Our transposition 
into the "world" of the animal is demanded, because that, i. e. transposition, is the kind 
of relation that pertains within that realm. This is what is binding - not some essential 
content uncovered once we have successfully transposed ourselves into the animal 
world, but transposition itself both as the content of that realm and as the entry into it. 
And this is precisely where we find Heidegger once again using the phrase `in the midst 
of beings, ' that first occurs in `On the Essence of Ground'. 
101 FCM, p. 277. 
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Nature does not stand there surrounding man with an abundance of objects - 
this much we can understand. Rather human Dasein is intrinsically a peculiar 
transposedness into the encompassing contextual ring of litiving beings. In this 
connection we should remember the following: it is not as if we were now on 
the same level as animals, both them and us standing over against a wall of 
beings with the same shared content, as though the animals amongst 
themselves and we amongst them simply saw the same wall of beings in 
different ways, as though we were simply dealing with manifold aspects of the 
same. No, the encircling rings amongst themselves are not remotely 
comparable, and the totality of the manifest enmeshing of encircling rings in 
each case is not simply part of the beings that are otherwise manifest for us, but 
rather holds us captive in a quite specific way. That is why we say that man 
exists in a peculiar way in the midst of beings. In the midst of beings means: 
living nature holds us ourselves captive as human beings in a quite specific 
way, not on the basis of any particular influence or impression that nature 
exerts or makes upon us, but rather from out of our essence, whether we 
experience that essence in an originary relationship or not. 105 
The model, it would seem, is this: as preoccupied by living beings, Dasein is attuned to 
their preoccupation with themselves; transposedness is, if you like, the form of this 
attunement. because transposedness is the form of relationality within this field. The 
general rule would be that attunement is not itself a kind of relation of Dasein to the 
beings which it finds itself in the midst of, but rather is a conformity of Dasein as 
relational to the relationality proper to those kinds of beings. This peculiar 
transposedness of Dasein into the mesh of rings transposed into one another is 
problematic because transposedness is itself a kind of withdrawal (each animal ring 
withdraws like any other disinhibition when transposed into another animals instinctual 
ring); projection which makes beings manifest is bound by the problem of 
transposedness. It should be remembered, however, that this model of the way that the 
statement of essence is binding for scientific projection is itself dependent upon a 
description extracted from scientific projection. Heidegger emphasises this fact himself, 
even going so far as to object that this completely undermines the idea that the statement 
of essence is in some way founding for scientific projection. 
104 FCM, p. 278. 
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Poverty in world is not the condition of possibility of captivation, but rather the 
reverse, captivation is the condition of the possibility of poverty in world. Yet 
we must further weaken even this proposition and say more appropriately: 
Captivation as the essence of animality is the condition of the possibility of a 
merely comparative definition of animality in terms of poverty in world, insofar 
as the animal is viewed from the perspective of man to whom world-formation 
belongs. Our thesis that the animal is poor in world is accordingly far from 
being a, let alone the, fundamental metaphysical principle of the essence of 
animality. ' 06 
The only thing that will stop us holding this view is remembering - remembering that 
the essential conception of animality does not stand in isolation, but was generated 
precisely by ourselves who already stood in some relation to animals long before it ever 
constituted the basis for a scientific investigation. 
For we ourselves have been in view all the time, whether we wanted to be or 
not [ ... ] 
in all our investigations [ ... 
] we enjoyed the constant possibility of 
recalling the Dasein within us as brought to light in a fundamental attunement. 
Or have we already forgotten this fundamental attunement in the meantime? 
Does it simply lie behind us like an episode, as something completely different 
that has not the slightest thing to do with unicellular living beings or the self- 
orienting behaviour of bees? 107 
But what then of founding, the founding that regional ontology is supposed to carry out 
on the self-founding of a science, if the relation between the statement of essence and 
the essential conception as laid out in scientific projection is not one of dependence, but 
rather a necessary circulation? The `gaining ground, ' the `taking up a basis, ' 
[Bodennehmen] in the midst of beings is identified in `On the Essence of Ground' as the 
second form of grounding after grounding as `establishing' [Stiften] that takes place in 
the projection of the `for the sake of which, ' that is to say in the projection of Dasein's 
own possibilities in understanding. `This "second" form of grounding does not arise 
after the "first, " but is "simultaneous" with it. ' 108 In projection upon its own 
105 FCM, p. 278. 
106 FCM, p. 271. 
107 FCM, p. 272. 
108 Ibid. 
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possibilities, Dasein always exceeds itself. But Dasein only possesses possibilities 
because it is in the midst of beings, and this `possession' is based upon a withdrawal of 
other possibilities. 
Certain other possibilities are already withdrawn from Dasein, and indeed 
merely through its own facticity. Yet precisely this withdralt'al of certain 
possibilities pertaining to its potentiality for being-in-the-world -a withdrawal 
entailed in its being pre-occupied by beings - first brings those possibilities of 
world-projection that can "actually" be seized upon toward Dasein as its world. 
Such withdrawal lends precisely the binding character of what remains 
projected before us the power to prevail within the realm of Dasein's existence. 
Corresponding to these two ways of grounding, transcendence at once exceeds 
and withdraws [ist überschwingend-entziehend]. 109 
This unity of projective outstripping - to use Malick's translation of überschwingend - 
and binding withdrawal is elsewhere characterised by Heidegger as an oscillation. 
`Temporalization is the free oscillation of the whole of primordial temporality; time 
reaches and contracts itself: '110 reaches in projection, and contracts in binding 
withdrawal. This characterisation of temporality as oscillation recurs in the 1929/30 
lecture course precisely in the final summation of the character of the fundamental 
attunement of profound boredom. `This is the one unitary phenomenon in which we, or 
rather the Dasein in us, oscillates out into the expanse of the temporal horizon of its 
temporality and thus is able only to oscillate into the moment of vision pertaining to 
essential action. This oscillating in between such expanse and such extremity is our 
being attuned, this boredom as attunement. "11 And again the expanse of the temporal 
horizon is opened by the withdrawal [Entzug] of beings, their telling refusal, which at 
the same time is a telling announcement of the moment of vision - Dasein being 
impelled beyond itself into the extremity of its possibilities. Now, how does the 
investigation into animality, inserted in the lecture course between the attempt to 
4Q4 Pathmarks, p. 129 (trans. slightly altered - see footnote 98); [The Essence of Reasons. p. II 11. 
110 MFL, p. 208. 
111 FCM, p. 151. 
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awaken a fundamental attunement and the analysis of world-projection in the as 
structure of apophantic assertion, fit into this oscillation? 
There is, according to Heidegger in `On the Essence of Ground', a third form of 
grounding, and this is precisely what he calls founding [Begründen]. 'As ways of 
grounding, then, they [the first two] give rise to a third: grounding as founding [Be- 
gründen]. In founding, the transcendence of Dasein takes charge of making the 
manifestation of beings possible, i. e. it takes charge of the possibility of ontical truth"2 
Founding is what makes intentionality, comportment toward beings, possible. But it 
should not be thought that it therefore founds an understanding of those beings in the 
- sense of proving it correct, or justifying it. Rather, Heidegger says, `Founding is that 
which makes the question "Why? " possible in the first place. ' 113 The "Why? " arises in 
the space; as it were, between the excess of possibilities in projection, and the binding 
withdrawal of attunement. `There is an excess of possibility in world-projection; the 
Why springs forth in this excess and is governed by being (reality), which itself presses 
around Dasein in its situatedness [Befindlichkeit]. " 14 Founding then does not consist in 
validating or justifying the basic concepts that underlie our access to and comprehension 
of a particular realm of beings, rather it consists in laying hold of the question that opens 
up the field. Gilles Deleuze briefly alludes to this connection between questioning and 
regional demarcation in some succinct notes on Heidegger's philosophy of difference in 
Difference and Repetition, `Ontological Difference corresponds to questioning. It is the 
being of questions, which become problems, marking out the determinant fields of 
112 The Essence of Reasons, p. 113; [Pathmarks, p. 129. ] 
"3 Ibid. 
114 The Essence of Reasons p. 115 (trans. altered) `Im Weltentwurf ist ein Überschwung von Möglichem 
gegeben, im Hinblick worauf und im Durchwaltetsein von dem in der Befindlichkeit umdrängenden 
Seienden (Wirklichen) das Warum entspringt. ' [p. 114]; Pathmarks, p. 130). 
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existence. See The Essence of Reasons. " 15 It is a question, or what I dubbed earlier, the 
persistence of a problem, which opens up a determinant field because neither projection 
nor attunement give us beings. Rather attunement always attunes us to the withdrawal of 
beings, their refusal in the face of the projection of our possibilities. Beings are 
adumbrated in the curtailment of our possibilities. They are specified not by a positive 
description of what they are, but by an admission of what they mean we cannot be. It is 
this "cannot" that constitutes attunement. Perhaps attunement is actually a form of 
dissonance - the peculiar dissonance in each case between different kinds of Being. On 
the basis of this upswing, Dasein is, in each case beyond beings, as we say, but it is 
beyond in such a way that it, first of all, experiences beings in their resistance, against 
which Dasein is powerless. ' 16 
The essential conception which is articulated in a scientific projection can only arise on 
the basis of an original solidarity with the most elementary content of the field. The 
projection. is bound by an attunement to the withdrawal of beings. But in projecting, 
science forgets the `unity that comes to light in the way in which excess and withdrawal 
become transcendentally attuned to one another. ' 117 The statement of essence expresses 
this unity as the persistence of a problem. Founding, then, holds the self-founding of 
science to account and calls for its repetition. When we see what this means in terms of 
the change-over in the understanding of Being, we will be able to answer Heidegger's 
question, `What does foundation of science mean, and to what extent is there revealed 
by it an inner limit in the essence of science? ' 118 
15 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. by Paul Patton, (London, The Athlone Press, 1994), 
p. 65. 
1 16 MFL, p. 215. 
117 `On the Essence of Ground, ' Pathngarks, p. 129. 
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The Internal Limit to Science 
On the face of it, the notion of an essential limit conflicts with the interpretation of crisis 
as repetition. The crisis in the sciences does not, or at least should not, represent a 
repetition of scientific projection, rather it represents the moment at which the sciences 
admit that they cannot found themselves, reject their own scientific projection and return 
to philosophy. But this ignores Heidegger's stipulation that the limit is an internal limit. 
After all, it is not as if beings and Being were two adjoining regions over which science 
and philosophy respectively have jurisdiction. 
Obviously, it is not a matter of a demarcation of the sort where science merely 
borders, so to speak, on something else, from which it is separated by a fence, 
i. e. it is not a fencing round which might not matter to it; rather it is a matter of 
a delimitation which its own essence directly lends to it. Science must 
necessarily take the limit to itself and give a delimitation. The limit lies in it 
itself as the other, which it is, and over which it precisely as science no longer 
has any power, but this other gives science the strength of its essence. 119 
What does this mean? The difference between beings and Beings is a matter of what 
Heidegger calls transcendence. Transcendence no longer refers to beings in themselves 
outside the realm of appearance as it does with Kant. Rather transcendence is an 
essential characteristic of Dasein's own Being. Transcendence refers to the fact that 
Dasein is already outside of itself in the world projecting itself upon possibilities. `For 
us transcendence does not mean "out towards an object, " the subject is already outside, 
and it is only outside alongside beings provided that it itself is disclosed. The being 
118 `Was heißt Grundlage der Wissenschaft, und inwiefern offenbart sich an ihr eine innere Grenze im 
Wesen der Wissenschaft? ' G27, p. 40. 
119 `Offenbar handelt es sich nicht um eine Begrenzung derart, daß die Wissenschaft gleichsam lediglich 
an etwas anderes stößt, davon sie durch einen Zaun geschieden ist, nicht um eine Umzäunung, die ihr 
gleichgültig sein kann, sondern um eine Begrenzung, die gerade als solche ihr das eigene Wesen verleiht. 
Wissenschaft muß sich selbst notwendig die Grenze nehmen und eine Begrenzung geben. Die Grenze liegt 
in ihr selbst als das andere, das sie ist und dessen sie gerade als Wissenschaft nicht mehr mächtig ist. 
Dieses andere aber gibt der Wissenschaft die Kraft ihres Wesens. ' G27, p. 211. 
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which itself is, and other beings, are already gone beyond in advance. ' 2" Dasein is 
transcendent insofar as Being is an issue for it. But this means that in projecting itself 
beyond beings towards Being, Dasein is capable of distinguishing between them. 
Transcendence is not only the inner possibility of ontological truth, and then 
indirectly also of ontical truth, but rather the condition of possibility for this 
and also, " for their hanging together, indeed for the possibility of 
distinguishing Being and beings, on the basis of which we can speak of 
ontology at all. [... ] The transcendence of Dasein is the condition of possibility 
of the ontological Difference; for the fact that the difference between Being and 
beings can break out at all, for the fact that there is this difference. 121 
But science is just the articulation of a scientific projection, an ontological projection of 
the constitution of the Being of the beings with which it concerns itself. `At this point it 
becomes clear that science is not just something with which one can also occupy oneself 
along with all the other possibilities, but rather that in order to be what it is, it must have 
struck its roots into the primordial essence of Dasein itself, into transcendence. ' 122 But 
one might object that any of Dasein's activities, scientific or not, insofar as they are only 
possible on the basis of some kind of understanding of Being, must have their roots in 
transcendence. Here, I think, we have to remember how scientific projection actually 
occurs. Scientific projection is not just one comportment among others because it is not 
simply dependent upon an understanding of Being, rather it is an explicit enactment of 
an understanding of Being that is itself dependent upon a change-over [Umschlag] in the 
understanding of Being. A change-over in the understanding of Being is a possibility of 
120 'Fur uns heißt Transzendenz nicht hinaus zu einem Objekt; das Subjekt ist schon draußen, und es ist 
nur draußen bei Seiendem, sofern es selbst erschlossen ist. Das Seiende, das es selbst ist, und anderes 
Seiendes ist im voraus schon übersteigen. ' G27, p. 208. 
121 `Die Transzendenz ist nicht nur die innere Möglichkeit für die ontologische Wahrheit und indirekt 
dann auch für die ontische, sondern gerade die Bedingung der Möglichkeit für dieses »und auch«, für 
deren Zusammenhang, ja, für die Möglichkeit des Unterscheidens von Sein und Seiendem, auf Grund 
dessen wir überhaupt von Ontologie sprechen können. [ ... 
] Die Transzendenz des Daseins ist die 
Bedingung der Möglichkeit der ontologischen Differenz, dafür, daß Unterschied von Sein und Seiendem 
überhaupt aufbrechen kann, daß es diesen Unterschied geben kann. ' G27, p. 210. 
122 `Nunmehr wird deutlich, daß die Wissenschaft nicht etwas ist, was es eben unter vielem anderen, 
womit man sich beschäftigen kann, auch gibt, sondern daß sie, um zu sein, was sie ist, ihre Wurzeln im 
ursprünglichen Wesen des Daseins selbst, in der Transzendenz, geschlagen haben muß. ' G27, p. 211. 
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transcendence as such. Moreover, insofar as scientific projection delimits a field of 
beings on the basis of an understanding of their Being, the ontological difference could 
be said to be inscribed in its very structure. This begins to explain what Heidegger 
means by an internal limit. Transcendence lies at the very heart of scientific projection. 
In so far as transcendence is the "there is" of ontological difference, this places the 
difference in the essence of science, yet at the same time differentiates transcendence 
from science. Heidegger says, `Transcending is the other over which science as such 
does not have power and which it especially needs in order to be what it can be. 
Transcending performs the delimitation of science and by this brings it precisely to 
itself 7123 
But why does science have no power over transcendence? Why does transcendence 
inhabit the essence of science as a limit? The clue lies, I think, in the centre of the 
passage already cited on page 249: `Science must necessarily take the limit to itself and 
give a delimitation. ' Transcendence, going beyond beings towards Being, is a limit 
within science because science delimits a realm of beings on its basis. Scientific 
projection proceeds on the basis of a change-over in the understanding of Being. This 
change-over is not itself under science's control. The change over from understanding 
entities as ready-to-hand to understanding them as present-at-hand, for example, does 
not occur within the field of the present-at-hand. It occurs to Dasein, and it occurs as a 
transformation of Dasein, insofar as Dasein is understanding of Being, that is to say, 
insofar as Dasein is transcendent. The change-over belongs to transcendence pure and 
simple. It is a possibility of transcendence that science must take up into itself precisely 
by enacting it. But science takes this possibility of transcendence in order to delimit a 
123 `Das Transzendieren ist das andere, dessen die Wissenschaft als solche nicht mächtig ist und dessen sie 
gerade bedarf, um zu sein, was sie sein kann. Das Transzendieren vollzieht die Begrenzung der 
Wissenschaft und bringt sie dadurch gerade zu sich selbst. ' G27, p. 212. 
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realm of beings. How does this delimitation occur? By embedding the change-over in 
the domain of beings as its foundation. Scientific projection opens up the domain of the 
present-at-hand to thematization by taking the change over as the backing of the 
domain. The change-over as such is unknown to science because it is embedded within 
the field of investigation as its foundation. 
Indeed the very researchers themselves who found a science for the first time 
and set it going - who, thus, so to speak, perform this change in the antecedent 
understanding of Being for the first time, while the others merely perform with 
it afterwards - even they have no knowledge of what has at bottom occurred 
[sich ereignet]. 124 
But why should this matter? In a sense it doesn't. There is no criticism implied. The 
point is not that science chooses to ignore the change-over in the understanding of Being 
in its eagerness to investigate beings, nor that the delimitation of the realm of beings to 
be investigated might be better executed if science were to take some notice of it. Rather 
the point Heidegger is making is that there is no other way of delimiting a realm of 
beings. 
The change in the understanding of Being presents itself to them [the scientists] 
in that form which all scientific representations have, as the delimitation of 
concepts; only it is now the most general basic concepts and representations 
which are determined: mass, force, speed, movement, place, time. With regard 
to the science in question they provide an adequate characterization of its field, 
but it remains obscure what these concepts mean at bottom; they figure just as 
the most general concepts concerning beings (Nature, for example). That which 
is meant in these concepts is itself not asked about any further. 125 
124 `Ja, selbst diejenigen Forscher, die eine Wissenschaft erstmals begründen und in Gang bringen, die also 
gleichsam erstmals diesen Wandel des vorgängigen Seinsverständnisses vollziehen - während die anderen 
ihn nur mit- und nachvollziehen -, selbst diese haben kein Wissen von dem, was sich da im Grund 
ereignet. ' G27, p. 193. 
125 'Der Wandel des Seinsverständnisses stellt sich ihnen vielmehr in derjenigen Form dar, die alle 
wissenschaftlichen Vorstellungen haben, als Umgrenzung von Begriffen; nur sind es jetzt die 
allgemeinsten Grundbegriffe und Vorstellungen, die bestimmt werden: Masse, Kraft, Geschwindigkeit, 
Bewegung, Ort, Zeit; im Hinblick auf das Feld der betreffenden Wissenschaft geben sie hinreichende 
Charakteristik derselben. Aber es bleibt dunkel, was diese Begriffe im Grunde meinen; sie figurieren eben 
als die allgemeinsten Begriffe bezüglich des Seienden (Natur, z. B. ). Dem, was in diesen Begriffen 
gemeint ist, wird selbst nicht weiter nachgefragt. ' G27, pp. 193-94. 
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We have to be very careful here. It might seem that Heidegger is proposing that the 
delimitation of the concepts is not sufficient, that what they mean remains unclear 
because they are inherently ambiguous. That they require further conceptual 
clarification. Or perhaps Heidegger is referring to the fact that these concepts are not in 
fact restricted to the individual science that adopts them as basic. After all concepts such 
as time, change, place are not the sole property of physical science. Time and change are 
fundamental to history also, but perhaps not in the same way or with the same meaning 
as in physics. What these concepts mean at bottom then would have to include all the 
possible meanings in every possible use, whether in the sciences or not. But, that the 
domain which a science investigates is only one among many, and that the concepts 
which it employs as basic (time, distance, motion in modem physics) are not limited to 
that domain, but rather are shared across all domains, that is not in itself sufficient to 
constitute an internal limit. After all if there were some way of adjudicating what was 
common and what was not to the employment of these concepts in different domains, 
then we would simply be confronted by an external demarcation that imposed no 
internal limit to the thematization of the domain. Rather the basic concepts are not just 
implicated (in each case in different ways) in each and every domain, but rather span the 
domains, and indeed as that which spans. They are implicated not just in the domains 
but in the change-over between domains. The concepts which are specific to the 
individual science take their meaning not from other concepts, but from what has taken 
place. This is what remains obscure. Heidegger tells us, that the scientists have no 
knowledge of what at bottom has occurred (sich ereignet). This is a very early 
occurrence of the semantic cluster that will later come to dominate Heidegger's thinking 
- sich ereignen, das Ereignis. The meaning of the concept of time employed in 
mathematical physics is not at bottom given by a concept of `event', a meaning which 
might rule over all the subordinate meanings of time in the various different sciences; it 
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is at bottom given by the event as such. Here we might want to say that the meaning of 
the concepts is `fulfilled' by and in the event. In other words the concepts that are basic 
to the determination of the field under investigation are themselves transformations of 
the transformation of our understanding of Being. The limit is internal because the limit 
is the foundation of the science, and the limit is constituted as the embedding of the 
passage into the field as the foundation of the field itself. This is the twist that 
`produces' the transcendental a priori. What is a priori to the transcendental a priori is 
the change-over as the concrete event of Dasein's transcendence. Concepts are, if you 
like, the after-image of the event. ' 26 
This is the internal limit. Scientific projection buries the passage into the field as its 
foundation. The internal limit of science is precisely its foundation which cuts it off 
from its source. It is this separation from its source at its very inception that necessitates 
repetition. But equally, repetition only `works' because scientific projection is at bottom 
the enactment of its source. We can say, then, provisionally at least, that what calls for 
repetition is the internal limit, because the internal limit is both the `source' of scientific 
projection within itself, and the delimitation of scientific projection from its source as it 
takes that source for its basis. 
1226 But as is well known, an after-image is always the complementary colour to the visual impression that 
produces it. The glowing red bars of the electric fire beside me become pale spring green stripes across 
the computer screen. Just so, then perhaps, the positivity which Heidegger tells us is the essential 
characteristic of science. `We have indeed now achieved an elucidation of the essence of science: it is 
positive knowledge and has the character of positivity. ' (`Zwar gelang uns jetzt eine Erhellung des Wesens 
der Wissenschaft: Sie ist positive Erkenntnis und hat den Charakter der Positivität. ' G27, p. 198. ) That 
which makes positivity possible, that which positivity embeds in the field of investigation as its other, is 
not perhaps its negation but its complement, the nothing which nihilates. `The nothing does not merely 
serve as the counterconcept of beings; rather, it originally belongs to their essential unfolding as such. In 
the being of beings the nihilation of the nothing occurs. ' (`What is Metaphysics? ', Pathmarks, p. 91 [Basic 
Writings, p. 104]. ) 
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Chapter Six 
Science and Philosophy 
In the period which we have been examining, Heidegger appears to have held 
diametrically opposed views about the possible scientificity of philosophy itself, 
summed up by two equally bald assertions: `That philosophy is scientific is implied in 
its very concept-) I `No, philosophy is not a science. '2 This apparent about-turn has been 
interpreted, if it has been noticed at all, as simply a change of mind. I want to suggest 
that these seemingly contradictory positions are in fact interconnected, and a good deal 
more complicated than is usually supposed. They are both necessary consequences of 
the existential conception of science. 
The 1927 lecture course, The Basic Problems of ' Phenomenologv, is devoted to 
demonstrating two theses: 1. ) `Philosophy is the science of being; ' and 2. ) 
`Phenomenology is the name for the method of ontology, that is, of scientific 
philosophy. '3 As Heidegger says in his introductory remarks, `A discussion of the basic 
problems of phenomenology then is tantamount to providing fundamental substantiation 
for this assertion that philosophy is the science of being and establishing how it is 
such. '` As we saw in Chapter Three, Heidegger maintains in Being and Time that 
scientific activity is based upon an initial scientific projection which makes explicit the 
understanding of the Being of the beings under investigation. The articulation and 
progressive elaboration of this projection Heidegger calls `thematization. ' And as 
' BPi', p. 1?. 
2 'Nein, Philosophie ist keine Wissenschaft. ' G27, p. 14. 
3 BPP, p. 13, p. 20. 
4 BPP, p. 1 1. 
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Heidegger starkly puts it, `Thematizing Objectifies. '' Thematizing, which is the 
progressive interpretation [Auslegung], that is to say, laying out, of the explicit 
understanding of Being achieved in scientific projection, objectifies those beings which 
have that kind of Being, but it does not objectify Being itself. That, apparently, is the 
task of philosophy: 
It is in the objectification [Vergegenständlichung] of being as such that the 
basic act constitutive of ontology as a science is performed. The essential 
feature in every science, philosophy included, is that it constitutes itself in the 
objectification of something already in some way unveiled, antecedently given. 
What is given can be a being that lies present before us, but it can also be being 
itself in the pre-ontological understanding of being. The way in which being is 
given is fundamentally different from the way beings are given, but both can 
certainly become objects [Gegenstände] .6 
In Chapter Three, we saw that the concept of objectification is to be rigorously 
distinguished from that of the present-at-hand. This is undoubtedly what authorises 
: Heidegger, in his own eyes at least, to start talking about the objectification of Being, a 
phrase that to many sounds distinctly un-Heideggerean. 7 Moreover, objectification of 
Being proceeds on the basis of exactly the same model as was sketched for the 
objectification of beings in Being and Time. `The basic act of objectification, whether of 
being or of beings - and regardless of the fundamental diversity in the two cases - has 
the function of explicitly projecting what is antecedently given upon that on which it has 
already been projected in pre-scientific experience. '8 The analogy between philosophy 
and positive science is possible because the understanding of Being as understanding 
must have the structure of projection. `If we say that being is understood in the 
Being and Time, p. 414. 
BPP, p. 281. 
7 `just as the particular sciences must objectify their entities against the horizon of their Being, so 
philosophy, if it is too to become a science, must "objectify Being itself" (! ) [... ] It is only with the "turn" 
two years later that Heidegger will undo this very un-Heideggerian way of speaking! ' Theodore Kisiel, 
The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time, (Berkley LA, London; University of California Press; 1993, 
pbk 1995), pp. 457-58. 
8 BPP, pp. 281-82. 
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existentiell understanding of the Dasein and if we note that understanding is a 
projecting, then in the understanding of being there is present a further projection: being 
is understood only as, on its own part, it is projected upon something. '9 But what is this 
something? Heidegger's answer at least has the merit of being short - time. But surely it 
merely opens the floodgates. What is time projected upon? And then that, and that, and 
so on. Heidegger is not unaware of the problem, though he does not seem keen to face 
it. He says, `We shall not now touch on the question that arises here, whether this 
recursion from one projection to the next does not open up a progresses in inf nitum. ' 10 
But even ignoring that possibility, the introduction of this new term, time, surely only 
; compounds our confusion. The thought of Being, which is not a being, is hard enough to 
cope with, one that constantly slips back into the very thinking it is supposed to guard 
against. But now on top of that, before that problem has even been properly cleared up, 
indeed supposedly to clear it up, time is thrown in as well - time, which certainly is not 
itself a being, just like Being, but equally well cannot be Being either, since Being is 
projected upon it, so that in some peculiar sense time is a priori to Being even. Time, 
which is not a being, nor Being either, seems to open a whole new wealth of differences. 
Is the difference between time and beings itself different from the ontological difference 
between Being and beings. What of the difference between time and Being itself - does 
this difference stand behind the ontological difference, as some even more profound 
difference? 
The difference between beings and Being is clearly crucial to the whole project of Being 
and Time, and is even alluded to in its opening pages, but the actual term `ontological 
BPP, p. 280. 
10 BPP, p. 280. 
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difference' is never used and the difference is never explicitly reflected upon. I' Indeed, 
it is only in the 1927 lecture course, as its editor, Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, 
points out in his epilogue, that the term makes its first public appearance. I` And it 
makes its appearance precisely as that which makes the objectification of Being 
possible: `we call the distinction between being and beings, when it is carried out 
explicitly, the ontological difference [die ontologische Differenz]. The explicit 
accomplishment and the development of the ontological difference is [... ] a basic 
comportment of the Dasein in which ontology, that is, philosophy, constitutes itself as a 
science. ' 13 And as if to leave no room for doubt, Heidegger goes on to say a few pages 
. 
later, `Our question [i. e. the question of ontological difference] aims at the 
objectification of being as such, at the second essential possibility of objectification, in 
which philosophy is [soll] 
to constitute itself as science. '14 What then is the connection 
between ontological difference, whose explicit accomplishment constitutes philosophy 
as a science, and time as that which Being is projected upon? 
It is important at this point to realise that Heidegger does not simply conjure time out of 
thin air. His confidence in the answer rests upon the outcome of the full existential 
analytic of Dasein, the demonstration that the Being of Dasein is inherently temporal, 
that existence is made possible by, and in fact makes itself possible as, temporality 
temporalizing itself. Time, in all its distinct modes, is the result of this temporalizing. 
But now we remember that the distinction between Beings and beings `belongs to 
11 "`Being" cannot indeed be conceived as an entity; [... ] nor can it acquire such a character as to have the 
term "entity" applied to it. ' (Being and Time, p. 23. ) 
12 `At the same time, the course contains the first public communication of the "ontological difference. "' 
(BPP, p. 332. ) 
13 BPP, p. 319. 
14 BPP, p. 322. Albert Hofstadter translates soll by `is supposed to. ' But this has the connotation 
nowadays of `only allegedly, ' whereas I read the soll as expressing obligation. 
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existence. Existence means, as it were, "to be in the performance of this distinction. " b 
Time, then, is in a sense nothing other than the ontological difference. Being is not 
projected upon something else at all, but only upon its difference from beings, a 
difference that is itself only opened up as projection. This is why the projection of Being 
upon time does not in fact open up an infinite regress of projections. 
But where is the final stage of this demand for ever further precursory 
conditions? It is temporality itself as the basic constitution of Dasein. 
Temporality, due to its horizonal-ecstatic nature, makes possible at once 
[zugleich] the understanding of being and comportment toward beings; 
therefore, that which does the enabling as well as the enablings themselves, that 
is the possibilities in the Kantian sense, are "temporal"16 
Temporality makes possible the understanding of Being, which itself is the possibility of 
any kind of comportment towards beings, i. e. any human possibility at all. Temporality 
makes possible possibility. It is if you like the possibility of possibility, therefore the 
possibility of itself. It is, as Heidegger says, the absolute earliest. The: eis no getting 
back behind, beyond, or before it. But this does not mean that temporality is an ultimate 
background. `Temporality is the primordial "outside of itself " in and for itself. ' 17 
Temporality is, if you like, the structure of Dasein's transcendence. 
All well and good. But this still leaves us only being able to say in a purely formal way 
that objectification of Being consists of making explicit the projection of Being upon 
time implicit in the understanding of Being. Does this say anything about the possibility 
of ontology as a science. Not really. After all, we have already seen that what is 
distinctive about science as science is not so much the projection of something upon 
something, but the fact that that projection is made explicit. It is this making explicit 
that is decisive for a science. Do we have any indication of how ontology might make 
15 BPP, p. 319. 
16 BPP, p. 325. 
'7 Being and Time, p. 377. 
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the projection of Being upon time explicit? In the case of positive science, it is the 
change over [Umschlag] in our understanding of Being that allows at the same time the 
encounter with beings and the scientific projection of their Being. As we saw in Chapter 
Three, scientific projection amounts to the explicit enactment of the change-over in our 
understanding of Being. Scientific projection awaits or anticipates, the distinction 
between authenticity and inauthenticity becomes unsustainable here, solely the specific 
discoveredness of the entities in question. As such science is unconcealment for the sake 
of unconcealment. But as we saw in Chapter Five scientific projection conceals the 
change-over as change over by embedding it within the field of investigation as its 
conceptual delimitation. This simultaneous reliance and concealment generates the 
permanent possibility of crisis that necessitates repetition (Chapter Four). Is there 
something similar at work in ontology? Does ontology as the science of Being rely upon 
an analogue to the change-over in our understanding of Being at the level of 
temporality? 
One thing seems to be clear. In Being and Time Heidegger envisaged the move from the 
question of the Being of Dasein to the question of Being in general as turning upon the 
seemingly insignificant distinction between temporality [zeitlichkeit] and Temporality 
[Temporalität]. 18 In The Basic Problems of Phenomenology Heidegger attempts to 
perform this move, which is why he flags the lecture course as `A new elaboration of 
division 3 part 1 of Being and Time. ' 19 The structure of temporality is not just ecstatic, 
but also horizonal. `Ecstases are not simply raptures in which one gets carried away. 
18 `Here, in the dimension of the interpretation of being via time, we are purposely making use of Latinate 
expressions for all the determinations of time, in order to keep them distinct in the terminology itself 
from 
the time-determinations of temporality in the previously described sense. [... ] If the difference in names is 
to be justified the two phenomena, the present and the praesens, should not mean the same thing. ' (BPP, p. 
305. ) But it is precisely the articulation of this difference which Heidegger finds it impossible to make in 
any clear, intelligible, or indeed productive way. In the end, it appears that the difference consists merely 
in the insistence that there must be a difference, else there could be no understanding of Being. But that 
would appear to be merely wish-fulfilment. 
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Rather, there belongs to each ecstasis a `whither' to which one is carried aw ay. This 
"whither" of the ecstases we call the "horizonal schema". '20 These honzonal schema, 
Heidegger tells us, constitute the existential-temporal conditions of possibility for 
anything like world. Temporality [Temporalit it] refers to temporality vie, tived from its 
horizonal, rather than its ecstatic side, as it were: `Temporality, is tempomlity tit'ith 
regard to the unity of the horizonal schemata belonging to 1 t. '21 The objectification of 
Being consists in making explicit the Temporal horizons upon which it is projected, 
which is why Heidegger also calls ontology Temporal science. 
It has to be admitted that this recourse to a terminology of temporality and Temporality 
has not impressed many commentators. William Blattner, for example, has commented 
coldly on Heidegger's attempt to analyse the praesensial horizon that accompanies the 
ecstasis of enpresenting, `The material in this chapter names but does not develop an 
account of presence as the horizonal schema of enpresenting. '22 Theodore Kisiel simply 
sees it as a regrettable mistake: `The bold claims induced by the spell of Kantian 
transcendental philosophy apparently lead Heidegger to believe that something like a 
Kantian schematism of human existence is capable of definitively articulating the 
evasive immediacy of the human situation, that is, of "saying the unsayable. "'`3 The 
difficulty that Heidegger encounters is that he cannot find anything to say about 
Temporality as such, which does not simply reproduce what he has already had to say 
about temporality. This becomes very clear, as Blattner noted, when Heidegger attempts 
to articulate the Temporal horizon of the ready-to-hand in terms of Pruesen:. 
19 BPP, fi. 1, p. 1. 
20 Beim, and Tinge, p. 416. 
BP P, p. 
William D. Blattner, Heidegger's Temporal Idealism, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 1999), 
p. ? 61. lie sums up Heidegger's whole attempt at Temporal science thus: `I shall deny that Basic 
Problems even vaguely sheds any light on either the ontological framework of being in general or the 
Hinre limited framework of the occurrent in the widest sense. ' Ibid, p. 254. 
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`Handiness formally implies praesens, presence, but a praesens of a peculiar sort. The 
primarily praesensial schema belonging to handiness as a specific mode of being 
requires a more particular determination with regard to its praesensial content. '24 The 
problem is that the horizonal schema of an ecstasis is determined by the ecstasis itself: 
`each ecstasis as such has a horizon that is determined by it and that first of all 
completes that ecstasis' own structure. '25 There seems, therefore, to be nowhere else to 
go to look for the `wealth of complex structures' that must be implicit in the Temporal 
horizon if the full manifold of Being is to get Temporal backing except the ecstasis. But 
the ecstatic structure of temporality would appear to be only capable of distinguishing 
three horizons for the understanding of Being, one of which is already praesens, so 
whence the wealth of complex structures within praesens? The switch over from 
temporal. to Temporal analysis does not appear to amount to anything like an Umschlag, 
because there turns out to be no intelligible difference between Temporality and 
temporality. 
At this point, Heidegger seems to admit to his bafflement while simultaneously skirting 
the issue. `Since, without complete mastery of the phenomenological method and above 
all without security of procedure in this problem area, the understanding of the 
Temporal interpretation continually runs into difficulties, let us try to procure indirectly 
at least an idea of how a wealth of complex structures is implicit in the content of the 
praesens belonging to handiness. '26 But turning to the question of the wealth of complex 
structures implicit in the praesens belonging to handiness, precisely avoids the question 
23 Theodore Kisiel, The Genesis of Being and Time, p. 457. 
'° BPP, p. 309. 
25 BPP, p. 306. 
26 BPP, p. 309. 
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of why there should be a praesens that belongs to handiness in the first place rather than 
simply praesens as such. 
However, buried within what seems like nothing more than a rehash of an analysis of 
the ready-to-hand that Heidegger has already gone through many times before, there is 
some evidence, I think, that something rather more interesting is going on. Heidegger 
attempts to analyse the presence of the ready-to-hand by way of its absence. `Everything 
positive becomes particularly clear when seen from the side of the privative. We cannot 
now pursue the reasons why that is so. Incidentally speaking, they lie equally in the 
nature of temporality and in that of the negation rooted in it. '27 The absence of the 
" ready-to-hand is not a pure absence, but rather an absence specific to the kind of 
presence belonging to the ready-to-hand. Something ready-to-hand can be missing, for 
example, in a way that something merely present-at-hand cannot. The rock buried some 
hundreds of feet beneath the ground is not missing in the way that the pen which was 
here beside me a few moments ago has gone missing. But the pen is only missing 
because what I was doing with it, now waits upon finding it again. Moreover the 
potential presence-at-hand of the pen is implicit in my attempts to find it. It is only if I 
stop looking for it in its proper place within the context of equipment, and instead admit 
to myself that it could in fact be anywhere that I stand any chance of finding it. This 
suggests that the absence of the ready-to-hand ties the praesensial horizon of readiness- 
to-hand both to the prasensial horizons of other kinds of Being and to the horizons of 
the ecstases of the futural and the having-been. The first tie suggests that the `wealth of 
complex structures' contained within the specific horizon of a particular mode of Being 
reflect monadically, as it were, the structural relations between the horizons of different 
kinds of Being, thus justifying perhaps Heidegger's recourse to the internal structure of 
27 BPP, p. 309. 
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the praesens of the ready-to-hand. But the second tie suggests that the honzonal schema 
are not determined by the ecstasis to which they belong, but rather by the interplay of all 
three ecstases in the three-fold unity of temporality. If the horizonal schema belonging 
to an ecstasis is in fact an `effect' of the interplay of all three ecstases, then the unity of 
the ecstases means something like the full participation of each in the structure of just 
one. That is to say an ecstasis already has the 3-fold structure of temporality as such - it 
is this self-embedding structure of what is inherently self-unfolding that leads to 
dispersal and manifold diversification. It is here, in the configuration of temporality as a 
whole, that there is perhaps room for something like the change-over which underlies 
. 
the positive sciences. 
This re-embedding of the three-fold structure of temporality within the two-fold 
structure of horizonal ecstasis is precisely what we have seen Heidegger struggling to 
achieve in The Essence of Reasons and The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic. The 
description of the various modes of grounding in The Essence of Reasons does not 
simply `ground' the notion of ground in temporality, thus appropriating one more item 
out of the philosophical heritage for the existential analytic, it refounds the notion of 
temporality. The description of ground given in The Essence of Reasons and the 
redescription of temporality given in The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, which 
stresses the way that the relation between thrownness and projection is oscillatory, taken 
together provide a more detailed picture of ecstasis as such. The picture of ecstasis given 
in Being and Time is taken solely from projection; temporality is ecstatic because it is 
projective. `The phenomenon of projection contains two things. First that upon which 
the Dasein projects itself is a can-be of its own self. [... ) Secondly, this projection upon 
something is always a projecting of.... '28 This projective character is then simply thrust 
28 BPP, p. 277. 
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upon the two other ecstases, even though they are quite simply not projection. This 
means that the original picture of temporality illicitly understands the whole of Dasein 
in terms of understanding - the violence done thereby should be clear. Suddenly all the 
work done of painstakingly separating out the manifold nature of disclosure is lost, and 
all disclosure becomes akin at least to projective understanding. The new picture undoes 
the harm by attempting to enfold the full structure of the Being of Dasein, that is to say 
falling thrown-projection, back into the notion of ecstasis as such, so that temporality 
cannot be confused with one element of it, i. e. projection. Ecstasis as such is now 
conceived of as the going ahead of itself back to itself that opens the horizon. But this in 
turn, means that projection itself is no longer thought of as bivalent as Heidegger 
laconically admits when at the end of The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics he 
says, `We can comprehend the primordial structure of the fundamental occurrence w )d 
its tripartite character as prcjzctior. -29 
This effort is directly linked, as is shown by The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, 
to Heidegger's determination to push the existential analysis of science to its 
foundations, to understand how scientific projection is bound by original solidarity to 
the most elementary content of the field itself, and how the conceptual delimitation of 
the field is related to the essential questioning that opens it up. The transformation of the 
structure of projection, which apparently marks the abandonment of the claim to 
scientific philosophy, is achieved by pushing the existential account of science to the 
limit. But the existential account of science can only be pushed to the limit by thinking 
through the horizonal structure of Temporality, that is to say, by trying to do Temporal 
science. 
-0- 
29 FCM, p. 362. 
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When in 1928 Heidegger says `No, philosophy is not a science, ' he does so at the 
beginning of bewildering series of analogies which he advances only so as then to 
withdraw them. His purpose, I think, is to adumbrate the structure of the relation 
between philosophy and science that I have just tried to sketch. He starts by making sure 
that we have no idea of what to make of the assertion. 
Is philosophy therefore inherently unscientific? Does it belong in the university 
at all? Are those who, imitating Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, maintain that so- 
called university philosophy is an extremely questionable idea, right after all" 
Yes and no. Was the effort of modern philosophy from Descartes through Kant 
and Hegel up to Husserl to raise philosophy to the rank of science not only 
futile then, but completely wrong headed? Yes and no. Is the title "scientific 
philosophy" then as meaningless as the concept "wooden iron"? Yes and no. 30 
'The statement that philosophy is not a science is equivalent to the statement that the 
animal is poor in world. It is ambiguous and unpacks itself in a bewildering shuttling 
back and forth. That philosophy is at the same time a science and not a science is 
something like the statement of essence regarding philosophy. The oxymoron "wooden 
iron" does not capture the peculiar relation between science and philosophy at all. 
Heidegger tells us, `the description "roundish circle" corresponds far better to the phrase 
"scientific philosophy. "' 31 The adjective `roundish' does and yet does not apply to a 
circle. It does not because a circle is after all not roundish, i. e. approximately round, but 
round as such, and yet for this very reason a circle can be said to exemplify the adjective 
more perfectly than any other shape. `Correspondingly in the expression "scientific 
philosophy" something is granted to philosophy that does not befit it - it is never merely 
30 `Ist also Philosophie von Hause aus unwissenschaftlich, gehört sie nicht in der Universität, also haben 
diejenigen recht, die in Nachahmung von Schopenhauer und Nietzsche die sogenannte 
»Universitätsphilosophie« für ein höchst fragwürdiges Gebilde halten? Ja und nein. Ist dann die 
Bemühung der neuzeitlichen Philosophie von Descartes über Kant und Hegel bis zu Husserl, die 
Philosophie zum Range einer Wissenschaft zu erheben, nicht nur vergeblich, sondern von Grund aus in 
ihrer Absicht irrig? Ja und nein. Ist denn der Titel »wissenschaftliche Philosophie« so widersinnig wie der 
Begriff »hölzernes Eisen«? Jan und nein. ' G27, p. 14. 
`Weit besser entspricht dem Ausdruck »wissenschaftliche Philosophie« die Bezeichnung »rundlicher 
Kreis«. ' G27, p. 16. 
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a science; but at the same time something is granted to it, which it already has in a 
primordial sense: it is more primordial than any science, because all science is rooted in 
philosophy, and first arises out of it. '32 
But, no sooner has Heidegger introduced the analogy of the roundish circle than he is 
warning against it, precisely because it could mislead one into thinking that philosophy 
was after all, at least in some exalted sense, a science. The very inadequacy of the 
adjective `roundish' means that the circle is its purest exemplar, the most `roundish' of 
things. `Correspondingly science has a deficient similarity to philosophy, thus 
philosophy is the purest and first science. This is the most disastrous error, which the 
" comparison above could also sponsor. Because philosophy simply is not science, not 
even the purest and most rigorous; it is not even something like the most rigorous 
science with knobs on. We can only say: What science for its part is, lies in philosophy 
in an original sense. Philosophy is indeed the origin of science, but precisely therefore 
not science, not even Ur-science. X33 Which would seem to lead us back to `wooden 
iron. ' We are going round in circles, but this circling does not undo the analogy, rather it 
seems to square it. The `roundish circle' provides us with an example of simultaneous 
redundancy and inadequacy. As Heidegger says: `To say of the circle that it is roundish 
is superfluous and inadequate at the same time. That the circle is not roundish, this not- 
32 `Entsprechend wird in dem Ausdruck »wissenschaftliche Philosophie« der Philosophie etwas 
zugesprochen, was ihr nicht zukommt - sie ist nie lediglich eine Wissenschaft; zugleich wird ihr aber 
etwas zugesprochen, was sie in einem ursprünglichen Sinne schon hat: sie ist ursprünglicher als jede 
Wissenschaft, weil alle Wissenschaft in der Philosophie verwurzelt ist, aus ihr erst entspringt. ' G27, p. 17. 
33 'Entsprechend ist Wissenschaft eine mangelhafte Angleichung an Philosophie, diese also die reinste und 
erste Wissenschaft. Hier ist die Stelle der verhängnisvollsten Irrturner, die auch der genannte Vergleich 
unterstützen könnte. Denn die Philosophie ist eben nicht Wissenschaft, auch nicht die reinste und 
strengste; sie ist aber auch nicht etwa strengste Wissenschaft und noch etwas dazu und darüber hinaus. 
Wir können nur sagen: Was die Wissenschaft an ihrem Teil ist, das liegt in der Philosophie in einem 
ursprünglichen Sinne. Philosophie ist zwar Ursprung der Wissenschaft, aber gerade deshalb nicht 
Wissenschaft, - auch nicht Ur-wissenschaft. ' (G27, p. 18. ) 
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being-able-to-be-roundish is not incapability, but rather over-capability. ''' Yet the 
analogy is itself inadequate. Heidegger says literally that it limps (hinkt). 3' The analogy 
is inadequate because the way in which the adjective "roundish" does not do justice to 
the circle is not the way in which the adjective "scientific" does not do justice to 
philosophy. A circle is more round than any roundish thing, but philosophy and science 
are not things that can be compared because philosophy inhabits science as its source. 
It is now a question of working out this existential concept of science in order 
through the working out of the concept of science to push up against a limit 
within science itself, in order to see concretely that science, precisely to be 
what it can be in accordance with its essence, must already be something more, 
something other and more primordial. This other turns out to be philosophy. 
Thus, as has already been emphasised, we do not compare science and 
philosophy as solid achievements, but rather in and through the interpretation 
of the essence of science we push on into philosophy. 36 
Philosophy cannot be entered into except by pushing up against the limit internal to 
science itself. The limit must not be passed througli so as to enter a realm on the other 
side, rather philosophy must show original solidarity with the limit, must grow into the 
limit, become one with it so that it becomes apparent that it has been joined to the limit 
since birth. Philosophy must become limited to become what it can be. Philosophy must 
be inadequate to itself to enact itself. It is this not coming up to itself that is enacted by 
pushing through science to the limit. The difference between philosophy and science 
does not consist of the fact that science is on one side of the limit and philosophy on the 
other, rather the difference consists solely in the way, so to speak, one inhabits the limit. 
30 `Vom Kreis auszusagen, er sei rundlich, ist überflüssig und angemessen zugleich. Daß der Kreis nicht 
rundlich ist, dieses Nicht-rundlich-sein-können ist nicht Unvermögen, sondern Übervermögen: er vermag 
wesenhaft mehr zu sein. ' (G27, p. 17. ) 
35 `Aber so einleuchtend dieser Vergleich sein mag, auch er hinkt und gibt zu einem gefährlichen 
Mißverständnis Anlaß, das wir gleich zu Anfang beseitigen müssen. ' (Ibid. ) 
36 'Es gilt jetzt, diesen existenzialen Begriff der Wissenschaft auszuarbeiten, um durch die Ausarbeitung 
des Begriffes der Wissenschaft in dieser selbst an eine Grenze zu stoßen, um konkret zu sehen, daß die 
Wissenschaft gerade, um das zu sein, was sie ihrem Wesen nach sein kann, schon und noch etwas mehr, 
etwas anderes und Ursprünglicheres sein muß. Diese andere weist sich als Philosophie aus. Wir 
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Once philosophy is separated from science it is the same as science, the science of 
Beings as opposed to the science of beings. The only way to maintain the essential 
difference between philosophy and science is to keep philosophy buried inside science 
as its internal limit - philosophy is not the science of the internal limit, that is to say, the 
bringing to light of the internal limit through an objectification, it is rather submission to 
the limit and as such enactment of the limit. But such submission involves at the same 
time projection, and this projection is projection to the limit. 
That Heidegger never relinquished the idea that philosophy or thinking might be entered 
into by pushing up against the internal limit constituting science is indicated by the 
- following quote from his late essay `Science and Reflection': `We will respond to the 
claim from afar [... ] when we begin to reflect by venturing onto the way already taken 
by the state of affairs [Sachverhalt] which shows itself to us in the essence of science - 
though not only there. '37 
-0- 
Hubert Dreyfus points out that Husserl had already upon his first reading of Being and 
Time identified a contradiction between the account of theoretical activity given therein 
and the claim also made therein that the existential analytic - hermeneutic 
phenomenology - is itself a theoretical analysis. 
38 `Heidegger seems to imply that his 
fundamental ontology in Being and Time will be a full clarification of the understanding 
of being, and even a science of being as such. This idea conflicts with the 
vergleichen also nicht, wie schon betont, Wissenschaft und Philosophie als feste Größen, sondern in der 
und durch die Wesensinterpretation der Wissenschaft stoßen wir auf die Philosophie. ' (G27, pp. 157-58. ) 
37 Martin Heidegger, `Science and Reflection, ' The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays. 
trans. by William Lovitt (New York, Harper and Row, 1977), p. 181. 
38 It might look as if Heidegger's account of thematizing as objectifying puts his whole project in 
jeopardy, in that his "thematizing analysis of being-in" ([Being and Time, p. ] 169) would have to objectify 
Dasein. Husserl actually made this objection when reading Being and Time. ' (Dreyfus, Being-in-the- 
World, p. 82. ) 
-269- 
presuppositions of hermeneutics. Likewise, as we shall see, Heidegger's claim that 
ontology is a "theoretical inquiry" ([Being and Time, p. ] 32) conflicts with this account 
of theory. '39 This leads Dreyfus to conclude that when Heidegger speaks of the 
existential analytic as theoretical, or of phenomenology as kind of thematization, he 
cannot be using these terms as he himself defines them. `Heidegger must mean to 
distinguish his involved thematic analysis of existence [... ] from the detached, 
objectifying thernatization characteristic of any discipline from physics to factual 
history. ')40 But those who are convinced that Heidegger cannot have meant what he said, 
fail to enter upon the path he took, while those who feel vindicated that he failed stand 
at its end without having been along it. What they miss out on is the path itself. 
Whatever may be the case about the failure or the necessity (or both) of the analogy 
between philosophy and science Heidegger's attempt to get into philosophy by pushing 
the analysis of science to Its limit leaves us as rich a store of insights and unearthings as 
any of his later attempts to push on into thinking. Perhaps that is all that can be asked of 
an attempt. Certainly it would be a shame to forget it. 
39 Tbid, p. 39. 
40 mid, p. 83. 
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